Class 234.7E Book D271E v.1
General Theological Seminary Library
Ninth Ave. and 20th St., New York.
*Besides the main topic this book also treats of*

| *Subject No.* | *On page* | *Subject No.* | *On page* |
|---|---|---|---|

# BISHOP DAVENANT

ON

# JUSTIFICATION,

&c., &c.

GENTHEO. SEMINARY
LIBRARY
NEW YORK



Engraved by T. Garner, from a Family Picture, in the possession of the Translator.

JOHN DAVENANT,

Bishop of Salisbury, Died April 20th. 1641.

LONDON,

Published for the Proprietor by Hamilton, Adams & Co. 1844.

GEN. THEOL. SEM. OF THE PROT. EPIS. CH.

A

# TREATISE ON JUSTIFICATION,

OR THE

# DISPUTATIO DE JUSTITIA HABITUALI ET ACTUALI,

OF

## THE RIGHT REV. JOHN DAVENANT, D.D.,

BISHOP OF SALISBURY,

AND LADY MARGARET'S PROFESSOR, CAMBRIDGE;

DELIVERED TO THE DIVINITY STUDENTS IN THAT UNIVERSITY;

PUBLISHED FIRST IN THE YEAR 1631,

AND NOW TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL LATIN,

TOGETHER WITH

TRANSLATIONS OF THE "DETERMINATIONES"

OF THE SAME PRELATE:

BY THE

REV. JOSIAH ALLPORT,

P. C. OF ST. JAMES'S, BIRMINGHAM.

*Our Righteousness (if we have any) is of little value; it is sincere, perhaps, but not pure; unless we believe ourselves to be better than our fathers, who no less truly than humbly said,* All our righteousnesses are as filthy rags. *For how can that righteousness be pure, which cannot yet be free from imperfection?*
BERNARD. *Serm.* 5 *de Verbis Esaiæ Prophetæ*, vi., 1, 2.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO.;

CURRY AND CO., DUBLIN;

RAGG AND CO., BIRMINGHAM.

1844.

GEN. THEOL. SEMINARY LIBRARY NEW YORK

5856

234.7E
D271E

GEN. THEO. SEMINARY
LIBRARY
NEW YORK

TO THE

# RIGHT REV. ROBERT,

## LORD BISHOP OF CASHEL, WATERFORD,

&c. &c.

My Lord,

If any good should accrue to the Church from the publication of the following treatise in the dress in which it here appears, the Church, and the Public (who will share in the benefit) ought to know to whom, under God, both are specially obliged.

Induced by your Lordship's kind importunity, followed up, as it was, by a generous encouragement rarely experienced by writers; after some years of hesitation and delay, I have resumed the work of putting Bishop Davenant's learned writings into our own language, and desire gratefully to acknowledge the obligation which has enabled me to indulge a heartfelt wish, to aim at serving the Church, by recalling attention to this treatise first, though not the next in order, of the venerated Prelate's productions.

And now, in dedicating the volumes to you, my Lord, as a token of respect, esteem, and gratitude, where each of those sentiments is so justly due, I fervently pray the Great Head of the Church, that

under His gracious blessing, you may find *all* the good result from your sacrifice and my labour, which you have desired, and may be long spared to enjoy much of the fruit of it.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most humble,

And devoted faithful Servant,

JOSIAH ALLPORT.

Birmingham, July, 1844.

# TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

The doctrine of Justification is of prime importance in the Christian system; since the clear apprehension of it lies at the bottom of all proper conceptions of the God with whom we have to do, and is therefore essential to the peace and comfort of the soul of man. In a more expansive view still, the due maintenance of it with fidelity of adherence, has been pronounced by the voice of warning, of which history has abundantly developed the truth, as "the mark of a standing or a falling Church." Hence the full and explicit exposition of the doctrine and its disentanglement from all erroneous and mistaken exhibitions, by those who are appointed to minister in the word and doctrine, is of vital consequence.

Prepossessed on these grounds in favour of the writings of Bishop Davenant years ago, and that prepossession wrought into a conviction, in the Translator's mind, of th[illegible] superiority to most others in the above respects, by [illegible] tion on the *Expositio ad Colossenses;* and receiv[illegible] subsequent testimonies to satisfy him that hi[illegible] was well founded, his wish had long been to re[illegible] given, after a short respite from his formo[illegible] proceed with the publication of Davenant'[illegible] vernacular tongue. Latterly his desires [illegible] revived, and even a degree of anxiety e[illegible] engage in the undertaking, by the re[illegible] mination of heterodox notions, on t[illegible] racter of his Church as a reposito[illegible] the extensive spread of dogmas [illegible] faith, and the peace of the Ch[illegible]

must be roused by the efforts making to obscure that doctrine, and revive those cumbrous ceremonies which have ever been the subjects of controversy between us and Rome; and whereby, as has been well and truly expressed, "the glory of Christ is extinguished, religion abolished, the Church destroyed, and the hope of salvation utterly overthrown?"

While the rashness and unfaithfulness of "the Sect" now happily "everywhere spoken against," and which has excited astonishment, by the injuries they have wantonly inflicted on their own Church for the exaltation of the "Mother of harlots and of all abominations,"—"treacherous dealing" that must render them objects of wonder for ages to come; —who that knew with what perspicuity and fulness the distinguishing doctrine of Protestantism and of the Church of England is held forth; with what richness of matter, powerful reasoning, and beauty of illustration it is defended in the writings of Bishop Davenant, and especially in the present elaborate treatise, but would be inflamed with zeal to bring it before the Church in the living language of *our* times; in the hope that, embodying the Truth as it does, it would meet with that acceptance with which his writings were universally received in their Author's own age, and tend to coun- the evil of proceedings we have so sadly to deplore?

such musings and feelings the Translator would at undertaken the work here placed before the pub- ous duties on the one hand, in a sphere abound- ting interruptions, and demanding almost un- on and toil; together with circumscribed ssing difficulties amidst pecuniary straits nted obstacles which seemed insurmount- n to engage in such an arduous—such a nd, body, and estate, was constantly *usta domi*, till about eighteen months was brought under serious consider- very influential quarter; and a few the writer in a way, and enforced

by reasons, which could not be resisted. Encouragement to such an extent was afforded, so soon as his readiness to embark in the work was signified, and so multiplied, from various quarters, as to make it evident where the path of duty lay. No difficulties or risks could then be regarded for one moment: and in pursuing his course with the ardour of a mind persuaded by a variety of collateral evidences, of what the Lord would have him to do, the Translator has been stimulated in no small degree, by the observation of a distinguished Prelate, that the work, if brought within easy access to candidates for Holy Orders, would "induce them to read deeply, and lead them to think correctly," on the all-important subject of Justification discussed in the following production.

That this work of Davenant is pre-eminently adapted for the purposes alluded to, no other testimony need be adduced than one of Bishop Bull, who, however differing from Davenant with regard to the *grounds* of their doctrine, has passed, in the following judgment, the highest eulogium upon this treatise for sterling worth, scholastic ability, and practical soundness. Thus, says he, on drawing to a close of his own discussion of the subject, in his *Harmonia*,—"As a conclu-
"sion to this undertaking, I will subjoin a remarkable testi-
"mony of a man of most extensive learning, and a most
"worthy Prelate of the Anglican Church, who well knew
"and faithfully maintained the sound and orthodox doctrine
"of our Church in this controversy, and who, in short, most
"successfully, if ever man did, exposed the subtleties and
"devices of Bellarmine, and of others of the Popish party;
"I mean the great Davenant, Bishop of Salisbury, who in
"his most learned Disputations concerning actual and im-
"puted righteousness, cap. 31, thus explains and confirms,
"in two short, but indeed most lucid theses, all the state-
"ments made in these Dissertations concerning the neces-
"sity of good works."—Bishop Bull's *Harmonia Apostolica, Disp. II., cap. xviii., sec.* 10.

It may be asked, with such testimonies to the value and importance of Bishop Davenant's writings as were adduced on a former occasion,* and the opinion of Bishop Bull,—how has it happened that his works have been so little known among us, and not brought before the Church at large till now?

The comparative oblivion into which the works of Bishop Davenant had fallen, notwithstanding the high estimation in which they were formerly held, must be imputed to the language in which they are composed; for certainly rich as is our Church in Theologians, she has none, perhaps, who in the union of acute and correct argument, solid judgment, Scriptural depth, and profound Patristic and Scholastic erudition, are to be named with him. It may therefore be doubted, if the following work had existed in the vernacular tongue, whether Bishop Bull would have ventured, by the publication of his *Harmonia Apostolica*, to re-introduce into the English Church that exploded and unscriptural view of Justification, which had been the fountain, as it is still the mainstay, of the mass of Romish and kindred error; and which our Reformers in the authorised decisions of the Church, and in their private writings, had so plainly and deliberately renounced. The authority of Bishop Bull, established permanently by his eminent defence of the Anti-Nicene Faith on the Divinity of Christ, gave, in a cold and formal era, a currency to his *Harmonia*, to which, as an exponent of Scriptural truth and Church doctrine, it is in no respect whatever entitled; but "from the publication of which," to use the language of a very learned and able Theologian of the present day, "may be dated a gradual lowering of the Theology of the Church of England.†

Mr. Newman's recent work on Justification is intended as

* In the writer's Life of Davenant, prefixed to his Translation of the *Expositio ad Colossenses*.

† Professor Garbett's *Bampton Lectures*. The fourth of the series contains a most searching and powerful statement of the whole controversy.

an elaborate *vindication* of the view solemnly repudiated by the Church of England, but maintained by Bishop Bull; and though the thorough Protestantism, in other respects, of that learned Prelate, would have revolted from the fabric which Mr. Newman has laboured to revive upon this old foundation, still the tendency of the doctrine is obvious, from the facility with which it harmonises with tenets and practices, conformable in spirit at least, with the worst corruptions of the Church of Rome; from which the antagonist doctrine was the main impulse of secession.

By each of the above writers the power of Davenant's Treatise, as amongst the most formidable to be assailed, is felt and acknowledged. The testimony which Bishop Bull has borne to the "great" writer whose views it was his object to subvert, we have just placed before the reader. With the veneration due to Bishop Bull on account of his former services in the cause of Christian truth, it is painful to ask, how he could with candour pretend a sympathy of view with a book so diametrically opposed to his own, the opposition between which is ingenuously owned. Mr. Newman, sustaining Bull's view, scarcely refers to any other opponent among the English Divines, than Davenant; but whilst he labours in the unseemly and ineffectual task of upholding the Roman Champion, Cardinal Bellarmine, against the powerful attacks of the learned defender of the doctrine of his own Church, he is compelled to bow to his talent, and acknowledge that the work he would disparage "abounds with noble passages."

How far the Translator has succeeded in the objects he had proposed to himself, and in placing Davenant's Treatise fairly before the Public in our own language, others must judge. The same method has been adhered to as in the Translation of the *Expositio ad Colossenses*. Most of the references have been examined, and more full allusion, in many instances, made to the modern editions of the works or authors quoted.

It may be well to observe that Davenant has no notes; for the illustrations and biographical sketches, therefore, interspersed in the work, as in the *Exposition*, the Translator alone is responsible; and such as he has been enabled to render the work, and that in its more excellent features, as regards his share in it, by the kind and generous advice and assistance of several learned friends (and whose valuable aid is here gratefully acknowledged), he commits it to the broad field of public reception; imploring in conclusion, the blessing of Heaven, to render it serviceable to any enquirer after truth and to the interests of the Church of God.

The likeness of the Bishop, appended to the present volume, is taken from an original family portrait of him, which came into the Translator's possession in a somewhat singular manner, a few months after the publication of the former volumes of the Exposition of the Epistle to the Colossians. He conceived it would not be an unacceptable present to his Subscribers, and it would certainly have superseded the first, taken from the portrait in Queen's College, Cambridge, had its existence been discovered in time.

J. A.

# CONTENTS.

CONTENTS OF THE CHAPTERS IN

## VOL. I.

THE FIRST DISCUSSION OF HABITUAL AND ACTUAL RIGHTEOUSNESS.

### CHAP. I.

THE HEADS OF THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION ANNOUNCED.


PAGE.

Three primary questions propounded concerning Habitual Righteousness. 1

Four concerning Actual Righteousness . . . . . 2


I.—OF HABITUAL OR INHERENT RIGHTEOUSNESS.

### CHAP. II.


The Frauds and Calumnies of the Papists detected and refuted . . . . 3


### CHAP. III.


*The First Question*—Whether a certain Habitual or Inherent Righteousness is infused into all the Justified, whence they may be called just?—proposed and explained . . . . . 8

The former point confirmed from the Scriptures . . . . . 9

. . . . . from Arguments . . . . . 10

The other point proved from the Scriptures . . . . . 11

. . . . . from Arguments . . . . . 12


### CHAP. IV.


*The Second Question*—Whether this Inherent Righteousness is so perfect as to exclude Original Sin? &c. . . . . 15

The State of the Question opened from Popish Authors . . . . . 15


### CHAP. V.


The Charge of the Heresies of Origenists, Messalians, and others, which the Jesuits bring against us, answered . . . . . 18

Their Arguments derived from the Scriptures stated and refuted . . . 21


### CHAP. VI.


Other Arguments of the Papists derived from the Scriptures considered . 31


### CHAP. VII.


Their Reasonings refuted . . . . . 36


### CHAP. VIII.


A Refutation of the Papists who contend that Concupiscence remaining in the Unregenerate is not Sin . . . . . 44


### CHAP. IX.


Bellarmine's Arguments sifted . . . . . 56

PAGE.

CHAP. X.

A Reply to the Arguments of Gregory de Valentia . . . . . 64

CHAP. XI.

Answers the Testimonies from the Fathers which the Papists are accustomed to allege . . . . . 72

CHAP. XII.

Meets other Testimonies by which they endeavour to show that neither Concupiscence nor its involuntary motions are sins . . . . . 77

CHAP. XIII.

Testimonies brought from Augustine answered . . . . . 83

CHAP. XIV.

Some things premised concerning the Nature of Original Righteousness and Sin . . . . . 99

CHAP. XV.

Proves that the Regenerate are not free from Original Sin . . . . . 103

CHAP. XVI.

Argues that Original Sin is Inherent in the Regenerate . . . . . 111

CHAP. XVII.

Shews that the will is not free from Original Sin . . . . . 119

CHAP. XVIII.

On the original contagion which adheres in the Concupiscible appetite . 123

CHAP. XIX.

Shows from the Fathers that no one of the Regenerate is free from Sin . 133

CHAP. XX.

Testimonies of the Schoolmen showing that Original Sin is not wholly removed from the Regenerate . . . . . 141

CHAP. XXI.

That Concupiscence remaining in the Regenerate, and its first motions, are sins, confirmed by the opinions of Fathers and Schoolmen . . 149

*The Third Question*—Whether Inherent Righteousness (whatever it be) formally justifies believers in the sight and judgment of God?

CHAP. XXII.

1.—The term Justification examined . . . . . 157
2.—The calumnies of opponents answered . . . . . 159
3.—The state of the question and the defence of the Papists described . 161

CHAP. XXIII.

The arguments of Bellarmine for Inherent Righteousness refuted . . . 164

CHAP. XXIV.

The arguments of Bellarmine against the Imputation of Christ's Righteousness answered . . . . . 176

CHAP. XXV.

The Testimonies of the Fathers discussed . . . . . 194

CHAP. XXVI.

Inherent Righteousness shewn not to be the formal cause of our Justification before God . . . . . 211

PAGE.

CHAP. XXVII.

Some things premised respecting the term *Imputation* and *Formal Cause* . 231

CHAP. XXVIII.

The Imputation of Christ's Obedience proved to be the Formal Cause of our Justification . . . . . 236

CHAP. XXIX.

Testimonies of the Fathers against Inherent, and in support of Imputed Righteousness. . . . . 253

II.—OF ACTUAL RIGHTEOUSNESS; OR, THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF WORKS.

This discussion consists of Four Parts; for it respects { The Necessity, The Reality, The Perfection, and The Merit, } of good works.

1.—OF THE NECESSITY OF GOOD WORKS. 273

CHAP. XXX.

*Question the First*—Of the Necessity of Good Works: The Author's opinion is partly explained in this proposition—Good Works are necessary in all believers who have the use of reason, and are of an age to practise them. This is proved—

1.—By Arguments derived from the Scriptures . . . . . 274
2.—By Testimonies of the Fathers . . . . . 280
3.—By the Testimonies of our own Divines . . . . . 281
Lastly, the Calumnies of Opponents are refuted . . . . . 283

CHAP. XXXI.

The Question, whether Good Works can be said to be Necessary to Salvation or Justification, considered and resolved by various conclusions 295

CHAP. XXXII.

Bellarmine's Objections answered . . . . . 303

2.—OF THE REALITY OF GOOD WORKS.

CHAP. XXXIII.

*The Second Question*—Of the Reality of Good Works, is explained in three propositions . . . . . 317
*The First Proposition* consists of three members; namely, that the Good Works of the Regenerate have in them, 1, a supernatural goodness; 2, are pleasing and acceptable to God in a supernatural way; 3, are destined by his Covenant or promise for the most gracious rewards . 318

CHAP. XXXIV.

*The Second Proposition*: That the Good Works of the Regenerate are imperfectly good, being stained with the adhesion of sin, and need to be accepted by God of his paternal mercy . . . . . 328

CHAP. XXXV.

*The Third Proposition*: That the aforesaid works, although imperfect and stained by the contagion of indwelling sin, are yet not to be regarded as mortal sins, nor are they so regarded by Protestants . . . . . 342

CHAP. XXXVI.

The Arguments of Bellarmine against the aforesaid propositions answered 349

PAGE.

CHAP. XXXVII.

The Testimonies of the Fathers which are cited by Bellarmine in his Treatise on Justification, lib. 4, cap. 16, explained . . . . . 364

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Answers the Reasons of Bellarmine . . . . . 372

3.—OF THE PERFECTION OF GOOD WORKS.

CHAP. XXXIX.

*The Third Question*, of the Perfection of Good Works, explained in two propositions . . . . . 382

*The First* consisting of three members; 1, that there are no works of Counsels more excellent than the works commanded in the Divine Law; 2, neither is there granted in this life a state of perfection consisting in the observance of such Counsels; nor, does the regenerate man supererogate by any work of holiness or righteousness . . . . 383

*The Second Proposition:* No one of the regenerate can observe and fulfil the law of God perfectly; but falls short of the perfection of the law through the whole course of his life . . . . . 384

Some things premised in confirmation of the propositions concerning the poison which the Papists mingle with their opinions about the works of Counsels, a state of perfection, and works of supererogation . . 384

CHAP. XL.

The first member of the former proposition demonstrated . . . . . 392

CHAP. XLI.

The second member of the proposition demonstrated . . . . . 402

CHAP. XLII.

The last member of the proposition demonstrated . . . . . 420

CHAP. XLIII.

Passages from antiquity produced . . . . . 443

CHAP. XLIV.

A few things premised, 451; and the arguments of opponents derived from the Scriptures answered . . . . . 463

CHAP. XLV.

The arguments of Bellarmine derived from examples and from the Testimonies of the Fathers, discussed . . . . . 486

CHAP. XLVI.

His arguments from natural reason . . . . . 503

## CORRIGENDA ET EMENDANDA.

Page 257, line 1, in Note †, for "adverseus," read "*adversus.*"

.... 456, paragraph beginning "thirdly," line 2, for "object," read "*subject.*"

Some few other typographical inaccuracies the reader will himself correct, without the necessity of pointing them out.

For Additions to Notes on pages 208, 446, and 488, see Appendix.

# PREFACE.

When reflecting upon the several topics which are controverted between us and the Papists,* I find that there is scarcely one in which our opponents do not maintain that side which immoderately exalts man, and everything of human attainment; while leaving it to us to maintain the cause of God in opposition to the pride of man. This I am desirous should be observed, in order that we may be induced to engage the more carefully with these opponents, who, whilst they are elevating and extolling dust and ashes, can never look to receive Divine help.

The truth of my remark will appear both from the discussion which we lately concluded concerning *the Judge and Rule of Faith*, and from this on which we have now resolved to treat, concerning inherent righteousness and the righteousness of works. In the former case what else appears to be the doctrine of Papists, than that God cannot be the Supreme Judge of Faith, but that the Roman Pontiff both can

* The Bishop *generally* uses the term "Papists" in speaking of the Members of the Church of Rome. Upon which term Heylin, no harsh opponent of their system, after objecting to their appropriation of the term *Catholic*, makes the following remarks in his Exposition of the Apostles' Creed, book iii., chap. 2:—"Since they have no mind to be called *Christians*, nor reason to be called *Catholics*, let us call them, as they use, by the name of *Papists*, considering their dependance on the Pope's decision for all points of faith. And, possibly we may gratify them as much in this as if we did permit them the name of *Catholics*. For Bellarmine (de Not. Eccle. l. 4, c. 4) seems very much delighted with the appellation; flattering himself that he can bring in Christ, our blessed Saviour, within the catalogue of Popes, and that he hath found a prophecy in St. Chrysostom [in Act. Apost. hom. xxxiii., § 4] to this effect, *quandoque nos Papistas vocandos esse*, that *Papists, in the time then following, should be the style and title of a true Professor*. Great pity it is, but he and his should have the honour of their own discovery; and *Papists* let them be, since the same so pleaseth."—However, it no longer "pleaseth" them to be called by this term, and modern courtesy commonly disuses it; but the Translator did not consider himself at liberty to adopt a different term, where this is employed by his author.

and ought to be; that the divinely inspired Prophets and Apostles have committed to writing the doctrines of the Christian Religion in an obscure and imperfect manner; but that the Roman Pontiff with his Prelates contains them all in their integrity in the escrutoire of his own breast,* and is able perspicuously to define them when necessary! Thus they speak degradingly of God; but have set the Pope with his coadjutors on the throne of supreme authority. Good right, therefore, have we to renew that old complaint of Lactantius *(De ira Dei*, cap. 22.*) So preposterously do they act, as to make what is human to give authority to what is Divine, whereas, rather, that which is Divine ought to give authority to what is human.*

Now what they have done in the question on the determining Faith and Religion, the same they take great pains to effect in the case of the attainment of Justification and Salvation. For they absolutely scorn a Justification arising from the mercy of God remitting the sins of believers for the sake of Christ, and accepting them to life eternal in Christ; but they admire and extol that justification which consists in their own personal virtues and inherent qualities. Thus, to have life eternal from the free gift of God, they do not think sufficiently honourable to them, but to obtain it by their merit of condignity and good works, this seems glorious enough to proud men.

And the way in which they maintain this position, though most false, is yet quite worthy of such patrons. For those who seek their faith, not from Christ or the Scriptures, but from the crazy brain and doting decrees of some individual, are acting consistently while they place their justification and salvation, not in the mercy of God and the obedience of Christ the Mediator, but in their own personal righteousness and merits.

It is evident how difficult and miserable a task the Papists have taken upon themselves, and how easy

* [——"of his own breast;"——the language of a Papal Constitution of Boniface VIII.: See the Canon Law, *Sexti Decret.* lib. 1, lit. 2, cap. 1.]

and desirable a part they leave for us. It rests with them to endeavour to prove, that wretched man, encompassed with this mortal and corruptible flesh, is nevertheless furnished with so perfect a righteousness, that he can present this his inherent righteousness, even before the scrutinising eye of God, for the purpose of receiving a plenary justification. Nay more, they must also maintain this point, that from this infused righteousness flow works so purified from all defilement, so free from all stain of sin, that any regenerate person can say truly to God,—"If I have deserved it give me the kingdom of heaven; if my works do not deserve it on the principle of condignity, refuse me!" O intolerable pride! O desperate madness! How much more wisely, how much more truly said William [Bishop] of Paris:—*Take care in your wrestling with God, not to lean upon a weak and fragile foundation, which they do who trust in their own merits. — — — For as he who leans only upon his own strength and merits, deprives himself of the aid and strength of God; so he who puts away all confidence in himself, and leans only upon grace and mercy, brings down upon himself the aid and power of God.* — Parisiensis *de Rhetor. Divin.*, cap. 51, pag. 385.

You see how wretched and impious is the cause which the Papists have to maintain. Now let us consider how holy, easy, and obvious is ours. We have then to shew, that God imparts to the justified the first-fruits of the Spirit and certain eminent gifts of sanctification, yet so that we are entirely dependent upon his mercy and the grace of our Mediator; but that sin is not so entirely rooted out from this mortal body, as that we can derive from that infused and inherent righteousness, a ground for justification before God. This also we have to shew, that the works which flow from this inchoate righteousness, however pleasing and acceptable to God, are still not in themselves so absolutely perfect, as that life eternal should be, not the gift of God in Christ (Rom.

vi. 23), but a reward paid, on the principle of condignity, to these our works.

We are certainly greatly indebted to the Romanists, who, as in all other controversies, so especially in this, desire us to prove, what Scripture manifestly sets forth, what the conscience of every individual dictates within him, and to what, in fine, the confession of all saints publicly testifies.

It is not therefore, more difficult to shew that the doctrine of a free justification is true, and to exhibit the deficiencies of man's righteousness, than it is to point to the light of the sun, or the spots on a cloud.

I will enter then upon the subject, premising merely, that it is not my purpose to take up the whole subject in controversy as respects justification and works; but to select certain special parts, by the explanation and determination of which, a way will be opened for readily forming an opinion of the rest. You perceive then to what points the present discussion is limited.

# A DISCUSSION

CONCERNING

# INHERENT AND HABITUAL RIGHTEOUSNESS.

---

## CHAPTER I.

### THE HEADS OF THE FOLLOWING DISPUTATION DESCRIBED.

The discussion is concerning habitual and actual righteousness, or (as we are accustomed to say) inherent righteousness and the righteousness of good works.

As to what relates to the inherent righteousness of the regenerate, I shall discuss three primary questions:

I.—The first, whether a certain habitual or inherent righteousness is infused into all the justified, whence they are called and deemed just? And here we may clear away the calumnies of the Jesuits, who are repeatedly exclaiming, that the Protestants do not acknowledge any internal renovation, any habitual righteousness in the justified; but teach that they, still remaining in the filthiness of their inbred impurity, are accounted both justified and just, by a mere naked acceptance, which only *covers*, but does not *cleanse*, their inherent corruption.

II.—Secondly, whether this righteousness which is infused into, and dwells in the regenerate, entirely expels original sin, leaving nothing in the regenerate which retains the true character and nature of sin? Where we shall have to shew, not only that certain *penalties* or *consequences* (as the schoolmen say) are found in all the justified, but also real, and in their own nature damnable, remains of sin, even though, the dominion of sin being now broken, and its guilt

not differ from the Romanists, it will not be necessary to prove laboriously what is in no way denied. We must labour rather to repel their deceits and calumnies; which being accomplished, we will confirm the truth of our proposition by some arguments for it.

There are two grand quibbles of which the Papists perpetually make use, when they cannot disprove any opinion of ours, which they endeavour nevertheless to obscure and bring into odium with the common people.

One is, that when we deny the power of inherent righteousness to justify, they take it as though the habit of this inherent righteousness were altogether denied by us. For instance, when we teach that no man is justified before God by his inherent righteousness or infused gifts, our adversaries immediately infer that we maintain, that none of the regenerate have any righteousness inherent in them. Bellarmine himself was not ashamed of this fallacy, as pointless as it is contemptible. *Calvin*, says he, (lib. 2, de Justif. cap. 1) *with the Lutherans, allows that there does not exist any inherent righteousness.* I expected some express quotation, but not one word could he bring; but he rakes together some words out of Calvin, which shew that the justification of believers does not consist in infused or inherent qualities, but in the act of God remitting our sins, and accepting us to life eternal in Christ. But it is one thing to separate inherent righteousness from the act, virtue, or merit of justifying, which Calvin rightly does; another thing to remove it altogether from the man, person or subject justified; which Bellarmine calumniously maintains, with no less malice than absurdity, that he has done. But we shall consider this matter more copiously hereafter.

Another fallacy of the Papists consists in this, that whatever is argued by us *comparatively and in a certain sense (comparatè et secundum quid)* respecting this inherent righteousness, this they immediately lay hold of and pervert, as though it was affirmed *simply and absolutely*, (*simpliciter et absolutè*). As, if any one of us should say, that we have no righteousness in which we can appear, if strictly examined before the Divine tribunal; or, that we have not the righteousness which the law of God requires for the avoidance of the curse and the attainment of eternal life, immediately they cry out, that we grant no

righteousness to the faithful, but contend, that those who wallow in their native filth are accounted righteous only by non-imputation. But who does not see, that inherent righteousness may be found in man, still a sinner, through the renovation of grace; and that, notwithstanding this, the same man may, compared with the exact rule of the Divine law, be pronounced guilty of unrighteousness? For the image of God, which consists in righteousness and holiness, is not perfected in a moment; nor is the image of the old Adam, which consists in the contagion of sin, obliterated in a moment: but the former is restored gradually; the latter shall be altogether abolished when this mortal shall have put on immortality. Therefore I wish you would carefully observe this twofold fallacy, which the Papal writers are always compelled to exhibit in arguing. For all their arguments err in this, that they confound the act of justification with the habit of righteousness, or thrust inchoate and evangelical in the place of absolute and legal righteousness. But it is sufficient now to have glanced at these points. We shall treat them, and open them more fully, when we come to sift and refute the arguments of our adversaries.

You have heard how much fallacy they make use of in the way of argument. Now hear what palpable and shameful falsehoods they put forward in the way of calumny; that when you know that things are laid to your charge which you utterly abhor, it may appear how much credit is to be given to their Jesuitical accusations.

It was the calumny of Bellarmine (whose words we just now cited) that *Calvin, with the Lutherans, does not admit of any inherent righteousness.*

Campian, in his eighth reason, speaking of Protestants, says, *They teach that the regenerate and sanctified are not even any thing inwardly, but mere corruption and defilement.* A little after he adds, *They assign excellent properties to grace, which they contend to be neither infused into our hearts, nor of sufficient efficacy to resist wickedness; but place it without us, in the sole favour of God, which favour does not amend the wicked, but, with the connivance of God, conceals that old mass, still reeking and loathsome, lest it should be thought deformed and odious.* As many untruths almost as words. For I appeal to you all, who ever among us either said or thought

that the regenerate are nothing within except mere defilement? Who has denied infused grace? Who has detracted from its efficacy in resisting wickedness? Who ever dreamt that it consists in the sole favour of God without us? Who, in fine, has denied that justified persons are amended and cleansed by the grace of God? Who ever asserted that the old and still loathsome mass is, with the connivance of God, concealed? These calumnies, as false as they are senseless, need no refutation; for these are not our doctrines, but the dreams of an idle, ignorant, and malevolent declaimer.

Duræus follows Campian, and not only is not ashamed of these calumnies, but moreover has thought it right to add to them. Accordingly he says: *I do not in the least wonder that Calvin should not acknowledge any renovation of the inner man in us, since he thinks the blessed themselves to be perpetually contaminated by their wickedness even in the regions of bliss.* For my part, I think this calumniator lost to all shame and sense, who has dared to charge Calvin with denying that renovation of the inner man, which he has inculcated in his writings a thousand times over; and with affirming that even the blessed in celestial glory remain contaminated, of which there is not so much as the slightest insinuation in Calvin.

Let Becan close the host of calumniators; who in *Enchir. de Justif. Calvin, cap.* 2, ascribes this proposition to Calvin: *That in justification the grace and righteousness are not infused, by which a man becomes renewed internally, and righteous and holy in himself; but that only the righteousness of Christ is imputed to him externally, whereby he is accounted righteous out of himself.* Indeed the opinion of Calvin (and that the true one) is, that man is not justified by infused or inherent righteousness. But the calumny of Becan (which is palpably false) is, that *God does not, when he justifies, according to Calvin, infuse inherent righteousness and renewing grace.*

You have heard what the Jesuits attribute to us; now hear what we really think about the renovation of justified persons.

Luther, *(tom. 5. in Epist. Judæ, near the end,)* says: *We have received the Holy Spirit through faith, and we have been purified; but notwithstanding, as long as we live here, that*

*corrupt mass of flesh and blood adheres to us.* Here he plainly confesses both a certain purification or internal renovation, and the remains of sin still cleaving to us.

Calvin, (*Inst. lib.* 3. *cap.* 3.) says, *Man is justified by faith alone, nor yet is real holiness separated from the gratuitous imputation of righteousness.*

Bucer, (*Colloq. Ratisb. p.* 317,) says, *We preach with open mouth, that inherent righteousness is bestowed upon us, and infused into us by Christ our Lord, the new Adam and the heavenly regenerator, as original sin is infused into us by the old Adam and our earthly generator.*

Melancthon, (*Loc. de Bonis Oper. qu.* 3,) says, that *inchoate obedience and the righteousness of a good conscience must be in the regenerate, although sin still remain in them.*

Peter Martyr says, (*Loc. com. Class* 3, *loc.* 4, *p.* 574,)—*God in very deed begets righteousness in men, when by his Spirit he repairs and wholly renews them, restoring the powers of their mind, and freeing the human faculties in a great measure from their native ruin. And this righteousness is wrought within and adheres to our souls by the gracious act of God.*

Chemnitz, (*Exam. Conc. Trident. de Justif. pp.*1—8,) says, that *Christ by his passion has merited for us, not only the remission of sins, but even this, that, on account of his merit, the Holy Spirit is given to us, that we may be renewed in the spirit of our minds.* And a little after—*We also teach that newness of life is begun in believers by the Holy Spirit, but we say, that we are not justified before God by our renewal.*

Whittaker, (*Resp. ad 8m rationem Campiani,*) says—*It is plain that he who has nothing in himself but corruption is by no means regenerate; for the new man, which is created after God, must be renewed in righteousness and true holiness.* Id. contra Duræum: *It is one thing to disparage all grace infused into us, which we by no means do; another to take away the merit of justification from this grace, which the Scripture most clearly does.*

I have thought it right to collect all these testimonies together, that all may perceive, that our Divines constantly and harmoniously teach inherent righteousness. We will establish the proposition itself; yet briefly, because our opponents, in this respect, agree with us.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE FIRST QUESTION PROPOSED, EXPLAINED, AND CONFIRMED.

First, it is asked, whether a certain habitual or inherent righteousness is infused into all the justified, whence they may be called and accounted to be just? We hold the affirmative, which we shall first *explain*, and then *confirm* argumentatively.

I. *I explain.*—By inherent righteousness we understand the supernatural gift of sanctifying grace, opposed to original sin, and in each of the faculties of the soul, both repairing and renewing that image of God, which through original sin was defiled and lost. Original sin filled the mind with darkness; this infused grace illuminates it with celestial light. The former has defiled the human heart by obstinacy and hatred of God and of the Divine law; the latter—this infused righteousness—softens the heart, and lights up and inflames it with the love of goodness. In fine, the former has infected all the affections with disorder, and the appetite itself with rebellion; whereas the latter—restored sanctity—brings the perturbed affections into order, strips the rebel concupiscence of his dominion, and sends him, as it were, under the yoke. Moreover, when I say that *the regenerate are called and accounted just, on account of this righteousness*, I mean, that God himself (who judges truly) discerns and distinguishes those, upon whom he has impressed this new image of holiness and righteousness, from the carnal and unregenerate; and calls and accounts the one party *ungodly*, and *impure, held under sin*, but the other *holy, righteous*, and *dead to sin*. Not because this infused holiness, or inherent righteousness, is perfect; but because it is genuine and in no respect hypocritical, and is both known and acceptable to God, who has infused it into the minds of the regenerate.

*I proceed to confirm*, and that each portion separately;

The former is this; that a certain habitual or inherent righteousness is bestowed upon or infused into all the justified.

This, in the first place, is manifest from the Scriptures; For they call the faithful and justified new creatures; *If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature*; 2 Cor. v. 17. *In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature;* Gal. vi. 15. *Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, but of God;* John i. 13.—But who, I ask, can form any notion of a new creature without the infusion of new qualities, and gifts of the Holy Spirit? For, from him who is created anew, the infection of natural impurity is removed; and a new image of holiness and righteousness is imprinted upon him. To these considerations let it be added, that all believers are called *washed*, and *sanctified*, and *temples of the Holy Spirit;* 1 Cor. vi. 11, 19 *Partakers of the Divine nature—Having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust*, 2 Pet. i. 4; and other texts of that kind; from each of which may be inferred their internal and habitual change from the infection of sin to holiness and righteousness.

Secondly, the Scriptures describe all the parts of this inherent and infused holiness, and testify that they are found in all the regenerate. The darkness of native ignorance is dispelled, and mental illumination is given them: *Ye were sometimes darkness, but now are ye light in the Lord;* Ephes. v. 8. — *Ye have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of Him who created him;* Col. iii. 10. A new heart is given them, inflamed with the love of goodness, and the desire of righteousness: *I will give you a new heart, and will put a new spirit within you; and I will take away the heart of stone, and give you an heart of flesh;* Ezek. xxxvi. 26. *The new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness;* Eph. iv. 24. Lastly, dominion over the rebellious concupiscence is given them: For *the body of sin is crucified and slain;* Rom. vi. 6. *It shall not have dominion over you* (v. 14.) Whoever therefore denies infused and inherent righteousness to be in those whom the Holy Spirit has thus changed and renewed, is manifestly opposing the Scriptures.

To these testimonies of the Scriptures, let us add some arguments founded in the same.

1. The love of God always produces some lovely effect in the thing beloved; for the Schoolmen decided, correctly enough, that the love of God must be understood according to *effect*, rather than to *affection*.* Therefore, since God embraces his children with an ineffable love, he must necessarily impress or engrave the mark or character of his paternal love upon them. But this is nothing else than a certain image and resemblance of his holiness. All the regenerate therefore have infused and inherent holiness. Thus Ambrose† elegantly expresses himself: *Thou art painted, O man, and painted too by the Lord thy God; thou hast a good artist and painter. Do not deface the good picture, shining not with paint, but with truth; not moulded in wax, but by grace.*

2. Where the *effects* of new righteousness are discerned, there it is manifest that the *cause* has preceded; for every effect presupposes a cause. Since therefore, all the justified perform supernatural works which cannot flow from the old Adam; it is certain that they are endowed with grace and supernatural holiness, derived from the new Adam. A bad tree, whilst it remains bad, cannot bear good fruit. When the regenerate therefore believe in God; when they love God and their neighbour; when they resist their lusts; when they endeavour to live soberly, righteously, and godly, to the glory of God, it is evident, that they have been changed and endowed with supernatural righteousness. For it is this inherent grace which imparts to them *a certain spiritual being, whence they have this faculty of performing spiritual actions*, as Thomas rightly observes.‡ To which also Cyril of Alexandria testifies, *Christ is formed in us, by the Holy Spirit imprinting upon us a certain Divine likeness, by sanctification and righteousness; for thus the resemblance of God*

* Dei amorem potiùs secundum *effectum* quam *affectum* intelligi oportere; a distinction probably grounded on the consideration that God has not any passions and affections; these being only ascribed to him ανθρωποπαθως as indicating analogous effects.

† Hexæm. lib. 6. cap. 8.

‡ Aquinas, quæst. disp. de virtut. art. 2, et art. 10.

*shines in our minds.** From this Divine likeness flow all the good and supernatural actions of justified men, through the co-operation of the Spirit, the giver of the same.

3. Every one of the regenerate is joined to Christ as the life-giving head ; and from him receives not only guidance and direction, but an inward influx of inherent grace. The Apostle says to the Colossians (ii. 19), *From* this head, Christ, *the whole body, by joints and bands knit together, increaseth with the increase of God.* We have similar declarations, Ephes iv. 16. Now, what increase, I pray, is this, which the members daily receive from their head, but the grace of faith, and new righteousness and holiness? But grace could not in any way be *increased* in us, unless it had been before infused and inherent in us. He therefore who denies that there is an inherent grace or righteousness in the justified, may be said to have altogether denied the efficacious and internal flow of Christ the head into his members; and, thus, one of the chief benefits of our conjunction or union with Christ. But this is contrary to the received opinion of all Divines, who unanimously lay it down, that Christ is the head of the Church, not only by reason of *dignity* or *governance*, but chiefly by reason of this *internal influence*, which inspires righteousness or holiness. Let Augustine speak for all, who, upon those words in Psal. lxxxvi. 2. PRESERVE MY SOUL, FOR I AM HOLY, thus writes :—*Let every believer say, I am holy, This is not the pride of the arrogant, but the confession of one not ungrateful.—Say unto God, I am holy, for thou hast made me holy.— —For if all believers have been made members of the body of Christ, and yet say that they are not holy, they do an injury to the head itself, the members of which are holy.*

And thus we have proved briefly, that a certain inherent righteousness, or holiness, is bestowed on all the justified. I come now to the other part of our proposition, which was,

*That all believers, or regenerate persons are, from this infused or inherent righteousness, called and esteemed righteous, and that by God himself;* which I thus prove :—

1. The voice of Scripture is the voice of God : But that voice calls Abel *righteous*, Heb. xi. 4 ; so Noah, Gen. vi. 9 ; so Job. In the New Testament, Zacharias and his wife are

* Lib. 4. comment. in Isa. orat. 2.

said to be *righteous;* Simeon, in Luke ii. 25; and several others.

2. By this distinguishing name, the regenerate and believers are separated in the Holy Scriptures, not simply from sinners (for there is no one who doeth justly and sinneth not), but from ungodly and obstinate sinners, who are dead in sin, 1 Pet. iv. 18.—*If the righteous scarcely be saved, where shall the ungodly and the sinner appear?* A characteristic name may, with propriety, be given to any object, from that quality which distinguishes it from others.

3. This it not *a title* without *a reality;* but God, who calls the regenerate *righteous*, sees in them that *quality*, or that *gift of infused righteousness*, which the Holy Spirit has poured into their hearts. As God therefore, calls and reckons those *believers*, upon whom he has bestowed *faith*, although it be imperfect; as he likewise accounts those *wise, sober, humble*, into whom he has poured *these virtues*, even though the opposite defects are not entirely removed; so he calls and deems those *righteous*, to whom he has imparted *the gift of new righteousness*, although it be not yet perfect in all its parts. It is therefore agreeable to Scripture, that whosoever is regenerate should be called and esteemed *righteous*. We will prove this very thing by some arguments:—

1. Reason itself, and the ordinary use of language, justifies this mode of speaking. Reason teaches, that even those who are sometimes, through infirmity and error, led away from the straight path of righteousness, may yet, from their habitual purpose itself, and their love of righteousness, be denominated *righteous*. Hence that definition in Justinian, *Righteousness is the constant and perpetual desire of giving to every one his due*. But in all the regenerate there is this purpose, this desire of paying his due to God and to his neighbour, although corrupt concupiscence may occasionally draw them to the contrary. *I delight in the law of God after the inner man*, says Paul, Rom. vii. 22, in the person of all the regenerate; and this is what Augustine has asserted Vol. 2, Epis. 50, [or 185] § 40. *Now therefore, so far as the new birth, which we derive from God, flourishes in us, we are righteous, living by faith; but so far as regards the remains of mortality, which we derive from Adam, we are not*

*without sin*. And elsewhere—*No righteous man is without sin; yet he does not on this account cease to be righteous, since, with earnest desire he maintains holiness.*

2. Believers are rightly called and deemed *righteous*, in comparison with, and in opposition to, carnal men, in whom there is no seed of inchoate righteousness, no effort after a godly life, no desire of holiness. In this sense, we call all those *learned* who are initiated in and apply themselves to literature, in contrast with the rustic and illiterate; although they yet manifest much unskilfulness and ignorance. Ambrose has included this argument in these words:—*Some of the saints are said to be perfect, as compared with worldly men, who neglect things Divine, and never enter upon the path of perfection.** If we may call them *perfect* in comparison with the worldly, much more may we call them *righteous*; for the word *perfection* denotes *strict and exact righteousness*. The regenerate therefore are called *righteous*, not by *imputation* only, but on account of the real *inherence* of that inchoate righteousness which is not, in any measure, inherent in the unregenerate.

3. It is a common saying in the schools, that characteristic names may be correctly and truly derived from the better part. We rightly and truly say that man is a *rational being*, because his better part, namely, his soul, is endowed with *reason;* although his flesh, or his body, is brutish and devoid of reason. After this example, we say, that a believer is *righteous*, because his better part, namely, that which is spiritual and regenerate, hath a certain image of *righteousness* and *Divine holiness* impressed upon it; although, in the meantime, those contrary dispositions, which draw him towards unrighteousness and impiety, may cleave to the old Adam. Lastly, from the ordinary use of language, the inherent quality (especially if it predominate) is used to characterise the subject, although something of a contrary quality may adhere to it at the same time. For we not only say that snow is *white*, or a swan *white;* but we call coverings *white*,† and garments *white;* on which nevertheless

* Amb. comment. in Epist. ad Philip. cap. III.

† *Tecta* candida—*roofs* perhaps, or houses, in allusion probably to the practice general throughout the kingdom in Davenant's time, though now confined to some parts of Wales, Pembrokeshire for instance, of whitewashing the *roofs* of houses.

oftentimes some spots of dirt, and sprinklings of black are scattered. Thus also we call water *hot*, not only that which boils with heat, but also that which has acquired some degree of heat, although the cold be not yet totally expelled. From which it is plain, by the same reasoning, that all the regenerated are rightly named and esteemed *righteous* from inherent righteousness, although as yet it is only begun and imperfect. I say *righteous (justos)*, not *justified;* because the word righteous (as we are now speaking concerning the righteous) denotes nothing else than one endowed by an infused habit or inherent quality of righteousness; but the word *justified* includes acquittal from all sin, and acceptance to life eternal;* which, as we shall, when we come to our third question, endeavour to the best of our ability to demonstrate, is not founded nor grounded in this inherent righteousness.

Let it suffice to have said these things concerning the first question.

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE STATE OF THE SECOND QUESTION OPENED FROM PAPAL AUTHORS.

From what we have hitherto stated and argued, it is sufficiently evident, that all our Divines concede, that the justified possess an inherent righteousness; and acknowledge moreover, that, from this inherent righteousness, they may be called and esteemed *righteous*, that is, endowed and adorned with a certain supernatural holiness, which natural or carnal men want, who are every where in the Scriptures represented as *unrighteous* and *ungodly*.

These points therefore having been fully established, we

* Mr. Newman quotes this whole passage, from the word "*Lastly*," in his "*Lectures on Justification*," p. 91, but inaccurately in some respects; and observes on the quotation, "Davenant's statement on the subject may be entirely received, though he was a Calvinist." Bishop Bull's opinion was that Davenant "well knew and faithfully maintained the sound and orthodox doctrine of our Church."—See extract from his *Harmonia*.

must enquire in the second place—Whether this inherent righteousness which we have conceded to be in the regenerate, is so perfect, as wholly to exclude original sin, and leave nothing in the righteous man which may retain the character and true nature of sin? Upon this single point depend almost all those other questions which have been subjects of controversy concerning justification, and the perfection or merit of works. If therefore we can prove our point in this, we shall obtain a bloodless and easy victory in all the rest. First then, I shall shew, from their most celebrated writers, what the advocates of Popery lay down in this matter. In the next place, I shall bring forward and refute the arguments by which they endeavour to establish their error; and lastly, I shall subjoin the orthodox opinion of our Divines, and establish it by as strong arguments as I am able to produce.

Bellarmine lays down our opinion (which he calumniously states to be the ancient heresy of the Origenists) in these words—*Sin is not taken away by the grace of Christ, but only covered;** he then opposes to it the following as his own:—*By this grace, received either in the sacrament or without the sacrament, every thing in man which hath the nature of sin is taken away.* But Bellarmine's manner of thus stating the question is not free from the charge of Jesuitic artifice. For whereas he says, that, *sin is not taken away by the infused grace of Christ,* this is both our opinion and also true. For original sin is not entirely taken away by grace from the nature of the regenerate, with respect to its *existence,* although it is altogether transferred from the person of the regenerate, if we regard its *guilt* or *liability to condemnation.* But when he adds that *this original sin is not taken away, but only covered,* the statement is quite untrue, and altogether foreign from our meaning. For we all confess, that this original sin is, by the grace of Christ, not only covered, but moreover is weakened, broken, mortified; and that, through the infusion of the new righteousness by the Spirit, its remains are very much opposed, and daily more and more diminished and destroyed. As to the opinion of the Papists, Bellarmine has stated it advantageously enough, and we shall hereafter meet it in his own statement of it.

* De sacr. baptis. lib. 1, cap. 13.

Vasquez thus lays out the state of the question:*—*In the remission of sins, there is a real eradication and extinction of sin; so that our sins are not only not imputed to us for punishment, but they are actually taken away and eradicated; so that now they cannot any more be imputed for guilt, or remain under a cover as Protestants frequently maintain.* But the question, as this Jesuit puts it,—*That sins are so taken away and extirpated, that they can no more be imputed for guilt*—if he speaks of original sin, is stated ambiguously, and requires to be explained by a distinction. For, so far as it respects *the state of a person*, it is true, that sin is so taken away, that it cannot be imputed for punishment; because, being expiated by Christ, it cannot be imputed to those who have obtained its remission; but, if it respects *the nature of sin*, then it is false that it is so taken away as not to be culpable in itself, and a thing deserving of punishment. But the opinion which he attributes to Protestants, namely, that sin is merely covered, has been rejected and refuted by us.

Vasquez elsewhere† brings forward the opinion of one Proclus‡ in these words,—an opinion which he asserts to be maintained by us:—*In the regenerate, as long as the body lives in this mortal life, sin lives, although it be externally restrained by discipline.* He then explains his own notion in these words—*By virtue of baptism all sins are actually rooted up, and not merely shorn and non-imputed.* Yet here also he craftily misstates the point in debate. For it is one thing (to speak with Proclus) to say, that *sin lives in the regenerate*; and another thing, that it *cleaves* to them. It is said to *live* when it *reigns*, and rules the life of the natural man by its dictates; but it *cleaves* to those in whom, although mortified, it yet *dwells*. What we are maintaining is, not that *sin lives in the regenerate*, but *that it remains*. And what he adds, concerning its being shorn, and non-

* In 1, 2, quæst. 113, cap. 4.

† In 3 Thomæ quæst. 69, cap. 1 et 2.

‡ PROCLUS.—Probably an amanuensis of Chrysostom, and Bishop of Constantinople, A. D. 432—446. He was a very pious man, a good scholar, and a popular preacher. His works, consisting of 20 Sermons and 6 Epistles, were published, Gr. and Lat., by Ricardi, Rome, 1630, 4to. See art. *Proclus*, in Soames's Edit. of *Mosheim's Ecclesiastica. History.*

§ In 3 Thomæ. quæst. 69.

imputed, we shall repel presently when we come to consider the Decree of the Council of Trent.

Suarez rightly propounds the opinion of the Romanists, viz., that *by grace original guilt is truly and properly blotted out, and whatever there is in it which has the true character of sin.* But he perverts our opinion (as do all the rest of the Papists) by the common calumny concerning the mere covering, and non-imputation of sin.

I pass by Valentia, Becan, and the rest; and I come to the Council of Trent, which exhibits the most certain rule of Papal Faith. Now the Tridentine Fathers obliquely censure the Churches of the Protestants, and bind them in an Anathema, or at least fancy that they have so bound them, by propounding, that *if any one shall deny that the guilt of original sin is remitted by the grace of Christ; or shall affirm that that wherein sin truly and properly consists is not wholly rooted up, but says that it is only cut down, or non-imputed: let him be anathema.* (Sess. 5.)—But even these cannot refrain from the usual Papistical sophistications; for they too, artfully and craftily, combine what is not at all disputed, with the point really at issue. For, we all confess that the whole guilt of original sin is remitted by grace; and do not merely say that original sin is only *cut down, shorn (radi)*, or *non-imputed;* but we affirm with the Scriptures, that it is *crucified* and *mortified* in all the truly justified. That term cutting down, or shearing, intimates nothing else, than that the *superficies* and *extremity*, as it were, of original sin is cut off; but we teach that *the evil root itself* is broken, bruised, and hewn in pieces;* and moreover that another root of spiritual righteousness and holiness is implanted in the souls of the justified. This is much more than to be only *cut down* or *non-imputed*, let the Fathers of Trent and the Jesuits growl at us as they please.

It has been my wish to bring forward all these instances in this place, that it may not be supposed that I have impugned only the private opinion of individual Papists, rather than the received judgment of the Roman Church; as moreover to shew, by the way, to our friends, by what subtilties

* The stress of the difference lies in the allusion implied in the verb "radi," to the mere felling a tree, and grubbing it up by the roots.—Cramp's *Text Book of Popery*, p. 7. Edit. 1839.

our adversaries endeavour to involve and pervert this controversy; and lastly, that all may understand what really pertains to the state of the question, and what should be separated and removed from it. That one point only therefore remains to be discussed, viz., Whether, by infused or inherent grace, whatever hath the true nature and proper character of sin is forthwith eradicated and entirely taken away in the justified. We deny it; the Papists affirm it, and endeavour to establish it by many arguments; not one of which, so far as my recollection serves me, will I suppress; for, as I have before said, the questions involved in this one point lie at the foundation of all the other disputes concerning justification and works.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PAPISTS STATED AND REFUTED.

1. Almost all the Jesuits whom I have seen, before they come to explain their arguments, object to us, that our opinion of sin not being entirely eradicated is the very ancient heresy of the Origenists; some also add, that it was revived by the Messalians,* and maintained afterwards by some obscure heretics, and that at length its defence has been undertaken, in our own age, by Protestants.

Truly it is a serious presumption against our cause, if we take part with ancient heretics against orthodox Fathers. Let us attend therefore to this charge of our adversaries. Thus speaks Bellarmine: † — *One Proclus, a disciple of Origen, in Epiphanius (heresi* 64*), teaches, that sin is not taken away by baptism, but only by death; and is there refuted, out of the book of Methodius on the Resurrection. The Messalians afterwards raised a similar heresy, as Theo-*

* "Messalians, or Euchites; a sect who denied the principal part of the spiritual efficacy of Baptism; they said indeed that it granted remission of sins that were past, but added no strength nor ability from the Spirit to withstand sin for the future."—Bingham's Antiquities, Vol. 3, Edit. 1836, p. 130.

† De Sacram. Baptis. lib. 1, cap. 13.

*doret testifies, lib.* 4, *de Fabulis Hæreticorum: others also in the time of Gregory, as he relates (lib.* 9, *Epist.* 39.) *But at length in our day all the Lutherans have taught the same.* So far Bellarmine. The same charge of having revived this old heresy is brought by Vasquez, in 3. Thomæ, quæst. 69. Suarez, on the same question, and Becan,* in Enchirid. tract. de justificatione Calvinistarum, cap. 1.

As to what relates to the heresy of Proclus, the disciple of Origen, which they assert that we have revived, I answer, that these Jesuits either never examined the passage in Epiphanius, or were shamefully deceived, or were desirous, perfidiously and in defiance of all conscience, to deceive others. For, first, in that place the matter there refuted is not of the indwelling of sin, but the errors of Proclus respecting the resurrection of the body; for he taught, that it is not the very body which we now carry about, which is to rise again, but another spiritual body, in which there will be the same impress, or the same form, which was in this; which that heretic imagined could not be rendered immortal.

Secondly, Methodius shews, that this body is to be immortal, sin being expelled by death; and he proves, by the testimonies of the Apostle Paul, and by apt illustrations, that sin is extirpated from this corrupt body only by death, but that, when sin shall have been extirpated, the body will be immortal. What the Jesuits therefore attribute to the heretic Proclus, are all orthodox statements of Methodius, disputing against Proclus and one Aglaophons.

Thirdly, it is easy to assign the circumstances which either deceived the Jesuits, or gave them a pretext for deceiving others, in this manner. For when it was found inserted in Epiphanius, *Here follow the words of Proclus;* and after six entire pages, *Now follow the words of Methodius;* they thought, that all which was inserted between

* Becan (Martin), a learned Jesuit of Hilvarenbec, in Brabant; born in 1561. He entered into the polemical contest carried on between Bellarmine, James I. of England, and Bishop Andrews, with less discretion than zeal; for in defending the former he carried the Papal authority to such a pitch, that even his own community disclaimed the arrogance of his tenets; the Parliament of Paris ordered his writings to be publicly burnt, and Pope Paul V. himself very inconsistently had them condemned by the Holy Office, the decree being issued at Rome on January 3, 1613. Still his writings have passed as authority among the more Papalised adherents of the Church of Rome.

these two headings, were the words of the heretic Proclus; whereas his error is comprised within the first twelve lines; but those which follow are the words of Methodius in refutation, as far as the expression,—*Exponit resurrectionem in sola specie servari:* after which, he again introduces the language of Proclus. Read, I beseech you, at your leisure, Epiphanius himself; and you will see that this is a perfectly correct statement of the matter; and that the Jesuits, whilst they charge us with the error of Proclus, are rather themselves his patrons, and accuse the orthodox Methodius of heresy.

But the allegation from Theodoret, lib. 4 de Fab. Hæreticis, namely, that we resemble the Messalians, is a pure invention. For they taught, that baptism is of no advantage to those who receive it; an error from which we are no less averse than the Papists themselves. They affirmed, moreover, that baptism, like a razor, removes only our former sins, but does not cut out the root. If, by *former sins*, they mean those committed before baptism, they agree in this error with the Papists, who will have the virtue of baptism to extend to the expiation of the sins of the past life; but, if any be committed *after* baptism, think that we must have recourse for pardon, not to the death and blood of Christ, applied in baptism, but to our own satisfactions. And as to that similitude of the razor, it is a thing which does not apply to us, since we in no way teach that the surface of sin merely is shorn away by baptism, while the root is untouched; but (as I have before said) we confess that its very root is virtually cut, and hewn in pieces, although not wholly and at once extirpated. Nor can the Romanists deny this; for, however they deny, that concupiscence remaining after baptism is sin; yet even they admit that it is the root of sin, and dwells in men even after regeneration. The root of sin, therefore, according to the Romanists themselves, is not expiated by means of baptism.

Let Hales speak for all, who first states the following objection,—* *It is the duty of a prudent physician, not only to remove the disease, but the root itself; it seems therefore that the chief physician ought to take away the disease of*

* Halens, part. 4, qu. 8, de Sacr. Bapt., art. 2.

*original sin, with the very root, namely, our natural corruption :*—and then he thus answers it :—*It is right to say, that it is the duty of a prudent physician sometimes to aim at removing the root of the disease; but not when the root of the disease is so grounded in the nature, that it cannot be taken away without the destruction of the nature.**

Lastly, as to what relates to those heretics whom Gregory condemns,† we hold nothing in common with them. Their error was, that sins are taken away in baptism, as to the superficies. Gregory, on the contrary, asserts, That in baptism we are released from all sins ; that we are entirely forgiven. We agree with Gregory, and affirm, that those heretics were involved in the deepest error. For *the guilt* of all sin is wholly taken away in baptism and entirely removed from *the person;* although *the root,* impaired and broken, cleaves still in *the nature,* and is not at the same time plucked up from it. This Augustine himself expressly acknowledges (Epist. 29) where he says, that *no one is without the fuel, or as it were the root of sin.* Nor does the Jesuit Suarez venture to reject our opinion, about the non-extirpation of the root of sin, as heretical ; but he only blames us for maintaining that this root of sin contains in itself the true nature of sin *(mali culpabilis). We,* (says Suarez‡) *may say, the fomes, that is, the ungovernable concupiscence is the root of all sins; and since baptism does not take away this root, it may be said not to take away sins by the roots, because, it does not remove the root of them.* Now, why are we to be termed Origenists or Messalians for affirming the same which the Jesuits may affirm without any error ? Thus we answer the charge of heresy which they unjustly and falsely attribute to us.

2. Bellarmine brings against us these passages of Scripture :—*Blot out mine iniquity ;* Psal. li. 1. *Thou takest away iniquity ;* Micah vii. 18. *The Lamb of God taketh away the sin of the world ;* John i. 29. *Christ cleanses the Church with the washing of water, by the word;* Ephes. v. 26 ; and the like : which he says cannot be understood of

* Vide Suar. in 3 Qu. 69, Disp. 26.

† Epist. lib. 9, epist. 39.

‡ Suar. in 3, qu. 69, disp. 26.

sin non-imputed, but thoroughly taken away and eradicated. Therefore nothing remains in the justified which hath the nature of sin.

To the two former passages, namely those from David and Micah, I answer, they are to be understood of the remission of *actual* sins, as is evident from the context. But actual sins are entirely taken away, because, as they had before passed away as to *the act*, and in remission are taken away *as to the stain* and *guilt*, nothing remains of those sins in the justified. But the nature of *original* or *indwelling* sin is not the same as that of *actual* or *transient* sins. Therefore whatever they allege concerning the perfect washing away of *actual* sins, we freely assent to; but, in the meantime, we altogether deny that it has anything whatever to do with the question at issue.—But as to that passage from St. John, *The Lamb of God taketh away the sin of the world*, it intimates nothing else than that satisfaction is made by the blood of Christ to the Divine anger, and that the guilt of all our sins is expiated; so that they cannot be imputed to believers in Christ, nor be brought against them. Lastly, Paul, when he affirms that *Christ hath cleansed the Church with the washing of water by the word*, immediately adds, *That he might present it to himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle;* from which it is quite clear, that the justified are totally cleansed as far as regards *remission of sins;* but not perfectly, as far as regards *renewal*, until they shall appear glorious in the kingdom of heaven.

Nor is Bellarmine's cavil any bar to this, namely, *That the baptismal cleansing is not done daily but once;* for although the *act* of baptising be done but once, and is never repeated, yet the *virtue* of baptism, that is, the regeneration and renewal of our corrupt nature, perpetually operates, and more and more purges away the stain of our nature, unto the last hour. I might also answer with Augustine,* that *the Church is so cleansed in this life, not that the justified have no remains of sin in them; but that they have no spot of crime or wrinkle of falsehood;* or with Bede, explaining this very passage in Ephes. v. 26, *In the kingdom of heaven the Church will be fully and perfectly*

* Contra Julian., lib. 4, cap. 3.

*without spot or wrinkle, or any such thing; for since he not merely says, that* HE MAY PRESENT IT TO HIMSELF NOT HAVING SPOT OR WRINKLE, *but adds,* GLORIOUS; *he sufficiently intimates* WHEN *it will be without spot or wrinkle.* So far Bede.

3. *Thou art all fair, my love, and there is no spot in thee;* Cant. iv. 7. *He that is washed, needeth not save to wash his feet, but is clean every whit;* John xiii. 10. *From all your filthiness will I cleanse you;* Ezek. xxxvi. 25;—*He hath chosen us that we should be holy and without blame;* Ephes. i. 4. Therefore the regenerate have nothing remaining in them, which hath the nature of sin.

I answer:—The Church, in this present life, is said to be *all fair,* as far as she shines in all the beauty of her spouse, in whom she is clothed. For every believer becomes one person with Christ; and so possesses perfect purity in *Christ,* although he has some pollutions of sin remaining in *himself.* This is that perfect righteousness which the Apostle prefers to all things, when he wishes to *be found in Christ, not having his own righteousness, but that which is through the faith of Christ,* (Phil. iii. 9.) When therefore the Church is endowed with this righteousness, she is all fair; for, as Gillibert speaks,* *She is reckoned without spot, whilst sin is not imputed.* Or, as Gregory writes upon this very passage: *The holy soul, while she believes in him who justifies the ungodly, and constantly mourns her sins in the faith of him, retains her righteousness by continual washings.* And as to what the Saviour says in John—*He that is washed, needeth not save to wash his feet, but is clean every whit,* it makes not against us, whether it be explained of *remission of sins* or of *renewal.* If of *remission;* we grant, that the blood of Christ cleanses us from all sin, and puts away all sins truly and entirely from believers, as Gregory argues from the same text.† If of *renovation,* or *sanctification,* then they who are washed are said to be *clean,* because they are cleansed in their principal part, and have the dominion of sin broken and shattered in

* In Cant. Serm. 29.—GILLIBERT of Hoyland, whose writings sometimes accompany those of St. Bernard; tom. II. col. 200; Edit. Paris, 1839.

† Epist. lib. 9, Epist. 39. [In the Benedict. Edit. this letter is the 45th of Book XI.]

them; not because they have all the remains of sin entirely eradicated from them. For Christ himself intimates that such remains of sin continue in those whom he had pronounced wholly clean, when he says that, they yet need to have their feet washed: no one needs washing to whom no filthiness adheres. Nor does that passage of Ezekiel require any other answer. For the faithful are cleansed from all filthiness, when they are washed by the blood of Christ, and embued with the spirit of holiness. For those remains of sin which cleave to the old Adam, to whom they are no longer considered to belong, do not make them filthy or render them odious before God; but rather, the obedience of Christ, into whom they are planted, and after whose image they are, in an incipient degree, formed anew, makes them clean in the sight of God. Lastly, as to that passage of the Apostle to the Ephes. (i. 4), *He hath chosen us that we should be without blame;* and that to the Colossians, (i. 22) *He hath reconciled you through death, to present you holy, unblamable, and unreprovable,*—these do not prove, that nothing which hath the nature of sin remains in the reconciled; but that all the justified ought to strive after, and will at length arrive at, that state in which they will be wholly free from every stain; but in the meantime are reputed *righteous* on account of the remission of all their sins, and are esteemed *holy* because of their inchoate sanctification. Hear Augustine:* *Wherever I have spoken of the Church, as not having spot or wrinkle, it is to be understood, not as though it were now so, but as what it is prepared to be, when it shall appear in glory.*

4. *Thou shalt wash me, and I shalt be whiter than snow;* Ps. li. 7. *Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow;* Isa. i. 18. *I have blotted out as a cloudt hy sins;* Isa. xliv. 22. But as, when the solar ray has dispersed the clouds by its heat, it causes them so to vanish that no darkness remains, but the sky appears completely bright and clear: therefore when sins are remitted, nothing remains which bears the peculiar character or nature of sin.

I answer, In all these passages, actual sins are spoken of,

* Retractat. lib. ii. cap. 18.

which are forgiven in the truly and cordially penitent. And we grant, that as nothing of blackness appears in snow, so in the penitent sinner the sins which he has committed are not beheld; but he appears forthwith before God, just as white and pure, as if he had never committed any. For, as the solar ray, by its heat, dissipates the clouds in such a manner, that they altogether vanish; so God, by his mercy and love, so completely blots out the sins of penitents, that not a vestige of them appears. But with respect to original sin (as we have before intimated) the analogy does not hold; for though its *guilt* is wholly removed from the *person* of the justified, the *contagion* is not altogether extirpated out of his *nature*. If any one should be seeking the reasons for this difference, the schoolmen themselves have brought many, why, when original sin has been remitted, God should notwithstanding, not see fit entirely to extinguish the principle or law of sin in the members. Hales* enumerates the following; namely, that *this corruption* (which he calls *penal*) *causes man to acknowledge his misery, preserves him in humility, brings grace and virtue into exercise, makes him more fervently desire life eternal*, &c. Augustine also touches upon this matter, in his treatise against Julian the Pelagian:† *There is some reason in the secret counsel of God, why, so long as we live in this mortal body, there is in us a something against which our mind must contend, a something also on account of which we must say*, FORGIVE US OUR SINS: and a few lines onward he remarks, *Such is the situation in which we are placed, that lest, in our present weak condition, we should live proudly, there is found a necessity for a daily forgiveness of sin.* And to this I conceive Bonaventura alluded, when he says, (lib. 2. dist. 32. quæst. 2.)—*The remedy of grace is primarily directed against original sin, so far as it regards its corruption of the person, and not so far as regards its corruption of the nature; and that, on this account, the disease of nature is not altogether removed.*

5. *We are buried with Christ by baptism into death;* Rom. vi. 4. *If we are dead to sin, how shall we live therein?* v. 2. Now the death and resurrection of Christ were true, in all respects, and not true in some respects, and false in others; therefore, the remission of sin is the true death of

* Part. 4. qu. 8. memb. 8. p. 99. † Book. 4. chap. 3. §. 28.

sin, not as to its guilt only, but as to every thing which has the nature of sin.

I answer,—In the language of Scripture those are said to be *dead to sin*, and to be *buried with Christ*, in whom the Holy Spirit has, by grace, broken the dominion of sin, and renewed the image of righteousness, although the corruption of sin is not yet extirpated; which is clearly gathered from v. 12. For, after the Apostle had taught, that they were dead to sin and buried with Christ, he does not immediately conclude, with Bellarmine, that, *Therefore nothing evil is left in us, which hath the nature of sin;* but—*Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof.* Now, of that which does not at all exist, there can be no danger lest it should reign. Hence from this VIth Chapter to the Romans, whence Bellarmine gathers that *there remains nothing in us which hath the nature of sin*, Augustine has inferred the contrary; namely, that *we are not perfectly freed from sin, whilst we are living in this mortal body.* Augustine on Psalm xxxv.*—*There is sin in this mortal body. But what says the Apostle? Let it not reign, &c. When does it begin not to exist? When that shall be accomplished in us which he says,* WHEN THIS CORRUPTIBLE SHALL HAVE PUT ON INCORRUPTION. He has expressions of very similar import on Psalm l.; and on Psalm lxxv.; also in Sermon xii.†; and in his Exposition of St. John, tract 41. § 10; and elsewhere. Aquinas himself thus writes on this passage:—*He said not, Let not sin exist in your body; because as long as our body is mortal, there cannot but be sin in it, that is, the fuel of sin.* We approve the observation of Aquinas, we reject the gloss—"Fuel of sin;" for although it is a received dogma among the Romanists, that they will not allow concupiscence remaining after baptism to be called *a fault* or *sin*, but *penalty* or *fuel;* yet the more wise among them perceived that this was contrary to the mind of the Apostle. Hence, says Hugo [de St. Victor]‡ *Mark,—the Apostle calls it sin. But it is my opinion, and indeed the opinion of most* [of us Romanists] *that it is not to be reckoned as a fault or sin, after Baptism:* As much as to say,

* See Bede on this place.

† In the Benedictine Edit. it is Serm. 180, § 6.

‡ Annotat. in Ep. ad Rom. pag. 184. B.

that almost all the Papists had departed from the meaning of the Apostle.

Again as to Bellarmine's objection, *that the death of Christ is true in all respects—not true in one respect and false in another;* and as to his inference, viz. *that the remission of sins is absolutely true;* we answer, that that remission is absolutely true, which takes away *the guilt of the person,* and *the punishment due to sin,* although it does not at the same moment entirely purge away *the corruption of nature.* For *the remission of sin* is nothing else than *the non-imputation of sin for punishment,* as Aquinas expressly affirms, qu. disp. de pec. ven. art. 11; and Durandus lib. 2. distinct. 32. qu. 1. Sanctification is indeed joined with this remission: but the remission is perfect, and is instantly accomplished; sanctification, or the purification of corrupt nature, is effected by degrees, nor is it completed before death. We do not therefore maintain a remission of sin, a justification, or a death of sin, which is partly true and partly false, as Bellarmine idly concludes; but we say, that the justification and remission of sin is absolutely true, when the sinner is absolutely absolved from the guilt and the punishment due to his sins. We say also, that this remission of sin is always joined with the true mortification of it, because that is deemed to be truly mortified, which, when its dominion is broken, it is kept under by the power of the Spirit.

6. *Except a man be born again,* &c. John iii. 3. *He hath saved us by the washing of regeneration*; Tit. iii. 5. But a new birth requires the true death of sins, and a true internal change, and not merely imputation. For how are we truly quickened and regenerated, if death yet remains in us? There remains, therefore, nothing in the regenerate which has the nature of sin.

We admit that regeneration requires the true death of sin; and yet we answer that sin is deemed to be truly dead when it lies trodden under foot by the renewing Spirit, and is not permitted to have dominion. For so the Apostle himself concludes, in Romans vi.; where, after he had taught that they were *dead to sin,* he warns them (v. 13), *not to yield their members instruments of unrighteousness unto sin;* and adds this reason (v. 14) *for sin shall not have dominion over you.* He allows therefore that it is not yet extinct, but still

cleaves to our members; yet that it has not power to rule over us, unless we willingly obey the lusts thereof. As regards a *state of militancy* therefore, he is said to be *renewed* and *dead to sin*, who, having been quickened by grace, is walking in the Spirit, and does not obey the lusts of the flesh. But that regeneration which we hope for in *a state of glory*, when all the elect shall actually and wholly live a new life, perfectly expels sin: for Christ calls this state also *regeneration*, Matt. xix. 28: *In the regeneration, when the Son of Man shall sit on the throne of his glory, ye also shall sit upon twelve thrones*, &c. Very improperly, therefore, does Bellarmine assign to this incipient regeneration, which (to speak with the Philosophers) is in the process of accomplishment, that which regards regeneration as consummated, which will be in the state of complete accomplishment.

7. *What fellowship hath righteousness with unrighteousness? What communion hath light with darkness? And what concord hath Christ with Belial*, &c. 2 Cor. vi. 14, 15. Now they who say that, whatever hath the nature of sin is not wholly taken away, would seem to maintain that, at one and the same time, the *devil* is dwelling in us by *sin*, which truly is always in us; and *Christ* by *justification*: For if sin, which in its very nature is mortal, be truly in us, then unrighteousness is in us, then darkness, then Belial; then is there a communion of light with darkness, of righteousness with unrighteousness, of Christ with Belial; which is contrary to the Apostle's words.

I answer,—This passage does not at all bear upon the present case; for the Apostle intends nothing else, than that believers, whose duty it is to be *servants of Christ* and of *righteousness*, ought not to yield themselves slaves, with unbelievers, to *the devil* and *unrighteousness*; that is, should have no intercourse with them, as far as regards the forbidden works of the devil, of unrighteousness, or of darkness. But the Apostle did not mean that no remnants of ignorance, of darkness, or of sin, continue in believers. For, why does he pray that the regenerate may be enlightened more and more, if no darkness remains in them? To what purpose does he enjoin them to be renewed in the spirit of their mind? Why, to cleanse themselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit, if nothing which has the nature of sin cleaves to

them? Nor yet will it follow from this, as Bellarmine endeavours to infer, that *the devil dwells in us by sin, at the same time that Christ does by justification.* For the devil is then said to *dwell* in any one, when he reigns and rules, by means of the dominion of sin; but when sin lies crushed, and the Holy Spirit rules, the devil is said to be *banished.* Miserable would be the case with the whole human family, if the devil *dwelt* in all in whom sin is found; for, *if we say that we have no sin, we lie, and the truth is not in us;* 1 John, i. 8.* Hence Augustine plainly declares, that *there never has been, and never will be, any man without sin, but Christ only;* (de spiritu et litera ad Marcell. cap. ultimo, tom. 3. Vide de peccatorum meritis et remissione, cap. 7 et 8, tom. 7.) But there is no force in the argument on which Bellarmine lays such stress, that *If sin be in us, then there must be a concord of light with darkness, of righteousness with unrighteousness, of Christ with Belial;* for those words, *fellowship, communion, concord,* denote voluntary union, and a certain loving conjunction with unbelievers in the works *of darkness, of unrighteousness, of Satan.* But in all the regenerate the *light* which is *infused* expels daily, more and more, the *native darkness;* the *grace* which is *bestowed* takes away day by day, the *defilement of sin;* and, in fine, the *Spirit* represses and overcomes the *temptations of the devil.* There is here therefore no agreement or fellowship, but a perpetual strife,—*a war without a truce;* according to that declaration of the Apostle, Gal. v. 17, *The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh, and these are contrary the one to the other.*

The Pelagians of old attempted a similar calumny against Augustine, saying that he represented the regenerate to be *in part children of God, and in part children of the devil;* because forsooth he had taught, that no one of the regenerate is entirely free from sin. But what does Augustine answer? *Although the devil is the author and chief of all sin, yet all sins do not constitute children of the devil; for the children of God also commit sin.*† So we answer; although the devil be the author of sin, yet the devil is not

* It may be well to remark here, that this is spoken to believers—to men renewed by the Spirit of Christ and looking to Christ.—Transl.

† Contra duas Epist. Pelag. 3. 3.

said to dwell in all in whom sin dwells, but only in those in whom it prevails and reigns.

8. *Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity;* Psal. v. 5. *Thou lovest righteousness and hatest iniquity;* Psal. xlv. 7. *The ungodly and his ungodliness are both alike hateful to God;* Wisd. xiv. 9. From these passages, it is evident, either that God entirely takes away sin, so that there is nothing for Him to hate; or that certainly nothing at all is remitted. For if sin should remain, God would hate it; if he hated it, his will would be to punish it; if it were his will to punish it, he would not pardon it. To say then that God does not impute sin, which really remains; and that it is his will not to punish it, is a manifest contradiction, according to the Scriptures, which describe God as a most severe enemy and avenger of sin.

I answer: They are called ungodly and workers of iniquity, who wilfully serve their ungodly lusts; but the regenerate are not called ungodly or workers of iniquity because thy have within them the latent remains of original sin. Nay, it is their perpetual effort to coerce and subdue this indwelling sin, lest it should again acquire dominion. They are therefore *opposers*, rather than *workers*, of iniquity. Nor does it follow that God hates the regenerate for their having in them some dregs of original sin. For the love of God towards the regenerate is not founded on their perfection or absolute purity, but on Christ the Mediator, who has transferred their sins to himself, and thus delivered them from the wrath and hatred of God. We readily admit then, that God hateth these remains of sin, and that he shows his hatred, by daily lessening, and at length eradicating them, by his grace and Spirit; but he does not hate the persons of those to whom they cleave, because Christ by his blood hath expiated their guilt. God therefore has willed to punish sin, which he hates, and hath punished it; but he punished it in Christ, who sustained its penalty instead of all the elect.

The sum of our answer comes to this: A two-fold hatred of sin may be considered in God; for he hates sin, either with a simple hatred, or a hatred which reverts upon the person. He hates the sins which cleave to the justified with this simple hatred, because their persons are reconciled to God; but he hates the sins of the ungodly, with that hatred

which reverts upon, or is visited, on their persons, because they have not the *ransom* of Christ applied to them for the expiation of their sins.

Neither can the Papists reject this distinction, since they themselves teach, that the sins which they call *venial*, are indeed odious to God, because evil; yet do not make those who sin venially hateful or odious to God. If venial sin (for I will use their own word) does not render him who commits it odious to God, though he commit it wilfully; then, much less do those remains of original sin, which have been weakened and mortified, and which are opposed by the regenerate by their own renewed will. *For venial sin, as it exists in this person or in that, hath more of the nature of sin, than original sin has*, by the confession of Aquinas himself, quæst. disp. de pœna orig. pecc. art. 1. resp. ad nonum.

Thus far have we answered those testimonies of the Scriptures which are adduced by Bellarmine, de sacr. baptis. lib. 1. cap. 13. We shall now repel those which occur elsewhere.

## CHAPTER VI.

### OTHER ARGUMENTS OF THE PAPISTS CONSIDERED.

1. *There is no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus*; Rom. viii. 1: Therefore there is nothing having the nature of sin left in them. The Tridentine Fathers make use of this passage in establishing their decree, Sess. v.*

* *Decretum de peccato originali.* This important decree, upon which the powerful reasoning of the Bishop bears so strongly, is thus expressed:—"If any one denies that the guilt of original sin is remitted by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ which is conferred in Baptism, or even asserts that that which is truly and properly considered sin (veram et propriam peccati rationem,) is not utterly taken awry, but that it is only shorn (radi,) or not imputed, let him be anathema. For in the regenerate God hates nothing; because there is no condemnation to those who are truly buried with Christ by baptism into death, who walk not according to the flesh, but, putting off the old man, and putting on the new, which is created according to God, are made innocent, immaculate, pure, harmless, and beloved of God; heirs indeed of God,

I answer, if we look to what precedes, Paul himself will afford us a clear solution. For in Chap. vii. v. 17, &c., he confesses that sin yet dwells in his flesh; he confesses, that it rebels against the law of his mind: in fine, he confesses that he is a miserable man, if he is considered in himself; but at length he flees out of himself to Christ; and notwithstanding the sin which dwells in us, he pronounces that *there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.* He did not then deny that the corruption of sin remains in the regenerate; but he affirmed that its condemning power has been taken away, as it respects all who are grafted into Christ.

2. *Ye are washed, ye are sanctified, ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God,* 1 Cor. vi. 11. Nothing, therefore, which has the nature of sin, remains in any regenerate person; for this is truly said of all the regenerate. This was the argument of Andradius,* and is urged by Stapleton and others.

I answer: The Apostle had said that they had been before *fornicators, idolaters, adulterers,* &c.; now he says, from all these sins ye are *washed* and *justified.* What is this to the point? For we grant that their actual sins were wholly blotted out, and we say, that original guilt was washed away; and as to that, every believer also is justified, that is, absolved from its guilt, and accepted in Christ unto life eternal; but we deny that this inward plague is at once eradicated. Nor does the Apostle intimate this, when he affirms that they are sanctified; for the work of sanctification

and co-heirs with Christ; so that nothing at all can retard them from entering heaven. But this holy Synod confesses and feels, that concupiscence or fuel remains in the baptised; which, since it is left for contest, avails not to injure those who do not consent to it, but resist it manfully through the grace of Christ: nay, he who contendeth lawfully shall be crowned. (2 Tim. ii.) The holy Synod declares, that this concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin (Rom. vi. vii. and viii.; Col. iii.) the Catholic Church never understood to be called sin, because it was in the regenerate truly and properly sin; but because it was of sin (ex peccato,) and inclines to sin. But if any one thinks the contrary, let him be anathema."—The IXth and XVth. Articles of the Anglican Church refer to the above.

* ANDRADIUS:—A learned Portuguese Divine sent by Sebastian, King of Portugal to the Council of Trent, in 1562, where he distinguished himself, and afterwards wrote an elaborate defence of the Council. To him the Church is indebted for the pre-eminent work of Chemnitz, "Examen de Concilia Tridentini." We are happy to find that there is a prospect of this admirable production being ere long presented to the world in the English language.

is continually progressing, nor is it completed before our departure from this life. That very same Apostle, therefore, at the same time that he says they were washed and sanctified, also affirms, 1 Cor. iii. 2, 3, that they were *babes in Christ*, and *carnal*, in some respects, and still infected with many sins.

3. *Know ye not that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?* 1 Cor. iii. 16. But in the temple of God all things are clean and pure; therefore no sin remains in the regenerate. This is an argument of Stapleton.

Answer:—In the perfected and finished temple of God, no sin remains; and we shall be such temples of God when we come to the state of glory; whilst however we are in this militant state we are truly esteemed and called *temples* of God, but not yet completely built, not yet carried to the height of perfection: It is then, by no means wonderful, that some rubbish and dust should be found in these temples, which are as it were in an uninterrupted course of building. We therefore answer Stapleton, as Augustine once did Julian:* *Let no one be so foolish as to suppose, that every baptised person is therefore perfect, because it is said— —The temple of God is holy, which temple ye are;— —We are the temple of the living God; and other things of this sort. For this name is given now, even while it is being built. Here our members, which are upon the earth, are being mortified:— —there is however in us something to mortify, so that sin should not reign in our mortal body*, &c. And concerning this evil which cleaves to the justified, he thus speaks in the same chapter:† *How could it be, that such and so great an evil should not, by the mere fact of its being in us, hold us in death, and drag us into final death, if its chain were not broken by that remission of all our sins which takes place in baptism?* Let the Papists shew us, why they deny that evil to have the formal nature of sin, which would condemn only by the mere act of its inherence, unless its guilt were removed by gratuitous remission.

4. *Christ offered himself once in the end of the world for*

* Treat. against Julian; book 6, chap. 14, § 42.

† Chap. 15, § 48.

*the destruction of sin;* Heb. ix. 26. And v. 28, *Christ once offered himself to exhaust the sins of many*, as the Vulgate translation renders it—*ad exhaurienda multorum peccata*. But of that which is *destroyed* and entirely *exhausted*, not even the smallest remains are seen. So Andradius.

I will not contend about words, although if we consider the force of the Greek word, ἀθετεῖν is to abrogate, *or to make of no effect*, and ἀθέτησις, the *abrogation*, in the same sense in which laws are said to be abrogated, when their force is lost, although they are not erased from the statute-books. I might therefore answer, that sin is abrogated by the death of Christ, both because it has lost its *condemnatory* power, inasmuch as it is expiated by the death of Christ; and because it has lost its *domineering* influence in the regenerate, inasmuch as it has been broken and mortified by the Spirit and grace of Christ; although it is not entirely rooted out of the mind and body of the regenerate. But let us admit the Vulgate version in both places. I say that Christ was once offered to destroy, and entirely to bear away, all the sins of all who are to be saved; so that there is not the least need for repeated and reiterated sacrifices, in the same manner as fresh sacrifices were daily renewed under the old law. Therefore, by this one sacrifice, sin will be entirely destroyed and abolished, but in that way in which Christ intended it to be abolished; now he intended that immediately, after the application of the virtue of his death, it should destroy and exhaust sin, whether original or actual, as to its *condemning* and *domineering* power, as we have said; but as to its *infecting* power, he intended sin to be by slow degrees taken away by the virtue of his death; and at length to be altogether swallowed up *when this mortal shall have put on immortality;* for so says the Apostle, 1 Cor. xv. 54, 55. *When this mortal shall have put on immortality, then shall be brought to pass that which is written; Death is swallowed up in victory. O death, where is thy sting? O grave, where is thy victory?* I will allege a passage of Augustine, which most plainly shews, that sin, as to its power of *defiling* and *enticing*, is not destroyed, and wholly taken away from the regenerate, before they are translated to the state of glory; it is cited by Bede in his Commentaries on the passage:—*Then it shall come to pass* (says Augustine)

*that there shall no where be a sting of death, no where shall sin be discoverable. Why so hasty? Then it will be accomplished. May your humility be thought worthy to have it then accomplished in you. Let not your pride prevent its being even then fulfilled in you. Then it shall be accomplished. Only in the mean time, whilst thou art contending with it, say sincerely,—If we shall say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. For we say not the truth, by saying that we have not sin, when here we are not without sin.*

5. *Who gave himself that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself an acceptable people, zealous of good works;* Tit. ii. 14. Gregory de Valentia says,* this passage is particularly clear; and it follows from hence, *That the merit of Christ has not only freed us from condemnation, but also rendered us acceptable, that is, free from sin, and worthy of being beloved by God.* There is therefore nothing of sin in the regenerate.

I answer, the words are sufficiently clear, but the Jesuit's inference is obscure enough. For that Christ gave himself for us, *that he might redeem us by paying the price*, and *might free us from all the transgression of the law*, is very manifest; but this in no way helps the Papal cause; and what follows, namely, *that he might purify unto himself an acceptable people*, helps it much less. For Christ, by the merit of his blood, and the efficacy of his Spirit, purifies all the faithful and makes them zealous of good works. Yet this purification is not carried to perfection in this life; for there always remains in us something which requires to be cleansed. But the gloss of the Jesuit, *that he renders us acceptable, that is free from sin*, is indeed worthy of its author. For the words in the Greek are, *that he might purify unto himself* λαὸν περιούσιον, *a peculiar people*. But grant the Apostle to have said acceptable: Is no one acceptable to God except he who is altogether free from sin? Why then does the holy Church, which without doubt is acceptable to God, pray daily for the forgiveness of her sins? They will perhaps say, that this prayer of the Church has reference to venial sins, which are continually committed by

* De Peccato Originali, cap. 8.

the justified; we however maintain that the remains of original sin cleave to them. But here I ask of the Jesuits, why venial sin perpetrated wilfully, hinders not that the regenerate remain acceptable God; while the broken and debilitated remnants of original sin, which their will resists, does hinder them? For, if we credit Durandus,* *original sin has in no degree the nature of guilt.*

As therefore they say, that the person of a man, reconciled by Christ, remains acceptable to God, although not exempt from sin; so we affirm, that this acceptance, on account of Christ, can exist, although he be not perfectly freed from original sin.

## CHAPTER VII.

### THE REASONS OF OUR ADVERSARIES REFUTED.

Besides these testimonies from Scripture, there are some minor arguments which they are likewise in the habit of producing. Let us then clear these also away.

1. Original sin is the true death of the soul, and constituted man an enemy of God.† Baptism therefore cannot save a man, unless it takes away original sin, and renders him the friend of God, and translates him to spiritual life. Thus it leaves nothing in man which hath the true nature of original sin.

I answer:—Original sin is called the death of the soul, so far as it binds the soul under mortal guilt; but we affirm that this guilt is entirely taken away in baptism. Secondly; it may also be said to be the death of the soul, in so far as it has expelled original righteousness, and has taken from the soul every faculty of doing good in supernatural things; so that it lives to sin, but is entirely dead to righteousness and holiness. Nevertheless it is not kept

* Lib. 2, dist. 42, quæst. 7.

† Suarez in 3. qu. 69. art. 4. disp. 26. sect. 1.

under this death; for by the infused grace of the Holy Spirit, sin itself is mortified, and the soul revives; so that as before it yielded its members servants to unrighteousness, so now, being regenerated, it is enabled to yield the same *servants to righteousness unto holiness*; Rom. vi. 19. Lastly, the enmity to God is taken away, so far as the person of the regenerate being reconciled to God by Christ, is pleasing unto him, and being adorned with new gifts, appears moreover fair in his sight. Since, then, indwelling sin, which is not yet extirpated from the justified, neither condemns the man because its guilt is done away; nor deprives the soul of spiritual life, because its dominion is broken; nor places enmity between God and the regenerate, because it so cleaves to the *nature*, as not to be imputed to *the person*, which is reckoned to be in *Christ*, not in *the old Adam*: there is no force in the conclusion of the Jesuit's reasoning, which supposes, that death and the hatred of God cannot be removed from man, unless whatever hath the nature of sin is removed.

2. True holiness or inherent righteousness renders the soul worthy of eternal glory, and therefore worthy to be exempt from the infliction of eternal punishment and privation of glory;* but any remnant of sin renders the soul unworthy of glory, and worthy of eternal punishment: If therefore we assume that inherent righteousness and the infliction of original sin exist in the same *justified* person, we assume that the very same person is at the same time worthy of glory and not worthy of glory; which implies a manifest contradiction.

I answer.—Holiness, or infused grace, is a previous disposition or state required by Divine appointment in all whom God has destined to glory. But our worthiness for glory does not depend upon the absolute perfection of inherent grace, but upon the right of adoption or sonship; for God does not design us for glory on account of infused qualities; but because he has adopted us in Christ, he therefore makes us co-heirs with Christ of eternal glory: *If sons, then heirs, heirs* indeed *of God, and joint heirs with Christ*; Rom. viii. 17. We therefore deny that inherent righteousness in the

* Vasquez in 1. 2. qu. 113. disp. 204. art. 2. cap. 4.

regenerate renders them absolutely worthy of eternal glory; which is clear from hence, that no one of the regenerate can enter into the kingdom of glory, unless the soul which in this life was never free from stains, be entirely freed from final grace in its departure. Hence that saying of Augustine—* *We are not without sin here; but we shall depart hence without sin.* But now, as to what he says, that sin remaining in us makes us unworthy of glory, we willingly allow it; for we expect eternal glory, not as due *(ex condigno)* to our inherent righteousness or holiness, but as a gift or *grace* (χάρισμα) of the Divine bounty accepting us in Christ; Rom. vi. 23. Yet we will not concede to the Jesuit, that these remains of original sin now mortified, render us more unworthy of glory, than the venial sins (as they call them) which we daily commit. When, therefore, he will tell me how these venial sins can consist with inherent grace, and yet not render the regenerate person at the same time worthy and unworthy of eternal glory, then I will answer him with the same facility about these remains of original sin.

3. It is a contradiction that anything should at one and the same time exactly accord with, and yet not accord with a given rule;† therefore the same man cannot be at the same time righteous and holy, and infected with any sin. For to be righteous or holy is nothing else than as it were to accord with the supreme rule in the eye of God; but to be in sin is the same as not to accord with his rule in the eye of God.

I answer:—Most certain it is, that the same thing cannot at one and the same time entirely accord and yet not accord with the same rule: we will therefore readily concede this to the Jesuit. Neither will we deny, that a man infected with any sin does not accord with God, or the Divine rule. But as to his assumption, that to be righteous or to be holy, is nothing less than fully to come up to the will of God, as the Divine rule, is most false, and contrary to the confession of all the righteous and holy, whether it be referred to our habitual or actual righteousness. For to be righteous or holy, according to the language of Scripture, denotes nothing else than to be endowed with some supernatural gift which re-

* Tom. 10. in verbis Apos. Serm. 29. [Serm. 181 in the Benedictine and subsequent editions.]

† Vasquez in 1. 2. quæst. 113. disp. 204. art. 2. cap. 4.

strains, enfeebles, and mortifies corrupt nature, and elevates man to the exercise of supernatural actions. But that righteousness and exact holiness which corresponds precisely to the Divine rule is peculiar to the angels and the glorified, not to the militant here on earth. How imperfect and impure our inherent or habitual righteousness is, Jerome has fully described in these words:—*They who seem to men to be holy, are by no means holy in the view of the knowledge and understanding of God; for man looks on the appearance, but God upon the heart. But if no one is righteous in the sight of God, who sees all things, and from whom the secrets of the heart are not hidden; it is clearly shewn that the heretics do not exalt man, but derogate from the power of God.** Concerning our actual righteousness, what is more plain than that saying of the Psalmist? (xxxii. 5, 6.) *I said, I will confess my transgression unto the Lord; and thou forgavest the iniquity of my sin. For this shall every one that is godly pray unto thee in a time when thou mayest be found.* They therefore are recognised as holy, who, notwithstanding, need the forgiveness of sins. But he has not need of the forgiveness of sins, who exactly accords with the Divine rule; for such an one would be able to endure the examination of the Divine judgment; which none of those whom God vouchsafes to call righteous or holy would venture to undergo: nay, the most holy men are wont the most humbly to deprecate it, like the Psalmist, cxliii. 1, 2; *Enter not into judgment with thy servant, for in thy sight shall no flesh living be justified.* Let us hear what Augustine writes on these words:—*What is meant by Enter not into judgment with thy servant? Stand not with me in judgment, by exacting from me all things which thou hast commanded; for thou wilt find me guilty, if thou shalt enter into judgment with me. There is need therefore of mercy, rather than of the most equitable judgment.*† And a little after,‡ *In the resurrection of the dead, we shall have complete righteousness; but, in the contemplation of that resurrection, our whole present life seems mere defilement.* Therefore that righteousness about which the Jesuit dreams,

* Hieron. adversus Pelagianos.

† Aug. tom. 10. Serm. 49. de temp. [§ 6; or Edit. Benedic. Serm. 170.]

‡ § 7.

as fully according with the Divine law, is to be restricted, not to the inchoate righteousness of this life, but to that according to which the angels and glorified beings live.

4. Grace infused or inherent, and inherent sin are related to each other, as contrary forms, each of which physically and formally expels the other, by its mere presence and indwelling. Therefore like as darkness is expelled by the admission of light, or cold by the introduction of heat; so by the introduction of inherent grace into the soul, whatever hath the nature of inherent sin is forthwith removed.*

I answer,—there are many, among the Schoolmen themselves, who maintain that sin expels grace not *by the nature of the thing*, but by its *demerit*. For since the preservation of grace depends upon a perpetual influx of God, as the preservation of light in the atmosphere upon the perpetual influx of the sun; they suppose that it can be expelled by sin, not because from the nature of the thing they cannot subsist together, but because God, on account of the desert of sin, withdraws the influx of his Divine grace. Durandus, Scotus, Paludanus,† and others, follow this opinion. Hence, as to any stain contracted from actual sin, it may, in my opinion, quite consist with inherent or infused grace; because God does not deal with the regenerate according to their demerits. The conclusion therefore will not hold, that because sin expels grace by its demerit, that is, deserves the withdrawal of grace, it therefore always expels grace in fact. As to what relates to the remains of original sin, I affirm that they may consist with inherent righteousness, although we admit the hypothesis of our opponents, that these two

* Quemadmodum igitur posito lumine in ære tolluntur tenebræ, vel posito calore tollitur frigus; sic positâ gratiâ inhærente in animo, tollitur illico quicquid habet rationem peccati inhærentis.—Original.

† PALUDANUS (PETRUS); a Dominican Friar and Professor of Theology at Paris; afterwards (1329) Patriarch of Jerusalem. He took an active part in the attempts to renew the Crusades; and subsequently in the Controversy between the Franciscans and Dominicans concerning the poverty of Christ and the Apostles:—he died at Paris in 1342. He published *Commentaries* on the third and fourth books of the "Sententiæ" of Lombard; *Sermones, sive Enarrationes in Evangelia* de tempore et sanctorum festis:—et *in Evang. et Epistolas Quadragesimales; De Causâ immediatâ Ecclesiasticæ potestatis circa materiam Confessionum; Quod fratres prædicatores habere possunt possessiones.* —These works are in the Bodleian Library at Oxford; whether he wrote any others the Translator has had no means of ascertaining.

qualities—that of infused righteousness and that of indwelling sin—are formally contrary to each other. For although two qualities formally contrary cannot harmonise in the same subject, and in the highest degrees; yet, when striving together, and in diminished degrees, they may for some time co-exist. For, if you place fire under the coldest water, it quickly imparts some heat to it; yet does not totally expel its natural coldness at once, but at length, by a protracted conflict it overcomes its enemy, and acquires full possession by its expulsion. So God applies the celestial fire of his grace to our nature, cold and dead in sin, which presently introduces some inherent holiness; yet does not thoroughly remove from it original sin, but, after a continual warfare in this life, at length ejects this adversary in death, and takes to itself full and peaceable possession.

Such are the considerations which Vasquez urges against us. Now I shall examine the weak reasonings of Becan.

5. When spots, filth, and defilements of the body are cleared away by external washing, they do not then remain in the body, but disappear;* therefore in the same manner, when spots, filth, and defilements of the soul are cleared away and purged by internal washing (which is effected in justification) nothing which has the nature of sin remains in the soul.

I answer,—As the filth of the body is not entirely cleared away, so soon as any one shall have begun to wash it, but after the operation of washing is finished; so the filth of the soul is not cleared away, as soon as the grace of God, whether in the sacrament or without the sacrament, shall have begun to purify us, but after the operation of cleansing grace has been perfected and completed. The Jesuit therefore most sadly errs in this, that he thinks baptismal grace produces its entire effect at once, whereas it frees us immediately from *the guilt* of sin, but by a gradual process from its pollution. We do not deny then that the effect of grace is a full and entire purgation from sin; but we teach with Augustine,† that we arrive at this hoped for perfection by the same baptism which is here received. We enjoy not immediately this perfect cleansing, but at length we shall attain to it by the benefit and efficacy of Divine grace, operating continually in us.

* *De Justif.* Calv. cap. 1. † *Contra Julian.* lib. 6. tom 7.

6. He who is completely freed and liberated from the bodily chains with which he hath been bound, surely does not retain them on his limbs, nor any longer carry them about with him; therefore he, who is liberated from the spiritual chains (that is from his sins) by which he had been bound and held captive under the power of Satan, no longer retains such fetters upon him, nor carries them about with him. Nothing, therefore, which has the nature of sin remains in the justified.

I answer:—In justification we are liberated from the chains of our sins, so far as they bound us for condemnation, yea, even so far as they held us under the dominion of Satan; and this suffices for its being truly said, that the chains of our sins are broken asunder by the grace of God: for the remains thereof abiding in us have not the nature of a chain, but are themselves enchained by the grace now predominant over them, and treading them as it were under foot. What the extent then of this liberty of the regenerate and justified is, we may learn from Augustine, and at the same time refute the error of Becan. He thus writes, on the freedom of the regenerate from sin, Tract. 41. § 10, in the Exposition of St. John:—*Our first freedom then, is freedom from open offences.* After a few intervening remarks —*When a man begins to be free from these, then he begins to raise his head in freedom; but it is only an inchoate, not a perfect liberty; but partly liberty and partly bondage; not yet entire, not pure, not full liberty, because not yet eternal.* Those therefore are exempt from the chains of their sins, from whom sin itself is not entirely taken away.

7. A skilful physician of the body so knows how to cure all its diseases, as not only to remove them from the body, but to eradicate and destroy them altogether. Therefore Christ, that most skilful Physician of souls, can entirely take away all those sins with which the soul is wounded and afflicted. And hence nothing which has the nature of sin remains in the man who is justified, or who is healed by Christ.

I answer:—We do not deny that Christ can heal all the diseases of our minds, nor that he is willing to cure them. But the question is, when is this thorough cure obtained? Our opponents say, it is effected immediately by the very infusion of sanctifying grace; but they do not prove it. We

say that it is not done before this mortal shall have put on immortality, and we easily prove it. Becan indeed enumerates four wounds for which, (as he affirms) Christ instantly in our very justification has brought a perfect cure; the ignorance of the understanding, the perverseness of the will, the infirmity and concupiscence of both kinds of appetite. But all this is uttered without sufficient learning or consideration. For the Papal Theologians lay it down indeed that the habitual aversion of the will from God is healed and reformed; but the infirmity of the will, the ignorance of the understanding, and inordinate concupiscence, they confess is not wholly healed or entirely taken away. To the same effect, Augustine speaks very beautifully and perspicuously* —*As a physician hates the sickness of his patient, and his object in his remedies is to remove the sickness, and raise up the patient; so God, by his grace, so acts in us as to effect the destruction of sin and the liberation of man. But when is this destruction effected, you will ask? If enfeebled, why not utterly destroyed? That is enfeebled in the life of those who are making progress, which is utterly destroyed in the life of those who are perfected.* And a little after:†—*Wounded, let us beseech the Physician; Let us be carried into the hospital that we may be healed.* Nothing can be clearer than that every militant one is wounded; and that the Church is the hospital in which the wounded ones are healed: but so that every day the disease of sin becomes less and less in them; and at length when they arrive at the haven of glory it is utterly consumed.

8. Baptism is compared to the Red Sea; but in it the Egyptians were utterly drowned and destroyed. In proof of this Becan alleges that saying of Gregory.‡—*He who says that sins are not altogether remitted in baptism, must also say that the Egyptians were not truly destroyed in the Red Sea.*

This reasoning decides nothing; for first, as the Egyptians truly died and were drowned in the Red Sea, so we confess that our sins are truly drowned and mortified by regenerating grace. But that sin is *mortified* is one thing, if we speak of original sin; and another that it is *entirely removed* and *extirpated*. Secondly, not only the Egyptians, but Pharaoh,

* *In Evang. Joan.* Tract. 41. § 9. † (§ 13 of the same Tractate on St. John.)
‡ Lib. xi. Epist. 45.

King of the Egyptians, was destroyed in the Red Sea. If therefore this mode of reasoning had any force, not only would our sins be utterly abolished, but the spiritual Pharaoh, namely, the Devil himself, would be removed from amongst us. Lastly, Gregory himself, on whose authority Becan rests his case, infers nothing more from this type, than that our sins are entirely remitted in baptism; which is not called in question by us.*

## CHAPTER VIII.

### A REFUTATION OF THE PAPISTS WHO CONTEND THAT CONCUPISCENCE REMAINING IN THE REGENERATE IS NOT SIN.

THERE yet remains one argument of the Papists to be refuted, especially as it has proved the cause of manifold disputes, and has led the way to a controversy peculiarly its own. It may be reduced to this form:—

Concupiscence hath not the true and proper nature of sin; but the whole corruption remaining in the regenerate is designated and comprehended under this term *concupiscence;* therefore the corruption which remains in them hath not the nature of sin.

In order to arrive more easily at the proof of the major, the Jesuits premise a most absurd opinion, which not only is inconsistent with the Scriptures, but has always been disapproved by the Fathers, by the more learned Schoolmen, and even by the more sound minded Papists. This I will state to you in the very words of Bellarmine:†—*It cannot by any means be inferred, that the mere natural state of man was more sound and holy before sin, than it is now after sin.* — — — *Nay rather, the most obvious principles*

* The student, desirous of knowing Davenant's views more at large on this subject, will do well to refer to his *Exposition on the Epistle to the Colossians*, especially to that portion on verse 12 in the iind chapter, or vol.1, p. 440 of the writer's Translation. The Index will direct him to other portions where the subject of Baptism is handled more or less at large.

† *De gratia primi hominis*, cap. 7.

*of reason teach, that man in his mere natural state* [before the fall] *would have been altogether such, that his downward tendency to vice would have existed in him. — — — God would not however have been the author of this rebelliousness, even if he had created man in a purely natural state; but that would have proceed from the nature of the material, contrary to the intention of God the Creator.*

Now Bellarmine's fancies, *that man created without supernatural gifts would not have had natural gifts more pure or more sound than we have them in a state of sin*, are opposed to the common opinion of theologians, for they teach that man, through the fall of Adam, was stripped of his supernatural gifts, and maimed in those of nature. Thus Lombard says:* — *Through the sin of Adam, man's natural endowments have been corrupted, and the endowments gratuitously superadded have been withdrawn.* Even man's natural endowments therefore, would have been more sound than they now are, if sin had not corrupted them. But where Bellarmine adds, *That the downward tendency to vice, and the rebellion of concupiscence against the mind, exist in man considered in his natural state*, both reason and religion at once contradict him. For reason teaches that, in everything, *that* is naturally the strongest which is the best and most noble; since therefore the mind and will are naturally more noble than the sensitive appetite, they ought to have, even according to nature, the dominion over it; and that appetite ought, according to nature, to be subject to the mind. Which may the more easily be understood from the circumstance, that the sensitive appetite in man is not the power of mere animal life, but of a reasoning soul directing its view to sensible objects. Therefore, as Durandus remarks,† the exercise of this appetite is designed by nature to be regulated by the exercise of reason. When therefore it manifests a rebellious and determined tendency to vice, this is not the natural defect of man considered in an unfallen state, but the original vice of man corrupted by sin. William, Bishop of Paris, has long since admirably refuted this error of the Jesuit in his treatise *De vitiis et peccatis*, cap. 1 and 2, and in his book entitled *De Causis cur Deus homo*,

* Lib. ii. 25. † Lib. iii. dist. 33. quæst. 3.

cap. 2. Even Aquinas himself acknowledges,* that this concupiscence by which the principle itself is liable to be borne downward, toward that which gratifies the sense against the order of reason, is contrary to man's nature considered as man. But man, as man, is nothing else than a rational animal considered in his simple natural state. But the unbridled motion of concupiscence, according to the opinion of Aquinas, is incompatible with man thus considered.

It is a small matter, however, that this Jesuitical error is opposed to Reason and the Schools;—it overturns the very foundations of the Christian religion. For if the condition of fallen man is the same in all things with the condition of man considered in an unfallen state, except that the latter has lost certain supernatural endowments, and the former never possessed them, it will follow, that man has not been inwardly defiled or polluted by sin, but only deprived of certain adventitious endowments, and held guilty for having lost them. And though he might not now shine clothed in his supernatural endowments as before; yet he would flourish and be free from every wound and distemper, as far as regards his natural soundness.† Now this is shewn to be most false by the experience of all men. For, as it is truly observed by William, Bishop of Paris,‡—*If we consider the condition of man before he sinned, in the purity and nobility of his natural perfections alone, and the condition of this present corruption in which we are born, we shall find that the former was truly human, and that of a true man; but the latter is, in a great measure, that of a brute.* A little afterwards he says, that *the natural warmth of the soul is as it were extinct.* Nor does Bernard think otherwise, who says§ that *in the fall of the first man we have all fallen upon a heap of sharp stones, and into the mire; whence we are not merely defiled, but also wounded and grievously shattered.* But in the sentiment advanced by that Jesuit [Bellarmine] the following clause is most abominable, and borders on blasphemy, in which he asserts that *this headlong rebelliousness arises from*

* Quæst. disp. *de Peccato Originali*, artic. 2, *resp. ad primum.*
† Vide Bernard, *in Serm. de Cœna Domini*, pag. 188.
‡ *De Universo*, part. 2, cap. 59, pag. 852.
§ *In Serm.* 1, *in Cœna Dom.*

*a certain necessary condition of the material, contrary to the intention of God the Creator.* For first, we would ask, what poison of so deleterious a quality can exist in a particle of earth as necessarily to dispose the soul united with it to run headlong into vice, contrary to the intention of God the Creator, unless it be restrained by some supernatural check? What devices so powerful as to set the powers of one and the same soul in hostile array, and inflame them to civil war, unless the strife be settled by auxiliaries called in from some foreign quarter! In the second place, who can suppose that God is so unskilful or weak an artificer, as to be unable to create a body out of sensible matter, but that it must needs draw, by its natural bias, the inferior powers of the soul into open rebellion against the superior? Lastly, that this downward tendency to vice, and this unbridled rebelliousness of concupiscence do not arise from the necessary condition of the material, but from the infection of sin, appears hence, that this rebelliousness hath its seat in the mind and will, no less than in the sensible appetite, and exerts itself upon spiritual objects. Nay, even in carnal sins themselves, the soul more frequently draws the body to unbridled lust, than the body does the soul.*

Let these observations suffice as to the error of the Jesuits, which I have thought should be briefly aimadverted upon for two reasons: *First,* that hence you may be able to form an opinion as to the soundness of the doctrine of the Papists concerning concupiscence, resting as it does upon such a foundation; *secondly,* that you may notice by the way that the Tridentine Fathers, when in their decree they assert that concupiscence, or the fuel of sin in the regenerate is not truly and properly sin, in reality mean that it is not truly and properly sin at all, either in the regenerate or the unregenerate; but in both, a natural state arising from the necessary construction of the material; and that the unregenerate are guilty of sin, not for having in themselves unbridled concupiscence, but for having lost in Adam the supernatural check of original righteousness, from which state of guilt they are not yet released. But let us now bring forward the arguments of our adversaries. Bellarmine in his

* Albertus, lib. 2, tract. 25.

treatise (*De Admissione Gratiæ*, book 5, cap. 7), thus contends from the Scriptures:—

1. *Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sin, and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death.* (James i., 14, 15.) Here we see four things distinguished; *Lust*, that is that faculty of exercising the appetite which, is prone to evil, and its three motions, *suggestion*, *delight*, and *consent*. Suggestion is that first apprehension of the object of delight, which draws aside and allures the soul. And if so be it draws to delight with some imperfect consent, the second motion follows, of which St. James says, *Lust, when it hath conceived*, that is, when it hath allured or entered the soul, *bringeth forth sin*. Lastly, if the suggestion with delight superadded to it, draws to perfect consent, the third motion is produced, of which the Apostle says, *Sin, when it is finished bringeth forth death*. For, by *sin finished* ought to be understood not only actual sin, but every sin whatsoever, with which the full assent of the will has been combined. Hence then it is maintained, that concupiscence—that is the power or faculty which tends [to evil] and its first motion—is not called sin; the imperfect bringing forth—that is, the delight not fully resolved on—is called sin, but not mortal; and lastly, that the finished bringing forth—that is, desire with full consent—is altogether mortal sin.

To this it may be replied; the Apostle is speaking not of that kind of temptation which proves or tries the character, but of that which leads into sin; and he shews first, its *cause* or *origin*, namely, corrupt concupiscence which dwells in our minds. Secondly, he teaches its *progress*, which consists in these distinct degrees: by its motion it excites and inflames the mind to desire inordinately the pleasurable object, then it ensnares or allures it by an unlawful delight in the same object; moreover it causes it to conceive within itself the purpose of the outward act; and in the end to *bring forth sin*, that is, bring to the act. Thirdly, and lastly, the Apostle indicates the issue or wages of sin; it leaves the sinner in a state of death and damnation.—Having given this explanation, I assert that Bellarmine has erred both in his *explanation* of this passage, as well as in his *inference* from it.

He has erred in his *explanation*; for he sets down the conception of sin to be a delight not fully resolved on; whereas the conception denotes rather the inward consent to the perpetration of the act: for the allurement, preceding the conception, designates such complacency or delight, as Lyra rightly observes on this passage. This also is unsound in the exposition of Bellarmine, that he mingles and confounds conception with bringing forth; now the bringing forth is what leads to the external act; as the Gloss rightly explains it.* There is moreover in his interpretation this great absurdity, that he would have *sin finished* to be understood of the internal desire to which consent is yielded; whereas the desire and consent are involved in the conception, and openly manifested in the bringing forth. Their opinion, therefore, is more correct who understand by *sin finished*, either sin grown into habit by frequent acts, as Aquinas; or a course of sin completed, as Calvin. Lastly, as to the words *bringeth forth death*, which he perverts into this meaning—*begins to be mortal sin*, that is a sense altogether foreign to the intention of St. James; for he is not enquiring what punishment is due to sin, according to its different degrees, but what end awaits the sinner, or what is the state of the sinner who yields obedience to his concupiscence.

Let us now pass to a consideration of *the inference* of Bellarmine. *Hence we learn* (says he) first, *that the inclination of concupiscence, and its first irregular motion, is not to be called sin*. As though it were necessary, that whensoever mention is made about any sin, the word *sin* should be used! St. James shews sufficiently that this concupiscence is original sin, when he says that it bringeth forth actual sin. Moreover, if the quibble of Bellarmine had any weight, concupiscence would not be sin, even in unbelievers themselves and the yet unregenerate; for the Apostle is speaking of these also. Bellarmine infers, secondly, *that the imperfect bringing forth of concupiscence, that is, the delight not fully resolved on, is not mortal sin*. But he himself is the inventor of this perfect and imperfect birth—a distinction not authorised by the words of the Apostle: then he improperly restricts this bringing forth to delight, whereas it must be referred to the perpetration of the act. Lastly, his inference

* Albert. ubi supra.

is bad, that *it is only when accompanied with full consent that sin merits death; because sin when it is finished bringeth forth death.* For an infant, as soon as it is born, or conceived, is liable to death, although it be rightly said to die after the career of life is finished; in like manner, original sin, which has neither brought forth, nor has been consummated by consent, generates death.

2. *Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. For I know that in me (that is in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing;* Rom. vii. 17, 18. The Apostle clearly teaches in these words, that concupiscence in a justified man is not properly such a sin as can render him guilty. For, in the first place, he says that the motion of concupiscence is not *his own work*, and on this account cannot be imputed *to him.* He then adds, that this kind of evil is not *in himself*, but *in his flesh;* now it is evident, that the flesh is not capable of sin properly so called.

Answer: If our opponents would be consistent, they ought to maintain, that neither in unbelievers, nor in the justified, is concupiscence properly sin; but an infirmity flowing from the necessary condition of the material, as Bellarmine in the passage already quoted philosophised. But they are ashamed to profess expressly what they hold at heart: they assert therefore, that concupiscence in the justified is not properly such a sin as can render him guilty: as though what is truly and properly sin is always capable of rendering the person of a justified man guilty. A distinction should therefore be made between the guilt of concupiscence which arises from its own proper *nature*, and the guilt flowing back upon the *person*, and binding him. This disorderly concupiscence, if it be regarded in itself, is always sin deserving of punishment; but if it be regarded with relation to the person absolved by the grace of Christ from all sin, it cannot render him guilty, that is, cannot bind him with deadly guilt: and in that sense it is sometimes denied, by Augustine, to be sin. He argues against Julian (Lib. 6. cap. 6.) that concupiscence is put away in baptism, *not so as not to exist, but as not to be imputed for sin.* But that which is said to remain, and yet not to be imputed for sin, has lost by gratuitous remission, the *guilt* wherewith it made the person guilty; though it has not lost the *taint* and *corruption*, which by its own na-

ture would render him guilty, if gratuitous remission did not prevent. But our opponent urges, that the motion of concupiscence is not *the regenerate man's own act*, and therefore cannot be imputed to him. This however does not prove the motion of concupiscence not to be sin in its own nature, but rather proves the contrary. For the Apostle in himself, and in every regenerate man, considers two persons, as it were; one of the carnal man derived from the old Adam, the other of the spiritual man regenerated by the Spirit of Christ. Nothing flows from that old man but sin; from this new man flows whatever is holy and acceptable to God. And by that saying, *It is no more I that do it*, &c., he means to express, *I, the spiritual man: I, the new person engrafted into Christ, as such, do not perform the motions of evil concupiscence. But there is in me another I, a carnal man, sold under sin, who does all these things*, &c. (v. 14).

From this passage, therefore, we gather that concupiscence and its motions are sins, as well because concupiscence itself is expressly called sin dwelling in us; as because the motions of concupiscence flow not from the person of the regenerate, as regenerate, whence good works arise; but as he remains partly carnal: for, hence the spring of all sins. Lastly, Bellarmine urges, that the Apostle says that this evil is not *in himself*, but *in his flesh*: Now the flesh is not capable of sin. Flesh, however, in this passage, does not denote the corporeal and sensible substance, which constitutes the one part of man: but the mind, the will, the affections, and the whole man as corrupt and defiled by the old Adam. Thus in Gal. v. 20, *heresies* are called *works of the flesh*, which however spring from the mind, not from the body. But this *flesh*, that is, this man considered as *carnal*, not only is capable of sin, but most peculiarly is capable of sin; for it is that other, namely, the spiritual man which is a partaker of righteousness and holiness.

Bellarmine objects to this reply, true as it is,—First, If by *the flesh* the whole man is to be understood, St. Paul could not truly say, *It is no more I that do it*. Nay, but he could most truly say so; for I, the spiritual man, I, engrafted into Christ, am rightly said not to do what I, the carnal man, and partially abiding in the old Adam, do. And the reason is, that the mind itself, and the will, so far as they are regene-

rate, strive against, and withstand themselves, so far as they are still defiled by the remains of the old Adam. Secondly, he objects, that that correction, *In me, that is in my flesh*, is foolish and frivolous, if that evil, of which he speaks, pervade the whole man. Nay, the explanation is the more necessary; for whereas the dispositions of regeneration, and of the flesh, that is, of the old man, are found in the whole regenerate man; just as in diluted wine, as well the water as the wine are found in every part: it was necessary explicitly to distinguish what flows from this regenerate and spiritual, what from that old and carnal man. Thirdly, he says that the flesh is distinguished from the mind in these words, *With the mind I serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin;* and therefore the flesh does not seem to extend itself at all to the mind. But the answer is easy; namely, that *mind* in this passage is used for the mind renewed and sanctified by the Spirit, and is opposed, not to the sensible and material flesh, but to flesh taken metaphorically, which in some measure still infects the mind itself. Fourthly, he argues that the Apostle explains what he means by *flesh*, when he says afterwards, *Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?* And that by body is designated one only of the two parts. Nay, surely, the body, in this place (as also elsewhere*) denotes that very mass of corruption and heap of sin, adhering as well to the body as to the mind. For the Apostle wishes and desires, not so much to be delivered from this body of mortality, as from the body of sin, which cannot be eradicated whilst we carry about the mortal body. He objects fifthly, that even though the word *flesh* is sometimes taken for the whole man, yet when the *flesh* is meant in a bad sense, it is used only of the ungodly whose mind obeys the flesh. We admit that it is sometimes restricted to the ungodly, but we deny that it is always so. For the godly themselves, so far as they have the remains of sin, are called *carnal;* not only as respects the inferior part, but as to the mind and will; 1 Cor. iii. 1, 2, and 3. For what can be the reason that the mind and will should so frequently yield to these lusts of the flesh, if they had not something carnal still remaining in them? But this sin,

* Rom. vi. 6; Col. ii. 11.

whereby consent is given to concupiscence, is not committed except by the will. Hence Altissiodorensis* has defined concupiscence to be *The evil will by which the soul desires to fornicate with the creature.* Lib. 3. art. 2. cap. 3. quæst. 2.

3. *There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus;* Rom. viii. 1. The Apostle had shewn before, that a concupiscence opposing the law of the mind exists in all the justified; and yet in these words he concludes that there is in them no condemnation; or that there is nothing in them deserving of condemnation. The Apostle therefore, did not think concupiscence to be sin properly so called, or in its own nature. For if it was sin, it would have in itself some condemnation, or guilt deserving condemnation.

We have touched upon this passage before; but because it is urged by Bellarmine somewhat strongly, we will reply to it again. It is then to be observed, that the Apostle has not drawn this conclusion, that *there is nothing damnable or worthy of condemnation in concupiscence itself;* but, *there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.* Therefore he points out the reason, why the regenerate cannot be condemned, namely, because they have been engrafted into Christ, not because they have been entirely freed from sin. For, like as by nature we are born children of wrath, and under the guilt of sin, because we are regarded as in the old Adam, and are infected with the original malady propagated from him; so, when we are born again, we are freed from the anger of God and the guilt of sin, because we are regarded as in the new Adam, and are endowed with a holiness derived from him. But (as was before said) we are absolved *forthwith* and *totally* from the guilt of all sins, on account of the merit of Christ, with whom we are joined in one person; though we are delivered from *the contagion of sin by degrees,* not on account of want of power in Christ the Redeemer; but for reasons delivered by us elsewhere.

Against this answer Bellarmine objects, First, that when the guilt has been put away, nothing can remain which has the true nature of sin, since guilt is that which is properly called sin, or at least that which is the formal part of sin;

* William, Bishop of Auxerre: see Exposition on the Colossians, Vol. I. p. 68, Note.

but when the formal part is removed, the nature of sin no longer remains.*—I answer: the guilt of sin is taken either for the intrinsic desert of its punishment, which is founded in its ἀνομία—its lawlessness, or its inordinancy; and this guilt is called by some the formal part† of sin, and is inseparable from sin; or from the extrinsic appointment to punishment, arising from the will of God, who determines and wills to punish it: and this guilt may be taken away and removed from the person by the sole will of God, although sin still cleaves to the person. We say, then, that guilt is taken away from indwelling concupiscence, not because the intrinsic demerit of it, which deserves punishment, is entirely taken away; but because the extrinsic appointment of it to punishment is taken away from all who believe and are engrafted into Christ, by God having mercy upon them for Christ's sake. Neither has this opinion originated in the teaching of the Protestants, but the most learned of the Schoolmen have maintained it long since. For that this destination to punishment can be removed, by the will of God alone, through a free grant, without any change of the man, is contended for by Scotus, Occam, Gabriel, Petrus de Alliaco, and others mentioned by Vasquez in 1, 2. Disp. 206, cap. 1.

Here, however, I would have you observe, that these learned men have asserted more than was needful for our defence: for they say that this guilt can be removed, without any inward change of the sinner: but we affirm that the regenerate are changed when they are absolved from guilt, namely, by concupiscence being very much weakened and broken, although not entirely eradicated.

Secondly, Bellarmine affirms that, although it be conceded that guilt is separable from inherent concupiscence, yet it is

* This passage might have been thus rendered: "But when the formal or distinguishing attribute of anything is withdrawn, the nature or character of that thing no longer remains." It is a general principle appealed to in general terms, in support of the particular application to sin; but the Translator did not feel at liberty to interpolate in the text, so largely, expressions, however desirable, to render his author more intelligible.

† As the phrase "formal part" and "formal cause" will frequently occur in the progress of the work, it may be well to add a definition as applicable to the use of it here. Webster explains it as "Having the power of making a thing what it is; constituent; essential."

certain from the Scriptures, that God never remits guilt whilst its foundation remains, because *the judgment of God is according to truth;* Rom. ii. 2. But this is a manifest begging of the question; for the point under consideration is —Whether God, for Christ's sake, remits the guilt of original sin, to those who still have the remains of this sin dwelling in them? And the proof which he subjoins from Rom ii. is quite foreign to the point. For the judgment of God may be according to truth, and yet he can absolve man infected by sin from its guilt. For God does not judge the regenerate to be altogether free from sin; neither does he judge concupiscence cleaving to them not to deserve punishment: but he sees them to be infected with the sin of concupiscence; he sees this sin to be in its own nature worthy of punishment, and he judges that, although they are sinners, yet for the sake of the Mediator, into whom they are engrafted, they are to be acquitted, and freed from all condemnation. In this judgment of God, nothing either false or unjust is to be found.

Thirdly, Bellarmine contends that the illative particle *therefore*, itself shews that this conclusion depends upon the foregoing words. There, however, he observes, the Apostle had not said, that God freely forgives the guilt of concupiscence; but had intimated that the motions of concupiscence are not sin, because the regenerate man says, *It is no more I that do it*, &c. But I answer, that neither from the preceding words, nor from the illative particle, nor from these words—*It is not I that do it*—can anything else be deduced, than that every regenerate man is no longer regarded in the old Adam, but is reputed a new person in Christ.

As therefore the actions which spring from the flesh, are declared not to be actions of the regenerate person; so also the inward guilt, which cleaves to the sin dwelling in their flesh, is with much more justice removed from their person. For there is nothing to prevent the non-imputation to the person of that which adheres to the nature, when the person is taken out of its natural stock and engrafted into a new one.

Thus far of the testimonies brought by Bellarmine from the Scriptures; he subjoins to these some arguments, which we shall also now proceed to sift.

## CHAPTER IX.

### BELLARMINE'S ARGUMENTS SIFTED.

1. BAPTISM frees from all sin; but it does not free from concupiscence: therefore concupiscence is not sin.

I answer:—Baptism frees *the person* from *the guilt* of all sins; but it does not immediately free *the nature* from the *operation*, or *indwelling* of original sin. This is the uniform opinion of Augustine, who teaches that concupiscence is original sin causing death in the unbaptised; but that it remains in the baptised, though its guilt is put away.* Concupiscence in baptised infants is discharged from its guilt, it is left to be combated with; but binds unbaptised children under guilt, and drags them to condemnation as children of wrath, even though they die in infancy. Augustine, therefore, plainly lays it down, that concupiscence is original sin and damnable in its nature, although the grace of baptism does away its guilt. And this is the reason why he is unwilling sometimes to call this concupiscence remaining in the regenerate sin, because he takes sin for the guilty thing, which is to be punished by the Divine appointment. But concupiscence remaining after baptism is not to be punished, because its guilt has been expiated in baptism, although in its own nature it deserved punishment. To this that saying of Augustine against Julian refers;† *A baptised person is free from all sin, not from all evil;* which is thus more plainly expressed, *He is free from the guilt of all evil, but not of all evil itself.* When, therefore, Augustine says, that the baptised person is free from all sin, he means nothing else than that he is free from all that culpable evil, which constitutes the person guilty. If the Jesuits denied that concupiscence remaining in the regenerate was sin in this sense, they would virtually agree with us, and we should not contend with them about the word. But when they deny it

* De Peccat. merit. et remiss. Lib. 2. cap. 2.

† Contra Julian. Lib. 6. chap. 5; see also chap. 6.

to be sin, they do not consider the remission obtained in baptism, but the nature of concupiscence itself, which they maintain as not being properly sin, even in unbelievers.

The Schoolmen adopt the opinion of Augustine. Lombard, (Lib. 2, distinct. 32) says, *Since original sin is the vice of concupiscence, we must inquire how it is put away in baptism, when even after baptism that concupiscence remains which was before.* He then soon after explains it in this manner: *Original sin is put away in a twofold sense in baptism: first, in that by the grace of baptism, the vice of concupiscence is weakened; and secondly, in that the guilt is remitted.* Other Schoolmen also teach, after the Master of the Sentences, that *original sin is removed in respect of its guilt, but remains in respect to the act:* and the Gloss on Rom. iv.* upon the words, *Blessed are they whose unrighteousness is forgiven*, &c.—As it may happen that some sins, although actually committed pass away as respects the act, and the guilt remains; so on the contrary it may happen, that original sin may remain in act, and the guilt be removed. Whence Hugo de St. Victor,† in reply to the question, *How is original sin blotted out?* answers—*It is totally remitted in respect to its guilt, and weakened as to its power or disposition.* The answer, therefore, of our writers, remains firm, Baptism frees the regenerate from all sin as to *the guilt*, yet not from all as to *the act.*

2. Again, Concupiscence, it is affirmed, is the effect and punishment of original sin; therefore, it is not original sin itself. For although one and the same thing can be both the sin and the punishment of the sin; yet this without doubt must be understood by comparison in different respects.

I answer,—Under the term *original sin* two things are usually denoted; the voluntary transgression of Adam imputed to all his posterity, and the hereditary corruption entailed upon his posterity. If reference be made to the voluntary transgression of Adam, then whatever corruption hath

* Albertus, Compend. 3. 3.

† Quæst. circa Epist. ad Roman. quæst. 107.

seized human nature can rightly be called the punishment or effect of original sin, taken in the first sense; or if reference be made to hereditary contagion, then inordinate concupiscence is a part or branch of original sin, and by consequence original sin. For although the Jesuits maintain that concupiscence and ignorance have in themselves the nature of punishment only equally with death; yet in this point they are abandoned by almost all theologians. We have before cited the opinion of Lombard, who clearly lays it down that the vice of concupiscence is original sin; to which I add the opinion of Hugo de St. Victor, who in his definition of original sin uses these words, in direct contradiction of what Bellarmine says :* *If it be asked what original sin is in us; that corruption or vice is meant, which we derive from our birth, namely, ignorance in the mind, concupiscence in the flesh.* And Augustine himself has declared to the same effect, that *concupiscence is sin, the punishment of sin, and the cause of sin.*†

3. If man were not born of Adam, and yet possessed the concupiscence which he now has, it could not be properly called sin in him; concupiscence, therefore, is not of itself, and in its own nature sin. For Augustine, (in his treatise against Julian, (Book 3, chap. 12.) concedes to Julian that man would not be a sinner, or guilty, on account of concupiscence, if he had not been born with it from Adam, but created by the devil. But that which of its own nature is sin, is always sin; and whencesoever it springs, whether from man or from the devil, it always renders guilty. Concupiscence therefore is not properly sin.

I answer:—The nature of sin is always to be traced to ἀνομία—or the violation of the rule instituted by God.‡ Original sin, therefore, is deemed that which in man is contrary to the primeval law, or inbred righteousness, which God impressed upon human nature. Actual sin is that which flows from this original, and opposes the law of righteousness, originally inscribed in the heart of man, and afterwards delivered in the Decalogue. But creatures which have not the law of righteousness, either impressed upon their nature, or

* De Sacram. Fid. Lib. 1, part 7, chap. 28.

† In Julian. Lib. 5, chap. 3.

‡ Vide Gregor. de Valent. de Peccat. Orig. chap. 5, p. 133.

prescribed by God, do not sin, either by possessing those inclinations which constitute man guilty, or by performing those actions which are accounted actual sins in men. For instance, we do not say that a wolf or a goat is contaminated by inherent sin, although in one there is a natural propensity to blood and slaughter; in the other to lust: nor do we say that they commit actual sin, when the former with great fury rends his prey, and the latter, under the excitement of desire, satisfies its lust. And the reason why they are not reckoned guilty is primarily this, because these inclinations of theirs, and their actions, do not oppose any law either *impressed* or *enjoined* upon them.

These things being laid down, let us now come to the point. First, then, I affirm, that that supposition of the heretic Julian, which Bellarmine also adopts, is utterly impossible; for it is as impossible that the devil should be the Creator of any man, as that he should be God: for Creation is the proper and peculiar work of Almighty God. To look for arguments from such fancies is indeed ridiculous.* Secondly, I acknowledge that Augustine rightly decides against the Manichæans, who fancied that an evil nature is created from an evil principle; that men are not guilty of sin, if they are such now as they were made from the beginning by their Creator. If then man were created by an evil demon (which reason and religion shew to be impossible) accompanied by the inordinate and unbridled concupiscence which he now possesses, he would not, on that account, be guilty of sin. For with what right could God convict as a subject of his and guilty of sin, a being whom he had not created, whom he had not either fashioned or bound to any rule, and who remains such as his Creator willed him to be? Whatever, according to their fashion, takes place in this creation of the devil, which Bellarmine fancies to himself, certain it is, that concupiscence of this kind, unbridled in a creation of God, formed without such defect, is sin. Thirdly, if this reason of Bellarmine had any force, nothing at all would be sin in its own nature. For, if man were created by the devil with habitual proneness to murder, to lust,—

* And yet Bellarmine, who derives many arguments from such sources, is very "acute," and a great "Master" (in his way) according to the Rev. J. H. Newman.—See his *Lectures on Justification*, *ut supra*.

nay, with an habitual aversion from God himself, it is argued by Augustine against the Manichæans, and is conceded to Julian, that such a man would be bad without any fault of his own, and therefore not at all bad; because he would be nothing else than what he was born to be. Hence, therefore, it is clear, that that assertion of Bellarmine, that *what in its own nature is sin, is always sin, and renders guilty from whatever source it arises, whether from man or from the devil,* is repugnant to the testimony of Augustine, who admits, that man can neither be accounted *bad*, nor by consequence *guilty,* for any vice or sin whatever, which was implanted in him from the beginning of his creation. When therefore we say that anything is sin in its own nature, we affirm nothing else than that there is an evil disposition, or action of the rational creature, in its own nature opposing some law of the Creator, which was either implanted in or prescribed to the same creature. Unrestrained concupiscence, therefore, is sin in its own nature, but not in every subject whatsoever; but in him to whom a law was given to the contrary by his Creator: as to kill an innocent man is sin in its nature, but not in the lion or the bear, because a law forbidding murder has not been given to them. When therefore we say, that anything is properly and in its own nature sin, there the law of the Creator should not be lost sight of, as is most absurdly the case in the aforesaid argument of Bellarmine.

4. Concupiscence, if it be taken for an involuntary act, that is, for the first motions of concupiscence which the mind resists, is no sin; therefore much less will it be sin, if we take it for the propensity itself to the act; but those first motions are not sin, because it is not in the power of man to be exempt from them.

Answer:—The first irregular motions, although the consent of the will be not added to them, are sins: first, because no one lusts after anything which does not please him; but all complacency whatsoever in an unlawful object, however brief and transient, is sin. Next, reason is bound to be very watchful in the repression of them. When, therefore, inordinate desires of this kind arise, they are not to be reckoned as mere passions, but as negations of lawful actions. This is illustrated by William, Bishop of Paris, in an

elegant simile :* *As if any one had undertaken the guardianship of a tablet, and was bound to take care that no scandalous picture, or unsightly representation should be painted on it; if he permitted that to be done, the spoiling of that tablet would be imputed to him; so the impressions of any base passions must be imputed to us and to our souls, when we suffer them to take place in us; because we are bound to preserve them from such passions.* Thus far Parisiensis. Lastly, the very definition of first motions, which is given by the Schoolmen, plainly shows that they are to be reckoned as sins. For, *the first motion*, they maintain,† *is an inclination of the evil appetite, in accordance with the object of incitement, tending impetuously to the enjoyment of the creature delighted in.* Since therefore the senses in man ought to be subject to reason, and they are excited to these motions in an unlawful manner against reason, those first motions are sins, as is rightly inferred by Hales.‡ Of the same opinion is Hugo de St. Victor, in his questions upon the Epistle of Paul to the Romans (quæst. 171). *It is asked* (says he) *what is that which the law forbids, and the Apostle did unwillingly? They say that the law of God forbids consent; but it is evident that the Apostle did not consent, because if he consented to concupiscence, he would have by no means consented to the law, but would have acted against it. But the Apostle felt the motion of concupiscence, yet he did not consent to it; nay he wished not to feel it. Whence it is plain that the law prohibits the first motions of concupiscence.* But what Bellarmine contends—*That it is not sin, because it is not in the power of any of the regenerate whatever not to have those first motions of concupiscence*, is a frivolous and foolish argument. For the nature of sin is not to be estimated from the infirmity of corrupt man, but from the primeval condition of man, as created by God. Hence the same Hugo, (whom we have before quoted) shews§ *that God justly prohibits that which cannot be avoided by us, and enjoins what cannot be fulfilled, that we may understand the perfection of the Divine righteous-*

* Secundæ part. de Universo, part. 2, cap. 103. p. 901.
† Halensis, part. 2, quæst. 108. memb. 1.
‡ Ibid. memb. 2.
§ Idem, quæst. 172, 173.

*ness, and that we may know what man was before the introduction of sin.* We grant therefore that it is not in the power of any man not to have in him the original infection; nor yet ought it to be concluded from hence, that there is not sin in this infection: so, although we concede, that it is not now in our power to avoid the first motions of concupiscence, yet because this faulty weakness has been contracted by the voluntary sin of our first parents, it also has the nature of sin.

5. If concupiscence be real sin, and always remains in man although justified, then Christ has not *truly*, but only *imputatively*, redeemed and delivered us from sin, and the devil is more powerful than Christ; because the former was able truly to pollute man, the latter was not able truly to cleanse him. Hence that saying (John viii. 36) will turn out false, *If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed;* for he is not indeed free who is yet under sin.

I answer:—There does not appear any legitimate consequence in this train of reasoning. For Christ has *truly* not *imputatively* redeemed us from concupiscence, and from all our sins; and *truly*, not *imputatively* freed us from the wrath of God and condemnation. For that λύτρον—ransom of the blood of Christ, offered to God the Father in our name—procures for us not (as Bellarmine foolishly talks) an *imputative*, but a *firm*, a *genuine*, a *solid* remission of sins. His objection, moreover—*If concupiscence be sin, and be not straightway extirpated and put away, the devil would be more powerful than Christ*—by no means holds good; for more might is exercised in freeing man from the guilt of one sin, than in defiling him by a thousand. Now Christ has delivered his people, not only from the guilt of one, but from the guilt and dominion of all their sins. And that he does not all at once root up whatever bears the character of sin, from the nature of the regenerate, is not to be attributed to *want of power*, but to his *wisdom*. For Christ could, in one moment, have freed all that are his, from the remains both of sin and death, and have transplanted them to a place of glory; but it pleased him that, after he had delivered them from the wrath of God, from the guilt of sin, and the danger of damnation, his grace should contend awhile with the remains of sin in their mortal body. Nor does that passage oppose it,

*If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed;* for they are deemed free indeed as respects their militant state, who are delivered from the dominion of sin and condemnation, although they are not straightway delivered from indwelling sin: like as a slave is accounted free indeed after his manumission, although he who had been his master is not dead. The Apostle teaches this in his vith Chapter to the Romans, where he plainly lays down both positions, namely, the deliverance of the regenerate from sin, and the indwelling of sin in the regenerate; Rom. vi. 6, 7, 12, 18. They are delivered, inasmuch as sin is weakened and mortified in them; its dominion being broken, its condemning power is taken away, the guilt thereof being expiated: yet they are troubled by indwelling sin, inasmuch as a law is left in their flesh rebelling against the law of the mind; Rom. vii. 23. Augustine, expounding those words which Bellarmine adduces, confesses,* that the regenerate feel a certain captivity in this life; nor, so long as they abide here, are they freed from indwelling sin.

6. It is not necessary to pray for the remission of the first motions which flow from concupiscence, if the will does not consent to them; they are therefore not sins; therefore neither is that habitual concupiscence, whence they arise, sin. But that we must not pray for their remission, Augustine affirms in his book *De perfectione Justitiæ*. And he affirms the same in his book to Boniface (lib. 1. cap. 13.) concerning inherent concupiscence itself.

I answer:—We cannot but admit that Augustine somewhere affirms that, it is not needful to say, on account of the involuntary motions of concupiscence, or on account of inherent concupiscence—*Forgive us our debts*—if we should be guilty in nothing else after baptism. For in his book *on the Perfection of Righteousness*, against Celestius, near the end, he says—*If I am not deceived there would be no need to say*, FORGIVE US OUR DEBTS, *if we were never consenting to the desires of sin*. But these assertions in no way help the Papists. For Augustine's reason for stating, that he did not think it was necessary, on account of this concupiscence or its involuntary motions, to say, *Forgive us our debts*, was not that they have not in them the nature and character of

* Tom. 9. in Evang. Joan. tract. 41.

sin, but that the guilt, as well of the incentive itself, as also of all the involuntary motions flowing thence, had been remitted and entirely done away in baptism. Consequently, according to this opinion of Augustine, it is not necessary to pray for the remission of concupiscence, because we have obtained it in baptism ; nevertheless it is incumbent to ask from God the perpetual assistance of his grace against concupiscence, with which we have to conflict through life. But grace is given, not that we may resist the punishments of sin imposed upon us, but to resist sin itself dwelling in us, and by its evil desires exciting us to actual sins. And hence it is that Augustine himself constantly teaches, that no one is so righteous as to be able to say he has no sin in him, though there may be some who do not yield their consent to concupiscence. Inherent concupiscence itself therefore is sin.

And thus have we sufficiently answered all Bellarmine's reasonings.

## CHAPTER X.

### A REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF GREGORY DE VALENTIA.

Among other writers of the Church of Rome, Gregory de Valentia* engaged in this controversy, and took upon himself the defence of [her view of the doctrine of] concupiscence. He has treated the subject with prolixity and obscurity ; but it does not fall within our province to discuss his arguments with much particularity. We shall examine those reasons alone by which he endeavours to prove that the concupiscence left in the unregenerate is not properly or formally sin. Neither shall we discuss all of them, but those only which are either peculiar to himself, or such as we have not yet refuted.

* A Spanish Jesuit, who flourished in the 16th century. He was born in the year 1551, and became a leading man of his order. Alegambe enumerates 33 works of his, and gives us a curious account of the remarkable auguries under which he was ushered into the world, indicative of what a notable defender of the faith he was likely to become.—See Baxter's Key for Catholics, edit. 1839. Note p. 313.

1. [He affirms that.] Sin properly so called is only a defect of some perfection necessary to man, in this life, for the obtaining of blessedness immediately on death; but the defect of original righteousness, which consists in the rebelliousness of concupiscence, is not a defect of the perfection thus necessary to happiness; for if it were, then it would follow that none would obtain happiness immediately on their death, because this defect is found in all. The defect, therefore, of original righteousness, which consists in the rebelliousness of concupiscence is not properly or truly sin.*

That we may reply perspicuously to this argument, it must be observed, that such perfection is not required for any one to be placed in a state of salvation and destined to a participation of glory, which is required for an introduction into the state of glory, and the actual possession of blessedness. What therefore is properly and truly sin, while it adheres to man, hinders him by its defilement from entering into that kingdom of heaven into which nothing that is defiled shall enter; but does not always hinder his being appointed an heir of this kingdom, namely, when his guilt is removed by the grace of Christ. And this we affirm may be discerned in all the regenerate; for they, notwithstanding this contagion of concupiscence, and the stains thence arising, are adopted among the children of God for Christ's sake, and heirs of eternal blessedness; but yet they are not introduced into this kingdom, till death intervenes, in which final grace blots out the stains of all sins in all who are to be saved; as Albert truly says; (Compend. 3, 13). What Gregory therefore quibbles upon—*If in the rebelliousness of concupiscence, there were a defect repugnant to final blessedness, or sin truly and properly so called, none of the regenerate would obtain blessedness immediately upon death, because this defect is found in them all*—is frivolous and absurd. The reason is plain; because this defect is separated and abolished in the very separation of the soul; this adherent concupiscence therefore does not retard the entrance of the godly into heaven, seeing it is entirely put away in the act of dissolution. Hence says St. Paul, *I have a desire to depart and be with Christ;* Phil. i. 23. And this it is which Methodius so well treats of in Epiphanius, against the followers of Origen,

* Gregory de Valent. de peccat. origin. cap. 8.

shewing by an elegant similitude, that sin has driven its roots so deep in human nature that it cannot be utterly extirpated except by death: *Like* (says he, Hæresi. 64) *as when in the fabric of some beautiful temples, a fig or some such tree, springs up and spreads its roots amongst the joints of the stones, it cannot be eradicated until the walls are taken down and the building raised anew; so sin which, like some wild fig tree, has germinated in man, the temple of God, is not extirpated until by the stroke of death this temple shall be thrown down; then indeed it is perfectly and completely abolished.* Concupiscence, therefore, may be truly sin, and yet not hinder the regenerate from the attainment of blessedness; because although they do not live here without the sin of concupiscence, yet after death they are thoroughly purged from this sin.

Rat. 2. If that inclination and propensity to evil which cleaves to a person acted upon by evil desire were properly sin, then God would not have promised that he would spare the human race, on account of this propensity to evil; for what is indeed sin, ought rather to stir up God's anger than move him to pity. But God has promised that he would spare the human race on account of this tendency. Thus in Gen. viii. 21. *I will not again curse the ground any more for man's sake; for the imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth. Neither will I again smite any more every living thing*, &c. It does not seem then that this unbridled proneness of concupiscence towards evil, is sin; because on account of this very native proneness, God says that he will henceforward spare the human race.—Ibid. de Origin. peccat. cap. 9.

The Jesuit perverts to his own purpose an error in the Vulgate version; for where it has employed the causal particle *for*, the adversative *although* should rather have been used. And thus Tremellius has translated it; *I will not again curse the ground for man's sake, although (quamvis*, instead of *enim) the imagination of his heart*, &c. The Hebrew particle bears both significations. If therefore we follow this acceptation, the argument of the Jesuit is gone; for the adversative particle intimates that there was a just cause for cursing, although the merciful God was unwilling to curse man on account of it. Secondly, where the Latin

version has *The imagination of the human heart is* prone *to evil*, whence Gregory infers that this proneness to evil is not sin; in the Hebrew it is *The imagination of the human heart is evil;* there being no word for *proneness*. If therefore this reasoning had any force, it would prove that an evil or wicked imagination is not sin; which even the Jesuit himself will be ashamed to affirm. But let us allow the adversary to make use of this corrupt interpretation, yet he will gain nothing by it. For the causal particle does not intimate that God spared the human race on account of this disposition, as though the inclination to evil was not a sin worthy of punishment; but because it was so implanted and fixed in human nature, that if he should punish it according to its deserts, he would hereupon be compelled to drown the world; which he promises to Noah, and in him to the Church, never again to do. Consequently the Jesuit unadvisedly ascribes to this proneness to evil, what ought to be attributed to the free mercy of God which he displays towards his Church. This is manifest from the viith Chapter, where we have almost the same words (v. 5 and 7.) *God seeing that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and every imagination of the thought of his heart was only evil continually, said, I will destroy*, &c. We perceive then in this proneness to evil a reason not *for sparing*, but *for destroying* the race of man. But God considering with himself this human depravity, may thence if he please take occasion of exercising either his vengeance or his mercy. It is not unlike that mode of speaking in the Psalms (xxv. 11)—*Pardon mine iniquity for it is great.* If the Jesuit had fallen upon this passage doubtless his subtilty would have screwed out of it, this wonderful conclusion, *That many sins are great sins, but not properly or truly sins; for what is truly sin ought to move God to anger not to forgiveness.* Of the same kind is that saying of Daniel, *To the Lord our God belong mercies and forgivenesses, though we have departed from thee:* Daniel ix. 9. Therefore to depart from God, or to rebel against God, is not sin, if Gregory's dialectics have any meaning. In these modes of speaking, then, not the *meritorious* cause of the Divine mercy is signified, but *the occasion*, or *the object*, which may be altogether contrary to the meritorious cause. To concede somewhat however to the Jesuit, it may be granted

that this innate proneness to evil, so far as it respects the case of individuals, not as contracted by the proper and personal will of any one, but as propagated in us from Adam unknowingly and involuntarily, may furnish occasion for the Divine merey, not because it is not sin, but because it is less sin than if it had had its origin from the will of individuals themselves. In this sense nearly are those words of St. Paul to be taken in 1 Tim. i. 13—*I was a blasphemer, and a persecutor and injurious; but I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly in unbelief.* He who should infer from hence, that to blaspheme God and to persecute the Church in ignorance are not sins, because what is truly sin moves God to anger rather than to mercy, would be utterly beside himself; for that word *because* does not intimate that blasphemy springing from ignorance is sinless; but that it is a lighter sin, and has less guilt in it, than the blasphemy which proceeds from premeditated malice. Gregory therefore might have inferred probably, This propensity, implanted in the human race is a lighter sin, than if it had been contracted by the personal will of the individual; but he could not, without manifest folly, infer that it was not at all sin, from God's having said, *I will not again curse, I will not again smite, because the imagination of the human heart is prone*, &c. For that word *again*, indicates that God had just before cursed men, and smitten them, on account of this very wickedness, for which he had resolved afterwards to spare their posterity, so far as not to punish the same by a universal deluge. But if there were no sin in this wickedness his promising to spare such men could not be attributed to the Divine mercy, on the contrary, it would be considered cruel and unjust that he had cursed them before for this wickedness, and laid upon them a grievous punishment. But I have spent too much time in refuting this empty reasoning.

3. [Again it is argued] If that unimpaired righteousness which Adam had, and which excluded concupiscence, be not enjoined us; if this defect of righteousness, which is discerned in concupiscence, does not formally oppose the Divine law; then concupiscence is not properly sin. But God has neither bound us by any precept to the possession of that unimpaired righteousness which Adam had, nor does

the Decalogue bind us to perform more than can be performed by healing grace. Since, therefore, it is impossible to shake off and avoid concupiscence, we are not bound to it, and consequently it is not sin.

I reply:—That unimpaired righteousness which was bestowed upon Adam, as the common head of the human race, was bestowed upon us also in him; if therefore Adam himself was bound to retain and preserve it, then we also were bound in him surely to the same perfect righteousness. The Papists are themselves well aware of this; for when they are engaged in disputing against Pelagius and Pighius, the objection is soon got rid of. Indeed Gregory himself thus replies to the assertion of Pelagius, that infants are not stained with original sin, because they are not bound by any precept:— *To this argument* (says he*) *I answer, that infants are also bound by some precept, not indeed of that kind which they ought to observe of their own will, which they could and ought to fulfil of the common will of the human race, namely, of Adam taken as head of the human race. By the very fact, therefore, of our understanding that a precept was given to Adam as head of the human race to preserve, by his obedience, that original perfection to himself and his posterity, we ought to understand that that precept pertains to his posterity also.* So far Gregory. Here then, I ask, what unimpaired righteousness was Adam bidden to preserve? Doubtless that which he received from God in his creation. For that which is commanded to the Church of Thyatira (Rev. ii. 25) may be understood as prescribed to all men:—*Hold fast that which thou hast received.*

Since then his posterity are bound by the same law with which Adam himself was bound, to the preservation of original righteousness, it is certain that the preservation of unimpaired righteousness has been commanded to every one of us in Adam. Whereas then our adversary concedes that there is in concupiscence a defect of that unimpaired righteousness, which was bestowed upon Adam, it has of necessity the nature of sin. And as to his urging, that *concupiscence is not forbidden in the Decalogue, because there is nothing further required than what may be performed by the rege-*

* De Origin. Peccat. cap. 2.

*nerate*, that is altogether false. For the legal covenant required exact obedience in all its parts; but it is Gospel grace which helps our imperfect obedience, and delivers us from the curse of the law, as the Apostle evidently concludes in Rom. iii. 19, 20, 21, &c. And Bernard writes beautifully to the same effect:* —*It did not escape the notice of the Giver of the precept, that the weight of the precept exceeded man's strength; but he judged it expedient that man should be reminded of his insufficiency in this very way, and know to what extent of righteousness he should aim with all his might. In commanding impossibilities, therefore, he did not render men prevaricators, but humble, that every mouth might be stopped*, &c. Hugo [de St. Victor] makes the same remark in his questions upon the Epistle to the Romans (*quæst.* 173.) *It is asked, Why did God forbid what could not be avoided? That he might humble the proud, enlighten the blind*, &c And at the close of this explanation he adds these words, *What then remains, except that man, not presuming any more upon himself, should flee to grace, and say, Lord, answer for me; for I am weak? God enjoins, therefore, not cruelly, but with great mercy, what cannot be done except by the great Mediator alone.* So far Hugo.

Lastly, when Gregory contends, that concupiscence is not repugnant to the Divine law *formally*, but *operatively;* if he means as to the ability itself, we concede that it is in itself good, and created by God, neither does it formally differ from the law; but if he is speaking of its irregular motion, or of the corruption inherent in the concupiscible faculty, we say that this corruption is formally repugnant to the law of creation first implanted in Adam; we say also, that it is prohibited in the Decalogue, if not positively, yet by virtue of that allowed rule,—*That which of itself inclines to evil is prohibited by the same law as the evil itself.* In fine, those involuntary motions also flowing from this corrupt concupiscence, we say are positively and expressly prohibited by that commandment, *Thou shalt not covet.* Inordinate concupiscence therefore is truly sin, and *formally* contrary to the Divine law.

4. [Again they affirm that] The nature of original sin

* In Cant. Serm. 50.

essentially and formally consists in the privation of original righteousness,* not indeed taken absolutely, seeing that it subjected the body to the soul, the appetites to reason, and the mind to God ; but taken particularly as having this end in view for man, viz., the subjection or conversion of his mind to God. Not that it is to be supposed, that that perfection is absolutely perfect in its kind, but of such kind, that by it all mortal sins can be avoided :† for that perfection of subjection whereby Adam was able to serve God even in avoiding venial sins, was only accidental. Since therefore concupiscence remaining in the regenerate does not hinder their mind from being subject to God, so far as is required for avoiding mortal sins and preserving the Divine favour, it follows that this concupiscence has not the formal nature of original sin.

I answer :—This prolix argument has nothing solid in it ; but everything in it is accommodated to Papistic errors : and yet in no one point established by any authority or argument. For, in the first place, the Jesuit's assumption, on his own authority, *That the nature of original sin consists formally only and particularly in the privation of the subjection of the human mind to God, but not in the privation of the subjection of the body to the soul, or of the sensitive appetite to reason*, is what we never will concede. For like as the rectitude, not of the mind alone, or of the will, but of all the other faculties, appertained to the integrity of original righteousness ; so also we must refer not only the disordering of the mind or will, but the ἀταξίαν -the disarranging and discomposure of the inferior faculties also, to the defect of original righteousness and of original sin itself. Moreover, what he adds, that *That perfection of subjection whereby Adam was able to avoid even venial sins, was accidental, and that therefore the defect of this perfect subjection has not in it the formal nature of sin*, is quite contrary to reason. For so essential to original righteousness was this perfection, that the Schoolmen have concluded, That man, who could (as the event proved) have sinned *mortally*, yet could not have sinned *venially* in a state of innocence ; because there was implanted in him such an infallible strength of rule, that the

* Valent. De Peccat. Origin. cap. 12. † Ib. cap. 14.

inferior part should be always subject to the superior.* Hence, what our opponents freely admit, *that the regenerate may sin venially*, plainly shews that there is in them some remains of original sin. Lastly, and what overturns the whole argument, that this evil of inordinate concupiscence does not cleave to the inferior part only of the soul, but to the very mind and will; the mind and will therefore of the regenerate themselves are not perfectly subjected to God, and therefore not perfectly free from original sin.

And thus at length we have abundantly and satisfactorily replied to all, or at least to the chief reasons by which the Papists endeavour to prove, that there remains nothing in the regenerate which hath the proper nature of sin.

## CHAPTER XI.

### ANSWERS THE TESTIMONIES OF THE FATHERS WHICH THE PAPISTS ARE ACCUSTOMED TO ALLEGE.

Popish writers are in the habit of bringing forward piles of testimonies from the Fathers, by means of which they endeavour to prove, that there is nothing remaining in the regenerate which has the nature of sin; we shall here, therefore, briefly meet these. We must, however, entirely pass by those which do not signify more than a plenary remission and free forgiveness of all our sins; for we willingly admit that all the regenerate and justified are absolved from all their sins. We shall discuss then those only which bear a shew of favouring the error of our opponents.

1. Clemens Alex. Pædag. Lib, 1, cap. 6 (p. 116 Pott.) says, *And these chains how speedily are they loosened; by human faith, indeed, yet through Divine grace, that is to say, when sins are remitted by one sovereign balm, namely, baptism. We therefore wash away all sins, and forthwith are no longer evil. This is the singular grace of the illumina-*

* Durand. Lib. 2. dist. 21. qu. 4.—Aquin. 1. 2. qu. 89. art. 3.

*tion, that our manners are not the same as they were before we were washed.* It appears then that sin is entirely taken away in our spiritual regeneration.

Clemens is shewing that the nations through ignorance and the darkness of the mind, had been as it were tied and bound in sin; and he says that these bonds are loosened when the minds of men are illuminated by Evangelic faith, and anointed by Divine grace. And because baptism was the seal, as it were, of the Christian faith, and the vehicle of Divine grace, he affirms that therefore by it, as it were by a sovereign balm, the eyes of the mind are illuminated and sins washed away. All this we freely grant to holy baptism. But Clemens adds, that *not only are all sins washed away*, which may be understood of remission; but that *we forthwith cease to be evil*, which seems to intimate that whatever hath the nature of sin is entirely done away. To this I answer, that Clemens meant nothing more, than that true Christians after baptism enter upon a new course of life, and put off their former wickedness: but this can and ought to be done by all into whom sanctifying grace is infused, though sin be not entirely extirpated. That this is the meaning of Clemens he himself shews, when he soon after adds, that the manners of the baptised are not the same as they were before. With Clemens therefore, the phrase *they are no longer evil*, means only *that they have renounced their evil habits;* which all the regenerate do. But if the Papists will adhere rigidly to the very words, they must oppose both Christ and his decrees: For *Christ taught that evil was still inherent even in the Apostles themselves, though now washed and sanctified by the word of faith, through the condition of their common origin, saying*, (Matt. vii. 11.) *If ye then being evil know how to give good gifts*, &c., as Augustine writes, *contra Julianum*, lib. 2. Besides, the Papists themselves confess, that after Baptism something, which may be truly and properly called *evil*, remains in the regenerate. Hence the phrase, *we are no more evil*, no otherwise contradicts our opinion than that of our opponents; unless it be explained, *We are not, as we were before, wholly and designedly evil, but renewed and changed by the Holy Spirit.*

2. Cyprian, Epist. lib. 2, ep. 2 [ad Donatum] writes, that the regenerate, in baptism, *suddenly and speedily put*

*off, what either being original has grown hard upon them, in the soil of natural matter; or having been practised for a long period, has become* (as it were) *engrafted in them:* He says also, that in baptism, *they put off what they had before been, and are changed as to the inner man, both in mind and disposition, the structure of the body remaining the same.* He seems therefore to have thought that nothing remained in the regenerate which has the nature either of original or actual sin.—I anwer:—

It is one thing to put off the old man with his corrupt lusts and passions, to change the evil mind and disposition; another thing to be entirely freed from all sin. Cyprian affirms that the former takes place in baptism, and we by no means deny it. For they are rightly said to have put off the old man and his perverse disposition, who have put on Christ and have begun to be renewed by the Spirit of holiness. But that these regenerate persons were entirely void of sin, Cyprian has neither ever said nor thought; nay he has distinctly taught the contrary; namely, that *there is no one altogether free from pollution and sin.**

3. Basil, *Exhort. ad Baptism.—Baptism is the remission of captives and of debt, the death of sin, the regeneration of the soul, the procurement of the celestial kingdom, the grace of adoption;* and elsewhere (on Psal. xxix.) Basil likewise calls baptism *the flood;* because like the flood it purges and carries away the defilement of our souls. Therefore nothing of sin cleaves to the regenerate.

We do not grudge all these and many more encomiums, if you will, to holy baptism; but we deny that an inference can be deduced from them, that baptised persons are void of all sin. For the death of sin does not prove its eradication; so neither does regeneration, nor adoption, nor the drowning of sin, nor the destination to the kingdom of heaven, since all these things are most truly attributed to those, who yet have in them indwelling sin, though mortified and subdued to the dominion of the Spirit. Parisiensis† well observes, *All sin is considered dead which has not extinguished the life of grace.* Wherefore it is considered dead when it does not rule.

* *Ad Quirinum,—Testimonicorum* lib. iii. p. 293. Edit. Paris, 1836.

† Paris. de Legibus cap. 28. pag. 95.

4. Nazianzen, in Sanct. Lavac., says, *The grace of baptism comprehends the purgation from every sin whatsoever and the rejection of every kind of impurity and defilement which has entered from corruption.* Therefore the regenerate are forthwith purged from all sin.

It is very true that the grace of Christ in *forgiving* purges us forthwith from all sin and impurity, because sin remitted is the same as no sin; but grace in *renewing* (of which also we are made partakers in baptism) exerts its virtue by degrees, in purging out the taint of sin, and at length at the end of life in exterminating it. The Papists, therefore, are sadly mistaken in thinking that the grace of baptism, in the first moment in which it is administered, exerts its whole efficacy; whereas it works through the whole of life in subduing sin, and at length effects its perfect expulsion. Grace therefore perfectly takes away sin, because *we come to that perfection which is expected in heaven, by the very same baptism which is here received.* (August. contra Julian. lib. 6, cap. 5.) And Aquinas rightly reminds us (part. 3, qu. 69. art. 3) that *baptism does not put away all those things in the present life which it has the efficacy of putting away, but by its virtue some are to be put away when this mortal shall put on immortality;* this he would refer to *the penalties of the present life*, but we can with equal advantage refer it to *the remains of indwelling sin.*

5. Chrysostom, Homil. ad illuminandos, says; *Let a man have been an effeminate, a fornicator, a servant of idols, in short, one who is burdened with anything else of this kind, although he should be heavy laden with even all human detestableness, although he should be bound with the chain of all wickedness; yet when he has come to that laver, when he has felt the Divine streams of that font, he is raised purer than the rays of the sun.*

Chrysostom is accustomed to indulge in an exaggerated and lofty style, especially in his hortatory or laudatory discourses. He is here extolling baptism with the highest praises, and inflaming the minds of men to the participation of so great a benefit. If therefore, anything has been spoken hyperbolically by him, to twist that otherwise than the nature of truth allows, is very unreasonable and wicked. But to come nearer to the point: I say that Chrysostom is re-

fering to actual sins, and the filthiness of the past life, all which he says is so remitted and put away in baptism, that the newly baptised person (as to what relates to fornication, idolatry, and all other wickedness of his former life,) comes forth from them even clearer than the rays of the sun. For actual sins of this kind, when the guilt has been afterwards removed, are entirely blotted out. But he adds afterwards, that the baptised are not only wholly absolved from the chains of these sins, but are even made holy and righteous, by a certain new righteousness suddenly produced in their souls. Nor do we deny this; but we say that this new righteousness has been begun, and therefore that purification clearer than the sun, ought to be referred to the remission of actual as well as original sin, not to the perfection of infused virtues. For in the sun nothing dark or obscure can be seen; but in a baptised and regenerate man (even by the confessions of our adversaries) there is something found which is bad, diseased, nay, may be truly called evil. But this, whatever is the disease or evil, whether it may be called sin or not, prevents the regenerate being regarded clearer than the rays of the sun.

6. Reticius of Autun* (de baptismo) writes,† that *it is the principal indulgence in the Church, in which we lay down all the weight of old offence, and blot out the former deeds of our ignorance, where also we strip off the old man, with his inbred wickedness.* No sin, therefore, cleaves to the regenerate.

Reticius enumerates three effects of baptism. The first is, that in it we lay down the load of former sin, through the mercy of God; that is, we escape the guilt of eternal damnation, in which the fall of Adam and original sin flowing thence had involved us all. And this is very much

*Rheticius, Bishop of Autun, had so great a reputation in the time of Constantine, that the Emperor chose him to be one of the judges in the cause of the Donatists. He assisted at the Council of Rome, wherein Cæcilian was absolved, and afterwards at the Council of Arles held in the year 314. St. Jerome says that in his time, this Bishop's Commentaries upon the Canticles were extant, and also a large volume against Novatian. Of the Commentaries, St. Jerome when writing to Marcellus says, that he had not sent them as he desired; because there were many things in them that displeased him, and but few that he could approve.—*Soames's Mosheim and Clarke.*

† Apud August. contra Julian. lib. 1. cap. 4.

the same as Augustine has expressed in other words in the same place, thus: *The contagion of the old death contracted in our first birth is purged away by the remission of original sin through the washing of regeneration in the second birth.* It is then undeniable that all the *weight* of original sin, which sunk us to eternal damnation, is taken away from all the regenerate; but that all the *virus* of original sin, with which we are infected, is taken away at the same time, we positively deny.

The second effect of Baptism mentioned by Reticius is the blotting out of all the wickedness of the past life; of which we do not in the least doubt. The last is that we put off by it the old man with his inbred wickedness; but this needs explanation. We must therefore know that we put off the old man, and put on the new, not *by an instantaneous* but by a *continued act;* for the regenerate do not as soon as they put on the new man, put him on perfectly, or put off the old; but they do both by degrees, and acquire full renovation and perfect holiness then, when this mortal has put on immortality. This inference therefore will not hold good, that the regenerate put off the old man, therefore they have nothing of sin in them, unless the reference be to the consummation, not to the inchoate act of putting off. For the inward man is renewed day by day, and the old man in the same way declines and becomes more corrupt from day to day. *We do not deny therefore the cleansing of the regenerate in this life, and yet we look for perfect cleansing in the next,* as says Augustine *contra Julianum*, lib. 2, pag. 981.

## CHAPTER XII.

MEETS OTHER TESTIMONIES BY WHICH THEY ENDEAVOUR TO SHEW THAT NEITHER CONCUPISCENCE, NOR ITS INVOLUNTARY MOTIONS ARE SINS.

Because the remains of original sin are found not unfrequently to be designated by the name of *concupiscence*, hence the Papists endeavour to prove from the Fathers, that

neither this concupiscence itself, nor its involuntary motions, bear the true character or nature of sin. We shall then endeavour also as strenuously to answer them.

1. Chrysostom, Hom. 13 in Epist. ad Rom.—*The passions are not in themselves sin; but their unbridled indulgence constitutes sin. For instance: concupiscence is not sin; but when it breaks forth beyond bounds, then it becomes adultery, not from concupiscence itself, but from immoderate desire.* He plainly denies that concupiscence is sin.

We must distinguish between the concupiscible power, the act of desiring, and the irregular motion of concupiscence. The power itself is good, and was created by God; the act itself is lawful, as it flows from the natural powers: but insubordination, or that which cleaves to the power itself, and is called *proneness to evil*, or that which puts itself forth in the act, and is called *unbridled concupiscence*, hath the nature of sin; the former of *original*, this latter of *actual* sin. We concede therefore to Chrysostom, that concupiscence itself, whether it be taken for the *power* or the *act*, is not sin in itself; but we deny to Bellarmine, that the corrupt, or unrestrained motion of concupiscence, is not sin. When concupiscence breaks forth into the flagitious crime of adultery, external, great and manifest sin is committed; but when it is more lightly excited either by the inordinate or undue passion, a sin is committed which is inward, lesser, and unseen of men, but not unknown to God. Nay *the very proneness of concupiscence to be carried out to sensual pleasure contrary to the order of reason is against the nature of man, as man**

2. The Author of the imperfect work on Matthew (Homil. 12.) expounding those words of the vth Chapter, *He who shall look on a woman to lust after her*, teaches that the command, *Thou shalt not covet*, was not given *to the flesh*, but *to the rational soul;* and on that account to lust with the flesh alone, while reason opposes it, is no sin.

I answer:—The command, *Thou shalt not covet*, is given *to the person*, namely, to man himself, not *to the flesh;* but man himself can by no means be bound to such a precept, if he had not a rational soul. But what Bellarmine has added,

* Aquin. quæst. disp. de peccat. origin. art. 2. resp. ad primum.

*Therefore to covet with the flesh alone when reason opposes it, is not sin*, must be regarded as a foolish and frivolous assumption. For, for the flesh alone to covet, is no less impossible than for the flesh alone to live. For even the rational soul, as respects carnal and sensible objects, infected as it is with the vice of the old Adam, is borne away to irregular desires; the same rational soul regarding the law of God, as far as it is renewed by sanctifying grace, strives against its own irregular concupiscence. This Augustine perspicuously teaches (contra Julian. lib. 6. cap. 5.) *The soul in its motions which it has after the Spirit, opposes its other motions which it has after the flesh, and again by its motions which it has after the flesh, it opposes its other motions which it has after the Spirit: and therefore the flesh is said to lust against the Spirit.* And yet plainer (de perfect. Justit.) *When there is anything of carnal concupiscence, which should be restrained at least by continence, God is by no means loved with the whole soul. For the flesh does not desire without the mind, although the flesh is said to desire, because the soul covets carnally.* Let Bellarmine therefore cease to prate foolishly, and to ascribe to the flesh alone what must be ascribed to the rational soul when putting forth carnal desires. For the desiring anything inordinately is not an act of the flesh alone, but of the rational soul clothed with flesh; and the resisting of this concupiscence even as we ought, is not a natural motion of the soul itself, but a supernatural motion of Divine grace.

3. Cyprian (or whoever is the author*) in a Sermon on the washing of feet, says, *The washing of regeneration so washes those whom the parental fall has infected, that neither any actual nor original stain, nor any vestige of it, can remain after that washing.*

This must necessarily be referred to the person of the regenerate from which guilt is removed, not to the nature of original sin. For the Papists themselves dare not deny but that some vestiges of sin remain after regeneration, aye and wounds too of original sin; however unwilling they may be to call these wounds, with St. Paul, by the name of *sin*.† For the ignorance which is left in the mind, the infirmity which

* It is now assigned to Arnold, Abbot of Bonnevale: See Dupin, vol. 1. 141, or 155.

† Bellarmin. de Amiss. gratiæ, lib. 6. cap. 10.

cleaves to the will, the rebellious principle which exerts itself in the appetite, are not marks of a nature formed by God, but manifest proofs of a nature corrupted by original sin. When therefore Cyprian affirms that no vestige of the original stain is left in the regenerate, it must be understood of the guilt of original sin loading and condemning the person, which guilt is wholly blotted out by free forgiveness ; not of the nature itself of original sin, infecting and vitiating the soul, which by the operation of grace is not instantly extirpated. This may be inferred from the words of Cyprian which are soon after added: for he says, that after this washing *original sins are no longer imputed, nor are those liable to condemnation on account of them, who have been once forgiven in baptism.* There is therefore no vestige of original sin in the regenerate, because it is no more imputed to them, because it renders them no longer obnoxious to condemnation, because it was forgiven them in regeneration. Nor yet is it to be thought that the nature of original sin remains at all such, after the washing of regeneration, as it was before regeneration, only its guilt being expiated ; but in the regenerate original sin cleaves, diminished, strangled, mortified. and in the new man subdued, through the grace of the Holy Spirit. In a word: In regeneration the hereditary load of condemnation, with which the fall of Adam and original sin weighed down all his posterity, is wholly and entirely taken away ; yet the virus of transmitted corruption, with which that fall of Adam had defiled all his posterity, is not wholly and entirely purged away.

4. Hilary, upon those words of the Psalmist, cxix. 29, *Remove from me the way of iniquity*, teaches that concupiscence is not sin, but only a way to sin. His words are these : *He intreats that the way of sin, by which he is prompted to go on to sin, may be removed from him ; that is, that all the desire of bodily pleasure may be taken away, that neither any temptation of concupiscence or ignorance, by which he might enter, as it were, upon the way to sin, assail him.* He must then not have considered that concupiscence was sin, but only way to sin.

That is true which Hilary wrote a little before : *That which moves on the way, is not the same as the way itself on which it moves.* When therefore we go to sin through

ignorance, evil desires, and inordinate concupiscence, as by a way; it is certain that these inward lusts are not that sin to which we go by them. But here we must inquire of what, and what kind of sin Hilary is speaking when he says, that concupiscence and ignorance are the way to sin. Doubtless he speaks of those gross and external sins into which all those rush who are ignorant of the Divine law, and follow their own evil desires. He means therefore, that ignorance and concupiscence are the way, that is, they directly lead men to iniquity, namely, to most grievous, flagitious, and base crimes.

Now consider how jejeune is Bellarmine's mode of arguing. Concupiscence is the way to sin, namely, to that which is external, and consists in wicked works, therefore it is not internal sin. No conclusion could be more unsound! For it is said, concupiscence is therefore called *way of iniquity*, because it leads men to the perpetration of works of wickedness and unrighteousness; as if any one should say, hatred and envy are the way to murder. But that these very ways to sin are sin in their own nature Hilary himself teaches. *Confession of one's ways* (says he) *is confession of one's sins;* The same on those words, *I have acknowledged my ways and thou heardest me.*

5. Saint Prosper, (de Vita Contemplativa, lib. 3. cap. 4.) writes, *I cannot commit sin unless I consent to the evil delight.* Therefore in delight itself, without consent, no sin is committed.

The words of Prosper are these:—*If I cannot commit any sin unless I consent to the evil delight, which is the character of passion, and if I contemn the commands of God which is the fruit of pride, how plain is it that every sin proceeds from cupidity, which is the root of all evils, and from pride, which is the beginning of all sin?* Prosper is speaking of the perpetration—the bringing of sin into outward act; which he affirms cannot be done, unless consent be first given to the evil concupiscence. But, in the mean time, he does not deny, that that inordinate motion itself of concupiscence soliciting to sin, hath the nature of internal sin, although the overt act to which it solicits, exist not without the deliberate consent of the will. Prosper therefore asserts nothing here which can either prejudice our argument, or subserve our

adversaries. But elsewhere (in Sentent. Sent. 176) he plainly teaches, that not the action only of an inordinate will, but the very desire, belongs to the fault of corruption.

6. Bernard, in his Sermon on the Six Tribulations, says, *That sin is at the door; unless you open the door yourself, it will not enter; appetite tickles in the heart, but unless you yield of your own accord, it will not hurt: withhold your consent lest it prevail, and you will be immaculate.*

Rightly may it be said, that the motions of concupiscence being repressed harm not the regenerate, nay they help towards the crown. But this does not arise from the fact that these inordinate motions are not sins but from the fact that their guilt (as Augustine seems to have thought*) together with original sin to which they adhere, is remitted in baptism, and because the motions of corrupt nature, which the new man resists, are not imputed to the person now translated out of the stock of the old Adam, and grafted into the new Adam, namely, into Christ. For (Rom. viii. 1,) *There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus; who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit.* Moreover those who resist their concupiscence may be called *immaculate* in this sense, that God neither imputes the innate taint of concupiscence to them; nor do they contract any new stain or damnable guilt from the mere motion of rebellious concupiscence, which they repress and coerce by the Spirit of grace. Or if these reasons are less satisfactory, I answer with Augustine (de Perfect. Justif. 1426) that *he is said, without absurdity, to walk without spot, who advances blameless to that perfection, free from damnable offences.*

Another passage of Bernard is adduced,† in which he asserts, *if concupiscence does not draw to consent, all its malignity vanishes.*

We acknowledge it; for it cannot injure the regenerate owing to the aforesaid causes.

* Vide August. in Ps. cxviii. concione 3, tom. 8.

† Serm. 56, super Cantica.

## CHAPTER XIII.

### THE TESTIMONIES WHICH ARE BROUGHT FROM AUGUSTINE ANSWERED.

Augustine alone of the Fathers now remains, and though he is altogether on our side in this controversy, yet our opponents venture to bring him forward as an authority against us. Bellarmine in his treatise, De Amiss. Grat., lib. 5. cap. 8. has scraped together some testimonies from each volume, which he misapplies in order to establish his own error. To these I shall briefly reply, having first premised a few things for the more clear understanding of Augustine's meaning.

It must then be observed, in the first place, that original sin has been placed by Augustine and the Master of the Sentences,* in our vicious and rebellious concupiscence. For *Adam, by the hidden corruption of his carnal concupiscence, hath himself diseased all those who spring from his stock*, as Augustine speaks, De Peccat. Merit. et Remiss., lib. 1. cap. 9. Secondly, we must also observe, that this concupiscence, in which original sin is said by Augustine to consist, not only belongs to sensuality, but dwells in the mind and will also. Hence he writes† that *the flesh lusting against the spirit is the carnal delight which the spirit itself hath from the flesh and with the flesh.* This is confessed by our opponents; for Bellarmine himself concedes, that although the viciousness of concupiscence consists chiefly in sensuality, yet that it also hath its seat in the mind. And Altissiodorensis‡ defines concupiscence to be *a wicked will, by which the soul seeks to commit fornication with the creature.* Thirdly, it must also be noted, that this rebellious concupiscence, according to Augustine, makes infants themselves the children of wrath, and binds them under the

* Lombard. lib. 2. dist. 30. lit. G. et H.

† De Genesi ad literam lib. 10. cap. 12. De Amiss. Grat. lib. 5. cap. 15.

‡ Lib. 3. tract. 2. qu. 4. pag. 130.

guilt of eternal death. That celebrated passage* is well known: *Such and so great an evil, how would it not by the mere act of being in us, hold us in death, and draw us to eternal death, unless its chain were loosened by that remission of all sins which takes place in baptism?* Fourthly, it should also not be forgotten, that, according to Augustine, the condemning nature of concupiscence, and its dominion, is removed and taken away from all the regenerate, though concupiscence itself is not yet removed or eradicated. He defends this his assertion against Julian (lib. 6. cap. 6.) *That the concupiscence of the flesh is put away in Baptism, though not so as not to exist, yet so as not to be imputed for sin; for although its guilt is put away, yet itself remains.* And elsewhere :† *In those who are regenerate in Christ, when they receive entire remission of all sins, it is necessary that the guilt of this concupiscence, though remaining, be remitted and not imputed for sin.* And a little after, *It may be that what remains as to the act, may be passed by as to the guilt.* This then is the uniform opinion of Augustine—That concupiscence is remitted in *baptism*, and yet remains in *the baptised.* Lastly, it must be observed, that of this concupiscence, which renders sin deadly in its nature, Augustine speaks variously after its guilt is remitted in baptism; for, concupiscence which he admits to remain in the regenerate, he openly calls *sin*, in many places, agreeably to the Scriptures and the Apostles: on the other hand, in some other passages he dreads the name of *sin*, and determines that that concupiscence which cleaves to the regenerate without guilt, ought to be called *evil* and *infirmity*, rather than *sin*. Hence arises the contest between us and the Romanists concerning the two-fold opinion of Augustine. They say, that when he calls the concupiscence of the regenerate *sin*, it must not be referred to the nature of the concupiscence remaining in them, as if it yet carried with it the true nature of sin; but must only be understood figuratively, because this concupiscence of the regenerate is the cause of sin as often as it is obeyed. On the other hand, when Augustine denies that this concupiscence is sin, they will have it that this is to be taken strictly, not as merely referring to the guilt of it being remitted, or to its hurtful power being taken away; but as

* Contra Julian, lib. 6. cap. 5. † De nupt. et concup. ad Valerium lib. 1. cap. 26.

referring to the very act or existence of it, such as it remains in the regenerate, which, they say, has now entirely cast off the nature of sin. Thus the Papists argue. But our Divines, on the contrary, affirm, that when the concupiscence of the regenerate is called sin by Augustine, it must be understood not only in the sense of being the cause of sin, which is true; but because it has really in itself the nature and character of sin. On the other hand, as often as he denies it to be sin, they maintain that the meaning of the word *sin* is restricted and confined by Augustine to sin involving guilt, and armed as it were with a condemning power. Just as if any one should say, that as a viper, stiff and almost dead with cold, because it cannot hurt is not to be called *a viper*, but *a harmless worm;* so Augustine is accustomed to denote concupiscence kept within bounds by baptismal grace, and stripped of its deadly guilt, not by the horrid name of *sin*, but by the softer name of *languor* or *infirmity*, because after remission it cannot bring harm to the regenerate who are walking in the Spirit. Now which of the two parties understand and explain the mind of Augustine the more correctly, will be clearly seen in discussing the testimonies which are usually adduced on either side. Let the testimonies then be produced which Bellarmine has brought together against us out of Augustine.

1. He brings two passages out of his first volume.* The first is this:—*Sometimes reason manfully restrains and controls the desire excited for evil things; when this is the case we do not fall into sin, but we are crowned after some little conflict.*

I reply:—The regenerate who manfully restrain the motions of carnal concupiscence, and do not yield to them the assent of the will, are denied *to fall* into sin, because they do nothing whence they can incur any new guilt. But we have before touched upon the cause of this,† and have shewn in agreement with the opinion of Augustine, that, together with the condemning guilt of original concupiscence, the condemning guilt of actual concupiscence is always remitted, if it is stopped on the first inclination, and does not include the deliberate consent of the mind. As Augustine therefore thought that it was not needful, that the

* Lib. 2. de Genesi contra Manichæos, cap. 14. † Chapter ix.

regenerate should pray for the remission of inherent concupiscence, because its guilt had been already put away in baptism; so he did not think it needful that the saints should say, *Forgive us our debts*, on account of their first motions, not because they are not sins, but because, together with their original root, they are remitted, and are not imputed to those who resist them. In this respect then he says that such persons do not fall into sin, who restrain those motions of original concupiscence. For Augustine calls sin *that which being committed retains guilt until it be remitted;** but these motions do not render guilty, because not only the old guilt of concupiscence itself, but also all those parts of concupiscence are put away by the washing of baptism. (Contra duas Epistolas Pelag. ad Bonifacium lib. I. cap. 14. tom. 7.)

2. The other passage is taken from the Retractations, lib. 1. cap. 15. in these words:—*This sin of which the Apostle speaks, is therefore called sin, because it is caused by sin, and is the penalty of sin.* He seems therefore to assert, that concupiscence is not properly sin, but figuratively only, or by trope.

I answer: We do not deny that concupiscence may be called sin figuratively, because it is both the cause and the punishment of sin; but we add from the same Augustine, that it is truly and properly sin, *because there is in it disobedience against the government of the mind;* as he also says speaking against Julian, lib. 5. cap. 3. For if it were not truly sin in its own nature, it would have no guilt to be remitted in baptism. For nothing except sin has the power of making and constituting man guilty.

3. From tom. 2 (Epist. 200 ad Assellicum) he produces this single testimony only:—*Although the desires of sin be in us, whilst we are in the body of this death, if we yield assent to none of them, there would be no reason why we should say to our Father who is in heaven,* FORGIVE US OUR DEBTS. The desires of concupiscence, therefore, without consent, are not properly and truly sins in the regenerate, because they do not need remission.

I reply: If this argument had any force, not only would the desires of concupiscence when resisted be properly not sins in believers, but not even in unbelievers would they be sins,

* Contra duas Epist. Pelag. cap. 13. Vide Concionem tertiam in Psal. cxix.

or need remission. For *the believer sins more grievously than the unbeliever in the same species of sin*, as Thomas (Aquinas) in Rom. viii. lect. 1. lays down. If therefore these motions before consent are not in their nature sins in the regenerate, much less would they be sins, or need remission in the unregenerate; which is against the common opinion of Theologians. But as the Schoolmen say, *Contra arguere, non est solvere—to contradict is not to answer.* I reply therefore as before: That the regenerate have no need of remission, so far as pertains to these unfulfilled desires, because they were remitted together with their root, namely, original concupiscence; not because they are not sin in their own nature. How far the hypothesis of Augustine is true, that *the guilt of these former motions, together with the guiltiness of concupiscence itself is taken away*, I do not say; I affirm only that this being laid down, there *is* no need to say, in regard to these, *Forgive us our debts*, although in their own nature they be determined to be sins.

Test. 4. From tom. 3. lib. 14 de Trinitate, cap. 1.; and from tom. 4. lib. de Continentia, cap. 7. Bellarmine produces two passages, which may be united, because they have entirely the same meaning; for in both places Augustine calls concupiscence remaining in the regenerate, not *fault*, or *sin*, but *languor*.

I answer: He uses this word *languor*, not as denying to concupiscence *the nature of sin*, but to signify that *the hurt* and *guilt* of sin was removed from it by the grace of remission. For what prevents that which he calls *languor* from being reckoned *original sin*? The grace of God indeed has remitted *the original fault*, by which the *person* of the regenerate is absolved from *the guilt*; but it has not abolished the *taint* of corruption, by which the *nature* of the regenerate is molested and infected with this corrupt *languor*. Peter Lombard shews that original sin is usually designated by many synonymous terms, expressing the same thing under various considerations. In lib. 2 distinct. 30. lit. G. original sin is called *fuel, concupiscence, the law of the members, the languor of nature, the tyrant which is in the members, the law of the flesh*. And Bonaventura endeavours to give a reason for all these appellations. In vain then does Bellarmine infer from this softer name of *languor* being used, that

Augustine does not acknowledge that in concupiscence there is the true nature of sin.

Test. 5. From tom. 5 he cites two passages; both from the books of the City of God. Lib. 1. cap. 25; *That disobedience of evil desire, which yet dwells in the dying members, struggles, as it were, by its own law, against the law of our will. If it be without fault in the body of one who is sleeping, how much more is it without fault in the body of him who does not consent to it?*

I reply: This was said by Augustine (as he himself informs us in the same passage) on account of certain pious women, who, lest they should consent to the passion of their ravishers, were thinking it better to put themselves to death. Augustine therefore argues, that they should on no account do so; but trust to God's help, who, if he suffered them to fall into this misfortune, would so keep them that their mind should not yield to natural evil, excited by the sin of another. At length he adds in the words adduced by Bellarmine, that the evil desires excited in the members, are no more to be blamed in the non-consentient, than in the body of the sleeping. It is plain therefore that Augustine speaks of that inward disobedience which the soul abhors, yet is compelled to feel, but only from the involuntary and external passion of the body. In that case the soul endures against its will, and does not solicit; and mere passion is not sin. But if the soul itself be touched against its will, with any inordinate delight, nevertheless, according to Augustine, it carries not the guiltiness of sin, any more than original concupiscence itself, which adheres to the regenerate against their will; and that because of the remission already obtained.

Test. 6. *With the exception of the Mediator alone, and children after the washing of regeneration, no one is clean from his filth, as it is written, not even the infant whose life is but a day upon the earth.** De Civit. Dei, lib. 20. cap. 26. He compares regenerated infants with Christ himself, as to their cleanness from the filth of sin; which comparison would be impious, if there were still in baptised children anything which had the true nature of sin, although it might not be imputed to them.

* The reference in Augustine is to Job. xiv. 4. Verse 5 of our Version would seem to be the passage in view.

I answer: For a person to be accounted clean from filth, two things are required; that he should have been purged from the filth of original sin, and not be defiled afterwards by any stains of actual sin. If Augustine spake of that cleansing only from original sin, which is conferred in baptism, it would be false that no one is cleansed from this infection except infants; for adults are no less purged from original sin after baptism than infants. He is speaking therefore especially of the filthiness contracted by actual sins; and from these sins he pronounces infants alone to be free, who by reason of age cannot as yet sin. This then is the sense of the words:—Christ alone being excepted, and recently baptised infants, whom the grace of Christ has cleansed from original concupiscence as to its *guilt*, and whose very age prohibits them from personal transgression as to the *act*, there is no one else clean from both, as well original as actual sin. A similar sentiment occurs in his book De Fide ad Petrum, cap. 41. *Hold most firmly and in no wise doubt, that even righteous and holy men, (in short) no one, except baptised infants, can live here free from sin.*

But Bellarmine urges, That regenerated infants are compared with Christ himself as to cleansing; which comparison would be impious if any defilement of true sin remained in them, either as to its guilt or as to its actual inhesion. I answer, that Bellarmine is impious, or at least unwise, in fancying that a comparison of equals is here instituted between Christ and baptised infants, because together with Christ they are excepted from the defilements of sin. For he meant not that they were cleansed from the filth of all sin, either in the same manner, or in the same degree as Christ himself; for, first, as it regards the filth of actual sin, Christ is clean because he neither committed sin at any time, nor could commit it; and that not because of the period of his life, but because of the fulness of grace and perfection of holiness. But infants are cleansed a little while from actual sin, not on account of purity of nature, but because of their feebleness. This is clear from hence, that as soon as they are able to sin, the depravity of nature immediately shews itself, and breaks out into actual sins. *Thus the imbecility of infantile members is innocent, not the disposition in infants,* as says Augustine (Confes. lib. 1.

cap. 7.) But as to what relates to the evil concupiscence, in which Augustine places original sin, Christ is clean, and always has been, not only from its *guilt*, but also from its *act*; but in baptised infants, though it be passed away as to its *guilt*, yet it remains in the *act*. In one word, Augustine meant only, that infants are wholly cleansed from the guilt of original sin, whilst not yet defiled by the stains of actual sin: but that they are cleansed from the remains of indwelling sin, he neither said nor thought.

Test. 7. From tom. vi. in lib. de bono Conjugali, cap. 11, a quotation is made: *The Apostle defends the use of marriage from all crime, when he says, and if thou shalt marry thou hast not sinned.* Concupiscence, therefore, or that inevitable desire of sanctified parents for children, is not sin.

I answer: Bellarmine does not owe much to this vith Volume, from which he could not furnish himself with even one pertinent testimony. For the passage here produced by him, unless it had been first curtailed and maimed, would rather have injured him than us. For thus stand the words themselves in Augustine:—*Decus conjugale est castitas procreandi, et reddendi carnalis debiti fides; hoc est opus nuptiarum, hoc ab omni crimine defendit Apostolus dicendo*, &c. It is true therefore that this use of marriage (which Augustine describes) is not sinful; but that the unrestrained motion of lust, which may accompany it, is not sin, is not proved from the words produced. For though he had spoken of the accompanying desire, yet since he says that the Apostle defends the act from all *crime*, and since crime is something greater and worse than sin, according to our usual way of speaking, the inference that this desire is devoid of sin, does not seem to be just. In fine, Augustine allows every inordinate motion *of men* to be *vicious*, although it is not *the fault of marriage*.*

Test. 8. From the viiith Volume our opponent brings many passages, but most of them of no great moment. From lib. 1 contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, cap. 10. THERE IS NO CONDEMNATION TO THEM THAT ARE IN CHRIST JESUS, *for no one is condemned but he who consents to the desires of the flesh for evil.*

We have before (pp. 31. 53) replied to this passage

* De bono Conjugali, cap. 6.

brought from the Apostle, that concupiscence remaining in the regenerate does not condemn them, because its *guilt* has been remitted, not because it wants the *nature* of sin; for *it is passed away as to its guilt, although it inheres in the act*, as Augustine often states. But the act or remaining nature* of that, the guilt whereof is only taken away by remission, is most manifestly chargeable with sin. For as Augustine elsewhere writes,† *Who doubts that it would be most absurd to say, that they have not sinned to whom pardon is granted?* so also may I truly say, Who doubts that it would be most absurd to assert, that that is not sin which can condemn, unless its guilt be separated from the nature which remains?

Test. 9. From the xiiith Chapter, these words are brought forward:—*We affirm that baptism gives the pardon of all sins, and takes away crimes; that it does not merely lop the surface; and that the roots of all sins are not retained in the evil flesh, like those of hairs on a shorn head, so that sins may spring up afresh to be cut down again. But I believe those persons* (that is, the Pelagians) *to be themselves deceived, or to deceive others, with regard to that concupiscence of the flesh, with which the baptised person must still piously conflict; and especially if he is to make diligent progress, and is actuated by the Spirit of God. But although this be called sin, yet it is not called so because it is sin, but because it is caused by sin; as a writing of any one is called his hand, because the hand wrote it.*

I reply: Here it is to be particularly observed, that a calumny aimed against Augustine by the Palagians, is refuted in this passage; for the Pelagians accused the orthodox of the error of teaching, *that baptism does not confer the pardon of all sins, nor take away crimes, but only lop the surface, so that the roots of all sins were still retained in the evil flesh*, and so on: to which calumny Augustine opposed his denial in almost the same number of words adduced by Bellarmine. Manifest therefore it is, that the Papists object to us little else, than what the Pelagians used

* It is plain from hence what is meant by the word "*actus*" when it refers to sin, since our author explains it of *the nature remaining*.

† De bono Conjugali, cap. 10.

formerly to object to Augustine, whence it is likely enough that *we* have embraced the doctrine of Augustine, the *Papists* that of the Pelagians. Moreover from this very unjust charge it appears, that Augustine used to teach something which gave occasion to this suspicion ; but if he had taught with our Papists, that nothing remains in the baptised which bears the nature of sin, nay that all the regenerate are, as to inherent righteousness, clearer than the rays of the sun, he would have left the Pelagians no pretence at all for their calumnious imputations. This calumny arose then from the fact, that Augustine every where used to teach, that the concupiscence with which all the children of Adam are born, is in itself a condemning sin, and that the same was *remitted* in baptism, but not *taken away* or *eradicated*. These sayings of his the Pelagians exaggerated or amplified (which all calumniators are in the habit of doing,) and made them apply to even personal and actual crimes ; as if he had been in the habit of teaching, that actual sins were not taken away, but lopped or pared off only, while their roots were left in the evil flesh. This was the pith of their calumny ; now consider the answer of this most learned Father, and you will perceive that it contains nothing opposed to our doctrine. First, he says that *baptism confers the pardon of all sins*. This too we freely profess. Secondly, he affirms that *baptism takes away crimes, does not merely pare them*. If the word *crime* is referred to actual sins (a sense in which Augustine is wont to use the word,) then, beyond all controversy, they are blotted out and wholly taken away ; but if, under this term, he embraces even original sin, then we concede that their crime, that is *their condemnable guilt*, is entirely taken away ; and moreover that their *corrupt nature* is not merely *pared*, but *broken* and *mortified*, as you have before heard. Hitherto then Augustine holds nothing contrary to our sentiments : but let us proceed. He says, in short, that *the deceptions of the Pelagians arose from the fact of his calling concupiscence, as yet dwelling in the regenerate after baptism, sin ;* and he subjoins that *it was so called by him, not because it was sin after baptism, but because it was caused by sin*. These last words seem to us, and to many others, to contradict those passages which are alleged from Augustine. I say, then, that the word *sin*

is taken here, by Augustine, in a more confined sense than it is wont to be used, either by the Apostle, or by us, or by Augustine himself in other places. For the word *sin*, according to the meaning of the Scriptures, denotes whatever involves a formal repugnance to the Divine law; and this consists either in perverse action, and then it constitutes actual sin; or in a corrupt and vitiated agent, and then it constitutes sin either original or habitual. But according to the philosophical use, sin is called the actual transgression of the law committed by the consent of one's own will. According to the more restricted use of Augustine, that only is called sin, upon which the mischief of sin is consequent, that is, its condemnable guilt; but if it be so, that the guilt be separated from it, then for the sake of distinction he calls the vice itself, apart from the guilt, evil, languor, infirmity, or something of that kind. But he denies that it is sin, to intimate that its damnable guilt is removed. When, therefore, he denies that concupiscence left after baptism is sin, he does not deny that it is a corruption in which there is a lawlessness (*ἀνομία*) condemnable in its own nature; but a guilt actually condemning, and holding under condemnation. Now it does not any longer actually condemn or bind the person with guilt, because that has been remitted in baptism. Lest this should seem our comment, look at the words which next follow in Augustine, in which he explains what he means by the word sin, when he affirms that, the concupiscence of the regenerate is not sin. *Sins* (says he) *are those things which, according to the concupiscence or ignorance of the flesh, are done, said, or thought unlawfully; which having been committed, also bind the persons under guilt; if they are not remitted. But this concupiscence of the flesh is so put away in baptism, that it does not injure those who are born again.* The Papists, then, are welcome to say, that the concupiscence of the regenerate is not sin, provided they understand by it nothing else, than that there is not anything committed by them, by personal and actual will, which still retains them under guilt. But if they mean thence to infer, that it has not of itself and in its own nature condemnable unlawfulness (*ἀνομίαν*) and therefore that it is not formally sin, Paul will reclaim against them, Augustine himself will reclaim against them, who shews

that it does not on this account injure the regenerate, because *its guilt has been put away in regeneration*: Ibid.

Test. 10. In the vith book against Julian, cap. 5, we read, *The justified are void of all sin, but not of all evil*: and he repeats the same, cap. 11; as also in book 2 de Peccat. meritis et remiss. cap. 22. From these passages Bellarmine thinks it is to be inferred, that concupiscence is not truly or formally sin.

It is not necessary that we should answer each of these passages severally: one will suffice for all: that answer we shall borrow from Augustine himself. When, therefore, he says, that *the justified are void of all sin, not of all evil*, I ask what he understands by the word *sin*, what by *evil*? By the word *sin* he understands a viciousness which contains condemning and binding guilt. Now in this sense he affirms truly, that *the justified are void of all sin*: because they are delivered from the condemning guilt of all sins by free remission. Thus he has explained himself in the same place,* *He is free from all sin, but not from all evil; which is more plainly so expressed, That he is free from all the guilt of all sins, not from all the evil.* Therefore he calls evil, with remaining guilt, *sin*: evil remaining apart from the guilt, he calls *evil* absolutely. I ask again, when he grants that this concupiscence of the regenerate is evil, what evil he means? whether natural and miserable evil, such as deafness, blindness, diseases, and things of that kind? or moral and condemning evil? If moral, and in its own nature condemnable, this is the very thing about which we are disputing, and which Paul everywhere calls *sin*. But such I shew to be understood, because that very concupiscence which remains in the regenerate needs remission; but natural evils require no remission. Hear Augustine (*ibid.*): *So great and such an evil is it, that by its merit existing in us, it would drag us to death, unless its chain were broken in baptism.*

From the three last volumes of Augustine, Bellarmine has not been able to bring forward any passage for the confirmation of his error. However, to save appearances, he has quoted three testimonies. [illegible]

* Contra Julian, lib. 6. cap. 5.

Thes. 21. Then, still from the Tract on Psalm 5: *The chaste office of the Spouse has no sin.*

That inspired fellow (as Augustine's own definition) is the chastity of generation, and fidelity in paying the bounden debt.* This has no sin. But if in this duty the endeavors conquerors accidentally blend itself, then indeed it will not be exempt from sin.

Thes. 22. In Thes. 19. from Tract 41. on John: *Whatever human will unjustly is blotted out, there there remains no infirmity?*

By unjustly Augustine intends two things—the iniquity of Adam in transgressing the command of God, imputed to all his posterity, and consequences propagated and entailed with the chain of condemnation. In baptism therefore, this sinful iniquity is blotted out through remission; for both the act of Adam is not any more imputed to the regenerate, and the condemnable chain of indwelling consequences, or deadly guilt, is broken. That consequence then which remains in the regenerate, by the chain of condemnation and dominion being loosened, is not to be called iniquity, but infirmity. But what would Bellarmine infer from hence? That this remaining consequence, because it is called infirmity is not sin, if we look to its nature and toward reality? Augustine himself exclaiming against this, who clearly shows, in the same tract, that this infirmity hath the nature of sin; he calls it the law of sin; he subjoins, *It cannot but be, that as long as we live, sin should remain in our members*; and he adds, that the unreasonable desires could not arise in us, unless sin were yet in us. I wonder therefore what right Bellarmine had to conclude, that concupiscence is not sin, because it is called infirmity; but does not permit us to conclude, that it is truly and formally sin, when it is inflicted and so expressly called by the very name.

Thes. 23. In Thes. 2. from the 6th Sermon on the words of the Apostle, this passage appears.—The angels with the flesh remaining, because iniquity is taken away, but infirmity remains.

Now we have often replied, that the word infirmity here

* In hunc Caniticum cap. 11.—Dupinay required the addition of this expression in the translation.

not exclude the nature of sin; for that which is *sin*, inasmuch as it opposes the Divine law, is infirmity, inasmuch as it makes us unable and unfit to fulfil this Divine law. Concupiscence, then, as long as it reigns and detains under guilt, is called *iniquity;* but after it has begun to lose its reign and guilt, is called *infirmity:* but whether it be called iniquity or infirmity, it will remain always *sin*, as long as it shall be habitually contrary to the Divine law.

And thus you have an answer to all the testimonies which are generally brought forward by our adversaries in this cause.

But Bellarmine endeavours to meet these replies of ours, and he affirms, first, that what our Theologians answer is false, viz., that when Augustine denies concupiscence to be sin, he sometimes takes the word *sin*, not according to the use of the Scriptures—which comprise under this term as well actual transgression, as original corruption; but, after the manner of the Philosophers, who restrict sin to the actual transgression of some law, perpetrated by the assent of one's own will. But that Augustine does so speak is manifest from the received definition of sin which he gives, lib. 22. contra Faustum, cap. 27: *Sin is something said, done, or desired, against the eternal law;* which definition, however, unless it is wrested, cannot properly be accommodated to original corruption implanted within us. For *the substance of sin* (as Bellarmine himself speaks, when explaining this definition*) *is a voluntary action, or a voluntary omission of action. — — For sin is the name of an evil work, and vice is the name of an evil habit.* Since then inherent concupiscence is the fault of our nature, not the operation of our will, what wonder if, in this sense, it is sometimes denied to be sin by Augustine. But, exclaims Bellarmine, *Who can suppose that Augustine would be willing to err with the vulgar?* Truly he who speaks with the vulgar does not always err with the vulgar. For Bellarmine himself, who well knew the original fall, according to the Scriptures, both to be, and to be called, sin, yet has confined the term *sin* to *evil operations*, and the term *vice* he has assigned to *evil habits*.†. Augustine therefore has not

* De Amiss. Grat. lib 1. cap. 1. † Ibid.

erred with the vulgar, nor impugned the truth of the Scriptures, because he has sometimes made use of the word *sin* in a stricter signification than the Scriptures are wont; seeing that at the same time he has so explained his meaning, as to accord in reality with Scripture.

The other answer of our Theologians is, that the word *sin* is taken in a twofold sense by Augustine: he sometimes calls whatever has a formal repugnance to the Divine law, *sin*, although it be free from guilt; he sometimes restricts the word *sin* to that only which is mixed and connected with condemning guilt: and he views it under this meaning as often as he denies that concupiscence dwelling in the regenerate is sin. Nothing can be said more truly. Yet Bellarmine exclaims, That this our distinction is altogether fictitious, since, according to Augustine, all true sin always renders the person guilty, in whom it exists. But on the contrary, I assert, that what is truly and in its own nature sin, may nevertheless not be imputed for sin to the person engrafted into Christ. But as often as this is the case (which we affirm to be so in all the regenerate) sin, remaining in them, is *deserving* of punishment* by its own innate depravity; because it is an evil contrary to the Divine law; but it is not *adjudged* to punishment,† owing to Divine compassion: because it has been remitted and pardoned in baptism. Now let us hear what Augustine himself thinks: Contra Julian. lib. 6. cap. 6, he says—*Concupiscence is put away in baptism, not as regards existence, but so as not to be imputed for sin; for although its guilt is now discharged, yet itself remains.* From these words, we deduce, first, that remaining concupiscence is truly sin; as well because the same concupiscence, which is said to be *put away*, is also affirmed to *remain*—but as what was put away had the nature of sin, so also has that which remains, since it is the same;—as because remaining concupiscence is said *not to be imputed for sin*: but there is no danger lest that should be imputed for sin, which has not the nature of sin. Secondly, we infer, that this concupiscence, which is truly sin, does not retain the regenerate person under guilt: be-

* Habet condignitatem ad pœnam.

† Non habet deputationem ad pœnam.

cause Augustine plainly asserts, that *it is put away;* that *it is no longer imputed;* that *its guiltiness is discharged.* We maintain, consequently, from this passage, that some sin remains, as to its nature, which does not constitute a person guilty after its remission.

But Bellarmine urges those words which are elsewhere met with in Augustine,* *Not to have sin means not to be guilty of sin*—words which are to be understood and expounded, not according to *identity,* but according to *equivalence:* as if he had said, It avails the same to the retaining the friendship of God, and obtaining of life eternal, either altogether *to have no sin,* or to be altogether *absolved from the guilt of sin.* This passage, therefore, tells most completely in our favour; as Bellarmine might easily have perceived, had he seriously examined the words immediately preceding, which are these: *It must be that in those who are regenerated in Christ, when they receive remission entirely of all their sins, the guilt of this remaining concupiscence is also remitted, so as not to be imputed for sin.* What, therefore, he adds—*Not to have sin means not to lie under the guilt of sin,* is the same as that saying among lawyers, *Not to be, and not to appear, comes to the same;* or, *to be absent and to be present inefficiently comes to the same;* or, as it is commonly said, *Not to have, and not to use is just the same.* For in this and the like forms of speaking, the word *same* is received not according to *the identity* of the thing, but according to its *equivalence.* Since then not to have the sin of concupiscence, and to be absolved from its guilt, though with concupiscence remaining, are things equivalent as to the removal of the anger of God, and the attainment of blessedness, Augustine correctly said, *That not to have sin, means not to lie under the guilt of sin.*

Hitherto we have sustained the assaults of our opponents, and have repelled them with all our power; it remains now, that leading our own forces into the field, we attack them in our turn.

* De Nupt. et Concup. lib. 1. cap. 26.

## CHAPTER XIV.

### SOME THINGS PREMISED CONCERNING THE NATURE OF ORIGINAL RIGHTEOUSNESS AND SIN.

Under our *first* head we conceded, that there is a certain infused and inherent righteousness in all the regenerate; under our *second*, we have refuted the arguments of the Romanists, who imagined that this righteousness is so perfect as to eradicate immediately and entirely original sin: It now remains that we confirm our opinion by testimonies and arguments from the Word of God. We affirm, therefore, that not only punishments, or certain sequels *(sequelæ,)* as the Papists are wont to call them,) of original sin, are found in all the regenerate and justified, but relics, real and condemnatory in their own nature; albeit the dominion of sin being now broken, and its guilt discharged, they cannot condemn the person who is reconciled to God by Christ.

But in order to understand what is the nature or character of Original Sin, we must consider what was the character or essence of original righteousness; for the privation of the one is the establishment of the other.

Original righteousness, then, is a certain good habitude or rectitude of the whole man, which conformed him to the Divine law or will, and made him meet to serve God with perfect obedience. This the Scripture intimates when it teaches, that *man was made in the image and likeness of God*, Gen. i. 27; when it says, *God made man upright;* Eccl. vii. 30. But such rectitude cannot exist, except when the faculties of the soul are in a sound state; for if any of them be deficient in good habitude or integrity, it hinders the rest from rendering a perfect obedience to God. For good springs only from uncorrupted sources; whereas evil will arise from any defect. Original righteousness, therefore, comprised the perfect illumination of the mind, which sufficiently furnished man with the *knowledge* of the

Divine will; perfect conversion of the heart to God, which rendered him apt for *obedience* to the Divine will: in short, perfect subjection of the sensitive appetites to the mind and will, which freed the soul from all internal discord and rebellious passions. If you take away any one of these, you destroy original righteousness. For take away the illumination of the mind, the will is in itself a blind faculty; nor can it serve God as it ought. Take away the conversion of the will to God, the enlightened mind will see what is best, but the depraved heart will follow what is worse. In fine, suppose the mind enlightened and the will good; yet if concupiscence be inordinate, it will spread darkness over the mind, enchain the will, and hinder the man from serving God according to the rule of perfect righteousness.

That original righteousness consisted of these three parts is plain from hence, that when the Scriptures speak of the renewal of righteousness commenced in the regenerate, they indicate some renewal of all these. For that the above light is partially restored the Scriptures shew, when they say, that it is granted to the regenerate to have *the eyes of their mind enlightened*, Ephes. i. 18.; and that *God hath shined into their hearts, to give the light of the knowledge*, &c.; 2 Cor. iv. 6. That an habitual conversion of the heart itself to God is granted them, they shew when they teach, that *a new heart is created within them*, Ps. li. 10.; that *their heart is purified*, Acts xv. 9.; and lastly, that the rebelliousness of concupiscence is healed, when they affirm that the regenerate are delivered from its reign and dominion, that they should *not obey its lusts*, as it is said in Rom. vii. 12, 14.

These things being thus explained, it is easy to shew in what the nature of Original Sin consists; for it is the knowledge of the opposites to these. Hence the loss of the rectitude, of which we have been speaking, in every one of the faculties of the soul, with the corrupt habit which always adheres to this loss, constitutes the nature of Original Sin. For Thomas seems to me to have remarked, not unsuitably,* *Just as bodily sickness has in it something privative inasmuch as it takes away the quality of the temperament and health: and*

* Aquin. 1. 2. qu. 82. art. 1. resp. ad primum.

*something positive in that the humours themselves are disordered; so original sin is not pure privation, but a certain corrupt habit.* And rightly has Cajetan laid down on this place, That this corrupt habit is founded on that proneness which is not merely *beside* or *without*, but *against* the due harmony of the soul. Let us now turn again to the oracles of Scripture, and learn from them in what the nature of Original Sin consists.

First, then; as original righteousness comprehended the spiritual light of the mind; so original sin implies the densest mental darkness. Hence the Apostle, depicting the condition of unregenerate men, says, Ephes. iv. 18; *Having the understanding darkened.* Behold the privation of original rectitude in the intellect! Now would you learn what that corrupt habit is, which always accompanies this privation, in all the powers of the soul? I shall easily shew it from the effects. For the human understanding is not a sufferer merely from privation of due knowledge; but is prone to mock at the truth, to hate it, and eagerly to embrace errors, and foolish and vain opinions. Hence said the Apostle, that *the natural man*, not only *doth not receive the things which are of God;* but he adds *they are foolishness unto him* (1 Cor. xi. 14); that is, he derides and scornfully rejects Divine truth, as a thing to be mocked at and worthy of fools alone. Nor does the natural man merely deride saving truth, but he hates both it and the preachers of it: *I have given them thy word, and the world hath hated them;* John xvii. 14. Men have *loved darkness rather than light;* John iii. 19. And as regards errors and vain science, the human intellect eagerly embraces both—yea, with open arms. The Apostle has noticed this evil in the wisest of the philosophers: *They became vain in their imaginations*: Rom. i. 21. For it is implanted in all the unregenerate, that as they receive not the love of the truth, so they readily give credit to lies; 2 Thess. ii. 11.; and all these things spring from that original taint which has seized upon the human understanding.

Now, in the second place, let us consider what are the effects of Original Sin on the will. As, then, the original rectitude of the will consisted in holding habitual conversation with God and the Divine will; so the original sin of the will consists in this, that it has lost this dutiful turning unto

God, and that there is found instead, an inordinate and contrary application to the creature. This deprivation is pointed out in these words:—*There is none that seeketh after God; they are all gone out of the way; they are together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good, no not one;* Rom. iii. 11, 12. And this contrary disposition is described in these words, *The carnal mind is enmity against God;* Rom. viii. 7,: *Being filled with all unrighteousness, maliciousness; haters of God,* &c. Rom. i. 29. But those words of God, Gen. vi. 5, most fully describe this worst disposition of the human heart: *Every imagination of the heart is only evil continually.* To which agrees that assertion of Jeremiah, *The heart is deceitful above all things,* (ch. xvii. 9); and of Job, *Abominable and filthy is man, who drinketh in iniquity like water;* Job. xv. 16. These depraved actions prove that there is in the human will an habitual aversion to God the Creator, and to his will; and the contrary lust of fornicating with the creature, and its vanity. And in these two things consists that original corruption which hath defiled the will.

It remains that we enquire, lastly, what is the nature of Original Sin in the inferior appetite. Now formerly the original righteousness of the sensitive faculty was its entire and perfect subjection, so as not to have the slightest inclination against the empire of the mind. In this inferior faculty, then, Original Sin will be characterised by an habitual proneness to shake off the empire of the mind, to bind reason, and lead captive the will. That this is the disease engrafted upon the sensitive faculty, the Psalmist plainly taught, when he likened carnal man to *the horse,* and *the mule, which have no understanding,* Ps. xxxix. 2; and the Prophet, who says of this kind of men, that *Every one turned to his course, as the horse rusheth into the battle;* Jerem. viii. 6. But the Apostle most plainly describes this evil, when he calls it, *The law in the members, warring against the law of the mind, and bringing man into captivity to the law of sin;* Rom. vii. 23.

Thus you see what Original Sin is, and what faculties of the soul it has seized upon, namely, the understanding, the will, and the affections; for as to the vegetative power, and the body itself, or the fleshly mass, although they may not

be free from any infection peculiar to them, yet they cannot become the seat of sin properly so called. For rightly, I think, has Aquinas observed;* *The superior part of the soul, and even some of its inferior powers, which are under its will, and are formed to obey it, are susceptible of sin; but the inferior powers which are not subject to the will, namely, the animal soul, and even the body itself, become subjects of the consequences of original sin, in the way of punishment, not in the way of fault.*

From what has been now premised, it will be the more easy to shew, whether any remains of Original Sin cleave to the regenerate or not. For, if we shall be able to find in them either a deficiency of due original righteousness, or unruly dispositions contrary to this righteousness, we may conclude, that they are not wholly free from original sin. For there is sin not only when a man hath not what he ought to have, but also when he hath what he ought not to have. We affirm, then, that the regenerate themselves are contaminated by the remains of original sin in both respects, as we shall proceed to prove.

## CHAPTER XV.

### IT IS PROVED THAT THE REGENERATE ARE NOT FREE FROM ORIGINAL SIN.

We readily admit that original sin does not remain in the same manner after regeneration, as it remained before; for there are two remarkable differences. In the unregenerate it occupies all the faculties of the soul peaceably, and rules in their mind, will, and affections: but in the regenerate, it neither dwells peaceably, because grace from above is infused into them, which daily opposes this disease, and more and more expels it from every faculty of the soul; nor does it rule over them, because grace prevailing and predominating, restrains it, and sends it, as it were, under the yoke. The other difference is, that in the unregenerate, it has the guilt

* Qu. disp. de peccat. orig. art. 2.

of eternal death annexed to it; but in the regenerate, it is absolved from this guilt by gratuitous remission, for the sake of the Mediator Christ Jesus, in whom, being taken from the old Adam, they are engrafted as into a new stock. But notwithstanding this, if the nature of the thing itself be considered, we affirm that something of original sin adheres to the regenerate themselves. These are our reasons, taken from the Scriptures; for the Scriptures declare that every man, however regenerated, is ever defiled by sin; and this must be necessarily understood of inherent sin.

Test. 1. *Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean? Not one.* Job. xiv. 4. And ch. xv. 14, *What is man that he should be clean? and he which is born of a woman that he should be righteous?* These places plainly shew, that no one is clean from all the defilements of sin, and therefore, that no one can be free from actual sin. For that inward pollution is the cause of outward sins.

Test. 2. *Enter not into judgment with thy servant, for in thy sight shall no man living be justified;* Ps. cxliii. 2. This may be truly said of every man whatsoever, and at any time whatsoever. But if the regenerate, whether adults or infants, should have, even for a moment, nothing of sin in them, then, if God should, at that time, enter into judgment with them, they could bear the examination of strict justice; which that no one can, all the saints, together with David, confess.

Test. 3. *Who can say, I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my sin?* Prov. xx. 9. From this passage it is manifest, that not even the regenerate themselves, or newly baptised, can boast that they are cleaner than the rays of the sun, unless they refer this their cleanliness to the remission of sins. This declaration Augustine applies even to infants, whom he denies to be absolutely clean in the sight of God.*

Test. 4. *The heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked;* Jerem. xvii. 9. Some render the original word *deceitful,* others *perverse;* Pagninus† *supplanting;* but

* Tom. 6. De sancta Virginitate, cap. 48.

† SANCTES PAGNINUS; or, according to the Italian, Sante Pagnini, an Ecclesiastic of the Order of St. Dominic, flourished in the 15th century, being born at Lucca in 1466. He was accurately skilled in the Latin, Greek, Arabic,

we concede that the wickedness of the human heart is intended by this word. Thence Bellarmine's observation that the word in Jeremiah is not *pravum*, but *callidum* (deceitful) is of little weight; for we are following the Vulgate version, which Papists are forbidden (under the pain of Anathema) to set aside: moreover, the Hebrew word itself denotes such a heart as is deceitful and treacherous, and resembling a beaten path, hardened in this its deceitful depravity. Such a disposition of the heart therefore argues the greatest depravity.

Bellarmine perceived that his first answer was devoid of force, he answers then secondly, that the heart of man is said to be depraved or evil, because it is prone to evil from corrupt nature; but he denies this proneness to be properly sin. This answer, however, is worse than the former; for the proneness or inclination of the heart to evil, although it may not issue in actual sin, yet is most properly Original Sin; because there is an absence of that righteousness which ought to belong to it, accompanied too by a disposition plainly contrary. For original righteousness in the heart, so far as its disposition is considered, was the conversion, inclination, or propension of the heart to good, with an aversion to evil: what else then can a proneness or inclination decidedly contrary be, but Original Sin? He therefore replies lastly, that the Prophet is speaking of the ungodly alone, and that they have a depraved heart, but not the regenerate. The Prophet however makes no such distinction of men; he speaks of the heart considered according to its natural propensity, for such are the words themselves in the Hebrew: *Deceitful and perverse above all things is the heart itself.*

We do not deny then that the heart of the regenerate is cleansed and purified; but still some natural stains adhere even to this heart: whence the Prophet, including himself in the number of the diseased, says, *Heal me, O Lord, and I shall be healed* (v. 14.)

Hebrew, and Chaldee tongues; yet was supposed to excel particularly in the Hebrew. He diligently applied himself to a comparison of the Vulgate Bible, with the Original Text; and believing it either not to be the Translation of Jerome, or greatly corrupted, undertook to form a new version, which he effected with great credit, producing a translation which has been in a great measure the model of all succeeding Latin versions.—*Townley's Illustrations of Biblical Literature;* Vol. ii.—See also Horne's Critical Introduction.

Our conclusion is, that the heart itself, so far as it is regenerated, possesses acquired purity; but so far as it retains any of the old leven it is corrupt, and so depraved, that God alone can perfectly understand its perversity; not any mortal, not even he who carries this corrupt heart in his own breast.

Test. 5. *We are all as an unclean thing, and all our righteousness as filthy rags;* Isa. lxiv. 6. The Prophet denotes what men are internally, namely, unclean; what also is the state of their external or actual righteousness, namely, polluted by the taint of this uncleanness. Neither does he speak of the wicked only, but also of the godly and faithful, of whom there is no one who is clear of this inherent uncleanness. Jerome thus writes on this passage; *We have been ever involved in sins; we shall be saved by thy mercy alone: we are in ourselves unclean, and whatever righteousness we seem to have is compared to the garment of a menstruous woman.*

Test 6. In the xth of Luke, v. 33. in the parable of the wounded man, it is plain that the disease or wound of sin is not all at once healed, but that the regenerate themselves are under the care of the Physician in the Church throughout their whole life. So Augustine explains this parable:* *Let us pray the Physician of the wounded; let us be borne into the hospital.—The Church, in which at this time the wounded man is healed, is the hospital of the militant one.* And Augustine likewise teaches,† that this wounded man, after the infusion of the oil and wine, is under the cure of grace, and at length brought to full health.

But Bellarmine answers, that this does not at all aid our cause; because, when the Scriptures teach, that man is healed by degrees, they are not speaking of the remission of sins, but of the healing of the languor left by sin. Now this languor [according to him] is not Original Sin, but the wound arising from Original Sin; and for this opinion he introduces Augustine, de Trinit. lib. 14, cap. 17. To reply briefly to these remarks:—It is true that this healing is to be distinguished from the remission of sins; for the regenerate receive full remission on justification itself, but not a full healing; and this is the very thing which we are proving.

* Tom. 9. in Evang. Joan. tract. 41. † Hypognost. lib. 3.

But his observation, *that this remaining languor, which is cured daily, is not any part of Original Sin, but the wound occasioned by Original Sin*, is a mere quibble. For the languor which is left in all the faculties of the soul is the absence of that original righteousness which was communicated to the same faculties in man's first creation. In the same degree therefore that that defect is not remedied, so far the remains of Original Sin are not taken away. After the removal of guilt Augustine makes use of the term *languor* or *infirmity*, more freely than that of *sin*;* but yet he always acknowledges, that that languor or infirmity hath in it the corrupt nature of sin; for he both says that it is called sin by the Apostle, and affirms that the guilt of this sin is remitted in baptism. Now it is sin alone which requires remission. Finally, the Schoolmen themselves, among other names for Original Sin, reckon this also, that it may be called *the languor of nature.*

Test. 7. *Every branch in me that beareth not fruit he taketh away; and every branch that beareth fruit he purgeth it, that it may bring forth more fruit;* John xv. 2. It is manifest that Christ is speaking here of the regenerate and those truly incorporated into himself, for these alone bring forth good fruit. But even these he shews to have need of continual cleansing, that, according to the increase of grace, warring against corrupt nature, they may grow daily in good works: They therefore, who require this cleansing, retain the remains of sin.

Bellarmine answers that cleansing is not necessary for the regenerate on account of Original Sin, which is perfectly remitted in baptism, but because of actual and especially venial sins which daily creep in; and he refers us to Augustine's lxxxth Tract on John.

We acknowledge that Original Sin in the regenerate does not require fresh remission; for its guilt has been perfectly done away in baptism: But we say, that Christ does not speak here of the cleansing through *remission*, but of cleansing by *renovation;* and he shews that those cleansed in baptism still require this other cleansing, because they are not yet perfectly freed from the contagion of sin. Bellarmine therefore endeavours in vain to transfer this purgation

* In Psal. cxviii. conc. 3. tom. 8.

to the remission of venial sins, contrary to the very sense of the words. For Christ said not, that he purged the branch bearing evil fruit, that is, committing actual sins, that it should be free from the guilt of crimes wickedly done; but, that he purged the branch bearing good fruit, that it might become more fruitful in bringing forth good works. This purgation then does not denote *forgiveness*, but a more fruitful *sanctification*. So Cyril of Alexandria :* — *Fruitful branches produce more fruit, by the care and culture of the husbandman. For in those who most apply themselves to virtue, God, by the grace of the Spirit, as by a pruning knife, prunes and lops away, at one time the pleasures, at another other passions of the soul by which the mind is dethroned from its empire. This is that circumcision which is understood not of the hand, but of the Spirit.* Theophylact also on these same words, EVERY BRANCH THAT BEARETH FRUIT, HE PURGETH IT, says—*Here we learn that however much any one be endued with virtue, yet he needs to be healed by God.*

But because Bellarmine has referred us to Augustine, hear how clearly he speaks for us (Tract. 80. in Joan): *Now ye are clean, namely, clean and to be cleansed. For unless they were cleansed, they could not have brought forth fruit; and yet every one who bears fruit the husbandman purges, that he may bear more fruit. He bears fruit because he is clean, and he is purged as yet that he may bear more fruit. For who is there in this life so clean, that he is not still to be cleansed more and more?— — He cleanses therefore the clean, that is the fruitful, that they may be so much the more fruitful, as they are the more clean.* So far for Augustine.

Although then it be true, that the regenerate are daily cleansed from their actual sins by remission, yet both the context itself, and the concurring assent of the Fathers shews, that this passage ought to be understood of the cleansing from indwelling sin by sanctifying grace.

Test. 8. St. Paul in the vith, viith, and viiith Chapters to the Romans, often declares, that sin *remains* or *dwells* in the regenerate, although it does not *rule* or *reign* over them. Rom. vi. 12: *Let not sin reign in your mortal body.* In vii. 17 : *It is not I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.*

* In Evang. Joan. lib. 19. cap. 14.

It would be tedious to repeat particulars; for in the vith Chapter he speaks of this sin five times, in the viith six, and in the viiith three. It is clear therefore, that Paul taught, that the regenerate are not wholly delivered from indwelling sin. The Papists reply, that concupiscence is called sin, but improperly by the figure Metonymy, because it is the cause of sin, if it be obeyed. But this rather proves that it is Original Sin properly taken; for it is the property of Original Sin to produce actual, if its inclination is obeyed. For like as a particular evil disposition, such for instance as incontinence, if it be obeyed, leads to the actual sins of fornication or adultery; so this general habit of evil concupiscence, which possesses all the powers of the soul, if it be obeyed, produces every sin whatsoever; according to the diversity of objects, to the eager desire for which it inflames the man. We therefore willingly grant, that this concupiscence is the cause of all actual sin; but we affirm that it is ridiculous hence to infer, that it has the name of Original Sin only improperly and by Metonymy. Our adversaries however urge, that sin properly so called is not seated in the *body*, but in the *mind*: Now the Apostle has said, *Let not sin reign in your mortal body*; he is speaking therefore of sin improperly so called. Certain it is that sin has not its seat in the body, that is in the corporeal mass itself, as its proper subject; for a spiritual property cannot adhere to a bodily subject:* but in this body it may put forth the efficacy of its rule as over a subject. And so the Apostle himself explains his meaning, when he commands us, *not to yield our members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin*; Rom. vi. 13. It is said therefore to reign in the body, when it subjects the corporeal members to itself, and misuses them in obedience to sin. What therefore dwells in the soul, may at length reign in the body.

Test. 9. *If we say that we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us;* 1 John, i. 8. From this passage we deduce, that the regenerate themselves always have in them something of inherent sin. For of actual sins, every believer newly baptised may say, that he has them not. The same may be said of infants, who, on account of their age, cannot commit actual sins; the same of every believer im-

* Accidens enim spirituale non potest hærere in subjecto corporali. Original.

mediately falling asleep, after asking the remission of sins from God in the name of Christ. But according to the Apostle, if any one say of himself, or of any other person whatsoever, this man hath no sin, he lies. Bellarmine meets us and answers* that the words are to be understood of daily actual little sins. But such an interpretation is not at all consistent with the truth of the Apostolic saying; for Bellarmine himself, before he has advanced three lines, affirms, it is possible that, for a short time, a person may be free even from all venial sin. Let this then be assumed:—If that man may say for this short time, I have no sin, he would *not* be deceiving himself, and the truth *would* be in him. John therefore was [of course] mistaken, and there was *no truth* in this *Apostolic* saying. Admirable answer doubtless of Bellarmine! which, to render man void of sin, makes the Holy Spirit the author of a lie! But Bellarmine quibbles on —*Although any one may be without sin for a short time, yet no one can affirm it of himself, because Job truly said* (ix. 21.) *Although I should be simple, even this my soul shall be ignorant of.*† Yet this is not sufficient to defend the truth of the Apostolic saying: For although this would not be proper in the person affirming, yet if it were true that he had no sin, he would not deceive himself by asserting it, but rather by asserting the contrary; neither could it be truly said of him, *the truth is not in him*, but *humility is not in him.* Augustine will stop the mouth of Bellarmine, who, as though he had foreseen the subterfuge of the Papists, thus writes on this passage: *Neither is it written for the avoidance of arrogance and pride,* IF WE SAY THAT WE HAVE NO SIN, WE DECEIVE OURSELVES, *otherwise it would not be added,* AND THE TRUTH IS NOT IN US; *but he would have said,* AND HUMILITY IS NOT IN US.‡ He has similar things in his book, De Nat. et Grat. cap. 34.

But with respect to what was objected concerning persons asleep, and infants, because he could not seriously solve it, Bellarmine attempts to elude it by a silly joke. *Just as if* (says he) *infants or persons sleeping could say, that they had*

* De amiss. Grat. lib. 5. cap. 11.

† Our version of this passage is, *Though I were perfect, yet would I not know my soul.* The Translator has given the Douay version above, as most accordant with Bellarmine's.

‡ In enarrat. in Psal. cxviii. conc. 2.

*no sin!*—Any one may, however, easily perceive, that the stress is not to be laid on the *person* affirming, but on the *thing* affirmed. If therefore any other person should affirm respecting any infant, or a person asleep, *This man has no sin*, the Apostle convicts him of a falsehood. This passage, then, furnishes an unanswerable reason for showing the remains of sin to be in every man.

And thus far we have proved generally, that none of the regenerate are free from sin, and *that* by express testimonies of Scripture: we shall now consider the powers of the soul singly, and shall prove argumentatively, that sin dwells in each of them.

## CHAPTER XVI.

### ARGUMENTS SHEWING THAT ORIGINAL SIN IS INHERENT IN THE REGENERATE.

We are now to prove that the remains of sin cleave even to the regenerate, and that not only in the inferior part of the soul, but in all the powers capable of sin. But one thing must be first premised—that this Original Sin is just that disposition which is contrary to, and resists the rectitude of man's primitive constitution in every faculty of the soul susceptible of sin. But under this contrary disposition I comprise the deficiency of the righteousness which ought to be in us, and the corrupt inclination connected with this deficiency, of which I have before spoken.

Now that such a disposition or habit hath the true nature of Original Sin, the very Schoolmen concede. Thus William of Paris* says, *Whatsoever God has not ordained in us, and yet is found naturally in us, is vice or sin in us.* And a little after, *Because personal rectitude is the good disposition in man when first created, original perversity resisting this is rightly called sin.* Even Aquinas† admits that every defect

* De Vitiis et Pec. cap. 2.
† Quæst. disp. de Orig. Peccat. art. 2.

found in the nature of the offspring, which is derived from the sin of our first parent, carries with it the nature of Original Sin, provided it be in a subject which is susceptible of blame Anselm also (as cited by Thomas*) affirms, that not only is the defect or total deprivation, but even the diminution of the soul's beauty imputed for sin.

In whatever faculty, therefore, susceptible of sin, we shew that either the contrary disposition, or privation, or diminution of original rectitude remains, in that we clearly prove, that the remains of Original Sin still continue. For the notion which the Papists are in the habit of putting forward† —that the very many defects of that perfection or rectitude which was bestowed upon Adam, may indeed be called *vices*, or *wounds* of the soul, but not *sins*—is but puerile. But this is to play with words; for the vice or wound caused to a power capable of sin, cannot be supposed to mean anything else than sin. There are some natural diseases, inconsistent with a state of primitive perfection, which are not part of Original Sin, but punishments; such, for instance, as bodily infirmity, corruptibility, and other things of that kind, which cleave to a subject unsusceptible of sin; or are not, as it were, the source of actual sins. But those which inhere in the mind, defile it, and in themselves make it guilty of sin. Others are wont to say, that there may be certain defects of original perfection, even in the mind, yet so as to have nothing else in them except the mere *material*, not the *formal* nature of sin. But first, it is not very rational to talk of I know not what forms and materials in Original Sin, which has the nature of privation. For what can the form of privation be, except a want of the contrary quality which ought to be in it? If then we can prove that such a defect exists, we at the same time prove Original Sin, even in the formal shape. Next, if we wish to have a ground for sin, that will be rather the materia *in qua* than *ex qua*. For example, in actual sin, the material is *the act* itself to which the malice or deformity inheres as the formal.‡ The material, therefore, of sin, is something good; and hence these defects, which our opponents are compelled to acknowledge to be certain

* Quæst. disp. de Orig. Peccat. art. 2.

† Vide Greg. de Valent. de Peccat. Orig. cap. 8.

‡ That is, its constituent element.—See Note p. 67.

evils, vices, or wounds of the soul, are falsely and foolishly called the material of sin; for *evil does not take root except in good;* Aquin. de Creat. qu. 3. art. 6. Lastly, since that which is called the *form* hath its seat in its *material*, it is absurd to seek the material of original sin in one faculty of the soul, and place its form in another: which all those are compelled to do, who adopt this foolish distinction. But let us now come to our arguments.

That there are in the rational or intellectual power of regenerate men certain defects or evil dispositions which must necessarily be assigned to that infected disposition arising from Original Sin, I shall shew by briefly stating the principal.

1. Curiosity, or the desire of knowing things not necessary, or hidden and mysterious, which it is not lawful to search out, when it exercises itself, is manifest actual sin; therefore that habitual or constitutional proneness of the mind to such knowledge is Original Sin. Parisiensis elegantly calls this curiosity,* *a prostitution of rational virtue;* and powerfully argues, *That it is no light sin or small turpitude, for the intellect once wedded to primal truth, to prostitute itself, and violate, by manifold adulteries, this venerable alliance.* Now it is manifest that this evil propensity is not wholly extirpated from the minds of the faithful. For few there are who do not more readily and diligently search after the knowledge of frivolous and useless things, than the things necessary to salvation; few there are too, who, applying themselves to the knowledge of Divine things, do not rather endeavour to enquire into those things which God intended should be concealed, than into those which he has revealed to direct our faith and life. In fine, there is no man who, if he gave way to his natural inclination, but would be eager in enquiring into useless and unlawful subjects in preference to the knowledge of the Gospel, which is *the power of God unto salvation.* This is the innate disease of the multitude; † hence they eagerly follow new teachers, new doctrines, and especially discussions of questions by no means necessary; while they scarcely hear without loathing what tends to the correction of morals, or confirmation in

* De Tentat. et Resistent. cap. 1.

† Athenian-like, Acts xvii. 22.—Translator.

the faith. The learned themselves are not free from this weakness, as the many frivolous questions of the Schoolmen testify. In fact even the very Apostles were not themselves entirely free from this disease, since Christ had to reprove them, because they were curiously desiring a knowledge of things by no means appertaining to them, John xxi. 21. Acts i. 7.

2. Original Righteousness rendered the human mind apt and ready to put faith in the Divine teachings and revelations; but now there is a certain slowness to believe even in the minds of the regenerate, which, unless it is overcome by some efficacy of the enlightening Spirit, either never, or with difficulty, would yield to the teaching of saving faith. Christ himself charged even his Disciples with this innate weakness. Although the death and resurrection of Christ are the fundamentals of human salvation, yet we find the Disciples themselves assenting tardily, and with great difficulty to their Master Christ, when propounding these things. Peter was so backward to put faith in the doctrine of the death of Christ, that he presumed to rebuke him when speaking of it, and hence brought deservedly upon himself the appellation of *Satan*. Matt. xvi. 22, 23. As to the resurrection, although Christ himself foretold that he should rise again the third day, yet this inbred tardiness was an hindrance to their believing the fact, when accomplished, and though sufficiently attested. Hence he upbraided some of his Disciples with this, *O fools, and slow of heart to believe all that the Prophets have spoken:* Luke xxiv. 25. And he charges the Apostles themselves with this same incredulity and slowness of heart, Mark xvi. 14. No one doubts that these were *born again* before the resurrection of Christ; but that this *slowness of heart to believe* is a great fault, and that too inbred and original, is beyond dispute. There remains therefore something of Original Sin even after regeneration.

3. Original Righteousness not only disposed and fitted the mind for exercising a ready faith in the Divine declarations; but also after faith was received and embraced, it kept the mind so firm in the obedience of faith, that it was freed from all vacillation, hesitation, or doubt. But in its present state doubts arise now and then in the minds of the

regenerate themselves, even on those things which they most firmly hold. Nor can infused faith root out these notions of unbelief entirely from the mind, but only repel and overcome them after much struggling. Hence that cry, Mark ix. 24, *Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief.* Hence that reckoning of Peter, *O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?* Matt. xiv. 31, and of all the Disciples, viii. 26, *Why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith?* These texts plainly declare, that some seeds of original unbelief still adhere to the minds of the regenerate, and which occasionally break out and lead it to proclaim war against faith. Let the advocates of Popery extenuate this proneness to disbelieve God and the Divine promises as much as they will, yet they never will be able to prove, but that it is sin in its very nature, and that too joined with the heaviest guilt unless it be remitted.

4. The proneness of the mind to vain, impure, nay sometimes to blasphemous thoughts, is a manifest lack, and also an evident derangement of that original rectitude which was implanted in the mind at its first Divine formation. For the human mind, according to the law of Creation, was disposed to receive only lawful and holy thoughts. But now, in the unregenerate, *the imagination of the human heart is only evil, and that continually.* The effects of this evil frequently shew themselves, even in the regenerate. First, in vain thoughts, and that at the most improper time: for whilst in prayer, when the mind ought to be specially intent and fixed as it were upon God, the regenerate feel it to be frequently carried away by vain and frivolous imaginations, which although they may sometimes arise from Satanic suggestion, yet certain it is that they very often spring from the inward and inbred wantonness of the human mind. Secondly, this proneness manifests itself in impure and filthy thoughts; for the minds of the regenerate, however they repel and restrain thoughts of this kind, yet perceive that they are but too easily excited and impressed upon their minds. This proves that the evil disposition of the mind is not yet fully healed. Lastly, the regenerate themselves sometimes feel a certain evil propensity, even to blasphemous thoughts, in their minds, which Parisiensis called *the very worst corruption of natural virtue.** Thomas has

* Parisiens. de Tentat. cap. 1.

rightly indeed distinguished the origin of these thoughts; for sometimes they arise from determined malevolence, and so far they are peculiar to the ungodly; sometimes they proceed only from the error or vanity of the intellect; and these happen even to the regenerate.* He might have added a third source, namely Satanic suggestion; and this is *a state of tribulation† accompanied by frightful vexation, and can be remedied by Divine power alone;‡* with this even the godly are sometimes afflicted. Thoughts of this kind are reckoned among actual sins; but that habitual proneness of the mind to conceive such thoughts is rightly termed original corruption.

5. Ignorance of the things necessary to be known, that is, a want of true knowledge, is Original Sin; which Paul shews, when describing the state of the natural man under sin, he reckons this also among other vices, in Ephes. iv. 18. *Neither walk ye as other Gentiles walk, in the vanity of their mind, having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that is in them.* It was Hugo de St. Victor's opinion, that this ignorance should be included in the very definition of Original Sin. For Original Sin (as he defines it§) is *the corruption or fault which we derive in our birth through ignorance in the mind, through concupiscence in the flesh.* I ask the Papists, therefore, whether this ignorance be wholly eradicated from the minds of all the regenerate? If they grant that it is not entirely taken away, then they acknowledge that real remains of Original Sin inhere in the regenerate. If they affirm that this ignorance is entirely eradicated, they are easily refuted. For in regenerate infants even when they are come to adult age, nay, in the most perfect Christians themselves, there is not found a perfect knowledge of the things appertaining to either faith or practice. *We know in part,* says the Apostle. And we see the Disciples of Christ themselves were ignorant of some things necessary to be known, even for salvation. *As yet they knew not that it behoved Christ to rise from the dead;* John xx. 9. But

* Aquin. 2. 2. qu. 13. art. 1 and 2.
† Luke xxii. 31; Acts xiv. 22.—Ed.
‡ Paris. 2 partis de Universo, parte 2. pag. 828.
§ De Sacram. lib. 1. part. 7. cap. 28.

this was inculcated in the Scriptures; this was foretold to them by Christ himself. Paul writes to the Romans, *Be ye transformed by the renewing of your minds, that ye may prove what is the will of God;* Rom. xii. 2. He intimates, then, that as yet, there dwelt in their minds some darkness which hindered them from understanding the will of God. But that this ignorance, as well in regenerate infants as in adults, is truly Original Sin, and such sin, that it binds a person with guiltiness and needs remission, Augustine plainly teaches: *Let us consider* (says he*) *that darkness of the rational mind through which infants are entirely ignorant of God, whose sacraments, even while they are being baptised, they resist.* And lest we should say that this ignorance is an *evil* or *fault*, but not properly *sin*, he soon afterwards subjoins, that it is a sin *which requires purgation.* And, in short, lest any one should surmise, that it is entirely eradicated in baptism, he says that this ebriety, as it were, of the mind, is not worked off in one night, but gradually. Augustine also, when speaking of adults, namely of the Corinthians, whom he takes for granted to be regenerate, nevertheless affirms, that the great evil of this foolishness or ignorance was yet remaining in them, not in the least taken away in baptism, yet forgiven and remitted. Think (says he†) *how great an evil it is, to account the things which are of the Spirit of God foolishness; yet such were they whom the Apostle had fed with milk, not with meat. Will you venture to say, that this evil and one so great—the evil of foolishness, because it was not removed in baptism, was sanctified?* In conclusion he subjoins that, *the regenerate do not remain under the guilt of this foolishness, because the benefit conferred by baptism was, that the guiltiness of all the evils, of which they were afterwards to be divested, either by death or by overcoming them, would be put away, by the remission of all their sins, not by the healing of all their diseases.*

From these testimonies it is very evident, first that this native darkness of the rational mind is the original fault, and moreover damnable in the unregenerate. Secondly, that in the regenerate themselves, it is taken away, not at some

* Tom. 7. de Pec. merit. et remiss. lib. 1. cap. 36. — Vide etiam contra Julian. lib. 3. cap. 12.

† Contra Julian. lib. 6. cap. 6.

one period of life, but gradually worked off, like a surfeit or intoxication of the mind. Lastly, although this lack of due knowledge is called, after remission, *an evil* or *disease* of the soul, not a *sin*, by Augustine; yet from its very nature, it induces guiltiness, and needs remission. Whence it follows, that this ignorance remaining in the regenerate is of its own nature sin.

Thus far have we treated of sin inherent in the rational faculty or power; now let us examine whether there is any residue of Original Sin in the will of the regenerate.

## CHAPTER XVII.

### IT IS SHEWN THAT THE WILL IS NOT FREE FROM ORIGINAL SIN.

Papal advocates are accustomed for the most part to restrict indwelling sin to sensuality, and they consider the will of the regenerate to be perfectly free from sin. But we affirm that certain remains of Original Sin, or of the old Adam, reside in the will no less than in the inferior portion of the soul, which may be proved by the following arguments:—

1. The loss of original rectitude is Original Sin; but in the will of those born again there is a defect of this rectitude. For as in things of magnitude, so in morals; we call that straight which lies direct between both its extremes. But God is the beginning and the end from which a right will ought never to deviate. Now that which, when applied to a right line, does not coincide with it, cannot be straight. But it is certain that the will of the regenerate is not exactly conformed to the rule of the Divine will in this life, neither as to the habitual disposition of the faculty itself, nor as to its act. The Schoolmen themselves grant, that the will of the regenerate has not as yet such absolute rectitude as that it can be free from all sin. So Lombard writes:* *The will*

* Lib. 2. distinct. 25. lit F. et G.

*before renewal cannot but sin mortally; after renewal, at least venially:* and he adds the reason, namely, that this happens *through infirmity not yet perfectly removed, and because grace is not yet fully consummated.* Bellarmine himself confesses this to be the great disease of the will, *that it cannot always wish well, and therefore not live without sin.** But such was the perfect rectitude of the will created in original righteousness, that it could abstain even from all venial sin. *Now* it cannot do this; there is therefore some want of due rectitude: and this defect is nothing else than Original Sin. Gregory de Valentia perceived the regenerate to be destitute of that rectitude of will, which was bestowed upon Adam, and which is necessary to the avoiding of those sins which they call *venial;* he answers, therefore, that Adam indeed received from God such a power or rectitude, that he might serve God without any sin, through his whole life: but he says that this perfection of subjection was *accidental*, in that it gave the power of avoiding all *venial sins;* but that it was *essential* to original righteousness, in that it conferred the power of avoiding all *mortal sins;* and hence he infers †That the loss of this rectitude, so far as it regards venial sins, does not pertain *essentially* or *formally* to Original Sin.—But this is to set limits to original righteousness and sin, according to their own fancy, not according to God's will. For that perfection of righteousness, which God impressed upon the first man, of whatever quality it was, ought to be found entire in all his posterity; since it was given to Adam as the common head of the human race. If therefore it does not appear whole and entire in us; so far are we destitute of original righteousness and infected by Original Sin. Moreover, if that perfection which conferred the power of avoiding even venial sins was only accidental to original righteousness, then original righteousness in Adam, and the state of innocence might subsist without it; but the Schoolmen themselves exclaim against this notion, and expressly teach, that venial sin cannot consist with original righteousness. But we have done with Gregory.

2. There is not only found in the regenerate a mere lack of due rectitude in the will, but a certain positive proneness

* De amiss. Gratiæ, lib. 6. cap. 10.

† De Peccat. Orig. cap. 14.

to unlawful appetites.* Now this proneness is that very disorder or corrupt habit which always takes the place of that righteousness which man has lost. And this proneness more or less operates in the will, according as there is a greater or less measure of holiness infused; but it works somewhat in all. Not that we need be at any pains to prove this; for the experience and conscience of every one will testify, that this perverse affection betrays itself whenever suitable objects are presented. If the hope of honour offers, this evil inclination of the will manifests itself in the passion of ambition; which we read was condemned in the Apostles themselves when ambitiously contending for the primacy. If there be an apprehension of loss, or if anything occur which nearly concerns our life, or fame, or property, this corruption will manifest itself in the passion of self-love. To say nothing of other objects which influence the human will, it is evident from these, that there is in the will of the regenerate man, a certain proneness inclining him to unlawful things, unless restrained by grace; which puts a principle of new disposedness, as it were, into the same will. Evils then, and unlawful desires flow not from the inferior appetite alone, but from the lustings of the will, of those born again, after evil things,—dispositions which are wont to be restrained by the same will eagerly desiring spiritual things. But this principle of inordinate appetites in the will, which requires the restraints of grace, what else can it be imagined to be than Original Sin? Original Sin, therefore, cleaves in the will even of the regenerate.

3. The will of the regenerate has not itself a full and perfect love of God; but is much less ardent in the love of God than it ought to be. Both these habitual dispositions of the will constitute Original Sin. The want of the love of God is a sin repugnant to the original rectitude of the will. Hence Augustine says,† *Perfect love is in no one so long as he lives on earth; but as long as it is capable of increase, its being less than it ought to be arises from corruption; in consequence of which there is not a just person upon earth.* Augustine asserts two things which cut the very sinews of Papistical doctrine: the first, that in every militant one,

* Vide Altiss. lib. 2. tract. 28. cap. 6.

† Epist. 29 ad Hieron.

there is a want of that perfect love which ought to be in him; the second, that this is such a defect as overturns perfect righteousness, brings on guiltiness, and needs remission. He excludes, therefore, that usual subterfuge of the Papists, who, when we shew that there are certain defects or vices in the regenerate, say, these are indeed certain evils or vices, but they have not properly or formally the nature of Original Sin: as the defects of any member, blindness, or deafness, are *evils*, but not *sins*. They cannot avail themselves of this answer: because the defects alluded to, which have not the nature of sin, do not impede righteousness, nor constitute guilt; for no one is accounted less just, or more guilty by God, because he has been born with the defect of some member, or is blind or deaf. But this want of love, which adheres to the will, is prejudicial to righteousness itself; it is therefore most properly denominated Original Sin. The reason for the too intense love of temporal things is the same; for corrupt love indicates a corrupt will. But who of the regenerate does not confess, that there is in his will an inordinate propensity for the perishing things of this world? which is proved even hence, that we need inducements and spurs to seek after heavenly things, and yet are torpid even under these. To catch at the things of the world we need no incentive, but rather restraint, that we may not be carried headlong after them. This fault of the will is perceived more in the regenerate, less in others; but in all it betrays itself to some extent. No one therefore is free from Original Sin.

4. There are contrary motions in the will even when sanctified by grace; the principles therefore of these motions are also contrary. For the will could not strive (as it were) with itself about the same object, and be impelled and diverted into contrary directions; unless, as by an infused habit of grace, it is inclined to good; so by the remains of Original Sin cleaving to it, it is impelled to evil. Hence the same will as *carnal*, that is, infected by the contagion of Original Sin, strives against itself as *spiritual*, that is, as sanctified by the gift of grace. I know that this struggle is wont to be attributed by the Papists to the vice of sensuality; as if the regenerate will struggled only with the sensitive appetite, not with itself. But it is certain that a contention of

this kind very often arises in the superior portion of the soul itself, when the mind having respect to sensible things is impelled one way by the motion of concupiscence, another way by that of grace. Augustine has often taught us that the will is engaged in this contest. Thus,* *The flesh lusteth against the mind, that is, the soul fights against itself, in that part which is weak through the flesh.* And a little after, *It is a disease of the rational mind, when delighted with inferior good, it partly desires, and partly does not desire, what is better. And therefore it is divided into two wills. And when one of these wills acts, the whole does not act, and that which is present to one is absent to the other.* This war never could exist in the will itself, if it retained that original rectitude in which it was created; but, because grace does not at once, but by little and little, expel the contagion of sin, hence it is that in it the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; that is, the will itself, so far as it is influenced by the grace of the sanctifying Spirit, fights against itself, so far as it is infected by the corruption of Original Sin. Let our adversaries explain to us, if they can, what, in short, that is which in the mind and will wrestles with grace, except Original Sin. But Bellarmine grants that there is such concupiscence striving against the spirit in the will itself;† therefore Original Sin attaches to it.

The sum of all these arguments is, that the human will ought to have from the law of its creation, rectitude, zeal, firmness, integrity;‡ but in the regenerate themselves much is wanting of this rectitude, zeal, firmness, and of integrity of the will towards God and goodness; therefore something of its original righteousness is wanting to it; and hence something of original unrighteousness or sin cleaves to it. And this is what Augustine writes: § *The more love there is in a man, the more he is endowed with virtue; the less love, the less virtue; and the less virtue, the more corruption. When therefore love shall be full, and perfect, nothing of corruption will remain.* Augustine consequently grants, that something of original corruption still remains in the regenerate, until

* Apud Bedam, in 5. ad Galat.
† De amiss. Gratiæ, lib. 5. cap. 15.
‡ Paris. de Virtut. cap. 11. p. 133.
§ Epist. 29.

they shall have obtained full and perfect love, which they never acquire in this life.—So much then for the original contagion, or corruption of the will; let us now descend, as it were, to a consideration of the inferior appetites in man.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

### ON THE ORIGINAL CONTAGION WHICH ADHERES IN THE CONCUPISCIBLE APPETITE.

It is generally admitted that the sensitive appetite is very much vitiated by Original Sin; and among its other evils the rebellion of unbridled concupiscence most especially manifests itself. Now that this inordinate and rebellious concupiscence is Original Sin, and condemnable in unregenerate men, Augustine every where teaches, and the Papists agree with him. Moreover, that this rebellious concupiscence remains in the regenerate themselves, however extenuated and subdued, is too well known to require proof. It only remains, therefore, to be shown, that this rebellious concupiscence remaining in the regenerate, is, truly and formally, Original Sin, although absolved from its guiltiness.

Reason 1. That which the Apostle not once or by the way, but fourteen times calls *sin*, and that too in the very place where he is treating of this matter professedly, we also ought to consider to be sin, and that properly so called; but in the vith, viith, and viiith Chapters of the Epistle to the Romans he distinguishes this concupiscence adhering to the regenerate so many times by the name *sin*. The Papists indeed say, that the Apostle in all these places does not speak strictly, but figuratively; but who can suppose that the Apostle meant purposely to state anything improperly? Or why should we not rather believe that the Jesuits themselves, when they deny that concupiscence is sin, speak improperly? Hugo de St. Victor (as we have before noticed), influenced by this authority of the Apostle, makes it a doubt rather, whether they themselves are right in denying this concupiscence

after baptism to be sin, than whether the Apostle spake properly in asserting that it is. The words of Hugo, explaining that passage of the Apostle, IT IS NOT I THAT DO IT, BUT SIN THAT DWELLETH IN ME, are these:* *Lo! the Apostle calls this sin; But it seems to us, nay to almost all, that after baptism this is not sin.* He intimates in these words, that this common opinion is opposed to the sentiment of the Apostle; and that their opinion is the more true who taught that this rebellious concupiscence, even after baptism, carries in it the nature of sin. For that there were some of this opinion, he shews by the words immediately preceding.

Reason 2. That habit, or defect, or propension (or whatever else we are to call it)—the immediate or proper act of which is the violation of the moral law, and from which such act flows,—is original corruption or sin. But the proper and immediate act of rebellious, or unruly concupiscence, is the violation of the moral law. The minor is evident from the express words of the Apostle, Rom. vii. 7, where he says that, from the law THOU SHALT NOT COVET, he knew that rebellious concupiscence was sin. Augustine also says, that the law forbids those motions of inordinate concupiscence, which the mind resists; *He does much good, who does what is written,* THOU SHALT NOT FOLLOW THY LUSTS; *but he is not perfect, because he does not fulfil that which is also written,* THOU SHALT NOT COVET.† And in the Epistle to Aselicus (Epist. 200), *The law, in saying* THOU SHALT NOT COVET, *has laid down, not what we are able to effect here, but what we should progressively aim at.* Bellarmine answers,‡ that *this precept,* THOU SHALT NOT COVET, *comprehends at once the means and the end: the means are to withstand concupiscences, and never to assent to them; and to this the law obliges us under the guilt of sin: the end is, not to covet at all, or to feel these inordinate motions; and this end the law indicates, so that we may understand at what, by God's help, we shall aim: but it does not oblige us to that which it is not now in our power to effect.*

But all these are false and fanciful notions: For *first,* since the law forbids the very motion of concupiscence in plain

* Annotat. in Epist. ad Rom.

† De Nupt. et Conc. cap. 29.

‡ Bellarm. de amiss. Grat. lib. 5. cap. 10.

words, and says nothing about assent; there is a mixture both of rashness and ignorance, in separating the binding force of the prohibition from the motion itself, and in restricting it to the assent alone. *Secondly*, if the assent be given to any evil concupiscence whatever, that sin will extend to other commands, according to the diversity of the thing coveted. As if any one assents to the desire of another man's wife, he is guilty of adultery; of another's house, he is guilty of theft; which may be thus understood of all the other commands. That the commands of God may not, therefore, be confounded one with another, it is necessary that this command, *Thou shalt not covet*, be supposed to refer to the inordinate motions themselves of concupiscence, to which the mind is opposed, in the same way as it is referred by the Apostle himself. *Thirdly*, what Bellarmine says, that *this law indicates that perfection to which we ought to tend*, is very true; but his subsequent opinion, that *we are not bound to this perfection, by virtue of the law itself*, is affirmed without any ground of support. For the proper force of the law is this, that it should so declare what is to be done or not to be done, as to oblige at once; for he who merely points out without enforcing, exhibits himself rather as a *teacher* or *monitor*, than as a *lawgiver*. *Lastly*, what he says, about its *not being in our power to abstain altogether from concupiscence*, does not prove that God may not command it; because the perfect law of God is attempered to the possibility of the upright man, not to the infirmity of fallen man. It is plain therefore that the very motion of unlawful concupiscence is actual sin, and prohibited by the Divine law.

Now we must shew that the very habit or proneness to evil and inordinate desire is Original Sin. And this will appear from the consideration of the opposite, viz. original righteousness.

The force then of original righteousness was such as to endue all the powers of the mind with possibility, aptitude, and propensity to practise actions agreeable to the law of the Divine will. The poison, on the other hand, of Original Sin is such as to instil into the same powers an inaptitude to good actions, and an inordinate proneness to the contrary. For just as the *ἀνομία*—the unlawfulness—of actual sin con-

sists in this, that it opposes the Divine law, as to the *act;* so that of original sin consists in this, that it opposes the same law as to the *inclination* or *habitude.* Consequently this inbred propensity or habit of inordinate concupiscence, which makes man prone to transgress the law of God, is Original Sin. And here it is well to weigh the relation which subsists between the law of our original creation, and the written law.

The law of our original creation we call that rectitude which God impressed upon each and all the powers of the mind, from whence arose their fitness and promptitude to serve God according to the actions suited to their nature. The written law is the rule of righteousness commanding those actions to which the law of our original formation had rendered man fit and prompt, and forbidding the contrary. He therefore, who commits an act contrary to the written law, is guilty of actual sin; but he who has within him a defect, habit, or propensity contrary to the law of original creation is infected by Original Sin.

Now let us examine Bellarmine's miserable replies. *Concupiscence* (says he*) *resists the law of the mind; but is not itself the formal resistance; nor does it resist as an action deviating from the rule of the law, nor as the faculty or person which is bound to follow the law; but it resists as inciting us, like the devil, to evade the law; since, therefore, the devil, although he incites to the evasion of the Divine law, is not sin, so neither is concupiscence.*

To solve this, we must understand that the word *concupiscence* sometimes denotes the mere faculty of desire: If Bellarmine means this, we grant that it is a good creature of God. Sometimes it denotes the contagion or unruly tendency, which has infected the faculty itself; and this disorder, we say, is formally repugnant to that rectitude which God has impressed upon the same faculty. It is also repugnant to the written law, not as an action, nor as a faculty, nor as a person, but as a corrupt disposition inclining to actions contrary to the law. The *comparison* therefore, and *inference* of Bellarmine are ridiculous:—the *comparison* is so, when he says, *As the devil incites to sin, so does concu-*

* De amiss. Grat. lib. 5. cap. 10. et 14.

*piscence*: for the devil incites as a distinct person does another person: but that disease of concupiscence incites as a corrupt inclination, which inclines the person in whom it exists to actions agreeable to his corruption:—The *inference* is also ridiculous, when he argues that the devil is not sin, therefore neither is the inordinancy of concupiscence. For although the person, who incites to some sin by an external suggestion, is not the sin itself; yet the corrupt disposition, which inclines internally to actual sin, is most properly Original Sin. As therefore the devil, although inciting to sin, is not sin itself, yet that proneness and malicious inclination of his to stir us up is sin; so although the faculty of desire itself is not sin, yet the inclination and propensity of it to evil is sin: even in one asleep, when it does not at all actually incline to sin.

With regard to the law of our original creation, Bellarmine answers,* That *it is not such a law as to make the transgressor of it guilty. For God has not commanded man to be born with original righteousness, but he ordained his nature according to his own pleasure. But if it should happen to be otherwise than God has ordained, there is indeed in it some sin of nature, but not such sin as deserves punishment.* This answer savours of Pelagianism, and may easily be refuted. For as it is truly said of all creatures, *God spoke and they were made*; so it may be no less truly said, *God bade that they should be such, and they were made such.* Consequently he who made Adam, and adorned him with original righteousness, not only as an individual, but as the common root of the human race, by that very act made him and all who spring from him, to be such, and to remain such. But Bellarmine's subsequent remark—*If it should happen that man be born otherwise than he had been created by God, it is a sin of nature, as blindness, or deafness, but it is not a sin deserving of punishment*—is true certainly so far as respects defects of the body, which are contrary to human welfare; but most false as respects the faults of the mind, such as ignorance, concupiscence, wickedness, which oppose the Divine law. For if men are not obliged to possess original righteousness, neither are deserving of punishment because

* De amiss. Grat. lib. 5, cap. 14.

they have lost it, and are born infected with the contrary dispositions, God would unjustly punish infants with eternal death, on account of the Original Sin with which they are born; and thus the answer of Bellarmine leads us directly to the heresy of Pelagius and Pighius.

Reason 3. The regenerate hate this rebellious concupiscence within themselves, and that from a good will conformed to the Divine. But there is nothing hateful to God and good men, except sin. That the regenerate hate their own rebellious concupiscence the Apostle testifies, Rom. vii. 15, *What I hate, that I do;* which words refer to the rebellious act of concupiscence, which is resisted. For so says Augustine: *That love is to be hated, wherewith an object is beloved which ought not to be so loved. For we hate our concupiscence, wherewith the flesh lusteth against the spirit; for what is that concupiscence but an evil love?** Now it is an opinion perfectly true, and most commonly received among all Theologians, that nothing must be hated except sin. Bellarmine replies, *That concupiscence is hated by God and good men, not as* SIN PROPERLY SO CALLED, *but as a* DISEASE.† In this, however, he expressly contradicts the Council of Trent, which declares that God hates nothing in the regenerate; nor does what he adds help him out of the difficulty, that the Council means hatred redounding upon the person. For the Fathers of Trent, and almost all the Papists, contend, that if anything remains in the regenerate deserving the hatred of God, that hatred cannot but redound upon the persons of the regenerate. Bellarmine therefore, has now plainly become a deserter to our side, and acknowledges that the hatred of God does *not* fall upon the regenerate, although they have in them *disorder* most worthy of hatred. Moreover, as to what he further says, that *concupiscence is hated by God, not as sin but as a disease*, is a foolish evasion; for God does not hate diseases, seeing they are not sins, but mere penalties. But the disorders of the mind deserve the hatred of God, require remission, and fasten guilt upon the person unless they are remitted; and by consequence they are most strictly sins.

* Tom. 8. enarrat. in Psal. cxviii. conc. 8.

† De amiss. Grat. lib. 5. cap. 14.

Hence Augustine, speaking of such diseases, says :* *Those disorders require no bodily physician, but are cured by the medicine of Christ's grace; first, so as not to bind under guilt; next, so as not to overcome in the conflict; lastly, so as to be entirely healed, and disappear altogether.* But the notion which Bellarmine puts forward, *That concupiscence is hated, not because it is sin, but because it incites to sin, and because we sustain a constant strife with it,* altogether favours our view. For that which, in the form of an innate and corrupt disposition incites to actual sin, is thereby shewn to be Original Sin. But the evil against which the regenerate are constantly striving, is not merely a disease bearing the character of a penal infliction; but a rebellious principle which, in its very nature, leads to condemnation; for to penal inflictions we are to submit; but innate sin is to be resisted. Our demonstration, therefore, is invincible;—that concupiscence is an evil deserving the hatred both of God and man, therefore it is sin.

Reason 4. The Old Man, which is to be mortified by all the regenerate, means nothing else than the whole body of Original Sin; but rebellious concupiscence is a part of the old man which is to be mortified: therefore it pertains to this body of sin. But it pertains to it as the chief part, and of the same nature with the body itself; therefore as Original Sin. The Apostle repeatedly shews, that this old man which we must crucify and mortify is inward corruption, or Original Sin derived from the old Adam. Thus Rom. vi. 6, *Knowing that our old man is crucified together with him, that the body of sin might be destroyed.* And Ephes. iv. 22, he bids the regenerate to *put off the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts; and to put on the new man, which is created in righteousness and true holiness.* Since the new man is created again in righteousness and true holiness, the very principle of opposition teaches, that this old man consists in unrighteousness and impurity. Consequently the rebellious concupiscence, which is the chief member of the old man, must also necessarily be a member really belonging to Original Sin. Augustine, from the fact that the regenerate, in chastening their body, endeavour to mortify and subdue this concupiscence, affirms† that its

* Contra Julian. lib. 5, cap. 5. † Tom. 7. Contra Julian. lib. 6. cap. 5.

wickedness is thus detected: *Do you not mark? Do you not clearly perceive, that when the Apostle is so vehemently chastening his body, if there was nothing there to chasten which is displeasing to God, he is doing a great wrong to God, by chastening his temple without a cause?* Although, therefore, Augustine abstains from using the word *sin*, after its guiltiness is remitted; yet he plainly intimates that it hath the nature of sin, when he says, that it is a thing so hateful and displeasing to God, that for the sake of mortifying it, it is lawful to afflict and master this body of ours, which is the temple of God.

Reason 5. That, in which there is both the *matter* and *form* of sin, has, according to the opinion of the Romanists themselves, the true and proper nature of sin. But in concupiscence, whether habitual or actual, there is both. For the Papists are accustomed to denominate the undue *conversion* or turning to the creature the *matter*, the aversion or turning away from the Creator the *form*, of sin. Moreover, as the habit of inordinate concupiscence comprehends in itself an habitual turning *to* the creature, and at the same time an habitual turning *from* God; so does the *act* of concupispiscence comprehend actual turning *to* the creature and *from* God: therefore it has the genuine nature of sin. That this is so, I shew from hence: that the turning to one point, and the turning from the opposite are not distinct motions, but one motion; nor do they flow from two different principles, but from one and the same. For as in turning to the West is involved our turning away from the East; and the same principle which inclines us to turn to this object, by the same power inclines us at the same time to turn away from that opposite object; so the improper turning *to* a mutable good, in whatever faculty of the soul it is found, is the same motion as the turning away *from* an immutable good; and that habit or propensity which inclines a man to turn unduly *to* the creature, inclines him likewise to turn unduly *from* God. In vain, therefore, do the Papists endeavour to separate these, which are the same *in reality*, and distinguished by the *reason* alone. In vain do they deny that concupiscence is sin, or has in it the form of sin, since they confess that it has the *matter*, which is in reality the same thing with *the form*.

We must also ask the Papists, by what argument they place the formal character of sin in turning *from* God, rather than in turning *to* evil? For I should be disposed to maintain, on the contrary, that if these were in reality distinct, yet the formal quality of sin should be considered as consisting rather in unduly turning to evil, than in turning from God. For it is the formal quality which gives to each thing its specific character: but the specific character of any sin must always be deduced from its undue turning to the creature, which may occur in a variety of ways; not from the act of turning away from the Creator, which is the same in every sin. Besides, it is certain that this turning from God is not intended by the sinner, but independently of his will accompanies that act of turning to any evil. We shall, therefore, look for the formal quality of any sin, more properly in that which is intended by the agent, than in that which follows without his will. However this be, since concupiscence denotes the inordinate tendency of the soul to turn to created things, certain it is that it draws with it unlawful turning away from the Creator, and therefore is truly and properly sin.

Reason 6. Inordinate concupiscence is sin in unbelievers; it is sin, and that deadly, in unbaptised infants: therefore it is also sin in the regenerate, when it remains in them after the guiltiness has been put away. The reason of the consequence is this: because *more* or *less do not alter the specific character of a thing*. But concupiscence in the regenerate after baptism differs from that which was in the same person before baptism; inasmuch as before it was powerful, reigning, and predominant; but after it becomes weak, subject, and restrained by the power of the Spirit. As if a man has weakened a strong and savage lion by many wounds, and has tamed, and at length enchained him, yet it does not cease to be a lion: by parity of reasoning, although the grace of regeneration has diminished and debilitated this sin of concupiscence, and as it were enchained it; yet it does not cause it entirely to put off its nature, nor lose the specific character or formal quality of sin. It has by God's remitting it lost its guiltiness; but it has not lost the nature of sin, since the *ἀνομία* [lawlessness, or want of conformity to the law] remains.

It is not necessary to bring together more reasons; only it must be shown how this Original Sin, which is usually called one and the same in each instance of sin, yet comprises so many irregularities, and that in the different faculties. And this will be more easily understood if we bear in mind, that the virtue of original righteousness was such as to give man a power of yielding due subjection to God in all things, and that in the proper manner. And this it did by conferring power upon each, and all the faculties of the soul, suited to their own determinate actions. The reverse then of this is true, namely, that Original Sin renders man unfit and incompetent to yield to God due obedience; and that by disturbing and perverting all the faculties of the soul, so that they are not able to exercise rightly their proper actions. Although therefore Original Sin is said to be actually one thing in every individual, yet this one thing, as an infection, has been diffused throughout the whole soul and all its powers; and renders the whole disordered, brutish, and quite incompetent to yield subjection to God in all its actions, however different. William of Paris has illustrated this by an elegant similitude:* *As drunkenness is one vice, and yet so disturbs the whole mind and body, that neither the one nor the other can discharge its due actions; so Original Sin, which is one in act, blinds the mind, perverts the will, corrupts the desire, and depraves the actions of all these.* Again (ibid) *Just as seed,* therefore, *is one thing actually, but potentially is the whole tribe of those things which spring from it; so this original evil is one thing actually, but in effect includes the whole progeny of vices which naturally spring from it.*

Let this, therefore, be the conclusion of our discussion: Seeing that the remedy arising from Sacramental grace is ordained directly against Original Sin, so far as it corrupts the person, and not so far as it corrupts the nature; it will remove its guiltiness entirely from the person, but does not entirely take away its contagion from the nature.† But the contagion being left, it does not lose its sinful quality by virtue of Baptism, nor acquire any sanctity, as Augustine rightly observes.‡ *Sin therefore is in the regenerate, sin truly so called.* Nor do the Schoolmen themselves differ in senti-

* De Vitiis et Pec. cap. 6. † Bonav. lib. 2. dist. 32. qu. 2.
‡ Contra Julian. lib. 6. cap. 6.

ment, so far as the thing itself is concerned. *Although a man,* says Aquinas,* *be so cleansed from Original Sin, by the Sacraments of grace, that this is not imputed to him for a fault—which is to be personally freed from Original Sin,—yet he is not totally healed. — — — In man, therefore, as continuing his kind, as far as he is an individual, Original Sin does not exist; but so far as the man who continues his kind, is a natural principle (or source) of generation according to the course of nature, the taint of Original Sin, which has reference to nature, remains in him.*†

We shall next add the testimonies of the Fathers.

## CHAPTER XIX.

### IT IS SHEWN FROM THE FATHERS THAT NO ONE OF THE REGENERATE IS FREE FROM SIN.

It now remains that we support our opinion by the suffrages of the Fathers, whose testimonies I think it proper to distribute into two classes. In the first we shall place those which plainly assert that no one of the saints is entirely free from sin, but that the remains of original evil cleave to all the regenerate to the last moment of this life. In the other class we shall place those which affirm that concupiscence itself, and in its inordinate motions is sin, even in the regenerate. For since by the confession of our opponents the regenerate are by no means freed from these, it will follow, that they are not indeed wholly freed from the contagion of sin.

That no one is freed from indwelling sin the following testify:

1. Origen in his xth Homily on Numbers (ch. xviii.) on these words, SUMETIS PECCATA SANCTORUM.‡ observes, *It does not seem an idle thing to me that he mentions the sins of the saints;*

* Contra Gentil. lib. 4. cap. 52.

† The note on page 95 is applicable here.

‡ These words must be considered (we suppose) to be in the version of Ruffinus, who translated this portion of Origen's works. See Huetii *Origenianorum*, lib. iii. sect. 3. § iv. *Clarke's Succession of Sacred Literature.* Vol. i.

*for in many passages of Scripture this language is repeated. We have to inquire, how some are said both to be saints, and yet there is mention made of their sins? For it does not happen (as some think) that as soon as any one begins to be a saint, thenceforth he cannot sin, and is to be reckoned forthwith entirely free from sin.* Origen, therefore, supposed that the saints very often commit sin, because they are not immediately and altogether delivered from inherent and indwelling sin.

2. This same Origen, in Homily xxi. on Joshua, says: *He who is fruitful and increases in faith, cannot exterminate the Canaanite, the worst seed, the accursed seed, the seed always moveable and uncertain. And certain it is, that the Canaanite always dwells with him who is fruitful and increases in faith; for the motions of temptations never cease from him.* A little after, he accommodates the same to every saint individually in these words: *If Jerusalem is built up in our heart, that is, if the vision of peace is founded in our heart, and we always keep in our heart Christ who is our peace, if we are so established in this vision of peace, that no evil thought ever arises in our heart, then we may say that we are in Jerusalem, and no others dwell with us, but those alone, who are saints. But now* (mark these words) *though we attain to even great proficiency, and are adorned with the highest affections, yet I do not suppose any one to reach such purity of heart, that he is never defiled by the contagion of an adverse thought: certain it is that the Jebusite dwells with the children of Judah in Jerusalem.* I ask, who is this Canaanite or Jebusite, who dwells with the saints, and who so infests them, that they never remain quiet from the motions of temptation; who suffers not their heart to shine with absolute purity, nay, who is wont often to defile their hearts with impure thoughts? That enemy of the saints is no other than *sin dwelling in them,* as St. Paul teaches; Rom. vii. 20. According to the opinion then of Origen, they who have made the greatest progress in holiness are, nevertheless, not free from indwelling sin.

3. Irenæus, lib. 3, cap. 37, says, that *God excluded Adam*

p. 166.—Opera Origen. Tom. ii. p. 301 Edit. Paris 1733. The first verse may be intended in this version. Junius has, in reference to Aaron and his sons, *Portabitis pœnam iniquitatis in sanctuarium.*

*from the tree of life, not out of envy, but from compassion, lest his evil should be immortal; and he has interposed death, that he might cause sin to cease, putting an end to it through the dissolution of the flesh.* Irenæus therefore plainly lays it down, that sin dwells in every man, until it is wholly absorbed by death itself.

4. Nazianzen, upon the Nativity of our Saviour, expresses the same opinion in these words: *Out of death* (says he) *we gain the destruction of sin, lest the evil should be immortal; and the penalty becomes a mercy.* He, then, did not think sin could be cut off and eradicated before death.

5. Cyprian in his *Sermon on the Nature of Circumcision, says: *However much conscience as a witness always unveils to us the abounding snares of inward sin, yet we must manfully stand our ground, and elude the alluring senses by the authority of reason, and watch lest assent follow.— — Truly it is a very high attainment if the contagion of this corruption does not break forth, and the raging beast with its corrupt breath is bound with iron chains, in the inmost recesses of the soul, and concupiscence is left to gnaw herself as a captive within, with broken teeth.* Who would not infer from these words, that sin still cleaves to the regenerate—for what else can this concupiscence be, which he calls contagion, a raging beast, which daily spreads snares for us within ourselves, which is to be bound with iron chains, than that taint of Original Sin which infects the soul, and impels us continually to actual sin? Rightly indeed does Cyprian add a little after, that to those who resist it, this concupiscence is intended not for *destruction*, but for *trial*, not because it has not in it the nature and essence of Original Sin, but because the regenerate are freed from its condemning guilt.

6. Methodius in Epiphanius, lib. 2. hæresi 64, says, *Whilst the body is yet living, sin must of necessity live with it, having its roots concealed within us, although it be externally restrained by the prunings of chastisements and warnings; otherwise it would not be that after baptism we should commit any wickedness, inasmuch as sin would have been wholly removed from us;* and a little after, *It is evident that sin is in a*

* Not his, but the Abbot's of Bonnevale, p. 27. Edit. Fell. See Rivet. Crit. Sacri. lib. 2. cap. 15.

*measure lulled asleep through faith, so as not to produce its noxious fruits, however it is not pulled up by the roots.* And at last, he adds the following, *It has not yet been our lot to see sin entirely eradicated; for how could that be accomplished before man is consigned to death?* These quotations so clearly express our opinion, and so fully meet the merits of the Papistic defence—so effectually decide the cause of Rome—that Bellarmine, Vasquez, and the rest of the Jesuits, have not been able to devise any satisfactory reply, but that one which evinces either remarkable ignorance or effrontery; namely, that these were the words of a certain heretic, one Proclus, and not of the orthodox Father Methodius. But let the passage in Epiphanius be examined,* and this calumny will forthwith vanish.

6. Gregory Nyssen, de Beatitudin. orat. 6, says, *Sin exists in some manner with infants, being both born with them and growing up with them, and only ceasing to exist with the termination of life.* Sin therefore is not extinguished in baptism, nor at the period when justification is received; but at the period of the completion and close of this present life.

8. Hilary, in Psalm lviii.; *Who will boast that he has a clean heart before God? Not even if he were an infant of a day, whilst both the origin and the law of sin remain in us?* No one therefore can boast, that Original Sin is wholly extirpated from his soul.

9. Ambrose, as cited by Augustine against Julian, lib. 2. observes, *Sin works many things in us, and oftentimes revived lusts arise notwithstanding our struggles against them,* &c. That which works in the regenerate, of necessity remains and exists in them; for, *to work* always presupposes *to be.* Sin works in them, therefore it exists.

10. Cassian, Collatione 23, cap. 17 et 18, teaches, that all the saints truly confess that they are unclean and sinful. And cap. 20, he says, *Whosoever ascribes* το 'αναμάρτητον— *sinlessness, to human nature, let him contend with us, not in vain words, but with the testimony of his own conscience, and then let him declare himself to be without sin.* As though he should say, that no one can deny that he is either defiled by the filth of inbred sin, or brought into bondage by actual

* Epiphanius, tom. 1. pp. 548—49. Edit. Colon. 1682.—See p. 19, supra.

transgressions, except the man who would stifle the testimony of his own conscience.

11 Jerome, to Ctesiphon, against Pelagius, says, that the Pelagians derived this error from the Stoics; namely, *That all our disorders can be extirpated from our minds, and that no fibre or root of vice remains at all in man.* What then is this root of vices which resides perpetually in man, but that inordinacy and original taint which has pervaded all the powers of the mind? The Papists therefore unite with the camp of the Stoics and Pelagians, when they attribute perfect righteousness, and a perfect extirpation of Original Sin, to the regenerate.

The same Father says, *They who appear saints to men, are in no respects saints in the view and to the knowledge of God. For man looks on the outward appearance; the Lord sees the heart. But if in the all-seeing eye of God, whom the secrets of the heart cannot deceive, there is not a perfectly just man, — — — those should be ashamed who maintain, that man can live without sin, if he will.*

The same in his Dialogues against the Pelagians, lib. 1. says, *If baptism immediately makes a man just and full of all righteousness, the Apostle would not have rejected a novice* (1 Tim. iii. 6). Jerome therefore thought that, in baptism, the hand-writing of old sins was, as it were, rent and torn away, but did not by any means suppose, with Papists and Pelagians, that the regenerate straightway become free from all indwelling sin, or perfectly righteous.

Also, in lib. 3. *It is at the end of the world, that the Lord will present to himself a Church without spot or wrinkle, which you suppose to be now perfect in this mortal and corruptible flesh, and to deserve that commendation of the Corinthians,* NOW YE ARE PERFECT, NOW YE ARE RICH; *whereas true and spotless perfection is reserved for heaven.* We are not freed, therefore, from all the defilements of sin in *baptism*, but in *heaven*.

7. Let us come to Augustine, who, in innumerable passages, confirms our opinion, and especially in those books which were written against the Pelagian heresy. In lib. 1. de Peccat. Merit. et Remiss. cap. ultimo, he says, *In infants, by the grace of God through baptism, it comes to pass that the flesh is freed from sin; but not so freed that inbred concu-*

*piscence in the living flesh is suddenly consumed and ceases to be; but so that that which is in him at his birth does not injure him now that he is regarded as dead.* Soon after he adds; *For neither in adults is this effected in baptism, unless perchance by an ineffable miracle of the Almighty Creator, that the law of sin which is in our members striving against the law of the mind, is wholly extinguished and ceases to be; but that whatever evil is done, or said, or thought by man, is wholly put away, while that law itself remains to be struggled against, notwithstanding the chain of its guiltiness is broken.* This is the very opinion of Protestants; for, first, Augustine determines with us, that concupiscence, which he also calls *the law of sin*, is that deadly taint which we derive from our first parents. Then he plainly asserts that this condemnable concupiscence is not extinguished, nor entirely eradicated, by baptism, either in infants or adults, without a miracle. Lastly, he acknowledges with us, that although this original disease of inordinate concupiscence is not wholly taken away, yet the guiltiness of it is entirely taken away and abolished. Original Sin, therefore, *actually* remains in the regenerate, although it is removed as to its *guilt.*

Lib. 2. cap. 7., he says: *All his old infirmity is not removed from the moment a person is baptised, but his renovation commences with the remission of sins. — — — Other things are done in hope until they be accomplished in reality. — — — For although in baptism there be a total and plenary remission of sins, yet, if perfect newness were wrought in the mind itself, the Apostle would not say* THE INWARD MAN IS RENEWED DAY BY DAY. *For he, who is daily renewed, is not yet wholly renewed; and by as much as he is not yet renewed, by so much is he still in the old state.* Here it is clear, that with the full remission which we obtain in baptism, complete renovation is not conjoined; and that not in the flesh alone, but in the mind itself, this want of plenary renovation is found, and the infection of the old remains. But what else is this old remnant, than sin propagated in us from the old Adam?

Lib. de Nat. et Grat. contra Pelag. cap. 62. *He is said most truly to be without sin, in whom no sin dwells; not he who, by abstinence from deeds of evil, says*—NOW IT IS NOT I THAT DO IT, BUT SIN THAT DWELLETH IN ME. Whose

were these words, but Paul's, the most holy Apostle? whom nevertheless, Augustine concludes to be subject to sin.

Lib. 2. contra Julian. Pelag. *The law of sin, which was in the members of the Apostle, striving against the law of the mind, is remitted in baptism, but not put an end to.* That which is remitted has without doubt the nature of sin: but this is the same with that which is not put an end to, but remains in every one who is regenerate: sin, therefore, remains in the regenerate.

In the Treatise de perfectione Justitiæ contra Celestium, respons. 9, he says: *Because the will hath sinned, the hard necessity of sinning pursues the sinner, until his whole infirmity be healed.* Therefore we are freed from all sin, not when we have put on Christ in baptism, but when we have put on immortality in heaven.

Respons. 17. *His righteous heart does not condemn him, when it condemns the sin which dwelleth in his members, and has no unbelief to charge upon him. So neither in his life, that is in his faith, is he condemned by his own heart, and proved not to be free from sin.*

Epist. 29. *Who is without any sin? Who, therefore, is without any depravity, that is, without some incitement, or, as it were, root of sin?* Augustine here asserts two things: that no one is without sin, that is to say *actual sin;* and no one is without depravity, namely, *inbred and original,* which is the root of actual sin.

Expos. in Evang. Joan. tractu 41: *God performs this by his grace in us, that sin is consumed, the man is delivered. But when is it consumed, you will say? If it is diminished, why not consumed? It is diminished in the life of those who make progress, but it is consummated in the life of those who are perfect.* Mark, I pray you, that the grace of regeneration does not, according to the opinion of the Papists, cut off sin, as if by one stroke; but, as we maintain, diminishes it, and weakens it by degrees, and at length consumes and entirely abolishes it in the life of the perfect.

It is therefore an unwavering opinion of Augustine, that the regenerate are freed from the *guiltiness* of all sin, whether actual or original; but from *the existence,* or *inherent contagion* of Original Sin, they are in no respect freed. I could

bring together many more testimonies, but I fear lest I should be tedious: let us proceed, therefore, from Augustine to others.

13. Gregory, Moral. lib. 21, in xxxi. cap. Jobi, cap. 3:— *The Apostle did not forbid sin to exist in our mortal body, but forbids it to reign; because, in corruptible flesh, it is possible for it not to reign, though it is not possible for it not to be. This is the point; for the very fact of being tempted of sin is sin, from which, as long as we live, we are not altogether perfectly free.** The same in lib. 6, Exposit. in 1 Reg. cap. xv. cap. 2. *By the sin which the Apostle says he did not do, he meant the motion of the flesh; but by the sin dwelling in him, he meant original corruption. Therefore, because from that fault arises the sin of the motions of the flesh, we rightly call the first offence the mother of it. But the children of this mother are all the concupiscences, sins, and vices. — — — The mother becomes childless, when the original fault is so restrained that it is not permitted to put forth any acts or motions.*

From these two testimonies we collect, that the most holy Apostle, and of course every other regenerate person, as long as he lives, is polluted by sin. Secondly, it is also manifest from hence, that that sin with which we are all defiled, as long as we bear this corruptible body, consists of a two-fold character; for we are defiled by indwelling sin, which is called by Gregory, the *first* or *original fault;* and by the inordinate motions arising from thence, which he calls the *children* and *offspring* of this indwelling and original fault. We are free, therefore, neither from the mother nor the children, however regenerate we be; that is, we are never entirely free, either from indwelling original depravity, or from inordinate motions.

14. Bernard, super Cantica, sermone, 58. p. 965. remarks: *However much you advance whilst you remain in this body, you err if you think your corruptions dead, and not rather suppressed. The Jebusite dwells within your borders whether you will or not; he may be subdued, but not exterminated.* I KNOW *(says the Apostle)* THAT IN ME DWELLETH NO GOOD THING. *It were little unless he confessed also, that evil was in him. Either, therefore, venture to prefer yourself to the*

* See also Lib. 17. in cap. xxv. Jobi. cap. 9.

*Apostle, or confess with him that you are not free from corruptions.* What then are these corruptions, from which even the Apostle was not free, but those depraved inclinations of concupiscence, which the Jebusite dwelling within our borders, that is, Original Sin cleaving to our mortal body, daily brings forth and produces?

You see with what unanimity the Fathers lay it down, that no one lives here free from indwelling, that is Original Sin: now let us see what the Schoolmen themselves think. They indeed seem in words to defend the Popish opinion, but in reality follow ours; for however they maintain that Original Sin is wholly taken away in regeneration, yet they so modify this their opinion, as to say that this must be understood as regards the *person*, not the *nature*. How much better would it be explicitly and openly to confess, that the person of the regenerate is freed from the *guilt* of Original Sin, but that he is not freed from original *depravity* itself? But let them speak for themselves.

## CHAPTER XX.

### TESTIMONIES OF THE SCHOOLMEN SHEWING THAT ORIGINAL SIN IS NOT WHOLLY REMOVED FROM THE REGENERATE.

Before we proceed to consider the testimonies of the Schoolmen severally, it must be observed in general, that they are not accustomed to assign, after remission and regeneration, the term *fault* either to the want of original righteousness, or to the inordinate concupiscence which remains in the regenerate; but as to the thing, they confess that both this want is found in them, and that this inordinate concupiscence is not immediately eradicated. Let them call it *penalty*, if they will, after its guiltiness has been removed, it is no concern of ours, whilst they are compelled to acknowledge that the thing itself, culpable in its nature, is not yet wholly taken away from regenerate men. But let us hear themselves.

1. We will begin, as is but just, with the Master of the Sentences and of the Schoolmen himself. *Original Sin* (says

he*) *is the corruption of concupiscence; concerning which we have now to examine how it is put away in baptism, since even after baptism the concupiscence which was existing before still remains.* He soon afterwards† explains it in this manner:—*Original Sin is said to be put away in baptism on a twofold account; because by the grace of baptism the corruption of concupiscence is weakened and lessened; and because its guiltiness itself is remitted.* Here we read of the weakening of Original Sin, of its extenuation, and even the removal of its guiltiness; but of that eradication of it which the Papists urge we do not read.

2. Gratian and his Glossators follow close upon Lombard. Gratian himself‡ brings this testimony from Augustine: *Original infirmity is not altogether removed from a man at the time he is baptised; but his renovation begins by remission,* &c. The Glossator adds—*In this distinction it is asserted, that although in baptism all sins are removed, yet in fact original sins are taken away in baptism as to guilt, but remain actually.* Another likewise says; *Although all Original Sin and actual is put away in baptism, yet Original Sin is not so put away, as not to exist; but remains debilitated and lulled asleep in the man.* This is the very point, for the teaching of which we are reputed *heretics* by the Papists.

3. Hugo de St. Victor, in his annotations in Epist. ad Rom. cap. 5, says—*In baptism original righteousness is bestowed, not that which Infants would have if there was no corruption of sin; but that which is understood in a participation of the merits of Christ. The privation therefore of original righteousness is so remedied in baptism, not that its character is restored, but that the loss of it is not imputed.* He afterwards adds also: *Some say that Original Sin is put away in baptism, as respects the penalty alone of eternal damnation, and remains even after baptism, as to the fault; according to what the Apostle declares*—IT IS NOT I THAT DO IT, BUT SIN THAT DWELLETH IN ME. And this opinion Hugo himself does not disallow, but intimates that it rather agrees with the mind of the Apostle. From hence, therefore, I wish you would observe these three things: First, according to the opinion of Hugo, the righteousness which

* Lombard. Lib. 2. dist. 32. lit. A. † Lit. B.

‡ De Consecratione, dist. 4. cap. 146.

is bestowed upon the regenerate, consists more in a participation of the merits of Christ, than in the perfection of infused virtues. Secondly, that when Original Sin is affirmed to be taken away by baptism, it is not so to be understood, as though a state of original and perfect righteousness were attributed to the regenerate; but that the want of that righteousness which ought to be in him is no longer imputed. Lastly, that this defect, together with indwelling concupiscence, is accounted guilt or sin by the Apostle, and may be rightly so called by us, provided we understand it to be guilt or sin in consequence of inbred derangement and perversity, and we maintain that it is separated from guiltiness and punishment, by the remission obtained in baptism, for the sake of Christ, into whom we are then engrafted as into a new stock.

4. William of Paris says: *Original Sin lies prostrate in those who are regenerated in the saving laver, conquered as it were, and slain; lest it should rise again to its former vigour, namely, lest it should reign and rule.—For which cause the Apostle says advisedly, Let not sin reign in your mortal body. He has not said, Let it not be in you; for it remains in the regenerate after the cleansing of the saving laver.** A little after he says: *Observe diligently how great a difference there is between the taking away of Original Sin and the taking away of the foreskin. The latter does not return after being removed; not even a vestige of it remains; but the plague of Original Sin both easily returns, and its great seedplot is left even after baptismal washing, a fact which the overflowing of former motions evidently proves.* He plainly teaches that Original Sin is taken away in the regenerate, not as to its *essence*, but as to its *dominion* and *guiltiness;* which is the very doctrine of Protestants.

5. Hales, parte 4. de Sacramento Baptismi, quæst. 8. art. 2. pag. 98., makes an objection nearly in this manner: *It is the duty of a skilful Physician, not only to aim at removing the disease, but also the root.— — It would appear, then, that the Supreme Physician also ought to take away the original disease with its root, that is, the corruption of our nature.* He solves it thus: *It is the duty of a prudent Physician sometimes to take away the root of a disease, but not when it is so*

* De Vitiis et Peccat. cap. 4. pag. 254, 255.

*rooted that it cannot be taken away without the destruction of nature. — — — Hence because in man the corruption is so rooted in his nature, yea, is, as it were, his nature itself; it is not the duty of the great Physician entirely to remove it.* Observe in these words, that concupiscence left in the regenerate is called *corruption*, and *the root of original disease.* But who ever denied that the root is a part of the tree, and the principal part too? Let the Schoolmen, therefore, sport themselves with terms as much as they please, and call concupiscence when its guilt is taken away *pœnam, vitiosam, morbum, languorem*, or whatever they will, which excludes the word *sin;* still, whilst they acknowledge such *corruption* to be in the regenerate, we shall not hesitate to call it, with the Apostle, by the very name—*sin.*

6. Bonaventura, Lib. 2. dist. 32. qu. 1. says, *Original Sin is done away in baptism as to its guiltiness, but remains in reality; for although concupiscence remains, yet it does not remain as to its fault, nor as rendering obnoxious to punishment.* What else does this phrase mean—*does not remain as to its fault, or as exposing to punishment,*—but what we express in other words? Its *guiltiness* does not remain, or its *damnatory power*, although the *contagion* itself, and the *disorder* of Original Sin does remain. It is plain, therefore, that the Schoolmen, by *fault*, understood sin coupled with its guilt; and in this sense alone they deny that original fault remains in the regenerate, which we also acknowledge. But the question is concerning *the nature* of the thing, not of the *guiltiness* which thence attaches; and that this may be separated from it by the mercy of God, on account of the passion and death of Christ, we of ourselves concede.

7. Aquinas in 4. sentent. distinct. 4. qu. 2. art. 1. *The sacraments are applied to persons; therefore baptism takes away from man that which, through the corruption of his nature, involved his person; and on this account, that infection of fault, so far as it affects the person, and that penalty which deprived him of personal act, namely, the deprivation of Divine vision, baptism removes; but does not entirely take away the infection in reality, as it affects the nature.* So says he. The meaning is—the infection of Original Sin affects *the person*, inasmuch as it involves it in deadly guilt; and so far it is taken away in baptism: but the same infection affects *the*

*nature*, inasmuch as it defiles the same by some evil tendency, or deprives it of innate rectitude; and in this sense, after baptism (however diminished) it still adheres tenaciously to him. Whoever admits this, as Aquinas does, adopts indeed another mode of speaking, but in reality embraces our opinion.

8. The Compend. Theologiæ (which some attribute to Albertus Magnus*) in lib. 3. cap. 3, contains as follows: *It must be observed that sin sometimes passes away so far as to its commission, and remains as to its guiltiness; as actual sin: sometimes, on the contrary, it passes away as to its guiltiness, and remains as to its commission, as is evidently the case with Original Sin after baptism.* Albert then did not think it impossible that guiltiness should be separated from the sin remaining; as we see it to be possible that the act may pass away, the guilt still remaining.

9. Richard Middleton,† lib. 2. dist. 32. art. 1. quæst. 1. says, *Although a child lack original righteousness after baptism, yet he is not blamed for the want of it, because not every loss of righteousness is a fault, but the want of that righteousness, to the possession of which he who lacks it is bound.* A little after, in resp. ad 3, he says, *Although original righteousness is not restored in baptism, yet the necessity of possessing it is remitted; and thus after baptism the want of original righteousness is not a fault, when before baptism it was a fault.* Hence it easily appears why the Schoolmen say, that after baptism nothing remains in the regenerate which has the nature of fault, since in the mean time they confess, that by baptism neither is original righteousness restored, nor inordinate concupiscence eradicated; namely, because the justified are freed from the obligation of possessing this righteousness, and from the guiltiness of evil concupiscence, although the defect of righteousness, and the corrupt habit

* See Exposition of Epistle to the Coloss. Vol. I. p. 148. Ed.

† RICHARD MIDDLETON, called the profound and abundant, was an English Schoolman of the Franciscan Order; first studying philosophy, law, and theology, at Oxford, and afterwards at Paris, where he obtained a high reputation. He returned to England and taught with great applause at Oxford, where he died about A.D. 1300. He wrote four books of Questions on Lombard's Sentences, and *Quodlibetica Theologica*, containing *Eighty Questions in Theology*, both of which works have been published; also Commentaries on the Gospels, and the Epistle of Paul, and some Tracts which are not published.

of concupiscence, in itself condemnable, are found in them. A reason for this we may adduce from the same author, namely, *Because the cause of culpability in Original Sin arises from a certain tendency to the sin of Adam.** When therefore a person is viewed no more in the Old Adam, but in Christ, it is just that this remaining contagion, although it be something vicious, should not however be imputed as a vice to the regenerate grafted into Christ.

10. Antoninus,† Sum. part. 1. tit. 8. sect. 3, says, *Although Original Sin has passed away, and its guiltiness is removed in baptism, because it escapes the obligation to eternal punishment; yet its reality remains, that is, habitual concupiscence itself remains in the baptised.* The Schoolmen, you see, when they endeavour to explain the mode of our freedom from Original Sin, do not assert either a restitution of perfect and primitive righteousness, or an utter eradication of unrestrained concupiscence; but content themselves with saying, that Original Sin is taken away, because its guiltiness is removed; because the obligation of having original righteousness is released; because the power of concupiscence is broken and weakened; and lastly, because the

* Ib. art. 3. qu. 2.

† ANTONINUS OF FLORENCE; his true name was *Antonius;* but on account of his diminutive stature, he acquired that of *Antoninus.* He was born at Florence in 1389, studied canon law early, and became a Dominican Monk at 16, having then committed to memory *the Decrees of Gratian*, at that time the book of chief excellence. He afterwards presided over several different Monasteries, and was made Vicar-General of his Order; he appeared with *èclàt* at the Council of Florence, and was appointed to engage in controversy with the Greeks. In 1446, the Florentines having demanded from Eugene IV. an Archbishop, pious, learned, and their countryman, in order that he might know the wants of the country, and, at the same time, be able to provide for them, Antoninus was appointed, as combining, in his person, all the qualities desired. He was repeatedly Envoy of his city to the Court of Rome, but his efforts to meet the wishes of his fellow-citizens, and yield to the orders of the Pope, were useless; though Cosmo de Medecis placed entire confidence in him, Eugene IV. expressed a wish to die in his arms, and Pius IV. assisted at his funeral. He died May 2, 1459, aged 70, and was canonised in 1525, by Pope Adrian VI. His piety was generally admitted, but his judgment has been questioned, and his works are said to be stuffed with silly stories collected from all quarters. His principal studies were Ecclesiastical History and Theology. Of the former there is extant *Summa Historialium*, or a Universal History of the Creation to his own time: Venice, 1480; Lyons, 1586, 3 vols. fol. Of the latter there is *Summa Theologiæ Moralis, partibis iv. distincta*, Venice, 1477, and 1479; Strasburg, 1496, 4 vols. fol.; and *Summa Confessionalis*, Lyons, 1564, 8vo.—*Soames's Ecclesiastical History.*

regenerate have not that inclination to the Old Adam which before they had. All these things we maintain much more briefly and plainly, when we teach that original corruption is not wholly taken away, but that the guilt arising therefrom is for Christ's sake taken away, and that all the regenerate are endowed with a certain inchoate righteousness, whereby the dominion of concupiscence is broken; although they attain not that perfect righteousness, whereby the root itself of concupiscence is plucked up.

11. Ægidius* in Dionys. Carthus. in 2. sentent. dist. 32. quæst. 1, says, That *Original Sin is the want of original righteousness, with the obligation of having it. — — This Original Sin is put away in baptism, not because original righteousness is restored to us, but because the obligation of having it is remitted from us. Whereas in the state of corrupt nature we are bound to have it; yet when we are made members of Christ by baptism, we are absolved from the obligation of having that righteousness. For by baptism we are constituted in another state and order of nature, so as not to be now called after the order of the earthly Adam, but after the order of the heavenly, that is, of Christ our Saviour.* Original Sin, then, is said to be taken away in the regenerate, not because the thing itself is taken away, but because the guilt of possessing it is not exacted, that is,

* Ægidius Colonna, or De Columna, the Profound Doctor, was born at Rome, of the illustrious family of Colonna; studied at Rome and in other places, and became an Augustinian Eremite Monk. He was invited to Paris, to be Tutor to Prince Philip, son of Philip the Bold, and taught many years in the University there. In 1292, he was made Prior General of his Order, and in 1296, Boniface VIII. made him Archbishop of Bourges. He died A.D. 1316, in the 69th year of his age. His body was conveyed to the Church of the Augustine fraternity at Paris, and it was inscribed upon his tomb, that he was a most perspicuous Commentator upon the Prince of the Philosophers, Aristotle, and that he was *lux in lucernis reducens dubia*, 'the luminary which brought doubtful things to light.' In a General Council at Florence, his doctrine was ordained to be received and inviolably observed, by all students and readers belonging to the Augustine Order, as 'the doctrine which enlightened the whole world.' His writings were very numerous, though but partially published, and never collectively. They afford but little confirmation, however, it is said, of the character given of them, treating abstruse questions with profound obscurity. They are on Scholastic Theology, Dialectics, on the Sentences of Lombard, Vindications of Thomas Aquinas and Bonaventura, and numerous other Tracts. The Lucubrations on Lombard were printed at Basil, 1623; his works *On Original Sin*, at Oxford, 4to, 1479; and his *Quæstiones Metaphysicæ et Quodlibeticæ*, at Venice, 1501.—*Soames.*

because the evil propagated from Adam no longer involves us in guilt, after that we have come out of the order and stock of the earthly Adam, and have passed into the order and stock of the heavenly.

12. Gregory of Ariminum, in 2. distinct. 30. art. 4, teaches, that *the essence itself of Original Sin is not taken away by baptism, but its guilt only; which is explained* to be nothing else than that the regenerate man, because of this evil quality still dwelling in him, is not exposed to punishment.*

It is sufficiently plain, I think, from all these testimonies, that the ancient Schoolmen themselves rather favour our opinion, than that of our adversaries. In their mode of speaking, indeed, they differ from us both. The Jesuits say, that nothing remains after baptism having the nature of Original Sin; but the Schoolmen are accustomed to say, that the original contagion is taken away in regeneration from the *person,* not from the *nature.* By which saying they intimate what we with Augustine enounce more clearly, namely, that the regenerate are absolved from the *guiltiness* or *condemnation* of Original Sin, but not freed from the *act* or *indwelling* of the same. We say that the want of orinal righteousness, and concupiscence after baptism, have in themselves the true nature of *fault* or *sin,* although, through the Divine mercy, as many as are implanted in Christ Jesus are not adjudged to final punishment on account of this fault. But the Schoolmen abstain from the word *fault* or *sin* after regeneration; nor is it to be wondered at, for I shall easily assign the reasons: For, first, there were among them some† who maintained Original Sin to be neither fault nor punishment, but only a state of guilt inflicted for the sin of the first man. No wonder, therefore, that after the guiltiness is removed upon regeneration, they should maintain that there was nothing culpable remaining in the regenerate. Secondly, some of them who have admitted this original defilement to be culpable, yet have said, that it is not a sin or fault, properly speaking, because it has not been contracted by the proper or personal will of the individual.‡ They who extenuate this fault in the unregenerate,

* Apud. Greg. de Valent. de Pec. Orig., cap. 11.

† Lomb. lib. 2. dist. 30.

‡ Durand. lib. 2, dist. 30, qu. 2.

beyond a doubt would do the same in the regenerate. Lastly, they who acknowledge guilt or sin in this original corruption, yet say that it carries with it the nature of culpability, not as man is considered as an individual person, but as he is considered as a particular branch of the human nature propagated from Adam.*

Since, therefore, after regeneration the subject begins to be a member of the new Adam, they are easily led to determine that there is nothing of this fault or sin remaining in the regenerate. But we had rather follow the Apostles of Christ, than these master-builders of distinctions. *They* call concupiscence, or disorder, not perfectly healed in all the faculties of the soul, *sin*. We shall therefore, with the good leave of the others, designate that same thing by the word *sin*. *They* also teach that notwithstanding this sin inheres in the regenerate, *there is no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus:* we both believe and confess the same, whatever Jesuits may argue to the contrary.

Thus far we have sufficiently considered the opinion and testimonies of the Schoolmen.

## CHAPTER XXI.

### THAT CONCUPISCENCE REMAINING IN THE REGENERATE, AND ITS FIRST MOTIONS ARE SINS.

We have alleged those testimonies which assert universally that there is something vicious and blameworthy remaining in the regenerate. Now because it is confessed among the Papists, that the regenerate themselves are neither freed from habitual concupiscence, nor from its inordinate motions, I shall yet further prove, by the testimonies of Fathers and Schoolmen, that this concupiscence, as well habitual as actual, is in its own nature sin, properly and formally understood, and consequently, that no one of the regenerate is, in this life, free from sin.

* Aquin. qu. disp. de Pec. Orig. art. 1.

1. Hermas,* lib. 1. Vis. 1, says, *It is sin, and that too a great one in a righteous man, if an evil desire shall have arisen in his heart.* And a little after, *There is indeed, in the servants of God, such an imagination as brings in sin.* He confesses that, in the regenerate, the very ebullition, and first rise or motion, of inordinate concupiscence, is sin.

2. Tertullian, de Pudicitia, cap. 6, says, *The law of not coveting condemns the beginning of sins, that is lusts and pleasures, no less than the committing of them.* If by the law of God, that very concupiscence whence actual sins take their origin, is prohibited and condemned, undoubtedly it has the true and proper nature of sin, namely ἀνομία.

3. Clemens, Strom. 2 (cap. 20. § 110.) affirms, that these inordinate motions of the mind are *the impressions of a tender and yielding soul, and certain* (as he speaks ἐναποσφραγίσματα τῶν πνευματικῶν δυνάμεων) *stamps of spiritual powers, against which we have to wrestle.* Now, who will venture to affirm, that that man does not sin, who suffers his mind to be stamped like wax, with diabolical impressions, however he restrain them from breaking forth into act?

4. Methodius in Epiphanius, Hæresi 64, pag. 173, explaining those words of St. Paul, *What I would, that I do not; but what I hate that I do* (Rom. vii. 15), teaches, that the very desire and inordinate thought is sin, and such sin as requires cleansing. But to quote the very words; *This is perfect good, not only to abstain from doing, but from thinking; for this is to be immaculate, and, as we are wont to say, perfectly uniform in hand and mind without any cause of reprehension. And consider, whether it was not for such thoughts that David intreated God,* CLEANSE ME FROM MY SECRET FAULTS. The holy Father, therefore, seems to affirm, that those very thoughts and irregular desires, which suggested themselves to Paul, however much against his will, had the nature of sin, and needed Divine forgiveness.

5. Isidore, Sententiar. lib. 2. cap. 17, says, *Sin is committed in the heart four ways; by the suggestion of devils, by the delight of the flesh, by the consent of the mind, by the*

* Respecting this early Father, and his writings, with those commonly designated the Apostolic Fathers, the reader may consult *Soames's Ecclesiastical History* for ample information, and some very judicious remarks.

*maintaining of pride.* He therefore acknowledges sin to be committed not only when the consent of the will is added to inward concupiscence, but also when the soul itself by effeminacy (just as ye have heard from Clemens) receives evil impressions, and suffers itself to be allured, and as it were enticed by them.

6. Let us come to Augustine, from whom we might quote testimonies almost innumerable; but because some have been already incidentally introduced in the preceding discussion, we will be content with four.

Lib. 6. in Julianum, cap. 5, he thus speaks of indwelling concupiscence; *Moreover, such and so great an evil, from the very fact of its being in us, would it not certainly hold us under sentence of death, and drag us down to final death, unless its chain were loosened by that remission of all sins which is made in baptism?* Augustine by this testimony strikes out all the devices and little distinctions of the Papists. For first, they are wont sometimes to say, that concupiscence is sin, or corruption, but not *condemnable*, nay rather *pitiable*, as blindness, deafness, and other diseases of nature.* But this is excluded; for such an evil is it, that of its own nature it draws men on to eternal death. Secondly they are wont to say, that this corruption is deadly in the unregenerate, so far forth as it renders the whole habit corrupt, one part of which is the turning away of the mind from God: but after baptism this aversion is removed, and then it ceases to have a deadly nature. But even Augustine is opposed to this answer, for he speaks of concupiscence as it remains after regeneration, and affirms that this very thing in the regenerate man no longer draws into condemnation because its guilt has been done away in baptism, not (as Bellarmine pretends) because its formal part has been taken away in baptism. In fine, they say, that that must not be looked upon as the guiltiness of concupiscence, which arises from it, and is founded in it, as though he who is involved in it were guilty for being in that state; but they will have that to be guiltiness by which it has itself been produced, not what it produces; and they illustrate the matter by the following comparison:—As if

* Bellarm. de amiss. Grat. lib. 8. cap. 3.

any one who should cut off his own hand, might be said to be guilty of cutting off his hand, not because to have the hand cut off is always sin, or makes one guilty, but because the cutting it off from himself involves guiltiness; so to have concupiscence in oneself does not make man guilty before God, but to have it from the voluntary transgression of Adam. This cavil, however, is set aside by those very words of Augustine; who, if he had wished to have expressed that meaning, would have said, Moreover such and so little an evil has arisen from the voluntary sin of Adam, that it would hold us under sentence of death, unless it were remitted; but on the contrary he says, *Such and so great an evil, from the very fact of its being in us, would hold us, &c.* Therefore it is condemnatory by its very *inhesion*, according to Augustine, and not merely from *the mode of having it*, as Bellarmine would fain make out.

Again, Augustine, lib. 1. contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum, cap. 14, says, *All the fruits of concupiscence, and the old guiltiness of concupiscence, is put away by the washing of baptism.* He who says that the guilt of original indwelling concupiscence, and all its fruits of actual concupiscence are put away from the regenerate, confesses that the nature of them is damnable in itself. For nothing needs remission, but what is deserving of condemnation.

Lib. 5. in Julianum, cap. 3, *The lusting of the flesh, against which the good Spirit lusteth, is both sin, because there is involved in it disobedience against the will of the mind; and is the penalty of sin, because it is inflicted for the deserts of the disobedient; and is the cause of sin, because of the yielding of him who consents to it, or the defilement of birth sin.* Bellarmine answers, that Augustine makes use of the term *sin* in a broad manner, to signify all corruption and evil; not as it is strictly and formally understood. But this answer amounts to nothing; for the reason which Augustine annexes shews, that he is speaking concerning sin strictly understood. For what can more evince the nature of sin properly so called, than that it opposes the mind renewed and sanctified by the grace of the Spirit? For this is just as if it opposed the Divine law itself. Let me add—We grant that Augustine makes use of this term *sin* in a broad sense, that is, not only for the act resisting the

Divine Law: but for the evil inclining to oppose it: this the more confirms our cause. For although the use of the Latin language for the most part restricts the word *sin* to the actual and voluntary transgression of the law; yet Scripture extends it to the inward and habitual infection of nature; and in this very sense we contend that concupiscence is sin. If then it be conceded to be such an evil we have gained our cause; for this is Original Sin.

Contra Julianum, lib. 6. cap. 8, he says,—*Nor is the case free from iniquity, when in a man either the superior faculties are basely subjected to the inferior, or the inferior obstinately strive against the superior, even though they are not suffered to overcome them.* He is speaking of the rebellious concupiscence of the regenerate which he calls *iniquity;* by which word he would denote a depravity contrary to the Divine Law, and of its own nature contractive of deadly guiltiness. This is clear if we look to what immediately precedes. For he had said that this is the determination of the Divine Law, that no iniquity be left unpunished, unless what the blood of the Mediator shall have expiated. He afterwards adds that this very rebellion of concupiscence remaining in the regenerate is such an iniquity as needs expiation and remission. Bellarmine [in reply] betakes himself to his accustomed little distinctions, and asserts that this concupiscence is iniquity, but so as taken *materially* not *formally*. There is, however, little ground for this distinction in the words of Augustine; for he speaks of such iniquity as induces guilt; but iniquity of this kind is properly and formally that same thing which we call *sin*. Then, because Augustine has said, that this concupiscence occasions the inferior members to resist the superior, Bellarmine infers that this is in the flesh alone, and therefore is not properly sin. But Augustine elsewhere shews, that the mind itself, and the will, inasmuch as it has not yet shaken off the old Adam, is a partaker of this rebellion.* Lastly, Bellarmine alleges in reply other passages, where Augustine writes that all iniquity is blotted out, although some infirmity remains in the regenerate. But to this cavil, it has been often answered, that Augustine

* Aug. contra Julian, lib. 6. cap. 5. de perfect. Just. pag. 1424.

sometimes restricts the term *iniquity* and *sin* to iniquity or sin coupled with deadly guilt; and in this sense he denies that concupiscence remaining in the regenerate is sin or iniquity; because it is no longer joined and connected with condemnable guiltiness.—Let us now dismiss Augustine and proceed to other witnesses.

7. Bede, in his Commentary in Psal. 1, observes, *The death of the soul is caused in three ways; namely either by delight alone, or by delight and consent, or by the perpetration of sin. Delight is the desire of sinning which is bred in the soul from the fuel of sinning that is in us, and by the suggestion of the devil added thereto: and this is the first death of the soul.* He clearly acknowledges that the very first delight itself of concupiscence which precedes the assent of the will is sin, and that too deadly in its nature. Now let us hear the Schoolmen.

8. Lombard, lib. 2. dist. 30. litera G.—*Now it remains to be considered what Original Sin is: It is then the fuel of sin, that is, concupiscence; which is called the law in our members, or weakness of our nature, or the tyrant which is in our members, or the law of our flesh.* Lombard clearly confesses, that this concupiscence, which is the incentive to actual sin, carries in itself the true nature of Original Sin; but that this remains in the regenerate themselves no one can either deny or doubt.

9. Aquinas, quæst. disput. de Peccat. Origin. art. 2. resp. ad primum, writes: *Concupiscence by which the lustful power is prone to be carried away to pleasure of the sense contrary to the order of reason, is against the nature of man; so far as he is man; and so pertains to Original Sin.* Since then this proneness cleaves to the regenerate, it must be admitted that there remains in them something which opposes the integrity of nature, as it was first constituted, which is infected by the taint of Original Sin. I know that Aquinas refers this concupiscence to the *matter* of Original Sin; and the aversion from unchangeable good he resolves into its *form;* but this makes little difference, since this *matter*, no less than the *form*, resists the Divine Law, and fastens upon man the guilt of eternal death. This distinction we have before overturned; further proof is therefore needless.

10. Hales, part. 2. qu. 108. memb. 2. writes, *Corrupt sensuality in man flows from Original Sin; and inordinate delight which proceeds from it (so far as it is corrupt) is called its first motion, and is sin; because it ought to be subjected to reason, and itself is affected in an undue manner contrary to reason, and is countenanced in some measure by reason, not indeed causing, but permitting it, and not suppressing its risings.* Three things are here to be noticed: First that Original Sin may attach to human inclination itself, because according to the law of nature, it ought to be subordinate to reason. Secondly, that the irregular motion of this power, with which even the regenerate are molested, is actual sin. Lastly, that reason itself is not free from sin, as often as sensuality is excited and is hurried with undue motion towards the object of delight. From all this it is plain, that sin perpetually remains in the regenerate themselves, whilst they are in this life.

11. Altissiodorensis, lib. 2. tract. 28. cap. 1. says, *The working of human lustfulness is voluntary, and is sin, even when it begins to operate before the judgment of reason.* And in the same place, cap. 2—*But it is called sin because it tends to what is unlawful. For there is an incentive, which inclines the human will to delight in a sensible object, in consequence of which the soul is beclouded and depraved by conjunction with the creature.* By this reasoning Altissiodorensis proves both that its first motion and spring has the nature of sin; and that because that motion *actually*, and the fuel itself *habitually*, tends and inclines to an unlawful thing.

12. Parisiensis de Sacramento Matrimonii, cap. 7. says, *The whole war of the flesh against the Spirit is iniquitous; therefore all the warriors of the flesh against the Spirit are iniquitous. — — Therefore, both the first rank, namely, that of the first motions; and the second, that of delights without the assent; and the third, that of the consent; and the fourth, that of works, &c.* And immediately afterwards he adds, that *these motions are to be slain on account of the iniquity of their rebellion against the Spirit, and on account of their culpability.* What is more plain than that, according to the opinion of this most learned personage, the old man itself remaining in the regenerate, and all his

troops, are iniquitous and culpable in their own nature; and therefore to be slain and eradicated?

13. Gerson, in regulis Moralibus, pag. 128. lit. B, observes, *All the first inclinations, because they are apt to follow reason, and to be regulated by it, if they shall have outrun it, may be called sins, even in infants and simpletons, because they are against the order of nature as first constituted.* With respect to the first inclinations, the same may be said of that proneness or propension to those irregular affections, namely, that it is sin, because it is contrary to the order of nature as first constituted.

And here let our second question end, in which we have proved, that the regenerate are not endowed with so perfect a righteousness, that nothing cleaves to them which has the true nature of sin. We have dwelt the longer on this point, because it is the basis of all those that follow, which we shall discuss with more brevity.

# THE THIRD GENERAL QUESTION,

CONCERNING

# THE FORMAL CAUSE OF JUSTIFICATION.

## CHAPTER XXII.

### ON THE WORD *JUSTIFICATION*, THE CALUMNIES OF OUR ADVERSARIES, AND THE STATE OF THE QUESTION.

We now come to the third question, in which the formal cause of man's justification is to be discussed. For whereas we have shewn that a certain inherent holiness is imparted to all the regenerate, which we treated in the first question ;* and whereas we have moreover proved, that this infused righteousness is imperfect and defiled by the filth of sin, which we did by many arguments in the second :† the order of the discussion, and the necessity of our subject itself now demands that we should enquire what, and of what kind, that righteousness is, which justifies man before God, and in the view of which, God himself pronounces man to be free from sin, and the penalty of sin, and accounts him worthy of his favour and eternal life.

Now that we may the more easily understand what this is, I will first examine the word *justifying*, or *justification;* then, to shelter ourselves from the calumnies of our adversaries, I will explain what they falsely attribute to us in this controversy concerning the formal cause of justification, and what we really hold : lastly, I will describe the state of the controversy itself, and the defence of the Papists.

As to the word *justification*, I do not enquire how many

* See Chapter iii. p. 8. † Beginning at Chap. iv. p. 14.

significations it has, or may have; but what signification it has in this particular article and doctrine of our faith. But since the sense of words is best gathered from those places in which some doctrine is professedly treated; we must in this matter especially recur to the Epistles of St. Paul, who formally lays down the doctrine of justification, and establishes it most copiously and strongly. With him then it always bears a forensic signification in this controversy, and denotes the act of God, absolving, like a judge, an accused person, pronouncing him just, and accepting him to the reward of righteousness, that is life eternal. Remarkable is that passage Rom. viii. 33, where the very antithesis of justification and condemnation shews, that to justify means, with St. Paul, nothing less than to declare and determine a person free from guilt and condemnation, by a judicial sentence: *Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth. Who is he that condemneth?* And in Rom. v. 18, he has the same antithesis between the condemnation which we incur from the fall of Adam, and the justification of life which we obtain by the righteousness of Christ. Nor does the Apostle force the word justification to this sense, but has followed the common usage of it in Hebrew and Greek. For although *to justify* seems commonly the same as *to render a man just by the implanted quality of righteousness*, yet neither among approved Latin authors (that I know of) is it used in this sense; and among the Greeks, the word δικαίοω denotes not the infusion of a quality, but the pronouncing of a sentence. The same may be said of the Hebrew, as appears from Prov. xvii. 15. *He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord.* Acceptable doubtless, and not abominable, would he be before God, who could implant holiness and righteousness in an ungodly man. It denotes therefore an act of *jurisdiction*, not of *infusion*. In this sense Christ himself uses this word in Matt. xii. 37. *By thy words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned.*—But, in so plain a matter, there is no need of more words; especially since the Papists themselves cannot refuse this forensic signification of the term, which they themselves acknowledge to be founded in Scripture. For thus says

Naclantus:* *There may seem to some a difference between Theological teachers, and the sacred Scriptures, when in the former to justify is to make just, and to be justified is to become just; but in the latter it is rather to declare just, and to be shewn as just, as we may collect from them at large: however, when we accurately examine the matter we find it otherwise.* A little after, he grants that this forensic signification of the word is more familiar, and more obvious in the Scriptures, than that other; although he contends that believers are not only declared just, but constituted so before God; which, if correctly understood, may be safely admitted, as we shall presently shew.

Now, in the second place, in order to meet the calumnies of our adversaries, we openly affirm that the righteous God justifies no one, that is (as we have explained) absolves him from guilt, declares him just, and accepts him to life eternal, which is the reward of righteousness, unless by the intervention of a true and perfect righteousness, which also becomes truly the righteousness of the justified person himself. Consequently this assertion is both false and foolish, that the justification of the sinner is, with us, nothing else than a mere fiction of law; since, in the meantime, he who is justified is not made a partaker of true righteousness. On the contrary, we affirm, that no one is justified, but he upon whom God has bestowed a righteousness so complete and perfect, that God in beholding him cannot but regard as righteous the person upon whom the same is bestowed. We also grant that there is in all justified persons, a certain inherent righteousness, which if they lay down as the formal cause of justification, making just, (for the coining of a word may be allowed) we will make no objection; but of the aforesaid justification, which answers to the strict scrutiny of the heavenly judge, it can by no means be either the formal or meritorious cause. That infused quality, whereby man is called *just*, is the formal cause whence man is so denominated: as the quality of heat is the formal cause whence the subject is called *hot*; but the mode of

* Naclantus in 1. ad Ephes. pag. 58. — NACLANTUS was Bishop of Chiozza or Clugia in the Venetian Territories: his Comment on the Ephesians was published at Venice in 1554. *Vide Scriptores Ordinis Prædicatorum*, by Echard and Quetif; tom ii. p. 202.

naming it will be in proportion to the degree of the quality. Moderate heat will make the subject hot, though but moderately; heat in the highest and most perfect degree will make the thing hot highly and perfectly. So, imperfect and incipient righteousness renders a man just, but imperfectly and inchoately; but none but that which is itself perfect and absolute can render him perfectly and absolutely so. And to such righteousness God has respect, when he either justifies the wicked at first, or, when regenerate, he esteems and accounts him *as* justified. Therefore let that former be the formal cause of this inchoate justification, but this latter alone will be the formal cause of this absolute and judiciary justification.

Thus then vanishes that threadbare calumny of the Papists,* namely, that no one of the Protestants, except Bucer and Chemnitz, acknowledges any inherent righteousness at all in the justified. For we all acknowledge and clearly profess, that God infuses a righteousness of this kind in the very act of justifying; but we deny that the sentence of God in justifying has respect to this as to the cause by which man is constituted *justified*. The objection of Bellarmine† also against Chemnitz is answered, when he accuses him of fraud, because he states this controversy in the following way: *What is that on account of which God receives man into favour? Is it the merit and obedience of Christ, or that inchoate obedience which resides in us?* Bellarmine objects—The question is concerning the formal cause, but the little word *propter* (on account of) denotes not the *formal*, but the *meritorious* cause. Although therefore the obedience of Christ be the *meritorious* cause of our justification, on account of which God justifies us; yet inherent righteousness may be the *formal* cause, through which we are constituted justified. But the Jesuit shews here that he forgot himself, since he himself speaks in the same manner, de Justif. lib. 2. cap. 1: *We must treat of the formal cause on account of which man is said to be just before God.* And in truth such a formal cause of justification must be laid down as, at the same time, can be meritorious too. For unless it have in itself that dignity, on account of

* Vasq. in 1. 2. qu. 113. disp. 202. cap. 1.
† Bellarm. de Justif. lib. 2. cap. 2.

which man is rightly reputed justified, it never will be the formal cause through which he stands justified in the sight of God.

Now as to the state of the controversy itself, Bellarmine and Vasquez affirm on the faith of Osiander,* that twenty different opinions are held among Protestants. But neither Osiander, nor those Jesuits themselves have been able to find even two different opinions among us, unless the differences about some little word must be supposed necessarily to form a different opinion.

But, says Bellarmine, it is the opinion of Luther that the formal cause of justification is faith. I answer, he always acknowledges it the *instrumental*, not the *formal* cause; unless so far as that under the term *faith*, he includes the object comprehended in faith. As though he would say that the obedience of Christ apprehended by faith is the formal cause of our justification. This has not escaped the notice of the Papists themselves, for Vasquez writes† :— *When, in Luther, faith is asserted to be our formal righteousness, faith is therefore called righteousness, because by it we apprehend the righteousness of Christ whereby we are justified.*†

As the second opinion, he mentions that of those who set it down, that the obedience and righteousness of Christ imputed to us is the formal cause of justification. Now this is the common opinion of all our divines; nor, as to

* OSIANDER (ANDREW) an eminent Divine, born in Bavaria 1498, and began to preach at Nuremburg in 1552. He was one of the promoters of the Reformation: but eventually, by his peculiar doctrines he became the cause of great disturbance in the Lutheran Churches. At the Conference of Marpurg, in 1529, between Luther and the Swiss Divines, he maintained his opinion "that a man is justified formally not by the faith and apprehension of the justice of Jesus Christ, or the imputation of his justice, according to the opinion of Luther and Calvin; but by the essential justice of God." He then drew up a Confession of Faith, which was printed by order of the Margrave of Brandenburg, but highly disapproved of by the Lutherans. He was a studious and acute divine, but much disliked for his arrogance, and the insolent manner in which he treated the aged Melancthon. His works are "*Harmonia Evangelica;*" "*Liber de Imagine Dei quid sit;*" "*Epistola ad Zuinglium de Eucharistia;*" "*Dissertationes duæ de Lege et Evangelio et Justificatione.*" He died suddenly at Konigsberg, where he was Minister and Professor in 1552. -See more of his peculiar opinions in *Soames's Mosheim*, Vol. iii. pp. 357, 358.

† Vasq. in. 1. 3. qu. 113. disp. 202. cap. 1.

the thing itself, is there one of them who has either thought or written otherwise upon the matter.

The third he mentions is that of Osiander, who acknowledges the essential righteousness of God, as the formal cause of man's justification. But all the Protestant Churches have exploded this opinion of Osiander. What then have we to do with it?

The fourth he reckons is that of Calvin, who (as he says) teaches that the formal cause of justification consists in remission of sin alone. But there is hardly an individual who does not know, that Calvin requires the imputation of Christ's obedience, without which no remission of sins is obtained. If therefore any one had asked Calvin what that is, on account of which, and through which, the ungodly is justified; he would have answered, *On account of and through the merit of the Son of God.* This is the cause of remission, the cause of acceptance; this the cause of passing from a state of death to a state of life; God, regarding this obedience and righteousness of his own Son, as apprehended by us by faith, receives us at first into the state of the justified; God, perpetually beholding this same righteousness granted and applied to us in the remaining course of our life, views us as justified:—In short, however sanctified and inchoately just he may reckon us, by the implanted and inherent quality of righteousness; yet, as justified, that is, absolved from sin and accepted to life eternal, it is through, and on account of, the righteousness of the Mediator bestowed upon us by God himself, and applied by faith and the Spirit.

To dismiss however philosophical speculations concerning the nature of the formal cause; when we are seeking for the formal cause of our justification, we seek for that on account of which the sinner is received into the favour of God; through which he stands immediately well pleasing to God and accepted to eternal life; by the benefit of which he escapes the condemning sentence of the law, and, in fine, on which he may and ought to depend, for obtaining the favour and approbation of his heavenly Judge. We shall now present our opinion, and the state of this controversy in the shape of two propositions, the contradictories of which the Papists endeavour to maintain.

The first is this ; that the perfect obedience of Christ the Mediator, who dwells in us and by his Spirit unites us to himself, is the formal cause of our justification ; since it is made ours by the gift of God, and applied by faith.

The second proposition is, Righteousness, implanted and dwelling in us by the Spirit of Christ, is not the formal cause by which we stand justified, that is, by which we are judged to be free from condemnation, and accepted to life eternal, as though worthy of the same through this quality dwelling in us.

The propositions of the Papists contradictory to ours are these :—

1. The formal cause of our absolute justification is the very righteousness which inheres in us ; and by inhering, makes us worthy of life eternal.

2. The obedience or righteousness of the Mediator is not bestowed or applied to believers instead, or in the way, of a formal cause, by the virtue and efficacy of which they stand justified or accepted of God to life eternal.

I shall say nothing now of the disputes among the Papists [as usual] with one another, about this their formal cause, which some would have to consist in habitual, others in actual righteousness ; I add nothing on the old Schoolmen, who taught that there is no habit or operation in us, which in its own nature can justify the soul, but that there is always need of the favour of God. See Vasquez in 1. 2. disp. 203. et 204. But waiving the disputes of the Papists [among themselves,] let us proceed to a solution of the arguments which they bring against us.

## CHAPTER XXIII.

### THE ARGUMENTS OF BELLARMINE FOR INHERENT RIGHTEOUSNESS REFUTED.

BELLARMINE seeks to support his opinion in two ways. First, affirmatively and directly, by endeavouring to bring out the conclusion that inherent righteousness in us is the formal cause of our justification. Secondly, negatively and indirectly, in attempting to prove, that the cause of our justification cannot by any means be the imputed righteousness of Christ. The former proposition he sets about establishing from the Scriptures, de Justif. lib. 2, cap. 3.

1. The first argument is taken from Rom. v. 17, 18, 19; *If by one man's offence death reigned by one; much more they which receive abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness shall reign in life by one, Jesus Christ. Therefore as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.* From this passage Bellarmine draws many inferences: *We learn hence,* says he, *that to be justified by Christ is not to be accounted or pronounced just, but truly to be made and constituted just, by the obtaining of inherent righteousness absolute and perfect. For to justify in this passage is to make just, as is plain from those words,* MANY SHALL BE MADE RIGHTEOUS; *where the Apostle declares what it is to be justified, namely, to be made just. The same also is to be gathered from the antithesis between Adam ana Christ; for the Apostle writes, that we are so constituted righteous, by the obedience of Christ, in the same manner as we are made unrighteous by the disobedience of Adam. But Adam made us unrighteous by inherent unrighteousness, not by imputed; so therefore Christ as to the opposite. Lastly, that this infused righteousness is true and absolute appears from hence, that Paul calls*

*it the abundance of righteousness; and adds, that the gift of God is greater than the sin of Adam. But the latter bred absolute unrighteousness in us, therefore, the former confers absolute righteousness.*

We do not deny that inherent righteousness is infused into the justified by Christ; and we allow that it is to be perfected and consummated in the life to come: but we affirm that, whilst we are in this life it is inchoate and imperfect; and therefore not the cause of our justification, but the appendage. But what Bellarmine urges, *that to be justified is not to be merely* PRONOUNCED *just, but to be made just*, we do not reject in its sound sense. For however we say that the term to be justified is forensic, yet we do not mean that the act of justifying on the part of God is nothing else than a bare forensic declaration, resting on no foundation; for it contains, in the first place, a valid gift of true and perfect righteousness, on which is founded that sentence and declaration of being just. And this is that gift which is mentioned by the Apostle in verses 16 and 17. We admit, therefore, that every justified person is not only pronounced, but made just; yet we deny that it is by the obtaining of a righteousness indwelling in us, but by the attaining to the righteousness performed by Christ, and communicated and imputed to believers by the Divine appointment. Nor does the antithesis help the cause of the Romanists, for although it is true that Adam made his posterity sinners, by propagating in all of them a certain inherent unrighteousness, yet it is no less true, that the same were made sinners by the imputation of the disobedience of Adam in eating the forbidden fruit. But in this passage the Apostle has reference to the guiltiness of mankind which is incurred from the imputation of Adam's transgression, rather than to that guiltiness which they contract by the infection from Adam entailed upon them. This is manifest from what he says, *By one man's offence, and by the disobedience of one man;* which words respect the act itself of Adam, and the violation of the Divine command, not inherent defilement or the derivation of infection to us. So Theophylact on this passage: *The offence of one man is that disobedience of Adam, by which we are made sinners; that is, become obnoxious to punishment and guilty of death.* Thus also Ambrose writes, *That we were*

*condemned for the alone sin of Adam. Therefore by the offence of one we are said to be made sinners, because we are rendered obnoxious to punishment and exposed to death by the imputation of the same.* We retort therefore the argument of Bellarmine: As the Apostle in this place teaches, that we are made unrighteous by the sin and disobedience of Adam, so he means that we are justified by the obedience and righteousness of Christ. But he is not so much treating in this place of the transfusion of sin, as of the imputation of that first offence; consequently his meaning is, that we are justified by this obedience of Christ imputed to us, as we are condemned by the imputed disobedience of Adam. But granting to our adversary, that the Apostle does speak of both, namely, of the disobedience imputed to us, and of the inherent unrighteousness entailed upon us from Adam, yet nothing else will follow than that we have both from Christ, that is, inherent and imputed righteousness; which we willingly concede. Lastly, as to what he argues from the Apostle, that *this inherent righteousness is perfect in all its parts, from the fact of the Apostle calling it* ABUNDANCE *of righteousness,* by no means follows: for this περισσεία τῆς χάριτος καὶ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, does not denote habitual grace or inherent righteousness, but the abundance of the Divine mercy, and the infinite treasure of righteousness which believers obtain by the obedience and righteousness of the Mediator. And this gift is said to be greater than the sin of Adam; because the grace of God, bestowing upon us the righteousness of Christ, not only puts away the guilt of the one first and original transgression, but of all our actual sins; as Theophylact and Aquinas have rightly observed on this passage.

2. The second testimony is quoted from Rom. iii. 24, *Being justified by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus—whom he hath set forth to be a propitiation, through faith in his blood.* The Apostle says, that we are justified freely by God, that is, of mere bountifulness; and this is the efficient cause: then he adds—*By his grace,* that is (Bellarmine being the interpreter) *by righteousness infused into us by him;* and this is the formal cause.—I pass by the rest of the passage because it does not bear upon the present question.

I answer; the Gloss of Bellarmine corrupts the text, but does not explain it; for these words, *by his grace*, namely, the grace *of God*, are not to be expounded, *by the quality implanted by him in us*, but *by his love, or gratuitous benevolence exhibited towards us*. They denote therefore the primary cause of our justification, not any effect of our sanctification or regeneration. And in this sense they were understood by Ambrose,* who affirms that this grace of God is in Christ, and refers it to the will of God, or that εὐδοκίαν—good pleasure—wherewith he was pleased to redeem us by Christ. But Bellarmine, on the other hand, argues: The favour of God is sufficiently explained by the word *freely;* therefore that addition, *by grace*, will denote, not the favour of God itself, but something else, namely, infused righteousness. Weak reasoning! for the Scriptures very often accumulate synonymous words for the sake of greater perspicuity and emphasis. We also very often use the same form of speaking; as when we say, I will give this to thee *gratis*. For although the word *give* itself intimates a free gift; yet the adverb being added, denotes the same thing with greater emphasis. So we say *gratiam gratis datam*, grace freely given, though that it is freely given is intimated by the word *grace* alone. In short, it is probable, that the Spirit itself, speaking in the Scriptures, repeated these words, *by grace*, and *gratis*, to reprove the error and stupidity of those who were about to oppose gratuitous justification. He insists, moreover:—The preposition *by* would not properly express Divine favour, but the formal, or meritorious, or instrumental cause: for it is not correctly said, God justifies us by his favour; but he justifies us by inherent grace, or by the merit of his Son. If Bellarmine had looked into the original text, he would have waived this petty objection: for in the Greek it is not Διὰ τῆς χάριτος ἀυτοῦ, *through his grace*, but τῇ ἀυτοῦ χάριτι, *by his grace ye are justified*. Although we can no less aptly say, that one is justified by the grace or favour of God, than it is wont to be said, that a robber is delivered from death by the favour of his prince. For the particle διὰ, *per*, alike denotes the primary and the instrumental cause. But he urges the following also: If justifying

* In Comment. in hunc locum.

grace in this place denotes the favour and good-will of God, yet, because this benevolence is never exerted in vain, it must necessarily effect in us inherent righteousness; for God effects what he wills; but he wills that all those who are justified by his grace should also be *holy and unblamable in his sight* (Ephes. i. 4). We grant the whole argument; for we do not maintain that inherent righteousness is not given to the justified; but that it is not itself the formal cause of justification. We must however add—That God is pleased to give righteousness to all the justified; but it is his pleasure to give only *inchoate* righteousness for the present state, which is sufficient for *sanctification;* not *consummate,* which by its own indwelling, is sufficient for *justification.*

3. Thirdly, he argues from its various attributes and names, that justifying grace is a gift dwelling in us. First, it is called a gift which we ourselves receive; *receiving abundance of grace,* &c.; Rom. v. 17. We have already replied, that this gift signifies the obedience of Christ, bestowed upon us, not holiness inherent in us. And we are said to receive this gift by the hand of faith, which applies the righteousness of Christ to us, not so as to become ours by way of *infusion* or *indwelling,* but by way of *imputation.* And I much wonder that Papists cannot understand how the righteousness of Christ is applied to us by faith, who suppose that they understand how the merits of Christ and the saints are applied either to the living or the dead by Papal indulgences. Secondly, grace is said to come by Jesus Christ: *The Law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ;* John i. 17. It is said also to be given according to measure by Christ himself: *To every one of us is given grace, according to the measure of the gift of Christ,* Ephes. iv. 7. But it is not rightly said of imputed righteousness, that it comes, or is given, according to measure; it must therefore be understood of grace inherent; we are then justified by inherent grace. I reply, in both passages the Scripture speaks of *sanctifying* grace, not of the grace of *justification;* and we have already admitted that sanctifying grace inheres in all those in whom the Holy Spirit vouchsafes to dwell. But this grace (as we have often said) is the appendage or consequence of gratuitous justification, not its constituent cause. Thirdly, it is

attributed to justifying grace, that it makes us new creatures; 2 Cor. 5, 17; and Gal. vi. 15. But that by which we are made new creatures is something inward and dwelling in us. I answer, we are said to be made new creatures by the internal operation of the regenerating and sanctifying Spirit, as by a primary and principal *efficient* cause; but we are said to become new creatures, in the way of the *formal* cause, by holiness and righteousness implanted in us by the Spirit. But this inherent righteousness is the formal cause of our *sanctification*, not of our *justification*. Hence we are said to be new creatures, not from our justification strictly taken, but from sanctification, its invariable companion; which, although they can never be separated, yet ought never to be confounded. Lastly, justifying grace is compared to light, Ephes. v. 8; and *love* is said to be *shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit;* Rom. v. 5. But light is something inhering in a lighted body; the grace of justification, therefore, is something dwelling in the justified. So also what is shed abroad in our hearts is something implanted and infused into us. I reply, that the word *light* does not denote grace *justifying* us formally, but grace *sanctifying* us formally. For a believer is said to be *light*, because he is enlightened by the light of faith, and the knowledge of the Divine mysteries; which supernatural knowledge, so far as it is considered as an implanted quality, is a part of sanctification, but not the cause whereby we stand justified in the sight of God.—As to the latter passage, the Apostle seems rather to intend the love of God towards us, which the Holy Spirit reveals in the hearts of believers, than that love wherewith we love God; which is inferred by probable conjecture from the 8th verse, and approved by Chrysostom and Theophylact. But suppose we grant that the passage is to be understood of our indwelling love, yet I cannot perceive in it, what Bellarmine would force upon us, viz, that we are justified by this love.

4. *And such indeed were ye; but ye are washed, but ye are sanctified, but ye are justified in the name of the Lord Jesus, and by the Spirit of our God;* 1 Cor. vi. 11. In this passage (as Chrysostom, Ambrose, Theophylact, and others expound it) the Apostle is teaching that men are cleansed and sanctified in baptism, by the invoking of the name of

Christ, and the operation of the Holy Spirit. And this is indeed to be justified; so that justification contains these two things, washing and sanctification. If therefore justification be washing and sanctification, it follows that justification is not the remission of sins alone, without internal sanctification. It likewise follows, that justification is not the imputation of righteousness, or its declaration in a judicial way. For imputation and a declaration need not the invocation of the name of Christ, nor the influence of the Holy Spirit. Thus speaks Bellarmine.

I answer, that the Apostle in these words is describing those signal benefits which are bestowed upon believers in the Spiritual laver. And in the first place he considers the washing away, or the cleansing from sin, to be the *genus*, and he divides it into these two *species*, namely, *justification*, and *sanctification*. Justification cleanses and washes from the guilt and punishment of sin, and that in one moment and perfectly; sanctification cleanses from the very indwelling contagion and filth of sin, but by little and little, and gradually. Hence Bellarmine is wrong in deciding that washing and sanctification are contained under justification; since in the washing away of sin, generally taken, both these are comprehended. Neither do the Fathers quoted by him teach that to be *justified* is the same as to be *sanctified* and *cleansed;* on the contrary they shew that sanctification is connected by the Divine appointment with justification, so that every believer becomes a partaker at the same time, of each benefit.

Now let us proceed to consider the consequences which Bellarmine seems to deduce. *If*, says he, *justification be washing and sanctification, it follows that justification is not the remission of sins alone, without internal sanctification.* But we deny that justification is sanctification, unless it be understood *concomitantly* only, or *consequently;* in this sense sanctification always follows and accompanies justification. In the next place, then, we have never taught, that justification is mere remission, without sanctification; although we deny that the qualities implanted in sanctification itself are the formal or constituent cause of justification.

Again, to examine his second inference, namely—*It follows that justification is not the imputation of righteous-*

*ness, or the declaration of it in a judicial way; for such an imputation or declaration there is no need of the name of Christ, or the influence of the Holy Spirit.*—It is not our opinion, that justification is mere imputation; but imputation founded in a true and valid bestowal of the thing imputed, and in an efficacious application of the same. But to say that, *If justification consisted in such an imputation it would not need the name or invocation of Christ, nor the virtue of the Holy Spirit,* is a weak and impious quibble of Bellarmine. For since the obedience and merit of Christ is the greatest among the spiritual benefits which are conferred upon us by God the Father, it can neither be obtained without the work and intercession of Christ, nor be efficaciously applied to any one without the efficacy and operation of the Holy Spirit; since in Christ are given to us all spiritual blessings, Ephes. i. 3.; and by the Spirit of Christ they are applied to us.

5. *When the kindness and love of God our Saviour appeared, not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly by Jesus Christ; that being justified by his grace, we should be made heirs according to the hope of eternal life;* Titus iii. 4—7. From these last words—*that being justified by his grace,* we understand, that in the preceding words justification is described; so that according to the Apostle justification is regeneration and renewal effected by the kindness of God, through the washing of baptism and the effusion of the Holy Spirit on us. But that this regeneration is produced formally by implanted and inherent gifts is clear; justification therefore consists in inherent gifts, or in indwelling righteousness.

I answer: In the salvation of man two things are especially to be considered; the cause of it and the way to obtain it. The cause of human salvation is the free mercy of God putting away our sins, through the blood of Christ, and accepting us to life eternal, on account of his obedience; and this gracious act of God we call *justification.* The way to salvation, or to the kingdom, is to serve God in holiness and righteousness all the days of our life. But that we may be able to enter upon this way of salvation, God heals the

weakness of our minds, and restores and repairs his image in us; and this act we call *sanctification* or *regeneration*. God is said to save us by both acts. Bellarmine is therefore wrong in inferring that the words cited above are a description of the justification of man. For the mode of salvation is described, not of justification only. But for the obtaining of salvation, sanctification must precede, no less than justification; since inherent sanctification is joined with salvation, as its *antecedent:* but free justification is connected with both in this passage, as the *cause* of both. We admit therefore that sanctification consists in inherent gifts; but we deny the new-fangled definition of Bellarmine, which asserts justification to be nothing else than regeneration or sanctification;—an inference not to be deduced from the words of the Apostle.

6. In the sixth place Bellarmine produces those testimonies which affirm that certain men were righteous. It is said, in Gen. vi. 9., Noah *was a just man;* so of Abel, in Heb. xi. 4.; of Zachariah and Elizabeth, in Luke i. 6. These, he asserts, were truly righteous, not imperfectly and inchoately righteous, but absolutely and perfectly. For the Scripture would never call those absolutely *righteous* who were not so. But this their righteousness was inherent; therefore they were formally justified by their inherent righteousness; for righteousness, absolutely perfect, formally justifies him in whom it dwells.

I wonder that Bellarmine should be willing to borrow arguments from the Pelagians which had been long ago crushed by Augustine. I answer, however, that some persons are called *righteous*, not because they have in themselves perfect inherent righteousness, but because they have the beginning of spiritual righteousness from the gift of the Spirit, and bring forth, under the guidance of the same Spirit, the fruits of sincere yet imperfect righteousness. So Augustine:* *No righteous man is free from sin, yet he does not on this account cease to be righteous, since he possesses holiness in disposition.* So says Prosper: *No one is thoroughly perfect in this life; for he is not as yet entirely healed; but the infirmity of the godly*

* De vit. contemp. lib. 1. cap. 9.

*is being healed daily.* The perfection of our righteousness, therefore, if we have any, consists rather in the remission of sins, than in the perfection of infused virtues. But Bellarmine urges, that the Scripture would not call those absolutely righteous who were not absolutely so. Why should not I also retort; the Scripture would not call those absolutely sinners, who were not absolutely sinners; therefore the same man will be absolutely just and absolutely a sinner? To leave that, however: If by absolutely righteous, he understands that which is real and positive, we acknowledge absolute righteousness in the regenerate; but if he means that which is faultless, and such as can endure the scrutiny of a strict enquiry, we deny such absolute righteousness to be inherent. Neither because man is called *righteous,* can his righteousness be proved to be absolutely perfect, any more than that because he is called *faithful,* or *chaste,* his faith is so perfect as to be free from all wavering, or his chastity so absolute as to be void of all inordinate affection.

7. *Whom he foreknew, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the first-born among many brethren;* Rom. viii. 29. *And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly;* 1. Cor. xv. 49. But Christ is not righteous by imputation, but by inherent righteousness; therefore we also, if we ought to be like him, if his brethren, if his images, should have inherent righteousness. For if we are in reality unrighteous, and righteous only putatively, we bear the image of the devil rather than of Christ.

To this I answer, that the Apostle is speaking of that glorious conformity, which the members of Christ expect in the life to come; but the argument—*We shall be conformed to Christ in a state of immortality, therefore we are now also exactly conformed to him*—has no sequence. Moreover, in this latter passage, if we consult the Greek text, the sense is plain; for the words are: φορέσομεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου, *we shall bear, portabimus.** We admit that we put on the image of Christ to some extent even in this life; yet we cannot hence conclude, that this image

* Following the Vulgate.—*Tr.*

of Christ has been so complete, that we can be justified by it. Nothing else can be hence concluded, than that there is inherent righteousness in Christ, and also inherent righteousness in us. But that ours has the same virtue for justifying us, as that of Christ has, may then be considered a consequence, when it is proved that ours has no less perfection, than that most pure righteousness of the Son of God. Lastly, Bellarmine's remark, that *we are justified only putatively, if we are not justified before God by the work of inherent righteousness*, is but trifling, and of little weight. For we are *truly*, not *putatively* righteous, if we regard our habitual righteousness; but this true righteousness is as yet inchoate and imperfect. We are also not only *truly* but *perfectly* righteous, if we regard the righteousness of Christ bestowed upon us; for it is not *imaginary* although it be *imputed;* because this imputation of God renders it no less rightfully ours, than if it were inherent in us. For it is a puerile and foolish notion to suppose that nothing can be truly and solidly ours, except in the sole way of inherency.

8. Bellarmine observes again, that *He who is dead is justified* from sin;* Rom. vi. 7.: and that the Apostle here teaches, that we by justification, whereby we die unto sin and rise again unto righteousness, do represent the death and resurrection of Christ. Now Christ did not die *putatively*, but *truly*, and *truly* rose again: we therefore die to sin not *putatively*, or in *imagination* merely, but *truly;* and rise again to righteousness in our justification.

The conclusion should have been, *therefore inherent righteousness justifies us.* But Bellarmine was not able to deduce anything else from this passage, than that there is true inherent righteousness in the justified, which no one has denied. The passage alleged however relates to *sanctification*, not to *justification;* for in this place, *to be justified from sin* means nothing else, than *to be freed from the service and dominion of sin;* which may be easily collected from the preceding and following context. For, since he who is justified by the sentence of the judge is forthwith freed from accusation and the threatened punishment, it

* The translation is here given in conformity with the original.

sometimes happens that *to be justified* is put for *to be freed:* and this is the meaning of the word in this text. Besides, it is not our justification properly understood, but our sanctification, which consists in mortification and quickening, that represents the death and resurrection of Christ. Our position then is, that this is not *fanciful* and *fictitious*, but *true* and *real*. And we consider that logic of Bellarmine, who would thence conclude that we are justified by inherent righteousness, to be merely *putative* and *imaginary*.

9. *If Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life, because of righteousness;* Rom. viii. 10. To this is added another passage from Philip. iii. 20; *We look for the Saviour, who shall change our vile body that it may be fashioned like to his glorious body.*

On these two passages Bellarmine raises this quibble: The Apostle says, that we have received the Spirit of adoption of God's children as to the soul; and look for the adoption of God's children also in the redemption of the body. But the adoption which we expect in the redemption of the body will be *most true* and *inherent*, not *putative* or *extrinsic*; consequently, the adoption which we now have in the Spirit by justification, is *true*, not *putative*.

The Jesuit does but beat the air. The conclusion which he deduces is not the question in dispute, but is simply that *our adoption, which we have together with justification, is not putative;* an inference which does not contribute any thing to the confirmation of his cause. As to the statement of the Apostle, it means that this *outward* man, on account of the indwelling remains of sin, is liable to death and corruption; but that the *inward* and *spiritual* man, by the *effectual working* and the grace of the Spirit, is raised again to a new life of righteousness; moreover, that the whole man is to be perfected in the life of glory, and that whatever corruption or infection yet adheres to the old man is to be utterly abolished.

How it is possible by these arguments to establish the doctrine of justification, by that inherent and imperfect righteousness which we obtain, I confess that I have not yet been able, throughout the whole course of Bellarmine's argument, to discover. In the ivth chapter of the 2nd book of his treatise on Justification, he endeavours to demonstrate

against Luther and Melancthon, that faith is not the entire formal cause of justification; yet in the same place he nevertheless acknowledges, that all the Lutherans had now all abandoned this error. He might have asserted, with more truth, that no one of them had ever fallen into the error. For his assertion that Melancthon says this expressly in the Augsburg Confession, art. 4, is an impudent calumny. Melancthon lays down that men are justified for the sake of Christ, through faith; and he states with the Apostle, Rom. iv. 3., that faith is imputed to us for righteousness by God; which we have before shewn is to be understood *relatively* in reference to the object apprehended. But he never asserts that faith is the entire formal cause of justification—a statement which Bellarmine falsely attributes to him. He accuses Luther also of the same error, and cites his Commentary on the iind chapter of the Galatians; but in this chapter he teaches nothing else, than that God justifies no one because of his works, but that he gratuitously imputes the righteousness of faith to believers for the sake of Christ. What therefore Bellarmine has adduced to refute this error, which he has himself invented, I pass by in silence, lest it should be supposed that I consider a most false and silly calumny worthy of an answer.

All we have now to do is, to meet those arguments of Bellarmine by which he endeavours to prove, that the justification of a sinner cannot consist in the imputation of Christ's righteousness.

## CHAPTER XXIV.

### THE ARGUMENTS OF BELLARMINE AGAINST THE IMPUTATION OF CHRIST'S RIGHTEOUSNESS ANSWERED.

Bellarmine opposes the doctrine of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ in his book de Justificatione, lib. 2. cap. 7.; but before leading his forces out into the field, he, in order to weaken our doctrine, propounds it by halves. For he asserts that we make justification to consist in the

imputation of Christ's righteousness, because Christ covers us with his righteousness, and God beholding us thus covered declares that he regards us as righteous. We, on the contrary, hold that justification consists in this imputation, not only because Christ covers us with his righteousness; but much more because he bestows *his* righteousness upon us. Nor do we say, that God regards us as righteous, merely because he looks upon us covered with the righteousness of our Redeemer; but because, according to his own appointment, he regards all who believe and are united into one person with Christ, as become truly partakers of his righteousness and obedience. This being premised, let us proceed to Bellarmine's arguments.

1. First, then, he objects that, for this doctrine of the imputed righteousness of Christ, there is no testimony to be found either in Scripture or the Fathers. For that no passage is to be met with in which we read, that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us for righteousness, or, that we are righteous by Christ's imputed righteousness. For as we do not read, that the redemption of Christ is imputed to us, so that we may be thence esteemed as redeemers of the human race; so we do not read, that his righteousness is imputed to us.

I answer,—If the grounds of our opinion are not to be found in the Scriptures, we must needs admit it to be false and erroneous; but what our grounds for it are you will learn when we shall have come to the establishing of our cause. In the mean time even those passages which Bellarmine himself adduces would suffice: that—*Blessed is he whose sins are not imputed to him—Faith is reckoned to believers for righteousness—Christ is made unto us righteousness.* For, it is for the doctrine itself we have to contend, not about syllables, or letters. But just observe Bellarmine's acuteness: *As,* says he, *we do not read that the redemption of Christ is imputed to us, so that we may therefore be regarded as redeemers: so we do not read that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us.*—Where anybody must see that to complete the sentence, these words are wanting, *so that thence we may be regarded as justifiers?* But Bellarmine perceived the folly of such a parallelism, and therefore did not venture to annex that most necessary member. I therefore

thus retort this quibble upon himself:—The redemption of Christ accomplished on the cross is so imputed to us, that we are thence called and accounted *truly* not *putatively* redeemed; therefore also his righteousness accomplished in the fulfilling of the law can be so imputed to us, that thence we may be accounted as *truly*, not *putatively*, justified.

2. Secondly, he argues that our doctrine is false from the consideration that no necessity for this imputation can be alleged. For if it were necessary, it would be so on the ground that man, after the remission of sin, is still truly a sinner; his sin, that is to say, being covered, not abolished. But the Scriptures, both of the Old and of the New Testament, intimate a true remission and washing away of sin. And here he produces many passages of Scripture, of which I shall say nothing separately, because we have already sufficiently considered them in treating the preceding question.

I answer, therefore, that there is the greatest necessity for this imputation; not because God denies true remission, but because true remission depends upon this imputation. Bellarmine weakly supposes, that first our sins are remitted, and *then* we require the imputation of Christ's righteousness. On the contrary, although they are simultaneous as to time, yet as to the causality, the imputation precedes the remission, and is a necessary pre-requisite, that this remission may be obtained.

Moreover, that any one should be justified, there is required, not a bare remission of sins, but acceptance to life eternal, and a destination to the kingdom of heaven. But after sins are remitted, there is not in us that perfection of inherent righteousness which is sufficient by its own worth to obtain the right of eternal life. Here, then, the perfect righteousness of Christ, the head, must come to the relief of all his members, and fill up what is yet wanting on their part. Basil humbly acknowledges this in his Sermon on Humility: *This is to boast in the Lord; when a man is not elated by his own righteousness, but acknowledges that he is destitute of true righteousness, and is justified by faith alone in Christ.* Lastly, what Bellarmine contends for, namely, that *sin is so entirely taken away in justification, that nothing remains in us which constitutes us sinners*, we

admit with respect to the pardon of actual sins. But original sin so passes away as to its *guilt*, as yet to remain in its *nature*, and infect the regenerate with those defilements, which would not allow his being regarded as a justified person and a citizen of the heavenly Jerusalem, unless God should look upon him as clothed and indued with the most perfect righteousness of Christ. Admirably says Bernard,* *I will speak of thy righteousness alone, O Lord; for that is mine also. For verily thou art made to me righteousness by God. Have I any reason to fear, lest this one righteousness should prove insufficient for us both? No; it is not so scanty a robe as to be unable to cover two.*

3. A third argument he deduces from a comparison of Adam with Christ, which he boasts of as completely unanswerable. It is this: The disobedience of Adam did not impress sin upon us *imputatively*, but *truly;* therefore the obedience of Christ took away and blotted out our sin, not *imputatively*, but *truly*. This is confirmed from Rom. v. 17, 18, and 19, *As by the disobedience of one*, &c. And in the same place, *Greater is the grace of Christ than the sin of Adam.*

This argument has been replied to before;† but because it is a second time brought forward, it shall be again refuted. I say, then, that this argument *requires* no answer at all, because of its manifest falsity and ridiculous absurdity. The proposition, that the disobedience of Adam does not become ours imputatively, or does not render us unrighteous by imputation, is manifestly false. This however is the form in which Bellarmine ought to have expressed himself. For the statement that *The disobedience of Adam did not impress sin upon us imputatively*, is so worded as to be revolting to common sense.‡ For who, in his senses, would ever have imagined imputation to be impression? As to the point itself —The disobedience of Adam is imputed to all his posterity for sin. This Bellarmine himself elsewhere acknowledges:—*The first transgression of Adam was the transgression of the whole human race.* — — *We sinned in the first man when he sinned, and that transgression of his was our transgression also.*§ I

* Serm. 61 *in Cant.* † See pages 164, 168.

‡ The expression, as quoted from Bellarmine, is—*Inobedientia Adami non imputativè nobis peccatum impressit.*

§ Bellarm. *De amiss. Grat.* lib. 5, cap. 18.

ask, Why ours? or how was it made so? Doubtless, because he was the root and representative of the human race; his unrighteousness, therefore, and disobedience is reckoned ours, and is imputed to us for sin. By analogy, because Christ is also the root, and became our representative, his obedience and righteousness, in the same manner, will be imputed to us.

Besides this manifest falsity which we have detected in the argument of Bellarmine, it may also be clearly shown to involve a twofold absurdity. The former consists in the opposition between *true* and *imputed* sin; so also between *true* and *imputed* righteousness. For to *imputed* sin he ought to have opposed not *true* but *inherent sin;* so also to *imputed* righteousness, not *true* but *inherent* righteousness must be opposed. Inasmuch as the actual transgression of Adam imputed to his posterity constitutes the true guilt of sin in them; so also the righteousness of Christ imputed to us constitutes us truly justified. For imputation rests not upon any fictitious substitution, but upon a true participation of the thing imputed. Lastly, in this *invincible* argument of Bellarmine* there is this ridiculous weakness, that we can grant the conclusion itself without any prejudice to our defence. For he expresses his conclusion in these words—*Therefore the obedience of Christ hath taken away and blotted out our sin, not imputatively, but truly.* We say, that by and on account of the obedience of Christ imputed and granted to us, we are *truly* absolved and delivered from sin, not *imputatively.* For the imputed righteousness of Christ denotes the cause, the merit of which God regards when he blots out our sin, and accounts us as righteous; but it does not intimate that the effect itself is not *real*, but *putative* and *fictitious*, as the Jesuit dreams. The Divine imputation of a thing not at all inherent may be the cause of that which is positive, and really existing, whether it respect injury or benefit.

4. Bellarmine impugns our opinion by denying the cause which we usually allege for the imputation of Christ's righteousness. For we say that this imputation is necessary, not only because the remains of original sin perpetually cleave to us; but also because our inherent righteousness is not so perfect that it can absolutely justify us. This is an open

* In hoc Achilleo Bellarmini argumento.

statement of our doctrine. Let us now listen to the confutation of Bellarmine. Inherent righteousnrss consists chiefly in faith, hope, and charity; but all these virtues may be perfected in this life: our inherent righteousness therefore is perfect, and we need not the imputation of the righteousness of another, namely, of Christ.

I answer:—What Bellarmine assumes, that all these virtues *may* be perfect, is not sufficient, unless he proves that they are perfect *de facto*. What God is *able* to do has nothing to do with the present question; but what he *wills*, and is *accustomed* to do, is the point to be inquired into. Bellarmine therefore endeavours, first, to shew the perfection of *faith*. If faith cannot be perfect in this life, it is impossible that it ever will be perfect. For it will be done away in the life to come. But who can suppose that so distinguished a virtue is never to be perfected?

Bellarmine seems to refer to that passage 1 Cor. xiii. 8, *Charity never faileth; but prophecies shall fail, and tongues shall cease, and knowledge shall vanish away;* in which passage, however, the Apostle does not assert that faith shall be wholly done away in the life to come. Peter Lombard says so;* but he could not bring all the Schoolmen over to his opinion. For Durandus avowedly maintains the contrary.† We say therefore that faith, so far as it is a habit, remains and is perfected in the life to come, although it is done away, so far as it is a certain accidental condition, adapted to the circumstances of our pilgrimage, which accompanies that habit. For the blessed themselves are so disposed that they would assent to God, not only from the evidence of the thing, but also on the authority of the asserter, although the thing affirmed were in itself inevident. Nay, every one of the number of the blessed would believe God, on the simple ground of the authority of the Speaker, much more readily than the man endowed with the greatest faith among those who are still pilgrims on earth. But this proves that the habit of faith is most perfect in the blessed, although its obscurity is done away by reason of the state of glory. But what if we should concede that this distinguished virtue is never brought to perfection? What disadvantage would thence follow, when plain sight succeeds in its place?

* Lombard. Lib. 3. dist. 31. lit. C. † Durand. ibid. quæst. 3, 4, 5.

At length Bellarmine betakes himself to Scripture, and labours hard to shew from thence the perfection of faith. *Peter* (1 Epis. i. 7.) (he says) *compares faith to gold which endures the fire; he therefore intimates that this faith is absolutely perfect.* But not all gold which endures the fire is wholly purified; nay, it is cast again and again into the fire, that its dross may at length be cleared out. So we say that faith, although imperfect, provided it be true, can endure the fire of tribulation; but is not purged from all the dross of unbelief before the termination of this life.—Again Bellarmine argues that in Acts viii. 37, the Eunuch is said to *believe with his whole heart;* and in Rom. iv. 18, *Abraham believed against hope;* at verse 19, that *he was not weak in faith;* at verse 20, *he staggered not through unbelief.* Lastly, Faith is said, 1 John v. 4, to *overcome the world;* 1 Pet. v. 9, to *withstand the devil;* and Ephes. vi. 16, to *quench all his fiery darts.* Now, according to Bellarmine, that which does such things must necessarily be perfect. But I answer: The Eunuch, as being regenerate, believed with his whole heart, that is, truly and sincerely; in the same Eunuch there were, however, remains of the old Adam, whence there was another spring of unbelief and doubt. Moreover, he believed with the whole heart, but not in that supreme and perfect degree which the law of God requires. As to Abraham, although in one thing he promptly and firmly put faith in God, yet it is not thence proved, that his faith was perfect according to the exact rule of the Divine Law, unless it be shewn that he believed God in all things, and always, and that without any struggle to the contrary. In fine, with regard to the alleged effects of faith, namely, that it overcomes the world, repels the devil, and other things of that sort; I deny that from these the perfection of faith can be demonstrated. For true faith, however weak and imperfect, does all these things by the power of Christ, who assists believers. Besides, faith overcomes all these enemies, but not in every conflict; for every believer is now and then wounded, yea, is sometimes thrown down and prostrated, although at length he obtains the victory, not by the perfection of inherent faith, but by the help of his compassionate Lord. Bellarmine, therefore, has not yet proved the perfection of inherent faith.

But he proceeds, and argues from Heb. vi. 19, that hope is thoroughly perfected in the regenerate. For the Apostle there says, that such a hope ought to be *as an anchor of the soul, both sure and steadfast.*

From the fact that it *ought* to be such, it does not follow that it *is* such; for nothing in us is so perfect as it ought to be according to the law of God. Besides, our hope may be compared to an anchor, though it be imperfect, and sometimes stagger. For the comparison respects the nature of hope considered in itself; but its staggering and infirmity arise from sin dwelling in us. In short, the Apostle does not speak of every kind of hope whatsoever; but calls *that* hope, a steadfast and sure anchor of the soul which leans upon the divine promises. Because therefore our hope is not fixed upon these promises by the fullest and most perfect adhesion, it cannot be full and perfect. Bellarmine might have learnt this from Lombard himself, who gives this reason why faith and hope shall altogether be done away in the life to come; namely, *because they exist but partially*,* that is, because they operate imperfectly.

At last he endeavours to shew that love is in all respects perfect in the justified; for, says Augustine, *Love is itself most true, most full and perfect righteousness; De Nat. et Grat.*, cap. 42; and cap. 70, *Perfect love is perfect righteousness.*

The same Augustine has said, Epist. 29—*Perfect love does not exist in any man whilst he lives here; but that which is less than it ought to be arises from our fault, in consequence of which there is not a just man upon earth.* I confess, then, with Augustine, that charity produces most perfect righteousness: but only when it is itself most perfect. Because, then, it is not itself yet complete, it cannot fulfil the whole righteousness of the law.

Bellarmine further calls in to his support that passage, John xv. 13, *Greater love hath no man than this, that he lay down his life for his friends. Now it appears that most of the martyrs reached this perfection; therefore they possessed then a perfect love.* The force of this passage, however, is not to prove that whosoever willingly lays down his

* Lib. 3. dist. 31. lit. C.

life for another has reached the pinnacle of perfect love; but to teach that this is the chief and most evident proof of love, namely, to be willing even to meet death for the sake of him whom we love. For if he who dies for another must be considered as exhibiting the greatest and most perfect love, the love of all martyrs would be equal in degree; which cannot be granted. In those, therefore, who undergo death from love, one may do it out of a greater and more ardent, another from a less and more feeble love; though we may justly affirm that no one does it with that highest and most ardent love which is due to God. He alleges also the following: *He who keepeth his word, in him verily is the love of God perfected;* 1 John, ii. 5. *But the word of God can be kept by the justified, therefore they have perfect love.* I answer, he who keeps the word of God uprightly and perfectly has perfect love; but no mortal can do this. *Enter not into judgment with thy servant* [must every one say]; *for in thy sight shall no flesh living be justified;* Ps. cxliii. 2. The regenerate do indeed desire and endeavour to obey God in all things, and delight in the Divine commands, so far as their mind is renewed by the Spirit of God; but even they occasionally flag and fail, so far as the flesh is weighed down and defiled in consequence of indwelling sin.

At length our opponent would sustain his point by the examples, promises, and exhortations of the word of God. *David is said to have loved God with his whole heart. God promises to give his people a heart to love him with their whole heart and soul;* Deut. xxx. 6. *In a word, Christ exhorts his disciples, Be ye perfect, as your Father which is in heaven is perfect;* Matt. v. 48. *And the Apostle Paul acknowledges, that he himself and certain others were perfect;* Phil. iii. 15. *It must therefore be admitted, that love can be perfect in this life. Hence, if we can have our faith, hope, and love perfect in this life, we do not require the imputed righteousness of Christ; since we may become absolutely righteous by this our own inherent righteousness.*

Upon this I would observe, that to demonstrate the perfection of love, it is not sufficient to love God with the whole heart, unless, moreover, we do so with the entire energy of the heart; and that this love so flourish throughout the whole course of our life, as to admit nothing

into the heart that is contrary to the love of God. Neither David, however, nor any one of the saints, embraces God with such entireness of heart as excludes all defect; nor, I add, which excludes everything repugnant and contrary, through the whole course of a man's life. The murder and adultery of David, the fall and perjury of Peter, attest this; and that all the other sons of God, his only begotten Son excepted, have had their falls, not so grievous, perhaps, yet repugnant to the perfect righteousness of the law, no one doubts. Rightly, then, does Augustine lay it down,* that there is no one who fulfils the precept which commands us to love God with the whole heart: *For since there is still remaining something of carnal concupiscence, which we must bridle by continence, God is not in all respects loved with the whole soul.* And with regard to the promise made to the people of God, it contains simply a promise of regeneration, which gives inchoate righteousness in this life, and will give full and perfect righteousness in the life to come. But inchoate renewal causes the regenerate to love God with the whole heart, that is, not with a double and hypocritical, but a simple and true heart; although not with that perfection which they ought according to the strictness of the law. Lastly, exhortations to perfection do not prove that the justified do at any time attain it in this life; but, as Augustine has observed,† *They admonish us as to what we ought to ask by faith, whither to send forward our hope, and towards what things to extend our anticipations.* The same reason applies to the different titles of perfection; for some are said to be *perfect*, because they reach forward to perfection with greater zeal, and approach nearer to it, than others; not because they have attained its height. Most truly said Augustine,‡ *There is a certain perfection according to the measure of this life, and it is to be ascribed to this perfection, that any one knows that he is not yet perfect.* And he speaks more expressly on Psal. xxxviii.—*You can no otherwise be perfect here, than as you know that you cannot be perfect.* The man, therefore, who has made much progress in righteousness, is not he, who, with the Papists, boasts that his inherent righteousness is so perfect, as not to

* De Perfect. Just. tom. 7. † De Spirit. et Lit. cap. 36. tom. 3.
‡ Contra duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 3. cap. 5.

need the righteousness of Christ; but *he who has learnt by his advancing how far he is from the perfection of righteousness.**

I deem this a sufficient reply to the foregoing argument: let us proceed to the next.

5. Bellarmine argues against our opinion on the ground of its impossibility. *For*, says he, *it cannot be that Christ's righteousness should be imputed to us in that sense in which Protestants assert imputation; namely, that by it we should be called and are righteous formally. For whereas there are two contrary forms, the one inherent, the other extrinsic, doubtless we ought to adopt the absolute designation from the inherent rather than from the extrinsic form. If any one should clothe an Ethiopian in white raiment, he could not correctly say, this Ethiopian is white; but he would properly say, this Ethiopian is black, because inherent blackness belongs to him more than adventitious whiteness. Thus therefore, if you clothe a man who is truly wicked and unrighteous with the righteousness of Christ in idea and imagination, you cannot properly pronounce him righteous, but you will most correctly call him unrighteous.*

I answer,—When in justification (which is the act of God absolving the sinner from his unrighteousness and accepting him to life eternal for the sake of Christ) we seek for the formal cause, the word *form* is not to be taken strictly; because form properly understood is a substance, and is required for the completion of substance; but whereas justification is not the name of a substance, *that* may be called its formal cause, by and on account of which it is obtained, and in which it consists, whether it be something inherent and absolute, in the justified person, or not. Bellarmine's assertion therefore, that *it is impossible for us to be righteous formally, by the imputed righteousness of Christ;* if by *formally* he understands *inherently*, is consequently somewhat trifling, and attributes that very opinion to Protestants which they oppose; but if by the *formal cause* he understands *that thing which God regards* when he justifies any sinner, and *that very thing* which he has respect to, when he accounts any believer as innocent, justified, and

* De Spirit. et Lit. cap. 36.

destined to eternal life; then I say, this is not any inherent quality, but the obedience and righteousness of Christ bestowed upon and imputed to believers, by the gratuitous mercy of God. Indeed it is impossible that this righteousness which dwells in Christ should be ours even in the way of *inhesion;* but when we are united to Christ as members to the head, it is not impossible that it should become ours in the way of *bestowal and saving participation*, and this way suffices to its obtaining the nature, the efficacy of, and a similitude to the formal cause in justification.

*But* [says Bellarmine] *where two contrary states have reference to one subject, the denomination should be applied from the inherent rather than from the external form.* Nay, it must be derived from both, though upon different grounds. For instance, should any one sprung from ignoble blood be afterwards ennobled bythe appointment of the King, he may be said to be both *ignoble*, regarding (so to speak) his inherent blood; and also be deemed truly *noble*, regarding the stock and lustre of rank now bestowed upon, and imputed to him, by the King's appointment: so every believer may be called *unrighteous*, if we regard the infection of sin dwelling in him, and *righteous* or *justified*, if we consider the merits and righteousness of Christ imputed and assigned to him by the Divine appointment. But Bellarmine's comparison of a justified man with an Ethiopian clad in white garments fails in three points: First, because nothing is put upon this Ethiopian which offers any ground for internal denomination from whiteness; whilst we maintain that there exists in every justified person, a something from which he bears an internal designation of righteousness, namely that inchoate righteousness, which although it does not entirely expel sin, yet begins to expel it; and, in fact, takes away its dominion. Secondly, because we admit, that an Ethiopian is truly black, notwithstanding his being clad with white, Bellarmine then takes it for granted that we concede that a justified man remains truly ungodly, notwithstanding Christ's righteousness imputed to him. He remains indeed truly polluted in himself by the indwelling remains of sin; but does not remain truly ungodly. For the term *ungodly*, as used in Scripture, is appropriated to those who lie dead in their sins, who have not obtained the remission of their sins,

who have not yet received the Spirit of holiness. Lastly, Bellarmine imagines that we are no otherwise endued with the righteousness of Christ than by thought, as boys are accustomed to say in the Schools, that they can assign blackness to a swan in their mind, and whiteness to a crow. But, as we have often said, imputation does not denote a fiction of the human mind, but the efficacious appointment of God, and most entire bestowal of the thing. If Bellarmine cannot see the difference which exists between the fiction and the bestowal of Christ's righteousness, he deserves to be placed before the dread tribunal arrayed in no other than his own inherent righteousness.* But to proceed:—

6. If the righteousness of Christ were truly imputed to us, so that by it we should be deemed altogether *righteous*, as if it were our own intrinsic and formal righteousness, then we should be deemed and accounted no less righteous than Christ himself, and therefore we might be deemed and called *the Redeemers and Saviours of the world;* which is absurd enough. To which I reply:—

The righteousness of Christ is truly imputed to us, and by it we are deemed righteous; but we are not deemed righteous, because this righteousness is inherent in us, but because we adhere to him who has this righteousness; and so it becomes ours by the law of faith, through *the benefit of communication*, not *in the way of inherency* As far therefore as regards that inference—*We are no less righteous than Christ himself;*—if a comparison is meant to be made between Christ's inherent righteousness and ours, it is altogether invalid and inconsequent; for it does not follow, that we are equal to Christ as to inherent righteousness from our having imputed righteousness by his gift: but if a comparison is made between Christ and us,—that inasmuch as he has the most perfect righteousness inherent in him, we receive the same most perfect righteousness imputed to us;—and it be asked, whether our righteousness is equal to the righteousness of Christ; then I say, that this comparison is foolish, and contrary to the rule of comparisons: for the inherent righteousness of one is aptly compared with the

* This passage has called forth the censure of Mr. Newman, who says—"This surely is unfair as well as severe!"—See Appendix to his Lectures, p. 408.

inherent righteousness of another; or the righteousness imputed to the one, with the righteousness imputed to the other, because these are of one and the same character: but to compare with each other the inherent righteousness of Christ, and the imputation of the same righteousness, which are things diverse in their kind, is exceedingly unreasonable. But much more absurd is what follows: *If by the imputed righteousness of Christ we are deemed righteous, just as if it were our own; then might we also be called the Redeemers and Saviours of the world.* Ridiculous inference! For a Redeemer and Saviour is not he who accepts redemption and salvation, the work of another being imputed to him, but he who accomplishes redemption and salvation for another, by his own efficacious work. We are therefore to be declared rightly to be *redeemed* and *saved* by the imputation of this righteousness; but we are called *redeemers* and *saviours* by no one who is endued with common sense. Lastly, it is to be observed that the righteousness of Christ is not imputed to this or that believer, according to the whole latitude of its efficacy, but as each one has need of it. Hence it is not imputed to Peter, as the general price of redemption for all, but as the price with which his soul in particular is redeemed, and by the merit of which he in particular is exalted to glory. But from such an imputation of this righteousness it cannot be inferred, either that we are equally righteous with Christ, or can in any sense be called Redeemers.—Bellarmine proceeds:—

7. Christ has restored to us what we had lost in Adam, as is collected from Irenæus, Augustine, and other Fathers; but in Adam we did not lose imputed righteousness but inherent: therefore by Christ we receive true righteousness, not merely external and imputed.

This argument is incorrect on many grounds: First, it is proposed confusedly. It should have been stated thus: *Whatever has been given by Christ, the same had been lost in Adam. Imputed righteousness was not lost in Adam; therefore, not given by Christ.* The major proposition is plainly false, for Christ gives many things to the elect which Adam never had, and consequently never lost. Christ grants to his people not only to be able to persevere, *if they are willing,* which Adam possessed; but he also provides *the*

*will to do so,* which Adam did not possess. Secondly there is a fallacy of the contingent, in arguing from a thing itself to a thing in a certain state. Christ hath restored that to us which we lost in Adam, namely righteousness; but that this restored righteousness should come to us, in the same way in which it was lost, is not necesssary. With respect to the minor, it is not any way true: For that original righteousness which Adam lost was never ours, either by actual or personal inhesion in each individual; but we are reputed to have lost it in Adam, inasmuch as we are members of the human race, of which Adam was the head; and by parity, although the righteousness of Christ does not dwell in us, yet it is accounted ours, because we are members of that mystical body of which Christ is the head. It is indeed true that we were moreover infected with indwelling sin through Adam; but it is no less true that, we are presented with inherent righteousness, through Christ. We concede, therefore, the very conclusion of this argument, namely, that we receive through Christ a true and inherent righteousness, and not merely one imputed. For the question is not what is received by man, but by what means he becomes justified in the strict judgment of God. We grant, therefore, to the Fathers, that we acquire greater internal holiness through Christ, than we lost in Adam; but the Fathers do not say that it is acquired immediately, but when at length this mortal shall have put on immortality: in the meantime *the just shall live by his faith.*

8. But Bellarmine objects—If, through righteousness imputed to us, we can be truly called *righteous* and the *children* of God, then might Christ, through our unrighteousness imputed to him, be truly called *a sinner,* and *a child of the devil.* But Christ is never called a sinner, ungodly, or a child of the devil, in the sacred writings; but holy, just, &c. Since then Christ is not called unjust or unrighteous, by the imputation of our sin, because he was truly holy in himself; by the same reason, neither are we to be deemed righteous by the imputation of Christ's righteousness, if in ourselves we are truly unrighteous and unholy.

I answer,—The connexion of the major is invalid. For as Christ, in taking our nature, did not assume all its defects, but ἀδιάβλητα πάθη—those blameless affections, that is, af-

fections of such a kind as would not derogate from his dignity; so, in transferring our sin to himself, he did not transfer all the consequences of sin to himself. By imputation, therefore, the penalty of sin and the curse of the law was transferred to Christ; 2 Cor. v, 21; Gal. iii. 13. But that filth of sin, and pollution of nature, whence men are called the servants and children of the devil, neither ought nor could have been transferred to Christ. Neither can such an inference be drawn from the fact of our being adopted among the children of God, and deemed righteous through the imputation of Christ's righteousness. For that we should obtain this by imputation the necessity of our salvation requires; but that Christ should become wicked and a son of Satan, was not only not necessary for the procuring of salvation, but is opposed to the salvation of man, and blasphemous even in imagination. Moreover, the effect of our unrighteousness to render Christ ungodly, and unrighteous, and wicked, is not at all equal to his obedience and righteousness, to constitute believers righteous and innocent. The reason is, that the ungodly and unrighteous are not united to Christ by that most intimate union which is the cause of this communication. They cannot therefore throw their sins upon Christ any otherwise, than by his own willingness to take them upon himself; but he would only so take them upon himself as not to be thereby *a sinner*, but to be constituted *a victim for sin*. But believers grow into one person with Christ; whence he so transfers his righteousness to them, that they are able to appropriate it to themselves as their own, and offer it to God for the obtaining of justification.—[But Bellarmine remarks:—]

9. Christ is compared in the Canticles to *a Bridegroom*, and the Church, or the justified soul, to *his Spouse*. But that Spouse is said to be *all fair* by her inherent beauty; not by the beauty of her husband imputed to her. For it would be most absurd, if the heavenly and truly beauteous Bridegroom should have a Spouse most vile, and adorned externally merely with some precious robe of her husband.

I answer,—It is not true that the Spouse is called *all fair* from inherent beauty alone, and not from that imputed to her. She is called *all fair* from that which is inherent, but she is only so in comparison of that state of corruption, in

which she was so entirely vile and deformed: not in comparison with the law of God, or the strict rule of Divine justice. For, if her beauty should be examined by this rule, it would be found to consist rather in penitence and faith, than in the beauty and perfection of inherent righteousness. So Gregory upon those words, THOU ART ALL FAIR: *Although she sins frequently, yet by constant penitence she constantly preserves her purity.* And a little after,—THE JUST SHALL LIVE BY FAITH—*For although as soon as he sins he deviates from righteousness, yet whilst he always believes in him who justifies the ungodly, and incessantly, under that faith in him, bewails his sins, he retains his own righteousness, through incessant washings.** It is then the remission of sins, and the imputed righteousness of Christ, which constitutes the Church, or the justified soul, immaculate before God. However, we do not say that the justified soul is in itself most vile, and beautiful *only* by an imputed adorning; nay, we acknowledge that it is decorated by many ornaments of infused grace: but we say that these ornaments are stained by many spots of indwelling sin, and that we must therefore flee to the righteousness of faith, in pleading the cause of our justification before the Divine tribunal.

10. But it is objected,—By justification the heart is so cleansed as to be prepared for union with God; but the unclean heart, however clean it be reputed, shall never see God: *true* cleansing, therefore, not *imputed*, is conferred in justification, or we must for ever be excluded from the kingdom of heaven.

Bellarmine, too fond of wrangling, has lost sight not of the truth only, but of the question itself. For the question is, not what gifts are bestowed upon man in justification, but in what gift justification itself consists. We freely confess that cleanness of heart is bestowed upon all the justified: but we deny that justification itself consists in this gift. Nay, this renewal of the heart pertains to sanctification, and is not *the cause*, but the *companion* of obtained justification;† coming together in point of *time*, but subsequent in the order of *causality*. We assert also that this cleanness is only

* Gregor. in Cant. Cantic. cap. 4.

† This is noted by Mr. Newman, in Lectures on Justification, p. 87.

begun in this life; for no one can say that he keeps his heart always pure. Nor is this any hindrance to the Divine vision. For the heart inchoately cleansed is united to God through faith and love in this life; and when it shall have attained to the clear vision of God in the world to come, it will be purged from all uncleanness.

11. Bellarmine's last argument is, *Christ hath suffered that he might sanctify the people with his own blood;* Heb. xiii. 12. *He gave himself for the Church that he might sanctify it;* Eph. v. 26. *And that he might purify unto himself a peculiar people;* Tit. ii. 14. But if he sanctified his people not *truly*, but only *imputatively*, he suffered and died in vain.

Our adversary appears to me to be dreaming, and to have no adequate understanding either of the subject or what he is saying. We acknowledge sanctification to be *true* and *real*, not *imputative*, as Bellarmine babbles; but we affirm that, true and real as it is, it admits of increase and degrees, and reaches not perfection, till God shall be all in all. But all those passages which declare that the Church is sanctified, and washed from all sins, we affirm are to be explained of a true cleansing begun in this life, and of a perfect cleansing obtained in that which is to come: so says Augustine on the Perfection of Righteousness against Celestius; and in Bede on Ephes. v. on those words,—*That he might present it to himself a glorious Church*, &c.*

Since then our sanctification, although true, is not yet complete, it will be by no means safe to make our justification before God depend upon it; for that alone justifies which most exactly and fully satisfies the Divine law. And thus we have sufficiently answered all the arguments of Bellarmine. Now let us weigh the testimonies which he marshals against us from the Fathers.

* See page 22 supra.

## CHAPTER XXV.

### THE TESTIMONIES OF THE FATHERS DISCUSSED.

Before we proceed to examine the testimonies of the Fathers separately, it is right to advert first to what Vasquez has already noticed (in 1. 2. quæst. 113. disp. 202.) namely, that this controversy, concerning the formal cause of Justification, has not been discussed by them so accurately, as that concerning the necessity of grace for the performance of works, which they handled admirably when contending against the heresy of Pelagius. If then any of the Fathers, on account of that close affinity and inseparable connexion of infused or inherent grace, with the grace of remission and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, seem rather to confuse the one with the other, we ought not on that account to confound those things which the Spirit of God is accustomed accurately to distinguish in the Holy Scriptures.*

It must be remembered too, that we are not contending against inherent righteousness: indeed, we acknowledge such a quality to be infused in the act of justification; but yet we assert, that remission of our sins, the being received into the Divine favour, and acceptance unto life eternal, do not either flow from this quality or depend upon it; but upon the gratuitous mercy of God absolving us from our sins and accepting us to life eternal for the sake of Christ and the obedience of Christ. Neither are the Fathers to be considered as opposed to this our opinion, if sometimes they refer the word *justification* to the infusion of righteousness: for the same word is used sometimes in a different sense, not only by the Fathers, but even in the Scriptures themselves.† Our enquiry therefore now is not concerning the divers significations of this word *justification* in the Fathers, but what sentiments they held on justification itself, which is the point of theological investigation.

* See Newman's Lectures p. 433. † Ibid, p. 434.

With these provisos let us see what Bellarmine has to allege against our doctrine out of the Fathers.

He begins with Augustine, all whose volumes he ransacks and brings forth some testimonies from each; *De Justificatione*, lib. 2, cap. 8.

1. Tom. 1. Confess. lib. 12, cap. 15. *As great as is the difference between the light which enlightens, and the thing enlightened thereby; so great is the difference between justifying righteousness, and the righteousness which is produced by justification.* In this passage he distinguishes our righteousness from the righteousness of God, and without doubt makes it a created quality, just as is light, wisdom, and the like.

I answer,—Augustine is speaking of the righteousness implanted in spiritual and eternal beings by God. If then we allow that those holy angels are justified before God by this their own inherent righteousness; yet it will not follow that we are justified in the same manner, until the righteousness begun in us shall have reached an angelic perfection. It behoves us therefore to wait till we become like the angels in heaven (Matt. xxii. 30), and then only to glory in this attribute of the holy angels. Moreover, in this place Augustine calls the righteousness of the creature not *justifying* righteousness, but the righteousness *produced by justification;* and we have always admitted that God the Justifier, at the same time with justification, produces in the justified a created quality of righteousness; but we deny that this quality, whilst it is imperfect, can justify us before God; which Augustine has neither asserted in this place, nor thought of. Lastly, the very conclusion of Bellarmine does not touch the present controversy; for he deduces from this testimony, that the righteousness inherent in us is a created quality; which we may very well grant him, without any prejudice to our defence.

2. Tom. 2, Epist. 55. *What else is righteousness when it is in us, or any virtue by which we live righteously and wisely, than the beauty of the inner man?* Here he most plainly places our righteousness in the internal renovation of the mind and the comeliness of virtue.

It is strange that Bellarmine should take so much trouble, in scraping together testimonies of this description, which

in no way aid his cause. That there is a certain inherent righteousness in us is admitted; that this also adorns the soul and renders it beautiful, no one denies; but we assert, with Augustine, that this righteousness is bestowed on the regenerate, in order that by it they may live righteously and wisely among men; not that by it they may stand absolutely justified before God. We admit also that this has its beauty; but it is also interspersed with many spots; which easily appear if any righteous man looks at himself in the glass of the Divine law. Bellarmine's argument therefore is foolish: Augustine places our inherent righteousness in the renewal of the mind; therefore, concludes Bellarmine, our justification before God consists in the same!—He proceeds,

3. Tom. 3 lib. 15 de Trinit. cap. 8. *Now this nature, when it is justified by its Creator, is transformed from a state of moral deformity, into a state of moral beauty.** Therefore a justified man does not continue in a state of moral deformity, nor does he need the imputation of the righteousness of another to cover or hide his inherent unrighteousness.

To this I answer:—Augustine says, that man's nature is formed anew by God, whenever he justifies the sinner; and we also say the same. We also grant the first inference of Bellarmine—*Therefore a justified man does not continue in a state of moral deformity,*—in this sense; he does not continue in that state of moral deformity in which he was previous to the commencement of this renewal. It cannot however be the lot of any mortal, that he has no moral deformity remaining in him until that renewal has been completed.—But the second inference of Bellarmine, namely, That such a person *needs not the imputation of the righteousness of Christ,* must be altogether rejected. For he who by the grace of sanctification is transformed into a state of moral beauty, is, notwithstanding this change, not brought into so perfect a state of moral beauty, as may constitute a formal cause of our justification.

4. Tom. 4. lib. 1. ad Simpl. quæst. 2. *Because it remains the purpose of God to justify believers, therefore he decrees the works which he already elects to the kingdom of heaven.*

* *A deformi forma formosam transfertur in formam.*

And afterwards: *Unless the mercy of God precedes our calling, no one can believe that he begins to be justified at his calling, and receives the power of doing good works.* Here, in the former passage, that is called justification, whence good works proceed; in the latter he shews that faith and love, whence the faculty of doing works proceeds, is that righteousness whereby we are justified.

In the latter passage Augustine is proving, not that men are therefore chosen by God, because they were about to do good works of themselves; but that they therefore do good works, because God, according to the good pleasure of his will, has chosen them, and by his infused grace rendered them capable of good works. To the former passage I answer, that good works, and that habitual righteousness from which they arise, proceed from justification; because God justifies no one into whom he does not infuse grace for performing good works, according to his immutable decree: but it is not thence proved, either that this infused grace or these works are the constituent cause upon which our justification is grounded, but rather effects consequent upon it. To the latter I also reply, that nothing else is thence proved, than that when a man is justified through faith, he at the same time receives the power of doing good works; so that under its direction he enters upon the way which leads to glory, or the kingdom of heaven.

5. Tom. 5, lib. 19. de Civit. Dei, cap. 27. *Man's righteousness here is of such a character, that God rules over the obedient man, the soul over the body, and reason over opposing vices, either by subduing or resisting them; and that God be entreated both for the grace of merit and the pardon of sin.* In this definition, there is no mention whatever of the imputed righteousness of Christ, but only of righteousness dwelling in us.

Augustine is not describing that righteousness by which man stands absolved and justified before God; but that by which, according to the measure of grace received, he endeavours to perform to God and man the duties of holiness and love. That he is not speaking of the righteousness which justifies before God is plain from hence, that this righteousness is consistent with inherent corruption; but that which justifies in the sight of God ought to be free from

every stain of corruption. This righteousness of which he speaks, needs pardon; but that which needs pardon cannot become the formal cause of justification. For that which needs pardon hath some ground of guilt in it; and on that account does not contain the cause of absolute justification. There was no need therefore that, in the description of this righteousness, he should make mention of imputed righteousness. Although in this very chapter he shows clearly enough, that this righteousness cannot stand before the Divine tribunal, but that we must have recourse to the merits of Christ. Hear the excellent opinion of Augustine on this subject, near the beginning of the same chapter: *Our righteousness, although it be truly such, on account of the end of the true good to which it is referred; yet, as long as we live here, it consists rather in the remission of our sins than the perfection of our graces.* Upon which words Ludovicus Vives thus comments: *We are in a great measure good, not because we live well, but because we have the pardon of our wickedness by the grace of God.* Who but must perceive how abhorrent to common sense it is, to suppose that the man who is accounted innocent, only because of his obtaining daily remission, should be able to stand justified before the tribunal of the heavenly Judge on account of his own inherent righteousness?

6. Tom. 6. de Hæresibus, cap. 88, Augustine explaining what the grace of God is, to which the Pelagians are opposed, and by which we are justified (as he himself says, lib. 2, Retract. cap. 37 and 42, and elsewhere) declares that it is that, *whereby we are brought out from the power of darkness, to believe in Christ, and are translated into his kingdom; and whereby love is shed abroad in our hearts, so that faith may work by love.* He here manifestly places the grace of justification, not only in the remission of sins, but also in the infusion of graces, especially of faith and love.

I answer,—It is not to be denied that Augustine makes use of the term *justification* in a twofold sense. For sometimes by justification he understands with the Apostle the free forgiveness of sin and acceptance to life eternal, by and through the obedience of the Mediator, apprehended by faith, as on the xxxist Psalm: *If the ungodly is justified, he*

*from an ungodly man becomes righteous. But how? Thou hast done no good, and the remission of sins is granted thee.* More plainly still: *Whatever you say was the virtue of the righteous in former times, yet nothing saved them but faith in the Mediator, who shed his blood for the remission of sins.** But sometimes he understands by justification, from the structure of the Latin word, the act of God infusing and implanting in us habitual grace or inherent righteousness. In this sense, then, he asserts that the Pelagians oppose that grace whereby we are justified, that is, they reject the sanctifying grace whereby we are made righteous; but in the mean time he does not assert, that the grace in us has reached such perfection as to be esteemed the formal cause of our justification, understood in the former sense. Bellarmine insists that because Augustine ascribes to this infused grace our being delivered from the power of darkness, and translated into the kingdom of God, that therefore by it also are we justified. I reply, Augustine attributes these effects to predestinating grace, not to inherent righteousness. The grace of God in Christ delivers us from the power of darkness, and translates us into the state of sons; and from this, as from a fountain, flows that love or infused grace, which produces the works of holiness and love. The mercy of God, therefore, by and through Christ, delivers us from the power of darkness, and translates us into the kingdom of his Son; but righteousness implanted enables us to resist the Prince of Darkness, and to walk in that way which leads us to the kingdom of glory.

7. Tom. 7. lib. 1. de Pecc. merit. et remiss. cap. 19. *We read that they are justified in Christ, who believe in him, because of a secret communication and inspiration of spiritual grace.* Hence this infused or inherent grace in us is that on account of which we are justified. Augustine likewise, in his book *De Natura et Gratia*, cap. 38, 42, et 70, teaches that love shed abroad in the heart is our true righteousness.

I answer:—In that passage which is produced from chapter 19, on the deserts of Sin, Augustine's object is to teach us, that sin is transmitted, not by *imitation* alone, as the

* Contra duas Epistolas Pelag. lib. 1. cap. 21.

Pelagians would have it; but by *propagation* from Adam to his posterity. And this he shows from the contrast of Adam to Christ. For as believers are justified in Christ, not because they imitate him, but because of the secret communication of spiritual grace which they receive from him; so in Adam all are infected by sin, not because they imitate his sin, but because of *the secret taint of concupiscence in himself, he hath corrupted all proceeding from his stock;* as Augustine speaks in chap. 9 of the same book: I acknowledge that the verb *to justify* in this place, and in some others, is opposed to the verb *to corrupt,* and denotes the inspiration or infusion of grace or inherent righteousness; as corruption denotes the propagation of indwelling concupiscence. But this justification which is the production of a new quality, according to the view of Augustine, is not that which justifies us before God, or by the virtue and efficacy of which we stand justified and accepted to life eternal. Hear the judgment of Augustine himself, and observe how unavailing this inherent righteousness is for effecting our justification before God: *When the righteous King shall sit on his throne, who will boast that his heart is pure? or who will glory that he is clean from sin? Unless perchance those, who wish to glory in their own righteousness, and not in the mercy of the Judge?** And a little after—*This is accomplished, (namely, by the infusion of inherent righteousness) that the heart is cleansed and all sin taken away, and that, which the righteous Judge, when he shall sit on his throne, shall find less cleansed, is remitted by his mercy, so that the whole is rendered sound and clean in the sight of God. — — — Mercy rejoices over judgment. If it were not so, what hope could there be? — — Then therefore, through his mercy, the righteous, being fully and perfectly cleansed, shall shine forth as the sun,* &c. Thus far Augustine. That justification then which he here makes to consist in inherent righteousness, is the progress to righteousness, but not yet arrived at the end of perfection; and therefore does not justify before God sitting on his throne, but needs his mercy; so that by this there would not be even any hope of obtaining the kingdom, unless mercy should prevail over judgment.

* De Perfect. Justif. contra Celest. prope finem.

But let us come now to those three testimonies which Bellarmine has not alleged, but merely alluded to. And wisely has he kept back the words themselves, for they speak most evidently in our favour.

The first is found in the book De Natura et Gratia, cap. 38. The words are these: *If in righteous Abel there was the love of God, wherewith alone whosoever is righteous is truly so, still there was in him that which he could and ought to improve; whatsoever was short of that was corruption*, &c.

Bellarmine seizes upon what appears to his purpose, namely, that love is here called *our righteousness;* but what favours our argument, and unfolds the meaning of Augustine, he fraudulently passes by; namely, that this love is imperfect in us, and that this imperfection arises from our corruption. When, therefore, Augustine says that *we are righteous by love*, he means nothing else, than that our works of righteousness flow from infused love; but when he adds, that *the same love is imperfect*, he plainly intimates, that no one can be justified before God by its efficacy. Love therefore (under which term, by the figure Synecdoche, he denotes grace or habitual righteousness) makes us *righteous* formally, yet only inchoately and imperfectly; but it does not make us formally *justified*, because justification cannot have a formal cause, unless it be complete in all its parts.

The second testimony appears chap. 42, in the aforesaid book: *I care not much whether here there have been, are, or can be any, who have had, or have, or are likely to have, such perfect love of God, that no addition can be made to it. For it is itself the most full, most true and most perfect righteousness.* The word is used altogether in the same sense in which, in the former testimony, and in this, love is called *our righteousness*, namely, because it is an infused habit qualifying us for bringing forth the fruits of true righteousness. But it does not contain the most perfect righteousness, until it shall itself be made most perfect. Such righteousness however is to be found in none of the saints in this life. Hence in this life, it justifies no one; nay it makes none inherently righteous, unless inchoately and imperfectly.

The last of the three testimonies [alluded to by Bellarmine] is found in the beginning of chap. 70 of the same book. *Inchoate love is inchoate righteousness; increased love, is increased righteousness; great love is great righteousness; perfect love is perfect righteousness.*

Augustine certainly here says, that love is righteousness; but at the same time that, if it is inchoate, it is only inchoate righteousness. He intimates moreover, that however increased it be, yet it is not most perfect righteousness, until it is so complete that no addition can be made to it. Since therefore such righteousness is found in none, however righteous they may be regarded, by infused love, yet it will not be considered as establishing them *justified* before God through it.

And so much for these three mute witnesses, which Bellarmine thought it better to name than to bring forward.

8. Tom. 8. in Psal. cxviii. conc. 26. *Who has effected righteousness in man, but he who justifies the ungodly? that is, who by his grace makes of an ungodly sinner a righteous man.* Likewise in Psal. xcviii. *Who has effected righteousness in us, but he who hath justified us? We then are the ungodly, he the justifier; when he even himself causes that very righteousness in us, whereby we please him.*

The answer to both passages is the same, namely, that Augustine uses the word *justification* in a double sense. Sometimes, with him, *to justify* is *to absolve from sin and condemnation, and to accept to life and eternal salvation*; sometimes it is *to implant the quality of righteousness in the souls of men.* If we consider it in the first sense, the formal cause of our justification is that merit of Christ which is regarded by God, when he reckons all his members as righteous, and translates them into a state of salvation: if the second, its formal cause is, that newness or new quality of righteousness, which is created by God in all the faithful, when he designs to sanctify them and fit them to pass through life holily. But now since these two are always connected, and since the former, properly called justification, is known from this latter, as from its effect or infallible sign, Augustine terms this infusion of grace *justification*, although, according to the language of Scripture, it should more properly be called *sanctification.* And this sanctification, or

righteousness inherent in us, is said to please God, not because by it we immediately stand in the favour of God, and in a state of justification or salvation, but because that after the person is made acceptable to God through the Mediator, then the gifts implanted in the same, and the works flowing from them are both pleasing to God; because as all the imperfections of his person, so also those of his virtues and works, are covered. But Bellarmine argues:—

9. Tom. 9. tract. 26 in Joan. *What is the righteousness of God, and the righteousness of man? The righteousness of God is not that whereby God is righteous, but that which he gives to man, that man may be righteous through God.* Therefore righteousness given or infused appears to justify.

I answer:—Augustine uses these words in incidentally explaining that passage of the Apostle, Rom. x. 3, *Being ignorant of the righteousness of God, and going about to establish their own righteousness, they have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God.* Alluding to this passage (I say) he states, that the righteousness of God means that which he gives to man, that by it he may be just. Hence Bellarmine infers, that inherent righteousness is that righteousness of God whereby we are justified. But, we reply, that God gives us the righteousness of Christ, no less than this inherent righteousness; and Augustine himself intimates this in the preceding words, where he says, that *Christ is our righteousness.* This inherent righteousness is also given us by Christ, but for a different end: the imputed righteousness of Christ is given, that thus Christ himself may be *the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth;* inherent righteousness is given that thus man, sanctified by God, may serve him in holiness and righteousness. Because these are joined and connected (as we have often observed) Augustine accommodates the term *justification* to both; yet so as always to mean, that this inherent righteousness justifies, that is, imbues man with righteousness, yet only imperfectly and inchoately; but that the merit or righteousness of Christ, applied to us by the Divine gift, justifies, that is, absolves from guilt and punishment, and places us in a state of acceptance and salvation, and that absolutely and perfectly.

10. Tom. 10. Serm. 15, upon the words of the Apostle

(Phil. iii. 9) *He who has believed in him will not have his own righteousness, which is of the law, although the law be good; but he will fulfil that very law, not by his own righteousness, but by that given him of God. For love is the fulfilling of the law. And whence is that love shed abroad in our hearts? Not indeed from ourselves but by the Holy Spirit which is given to us.* In this passage he teaches us that that righteousness which is given to us from God, is love itself shed abroad in the heart, by which we fulfil the law, and consequently are justified.

Augustine is continually taking occasion to oppose the Pelagian heresy. Since therefore the Pelagians made infused grace as it were useless, or at least not very necessary, whilst they greatly exaggerated the power of free-will, Augustine is compelled to shew, on all occasions, the power, efficacy, and necessity of inherent grace; and hence it sometimes happens, that he ascribes to this grace the effect of justifying and of fulfilling the law. But he means nothing else, than that that righteousness which flows from the power of free-will, before grace is infused, is not accounted with God for true righteousness; but that the righteousness given and infused by God is reckoned true and sincere righteousness, although imperfect. He intimates also, that all obedience, lawful and grateful to God, which is rendered to the law, flows not from the powers of free-will, but from this grace or love. Now that this is the meaning of Augustine, when he attributes the fulfilling of the law, and justification, to inherent righteousness, is manifest from hence, that he acknowledges this very fulfilling, and justification itself, to be imperfect. I shall adduce his words quoted from the same Sermon: *Let us* (says he) *increase this justification as much as we are short of it; and let us perfect it when we shall arrive there, where it shall be said,* WHERE, O DEATH, IS THY VICTORY? Who does not perceive that this justification, which derives its name from the infusion of righteousness, is deemed imperfect by Augustine, when he exhorts us to grow in it; when he reminds us that we cannot be perfect in this life? Whatever therefore we determine about the word *justification*, certain it is that Augustine never wished to ascribe to inherent grace that it should become the formal cause of absolute justification before God.

Thus much concerning the testimonies of Augustine, whom Bellarmine falsely asserts to be opposed to the cause we maintain, since he agrees with our opponents only in an ambiguous use of the word, but most plainly gives his suffrage with us on the very main point of the controversy. Let us proceed to other Fathers.

11. Ambrose Hexæm. lib. 6. cap. 8, says, *Tell me, pray, whether justification seems to be bestowed upon you, in the body, or the soul? But you cannot hesitate since righteousness* (justitia), *whence justification is derived, is indeed of the mind and not of the body.* Here by righteousness (*justitia*) we cannot understand the remission of sin alone, or the imputed righteousness of Christ, since this inheres neither in the mind, nor in the body: we ought therefore, to understand inherent righteousness; and consequently *that* is it which justifies us.

Ambrose, in the passage just quoted, is disputing whether man be made in the image of God, as to his body or his soul; and to prove that it is to be understood of his soul, he brings in that passage of the Apostle, Rom. viii. 29. 30. *He hath predestinated them to be conformed to the image of his Son. But whom he predestinated them he also called; and whom he called them he also justified.* Then he subjoins the words adduced by Bellarmine. From this passage then it may be gathered, that Ambrose, no less than Augustine, sometimes attributes the word *justification* to the infusion of righteousness, and in this sense understood the words of the Apostle; but it cannot be shewn that he thought that, in this righteousness infused into us, consists the formal cause of our justification before God. For the formal cause by which a man may be considered just in himself is one thing; the formal cause which constitutes him justified in the sight of God is another. Man may be denominated righteous in himself, from that quality of righteousness which however imperfect is yet true; but he cannot stand justified before God, unless by that righteousness which comprehends every point of perfection. Nor did Ambrose himself think otherwise, when telling us that we must not trust in this inherent righteousness. Lib. 1. de Jacob. et vita beata, cap. 6. *I will not boast that I am righteous, but I will boast that I am redeemed: I will boast, not that I am free from sin, but that*

*my sins are forgiven. I will not boast that I have been profitable, but that Christ is my advocate with the Father, and that the blood of Christ was shed for me.* You see in what Ambrose placed the hope of his justification; not in the quality of inherent righteousness, but in the mercy of Christ redeeming him; not in his being pure from sin, but in the remission of his sins; not in short, in works flowing from this inherent righteousness, but in the blood flowing from the side of Christ.—Bellarmine proceeds:—

12. Again, Ambrose lib. 6. on Luke, says:—*In this is the justification of God, if he seem to have transferred his gifts not to the unworthy and guilty, but to those made innocent and righteous by ablution.* He teaches that God *justifies* and *is justified* in baptism: that he *justifies* because by ablution he makes men clean from filthy, just from unjust, innocent from guilty; that he *is justified,* because he shews himself just by conferring the Divine gifts, not upon the ungodly and unjust, but upon those who are made godly and righteous by himself. But if the doctrine of the Protestants were true, God could not be justified in lavishing his gifts upon men truly vile and unrighteous, for them to be falsely accounted righteous and innocent.

This passage is rather confirmatory of our opinion, than opposed to it. For Ambrose says, that God is justified through baptism from this circumstance—that we yield to him as to a conqueror, by confessing our sins and imploring his grace. He adds moreover that he is justified from hence, that after he has granted us the pardon of our sins, he imparts his gifts on those who are no longer unworthy and guilty, but who have been made innocent by washing. We are therefore accounted innocent, because we have obtained the remission of our sins. But the gifts of grace which are additionally bestowed upon us, are not given to the unworthy or unclean, for this very reason, that they are given to those whom God of his free mercy has vouchsafed to wash from their sins in the blood of his Son. The Protestants, therefore, do not hold, that those, who are justified through Divine mercy, remain unclean as before, but are absolved from the guilt of all their sins, and moreover are cleansed from the inherent defilements of sin, but imperceptibly and gradually: not purified from all such till this

mortal shall have put on immortality, as we have often said. This purification from defilement then, by the infusion of grace, is a gift bestowed on the justified, but is not itself the gift of justification.—From Ambrose he passes to Jerome.

13. Jerome, lib. 1. advers. Pelagianos [cap. 3] says, *This is the sum of man's righteousness; to account whatever righteousness you can have, not to be your own, but the Lord's, who hath bestowed it.* And lib. 3. *Now* (says he) *thou art made clean in the laver, and of thee it is said, Who is she that cometh up all white, and is indeed made clean; but is not able to keep her purity, unless she is sustained by the Lord?* St. Jerome places our righteousness in the virtue and purity which we acquire in baptism; not by the imputation of another's righteousness.

Bellarmine shews himself forgetful of the very point at issue. For the question is not whether inherent righteousness consists in habits or infused virtues; but whether justification before God is to be placed in this inherent righteousness. As to the former passage, Bellarmine has cited it to *no purpose* and *inconsiderately: To no purpose*, because Jerome affirms only, that this is the sum of our righteousness, that however much or little it be, we acknowledge that it derives its origin not from our free-will, but from God. What has this to do with the controversy concerning justification? Does whatever God bestows upon man obtain forthwith the power of justifying? If Jerome has not said this, he has said nothing to help Bellarmine. This passage he has, moreover, brought forward *inconsiderately;* for we no sooner look into it, but we at once discover things which spoil his argument; for the following words immediately precede those alleged by him: *We are then righteous when we confess ourselves sinners; and our righteousness is not of our own merit, but of the mercy of God, Holy Scripture declaring*—THE RIGHTEOUS MAN IS THE ACCUSER OF HIMSELF IN THE BEGINNING OF THE DISCOURSE: and in another place—ACKNOWLEDGE THY SINS THAT THOU MAYEST BE JUSTIFIED.* To suppose therefore

* *Holy Scripture declaring:* Prov. xviii. 17; Isaiah xliii. 26. Neither of these texts, *as quoted by Jerome*, will be found exactly to answer to either the English authorised version, or to the common Editions of the Vulgate Latin.

that any one is, from this inherent righteousness, so just in the sight of God, as not to need what pertains to righteousness, is an opinion which Jerome, in the same passage, attributes to the Pelagians, and refutes.—Thus much for the former of these testimonies; I come now to the latter in which Jerome alludes to those words in Cant. viii. (5.) And we must observe that Bellarmine very deceitfully passes over those words, *Innitens super fratruelem suum*, or *Innixa super dilectum suum—leaning upon her beloved;* which words are both in Solomon and in Jerome. We acknowledge then that the Church, or the believing soul, is made white, that is, is sanctified in baptism; but that she may be justified before God, she does not rest upon this her inherent sanctification, but upon her beloved, that is upon Christ. Moreover, Christ is said to render the believing soul white, not by the infusion of the grace of sanctification only, but much rather by the free remission of sins, and by the communication of his own most perfect obedience. Bellarmine therefore wrongly takes away from the justified man the imputed righteousness of Christ, because Jerome does not take away inherent.—He proceeds,

14. Prosper in Resp. ad caput 6. Gallorum, says, *The justified man, that is, the man made godly from an ungodly one, without any good deserts preceding, receives a gift by means of which he also acquires merit; so that what has been begun in him by the grace of Christ, is increased also by the diligence of free-will, the help of God being never wanting to him, without which no one can advance, or abide in what is good.* The imputation of Christ's righteousness is not the gift whence merits are acquired, nor is it increased by the diligence of free-will: therefore we are not justified by it.

When Prosper explains that a justified man is *made godly from an ungodly man*, he does not mean that it is effected through infused righteousness alone, but much

On the passage in Proverbs, Rosenmuller, (Scholia in V. T.) thus writes: Ex nostratibus nonnulli post Græcum Alexandrinum, qui prius hemestichium vertit, δίκαιος εαυτοῦ κατήγορος ἐν πρωτολογία *justus sui ipsius accusator in principio sermonis, hunc versum sic intelligunt, justum primum esse sui accusatorem, postea vero in alios inquirere, juxta illud Christi in Evangelio* Matth. v. 7. *Ejice prius trabem*, &c.

The variations in the passage from Isaiah are not material.

rather by the mercy of God absolving believers from ungodliness, and imputing to them the merits of Christ. The infusion of grace from ungodly makes a man godly, but inchoately and imperfectly; so that this piety receives daily increase, and reaches not full perfection whilst we are clad in this corruptible flesh. But the remission of sins, and the imputation of the merits of Christ, constitute him at once, and perfectly righteous in the sight of God, and purer than the rays of the sun itself. We do not deny then the infused gift of holiness to be received by all the justified, whence spring the works ordained to salvation, which are called *merits* by the Fathers; but we do deny that this gift, which all the justified receive, is the formal cause itself by which they are justified, which Prosper has not affirmed. Lastly, it is not true, that the imputed righteousness of Christ is not the cause whence merits are acquired. For, if we speak of the most perfect merit, it is to be had from no other source than the treasure of Christ's merits applied to us; and even this justification by the obedience of Christ is the cause of sanctification itself and infused righteousness, whence our merits whatsoever they be, arise. Remarkable is that saying of Bernard,* *Christ my Lord obtaining the kingdom of heaven by a double right, namely, by the heirship of his Father, and by the merit of his passion, himself content with the one, bestows the other upon me; from the bestowment of which claiming it to myself by right, I am not confounded.* This merit then bestowed upon us, is that by which we have a right to glorification; and therefore, by which we have justification; for that same which justifies gives a right to glorification.

15. Cyril of Alexandria, lib. 6. de Trinitate, says: *The Spirit is fire, which as soon as it has diffused love in us, and has inflamed our minds by its heat, we attain righteousness.*

What is asserted here is, that by the Spirit, we attain that inherent righteousness wherewith we are endued; but what power there is in this inchoate righteousness to justify before God, is not shewn from this passage. He refers us to other places of Cyril, namely to lib. 11. in Joan. cap.

* In Vita Bernard. lib. 1. cap. 12.

25, consulting which chapter I found, that we have infused righteousness, or sanctification, inspired into us by the Spirit of Christ; and at the same time I find that Cyril has placed our justification, in the remission of sins, not in this inchoate holiness. For he thus speaks,* *We are justified through faith in Christ, who was delivered for our sins.* And a little after, *He bare our sins, and being numbered with the wicked, he hath justified us by tearing away through his cross, the hand-writing which we made against ourselves.* He hath not said, we are justified by the righteousness which he hath infused into us; but through faith which apprehends the remission of sins in Christ. Nor hath he said, He hath justified us by the infused gift of holiness, but by tearing down the hand-writing of our sins. He here recognises sanctification; but does not ascribe justification to it, which Bellarmine corruptly does. He bids us however consult Cyril also lib. 12. Thesauri, capp. 3 et 5. We have consulted both places, and we perceive that the Divinity of Christ is being proved in them, and are at the same time shewn, that we are formed anew together to the image of Christ in righteousness and holiness; but of our standing justified by our inherent holiness, Cyril has not so much as one word.

16. Gregory, lib. 18. Moral. cap. 33, expounding that passage of Job, xxviii (18.) *They shall not be remembered in comparison of it*, has these words, *All the elect of the home above are indeed holy and righteous; but by a participation of wisdom, not by the comparison. Wisdom itself indeed is called righteousness; and the servants of wisdom are called righteousness; but the former is the righteousness which justifies, the latter are the righteousness which is justified.* We are therefore just by the participation of infused righteousness.

Gregory is shewing in this place, that Christ, the wisdom of God, is just and holy after another manner than men, who are sometimes adorned with the same titles. Christ is called righteousness, but *justifying*, that is, bestowing upon believers united to himself, his plenary righteousness, and imbuing them also with inchoate righteousness: WE

* In Joan. lib. 11. cap. 25.

also are said to be the righteousness of God in him, but *justified*, that is, endowed with his most perfect righteousness, and embued moreover with inherent righteousness through him. Let us therefore admit, that Gregory calls our inherent righteousness *justified righteousness*, that is, produced in our souls, and implanted by Christ the justifier, it will not hence follow that it is *justifying*. Nay, on the contrary, we more correctly gather from hence, that the righteousness of Christ alone is justifying righteousness, whether considered as rooted in him, or as participated by and imputed to his members.

And these are all the testimonies which Bellarmine has cited! At last he bids his readers to consult Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and of Nazianzium, Chrysostom, Theophylact, Œcumenius, Leo, Bernard; but because he hints at the passages generally, and has not produced them, I pass them by; for if they had been of any weight, without doubt he would have expressly cited them.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

### INHERENT RIGHTEOUSNESS SHEWN NOT TO BE THE FORMAL CAUSE OF OUR JUSTIFICATION BEFORE GOD.

You have heard the arguments of our opponents: Let us now come to our own, which we shall distribute into two classes. In the first we shall place those which prove that inherent righteousness is not the formal cause of justification; in the other, those which demonstrate, that the righteousness of Christ bestowed upon and imputed to us, is the formal cause by which we stand justified before God.

And here that there may be no useless jangling about terms, it must be premised that, by the formal cause of our justification, we understand nothing else than that by which we stand, in the sight of God, freed from condemnation, innocent, and graciously accepted unto life eternal. If this

be effected by that righteousness which is our own and inherent, then that is the formal cause of our justification; if, through the sole obedience and righteousness of Christ apprehended by faith, and bestowed upon and imputed to us by God, then that will be the formal cause of our justification. I add also, that our dispute is concerning inherent righteousness, as it exists in this state of pilgrimage, not as it might be, by the absolute power of God, nor as it will be in heaven, when it shall be perfected in the glorified state. We therefore deny, that this quality of righteousness or holiness, which God imprints in regenerate men, is the formal cause of their justification; that is, that it renders them spotless, innocent, acceptable to God, and worthy of eternal life, by its own inherent nature; and *that* without the imputation of the merits of Christ, or the favour of God supervening, as Vasquez contends at large in 1. 2. disp. 204. Our arguments are these:—

1. Inherent righteousness is something abiding, produced and impressed by the Holy Spirit, which is presumed even to be in those who are not able to work, or to exhibit actual righteousness. And hence it is that the Papists allow that this inherent righteousness equally belongs to infants and persons asleep, as to adults and those who are awake.* But that such a habit or inherent quality is the form of justification, is not yet agreed upon among the Papists themselves. For,

First, however much they argue about these infused and inherent habits, yet that such habits are given or infused into the regenerate is held only as probable among some of the Schoolmen, and not as an article of faith.† Secondly, though it were an article of faith, that a certain habit or inherent and abiding quality of holiness is impressed on all the regenerate, (which I think can be established from Scripture) yet among the Papists it is not an article of faith, that any adult is formally justified by this inherent quality. We have before quoted the testimony of Medina in 1. 2. qu. 113. art. 2. Vasquez also, upon the same question, cap. 5. ingenuously confesses, that it has not hitherto been defined among Romanists, whether in adults justification takes

* Bellarm. de Justif. lib. 2. cap. 15. † Vasquez. in 1. 2. disp. 203. cap. 3.

place by an act or by a habit, as respects its *form*. Since then nothing ought to be more certain or better known to a Christian man than that, by the worth and efficacy of which, he stands before God absolved from sin, innocent, and accepted unto life eternal; and since it is yet uncertain among the Romanists themselves, whether it is by abiding qualities that we are justified before God: they foolishly and unfairly obtrude upon us a form of justification, which they themselves do not admit as a certain article of Divine faith. And yet (if Bellarmine is to be believed) the same is established as the formal cause, by the Tridentine Fathers, under *anathema!**

2. Our second argument will overthrow those, who maintain that inherent righteousness is the formal cause of our justification, but who yet interpret this inherent righteousness to be *actual*, not *habitual*. I affirm that this opinion is repugnant to common sense itself. For actual righteousness neither ought to be called, nor can be understood to be, an inherent gift; since it consists not of permanent qualities, but transient acts: now such acts as these are said to emanate from the mind, not to inhere in it. Hence Bellarmine himself infers (*de Justif.* lib. 2. cap. 15.) that the Council of Trent denies that man is justified formally by actual righteousness. See then the shameful fluctuation of the Papists on a subject of the utmost moment. The Council of Trent denies that man is justified formally by actual righteousness; other Papists acknowledge that it is not an article of faith, but only a probability, either that such a habit is infused into believers, or that righteousness is an inherent habit in us. Who then does not see the consequence, that the Church of Rome as yet holds nothing certain or defined, as it respects the formal cause of justification?

3. Our third argument will militate against both parties among them. It is this: Habitual righteousness constitutes no adult formally justified with God, unless actual righteousness, flowing from the same, perfectly fulfils the righteousness of the law, by doing all those things which the law enjoins, and avoiding all things which it forbids. For he who by his acts offends God, and incurs the guilt of

* Bellarm. de Justif. lib. 2. cap. 15.

condemnation, cannot at the same time, continue justified by his habits, and worthy of heaven: for *the doers of the law will be justified*, Rom. ii. 13. Nay, he is worthy of greater damnation, who, having in himself the habit of inherent righteousness, yet does the works of unrighteousness. Let the apostate angels, and Adam himself, serve as an example, who, although they were indued with inherent righteousness, yet by contrary acts fell from their high estate.—But these things being allowed, let us proceed to the minor premise. We say then, that no one satisfies the law by his actual righteousness; nay he is continually transgressing it, either by commission or omission. To say nothing of the other commands, no mortal man fulfils these two—*Thou shalt love God with all thy heart*, and *Thou shalt not covet*.

Bellarmine meets this argument somewhat timidly. This, says he, (de Justif. lib. 2. cap. 14) *if it proves anything, proves that actual righteousness is not perfect: but it does not prove that habitual righteousness is not so perfect, as that we should become absolutely righteous by it, and be so denominated*. But this involves a contradiction, viz. that a person remains justified at the same time by virtue of inherent righteousness, and yet unjustified on account of the defect of actual righteousness. But he adds—*Nevertheless no one can draw any just conclusion from that circumstance against an actual righteousness*. Why not? we ask. Because, he tells us, although it may be in some measure imperfect on account of the admixture of venial faults, and needs daily remission of sin; yet it does not cease to be true righteousness, and perfect in a certain way of its own.

We are not enquiring however concerning the reality of righteousness, but its certainty or efficacy to justify. Now that which needs daily remission can neither justify *formally* nor *meritoriously*: for a righteousness perfect in a certain way of its own, and imperfect in some other way, as Bellarmine perplexedly argues, is not sufficient for effecting justification; for to produce that, it must be perfect in a legal way, and complete in all respects: For it is written, *Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the law to do them*. Gal. iii. 10.

This argument is confirmed with many other reasons by

St. Paul. For in Rom. iii. 20, he thus sums up his reasoning, *By the deeds of the law shall no flesh living be justified in the sight of God;* which afterwards, and throughout the whole of the ivth chapter, he undertakes to establish. In Galat. iii. also, he laboriously treats and confirms the same conclusion. The heads of St. Paul's discussion are these:— We all have sinned and are come short of the glory of God; all the just live by faith; we are justified *freely* (δωρεὰν); we are rendered *blessed* by the *remission* of sins: Therefore we are not justified by works. Again, if justification were to be sought by the deeds of the law, then Christ would have died in vain; faith would be vain; the promises vain; we should be yet under the curse: Therefore justification is not to be looked for from the law, nor from our obedience to it.

Romanists employ various methods in endeavouring to meet these arguments of St. Paul, but there is one on which they mainly rest, to which we shall reply. They say then, that when St. Paul excludes the works of the law from the office of justification, he means to exclude those only which are performed from a mere knowledge of the law, without the Spirit of grace moving within. For with Paul (as Vasquez says, in 1 2. disp. 203. cap. 7.; and disp. 210. cap. 8.) the works of the law are the same thing, as works done from a mere knowledge of the law, without the Spirit of faith or of grace. But in contradiction to this statement, the works of unbelievers, and of those not yet regenerate, are accounted by the Apostle evil works and works of darkness; it was not needful therefore that he should assert with such vehemence, that no one is justified by *these* works. Again, the Apostle, in the passages cited, excludes the works of Abraham from justification; that is to say, of Abraham, regenerate, circumcised, and a believer; not in his idolatry, and as yet unconverted.* Thus David acknowledges, that not even the works of the regenerate can bear the scrutiny of the Divine judgment: *Enter not into judgment with thy servant;* Ps. cxliii. 2. He does not say, *with thine enemies*, or *with unbelievers;* but *with thy servants*— who love and study to keep thy commands; for even they

* Rom. iv.; Gal. iii.

cannot be justified by their own works. Lastly, Paul says of himself and the other Apostles, Gal. ii. 15, 16, *We who are Jews by nature know that a man is not justified by the works of the law.* These subjects, however, will be more copiously handled when we shall come to speak of the merit of works,—The sum of the argument before us is this: No one stands justified *meritoriously* by his actual righteousness, therefore neither *formally* by habitual; for what the act is, such is the habit: therefore the insufficiency of actual, most plainly demonstrates the insufficiency of habitual righteousness, to justify.

4. Inherent righteousness in itself considered, such as it is found in the militant state, is imperfect, and wants those degrees of perfection which are necessarily required for formal justification. For, to be justified formally by righteousness is nothing less than to be conformed to the Divine will, as the supreme rule. For, if we look into the principal parts of this habitual righteousness, which are faith, hope, and love; it is manifest that each of these labours under many defects. Faith is infirm and wavering in all the regenerate. Whence every believer says daily, with the disciples of Christ, *Lord, increase our faith!* Luke xvii. 5; and with him who said, *Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief!* Mar. ix. 24. Hope also fluctuates and is languid; hence that saying of the Psalmist, *Why art thou cast down, O my soul, and why art thou disquieted within me? Hope thou in God;* Ps. xlii. 5. Believers, therefore, do hope in God; but they are driven hither and thither, as it were, by many waves of doubtfulness. Lastly, Love itself is dead and cold, in comparison of that fervour which it ought to have; hence even in the regenerate the love of carnal concupiscence breaks forth, tending to the things of this life, because they have not that full love which would tend to the things of God. Lombard himself confesses all these virtues to be imperfect: *We must notice* (says he*) *how faith and hope because they are but in part, are said to fail; and charity not, though it too be but in part. For we love but in part, that is, imperfectly; as we know but in part.* He answers, *Charity itself will fail, in so far as it is but in part, because its*

* Lombard, lib. 3. dist. 31. lit. C.

*imperfection will be taken away, and perfection added.* This then is the force of this argument: No righteousness but that which is perfect, according to the exact rule of the law, justifies before God; but our inherent righteousness is not such, nay in its best and innermost parts it labours under faults and defects.

5. That righteousness which by its inhesion constitutes man formally righteous before God, takes away the defilement and guilt of all sins whatsoever, even the most minute; for he who has in himself that form of justification, cannot be unjustified. But inherent righteousness effects not this; since, notwithstanding this quality, man stands stained with many venial sins, stands worthy of punishment, nay destined to punishment, and that not a light one; nay nothing less than that of hell itself, if you except eternity. Lastly, that he may throw off this stain of venial sins, he needs a certain renovation and inward justification.* All these things our opponents concede to us. Let them then, shew how *that* can be an inherent form of justification, which admits so many things contrary to justification to meet in the same subject.

But they will say, that guilt arising from venial sin, and the desert of punishment, nay the destination to the bitterest pains of Purgatory, consists with their formal justification; for that it is sufficient for the effect of justification, that it frees from mortal sins, and eternal punishments, although it leaves man obnoxious both to the stains and the penalties of venial sins. But the Papists may keep to themselves this half justification. We acknowledge no other formal cause of justification than that which, being applied to us, procures straightway peace with God; delivers from the guilt of sin; renders us safe from the avenging wrath of God, and, in fine, makes us happy.† Our inherent righteousness effects not this; and is not, therefore, the formal cause of our justification.

6. The formal cause of justification, after the commission of sin, ought to have so much efficacy as to take away the offence given to God, and to make amends for the injury

* Vasques, in 1. 2. disp. 207 capp. 1 et 4.

† Rom. v. 1; 1 John i. 7; John iii. 18; Rom. iv. 6.

done to the Divine Majesty. But by a created quality (such as inherent righteousness,) this offence is not taken away, nor does it satisfy God for the injury done to him. As to the former part of the proposition, it is conceded by our opponents; for Bellarmine assigns these effects of righteousness to justification, that it purges away the quality of sin, renders a man righteous, reconciles him to God, and ordains him to the kingdom.* And Vasquez argues at large, that this inherent righteousness, of its own nature, wipes out sin and offence, without the favour or forgiveness of God being added: as light by its very nature and its inhesion expels darkness.†

Let us enquire then concerning offence, whether it can be paid and blotted out by the habit of inherent righteousness. It is evident that the nature of offence, in every mortal sin, is infinite; because sin is committed against an infinite person, to whom we are bound by an infinite obligation, whom we infinitely injure, as often as, preferring the creature to him, we embrace the latter and turn away from the Creator. So says Aquinas, That *sin committed against God has a certain infiniteness arising from the infinitude of the Divine Majesty.*‡ If any one should doubt that an offence against God, or that the evil of any sin whatsoever is infinite, let him bear in mind the infinite punishment due to every mortal sin, according to the received opinion of all the Schoolmen, and the just threatnings of God. But then it is impossible that an offence of infinite desert should be wiped out or compensated for by a quality of finite virtue and desert.

7. If inherent righteousness be the formal cause of justification, then it expels the contrary form, namely, inherent sin, on its very first introduction, and by its very *formation* of the subject. This proposition is not only granted by the Papists, but is laid down as the strongest foundation for their defence. It is ingenuously admitted by Vasquez in 1. 2. disp. 204. cap. 4, *If inherent righteousness could exist together with sin, even by the absolute power of God, it would follow that whatever of this kind inheres in us, is not true righteousness, nor does it deserve such a name.*

* De Justif. lib. 2. cap 16. † Vasq. in 1. 2. disp. 204. capp. 1. 2. 3. &c.
‡ Aquin. part. 3. quæst. 1. art. 2.

And disp. 207. cap. 3. *It remains that grace and inherent habitual righteousness is, of itself, and without any previous disposition, bestowed, of such a nature and virtue, that it is utterly inconsistent with the defilement of sin, and cannot co-exist with it, even by the absolute power of God.* We freely concede to the Jesuits, that if these things can be truly predicated of righteousness infused into those who are in this militant state, it may then be the form of our justification.

But to this opinion are opposed, first, all those of the Schoolmen themselves,* who teach that this inherent righteousness is expelled by sin, not *formally* however, but *demeritoriously;* not *physically*, and *by the nature of the thing, but by the voluntary act of God, owing to the demerit of the sinner restraining the influx of grace.* If therefore God will not treat with any one on account of his demerits, inherent grace may exist in him together with the defilements of sin. And this we say is the condition of all the regenerate; from whom this inchoate righteousness is not withdrawn, although they may at intervals be stained with the defilements of many sins. That therefore is not the form of justification, which by its own nature neither takes away the infection nor the guilt of sin. Secondly, they still more plainly agree with us, who expressly teach,† that the quality of righteousness or inherent grace is not of its own nature incompatible with sin, but can consist with it in one and the same man. And this opinion is very agreeable to right reason; for although the quality of righteousness in itself, in its fullest exercise and perfection, excludes the contrary quality of sin, yet since it is only begun in us, and in its outline, as it were, it may co-exist with some defilement and deformity of sin. For as the habit of love, or of grace, does not hinder the contrary habit of inordinate concupiscence from existing in the same man; and as any act whatever, flowing from this grace, does not forthwith altogether banish indwelling evil concupiscence; so neither does the habit of concupiscence, nor any inordinate act of sin whatever, flowing from the same, altogether extinguish or expel inherent grace. That therefore is not the proper

* Richard, Scotus, Durand., Palud. and others.
† Gabriel, Occam, Medina.

form of justification which may be found in a person liable to sin. Lastly, the Scriptures themselves with a clear voice pronounce that all our righteousness is defiled with the filth of sin. Isa. lxiv. 6; *We are all as an unclean thing, and all our righteousnesses as filthy rags, &c.* Job. ix. 30. 31; *If I wash myself with snow water, and make my hands never so clean, yet shalt thou plunge me in the ditch, and mine own clothes shall abhor me.* Dan. ix. 7; *Righteousness belongeth unto thee, but to us confusion of face.* Ezra ix. 15; *Behold we are before thee in our trespasses; for we cannot stand before thee because of this.* All these were endowed with inherent grace; and yet they acknowledge themselves to be at the same time defiled with the filth of sin. With inherent righteousness then (such as it is in us) sin dwells, and hence it cannot form the real cause of our justification. To this point apply all those arguments which have been adduced on a former topic to shew the imperfection of inherent righteousness.

8. He who stands justified by his own inherent righteousness is, from the moment he obtains this quality, pleasing and acceptable to God, yea, worthy of eternal life, by virtue of this very quality, without the favour of God intervening, or the imputation of Christ's merits, for, according to Romanists, the formal cause of our justification does of its own nature absolutely make us pleasing to God, and worthy of heaven.* Hear with what confidence they assert the dignity of this inherent righteousness: *The effect of infused love is, that it reconciles man to God, that is, makes him acceptable and a friend to God; and this effect follows absolutely, from the nature of the thing.*† Vasquez is much more bold: *Inherent righteousness* (says he‡) *so renders the soul just and holy, and therefore a child of God, that, by this very thing, it makes him an heir and worthy of eternal glory; nay, God himself cauld not cause, that a just man of this sort should be deprived of eternal blessedness, although by his absolute power he might so ordain that he should never be rendered blessed.* Thus they. We, on the contrary, affirm, that however this quality of holiness

* Vasq. in 1. 2. disp. 204. capp. 2. 3. 4. &c.
† Bellarm. de Justif. lib. 2. cap. 16.
‡ Vasq. in 1. 2. disp. 204. cap. 4.

or infused righteousness be pleasing to God, because it is the effect of his Holy Spirit, and is found in the person reconciled who is pleasing to him for Christ's sake, yet this righteousness itself, seeing that it is inchoate and imperfect (as was before said) hath not so great worthiness of itself, but only from the favour of God, through and on account of the Mediator. We therefore stand pleasing to God our Father, and accepted to eternal blessedness, not by the efficacy, the dignity, or the virtue of this infused quality, but by the merit of the Mediator.

Let us come to the oracles of Scripture: these ascribe all such things to the mercy of God in Christ, which *they* attribute to their own inherent righteousness. If it be asked through what means we are received among the children of God? we must answer, through and for the sake of Christ; not through or because of the holiness bestowed on us. Go to Galat. iv. 5, 6. *God sent forth his Son to redeem us who were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons. And because ye are sons, he hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts.* He does not say, Ye are received among the sons because the Spirit has impressed upon you a certain inherent holiness; but, on the contrary, Because through Christ ye are received among the sons, therefore ye are endowed with these gifts of grace. Inherent holiness is not *the cause* of sonship, but *the consequence.* Moreover, if it be asked, through what means we stand pleasing and acceptable to God? we must answer, not through this our inherent righteousness, but through the favour of God, bestowed upon us in Christ the Mediator. Thus in Daniel ix. 18, *We do not present our supplications before thee for our righteousness, but for thy great mercies.* And in Rom. v. 9; *Being justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him.* He does not say that being justified, we are afterwards delivered from the wrath of God through inherent righteousness; but that we remain reconciled to God through Christ himself, and that God remains pacified to us through him, by whom we have been brought into the favour of God from the beginning. Lastly, if it be asked through what channel we stand appointed and accepted to eternal blessedness? we must answer, not through infused grace, or through inherent

righteousness; but through Christ the Mediator. Go to Rom. vi. 23. *The gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord.* Since therefore it can be truly said of the regenerate that God, by and for Christ's sake, bestows his favour on those who deserve far otherwise at his hands, and brings them to eternal life for the sake of the same, most certain it is, that their inherent righteousness (new as it is and only commencing) is not the formal cause, through which they are justified and made acceptable to God.

9. Sanctification by inherent righteousness is, in order of causality, posterior to justification; nay, they are two acts, although concomitant in time, yet distinct in themselves and in their nature.* But the Romanists, defining that inherent righteousness is itself the form of our justification, hold that the remission of sin differs from the infusion of righteousness no otherwise, than the infusion of light differs from the expulsion of darkness, or the introduction of heat from the expulsion of cold, in one and the same subject. Vasquez says,† that the Council of Trent lays it down, that *by internal renovation and inherent righteousness, the contrary things are expelled, as by their proximate form, and that sin is remitted without pardon from the very infusion of righteousness.* If therefore we prove that remission of sin is an act naturally distinct from the infusion of holiness, and that our sanctification by inherent righteousness is naturally posterior to justification, we shew, even by the confession of our adversaries, that it is not the form of justification. Let us try, then.

In sin, we may consider that internal disorder which has a certain spiritual taint and defilement connected with it, and offence against God thence arising, and consequent exposure to punishment. Remission directly and properly regards the offence and punishment, so that we may truly say, that sin is remitted, when God ceases to be offended, and forgives the punishment. But the infusion of grace has respect to the defilement and stain of sin, and restores to the soul that beauty, and, as it were, spiritual light, which the filthy and black nature of sin had bedimmed. That

* Vide Scot. in 4. distinct. 16. quæst. 2. † In 1. 2. disp. 206. cap. 5.

this remission is something distinct in reality and nature from the infusion of grace, I shew from the confession of our adversaries, who most plainly contradict themselves in this very matter. *We most readily admit* (says Vasquez*) *that original sin can be remitted by God, without any internal change of the sinner.* But this admission gives a fatal wound to the cause which the Jesuit is defending. For in the Schools it is ordinarily said, *That God himself cannot dispense with a formal cause.* If therefore the infusion of righteousness were that form upon which remission of sin depends, not even could God himself remit it, without this infused righteousness; just as a subject cannot be made hot without heat. This admission therefore of our opponents must not be lost sight of; for we refer to original sin especially, when we maintain that no one is free from sin, and therefore that no one can be justified by inherent righteousness. But upon actual sin too, we find them confessing† that *God can translate to his glory, from the very act of sin, a sinner unworthy of blessedness; so that although he never had been righteous in this life, but polluted, he would afterwards, being changed in another life, by the vision of God, be fully justified.* I ask, then, would not God in that case have laid aside all ground of offence, and remitted the punishment, when he not only appoints, but brings the sinner safe to blessedness? This they concede can be done without the infusion of grace; and therefore remission is one thing, infusion of grace another. What they allow can be done, that we say is truly effected, with this difference only, that whereas they suppose remission possible without any renovation or infusion of righteousness, we say it is always accompanied, by the appointment of God, with infused grace or righteousness, though only begun and imperfect, and not of itself sufficient for the cleansing away of sin and the justification of the sinner. But let us come to arguments.

Remission of sin is an individual act, and effected in a moment; but the infusion of grace, or sanctification, is a continued act, and effected successively, and by degrees. Remission delivers from guilt and the punishment of sins;

* In 1. 2. disp. 206. cap. 4. † Ibid. cap. 3.

but the infusion of grace purges from the stain and defilement of sin. We obtain the remission of sin proximately from God, by the righteousness of Christ imputed to us: but the infusion of righteousness personally, by the operation of the Holy Spirit. The Jesuits, are therefore, quite mistaken in laying it down, that forgiveness of sin is not at all distinct from the infusion of inherent righteousness, and in contending on that ground that inherent righteousness is the form of our justification.

But we must also shew, that this infusion of inherent righteousness is naturally posterior to our justification, and therefore not the formal cause of our justification. Colos. i. 21, 22: *He hath reconciled us in the body of his flesh, that he might present us holy and unblameable*, &c. Holiness therefore follows justification, and is not the formal cause in which justification consists. In Titus ii. 14: *He gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people*, &c. First, he redeems us from the guilt of sin and the Divine wrath; then purifies us by the infusion of grace. We are not therefore redeemed by the mere infusion of grace from the wrath of God, and guilt, as our opponents suppose: but grace is infused into the redeemed, that *being delivered from the hand of their enemies they may serve God in holiness and righteousness.** Rightly, therefore, has Durandus laid it down,† that, in the order of causality, we are reconciled to God, accepted, and made friends, before we are endowed by him with that renewal of inward righteousness. And he brings a most powerful reason for it, namely, that all the holy dispositions, even in sanctification, are bestowed upon man by God, inasmuch as he is now beloved by him, and accepted in Christ. For so says the Apostle to the Ephesians, i. 3: *He hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in Christ.* Nor does the Holy Spirit bestow these gifts of grace on any but those who are in Christ: *If any one hath not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his:* Rom. viii. 9. Though therefore we do not make sanctification posterior in time to justification, yet, in the order of causality, the infusion of the grace of sanctification follows justification. For God

* Luke i. 74. † Lib. 1. dist. 17. quæst. 1.

frees the penitent and believing sinner from the guilt of his sins for Christ's sake; then he makes him pleasing and accepted to life, for the sake of the same Christ; finally, that he may lead him to life eternal by the way of holiness, he imprints inherent righteousness upon him, not to be the cause of justification and acceptance, but to lead him into that way, out of which no one can attain to the rewards destined for the justified and accepted.

But Vasquez objects*—If in the order of causality man be imagined to be made just, and pleasing to God, before he is possessed of inherent holiness or righteousness, then the gift of infused righteousness will be superfluous. We deny the consequence; because God will be glorified not only in our gratuitous justification, but also in our holy conversation of life. He therefore infuses righteousness into the justified, not that they may be justified before him by it, but that by it their light may shine before men to his glory. He also pretends secondly, that this love of God wherewith he is understood to love us, and regard us as pleasing, before he infuses inherent righteousness, is not that special love, with which he regards the justified and reconciled, but that common love with which he loves us on the ground of the gift of creation. But neither can this be admitted; for that love with which he loves unto the sanctifying of us, regards us as planted in Christ, and members of that body which receives supplies of holiness from the fulness of the head. Gal. iv. 6. *Because ye are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of his Son into your hearts.* In the order of causality therefore, we are supposed to be justified, and planted into Christ, before we are endued with the gift of inherent righteousness. This latter then is not bestowed as the formal cause of our justification, but is superadded to the justified as a gift and ornament by the Spirit of Christ.

10. If inherent righteousness were that which cleansed us from the guilt of sin in the way of form, constituted us perfectly just, reconciled and rendered us pleasing to God; in fine, made us worthy of eternal blessedness, and that by the efficacy and dignity of its own innate quality; then it would follow that the merits of Christ were applied to us merely

* In 1. 2. disp 206. cap. 1.

that we might obtain this inherent righteousness from the favour of God; but this quality having been obtained, the imputation of Christ's merits and acceptance for Christ's sake would then cease. Vasquez acknowledges the consequence, and confirms it* by the authority of the Council of Trent:—*The Council teaches, that the application of the merits of Christ is made by the very fact of those gifts of his merits being bestowed upon us which we received by infusion; and since it does not say that this application is made in any other way or time; that is to say, after infusion—it plainly shews that it is effected then only, and in that way alone.* A little after: *The Council lays the application of the merits of Christ in the infusion of the gifts only. But for the best reasons does it assign no application of his merits, subsequent to the infusion of the gifts; because, by that very circumstance, it would refer the remission of sins, and therefore justification itself, to the merits of Christ and his righteousness as the form.* Now this argument of the Jesuit is worthy of especial notice, wherein he acknowledges that, if after the receiving of inherent righteousness, we still need the Divine acceptance by and for Christ's sake, then justification would be referred, not to our inherent righteousness, but to the merit of Christ and the favour of God, as to its formal cause. I will shew therefore that the merit of Christ avails to render us pleasing and acceptable to God, not merely in a first justification, as they talk; but after the infusion of inherent grace: For if the merit of Christ intervened only to produce this effect, that God on account of it might infuse into us the quality of inherent righteousness; and that, this being obtained, we might by it stand cleansed from the guilt of sin, become acceptable to God, and worthy of blessedness: it follows most plainly, that Christ hath not properly or strictly redeemed us from our sins, or reconciled us to God, nor merited eternal life for us; but by his blood and obedience hath merited for us this quality of inherent righteousness, which effects all these things. When therefore the Apostle writes, Eph. i. 7, *In Christ we have redemption, through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace*, if we follow the opinion of Papists, this

* In 1. 2. disp. 206. cap. 3.

will be the sense: Christ by his precious blood hath not immediately blotted out our sins, but by interposing this price hath acquired for us a certain quality of inherent righteousness, which truly cleanses us from all our sins. So when the same Apostle says, *We are reconciled to God by the death of his Son*, Rom. v. 10, the Papistic gloss ought to be this: The Son of God, by his death, hath merited for us an inherent righteousness, by which we are pleasing and reconciled to God. Lastly, when Christ himself asserts, *I give unto them eternal life*, John x. 28; and his Apostle, *The gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord*, Rom. vi. 23, the Papists are compelled thus to interpret it: Eternal life is not given to the regenerate by Christ, because they are accepted of God in Christ; but because Christ hath impressed upon them a quality of righteousness which, of its own nature, without favour or acceptance interposing, makes them absolutely worthy of eternal life. Away with these, not triflings merely, but very blasphemies, which transfer to the worthiness of a created quality all that we owe to the Son of God, our Redeemer. The scope, then, of our argument is this: Christ resigns to no creature the special works of a Mediator; hence he does not attach to inherent righteousness the virtue of taking away our sins, of reconciling us to God, of rendering us accepted to life eternal; and therefore he does not make it the formal cause of our justification.

11. If, in a justified man, after the infusion of inherent righteousness, any thing inhere which of its own nature is an object worthy of the Divine hatred, then it is plain that this righteousness is not the formal cause of our justification. For, according to our adversaries* the formal cause of justification expels by inhesion whatsoever is in itself hateful to God, or worthy of punishment. Now it appears, that evil and rebellious concupiscence deserves the hatred of God; for, unless God should hate it, pious and regenerate men would not hate it. But the Apostle in Rom. vii. testifies that he hated it. Since then, notwithstanding the infusion of inchoate righteousness, something deserving of hatred remains in the regenerate, *that* cannot be the formal cause

* Vasq. in 1. 2. disp. 204. cap. 6.

of justification, but something else must be sought after, by which we may become pleasing and accepted of God to life eternal.

12. The formal cause of justification ought to be of such a kind, that a Christian may safely and boldly confide in it, under struggles of conscience and the agony of death. But no Papist has ever dared to trust his salvation to this his inherent righteousness in heavy temptations, when conscience, smitten with a true sense of sin and of Divine wrath, has been dragged as it were before the tribunal of God. Chemnitz has well remarked, that men think one way concerning justification in their disputations, when wrangling with men like themselves, another way in their meditations, when they come with conscience into God's presence, as it were to plead their cause.* None of them speak of their own inherent righteousness before the Divine tribunal, but fly full of fear to the mercy and acceptance of God in Christ. But if they were willing to stand by their doctrine, they must either depend upon this formal cause, or give up all hope of salvation. For they deny that any man can either be justified or saved, in whom there is not inherent grace or righteousness, which may justify a man by its inhesion in him, and so make him worthy of eternal blessedness. But let us hear how little they attribute to this inherent righteousness, when they speak, not in a spirit of contention, but under a conviction of conscience. *For my own part,* (says Bernard,†) *what I want in myself I confidently borrow from the bowels of my Lord, seeing they overflow with compassion, and want not channels through which to flow forth.—It is sufficient for me, for all unrighteousness, to have him alone propitious to me, against whom I have sinned.*‡ *Lord,* (exclaims Anselm,) *I oppose the death of our Lord Jesus Christ, between thee and me, and thy judgment. Otherwise I do not contend with thee.*§ The same author, in his meditations, says, *My conscience has deserved condemnation, and my repentance is not sufficient for satisfaction; but it is certain that thy mercy exceeds all offence.*

* Loc. Theolog. part. i. de Justif. loc. viii. §. 2.
† In Cant. Serm. 61. ‡ Serm. 23.
§ Exhort. ad frat. morit.

But why do I have recourse to these older writers? Let there be given me out of these presumptuous Jesuits even one who, after he has written vast volumes upon this his inherent righteousness, dares, when in danger of eternal death, to trust in this as his formal justification. Let him say to God, "Let all those be excluded from heaven, who are not found worthy of heaven by inherent righteousness; let all be cast down into hell in whom there inheres anything which can truly be called sin." Under this condition they affirm and maintain it, that all men ought to be saved and justified; but no one of them would venture on these terms himself to make the experiment with God. That therefore is not the formal cause of justification, without which the Papists themselves both seek and hope that they may be absolved in the Divine judgment, and accepted to eternal life.

13. He is not justified by his inherent righteousness, who stands justified on the ground of his receiving every day from God the pardon of his unrighteousness. For he would be foolish and ridiculous, who should boast that he, by his own innocence and virtue, stood accepted before any earthly king, when, on account of crimes committed against him every day, he was discharged from the deserved punishment by his clemency, and out of mere benevolence restored to his favour. But we all sin every day. Every day we seek remission, and in the article of death do so most urgently and humbly. Consequently we acknowledge that we do not stand justified, or worthy of heaven, by the quality of righteousness permanently inherent in us, but that by remission of sins and Divine grace, life eternal for Christ's sake is bestowed upon us, though most unworthy of it. I will cite a passage of Augustine, somewhat long, but excellent, and most pertinent to our purpose:—

IF THOU SHOULDST MARK INIQUITIES, O LORD, WHO SHALL STAND? *Lo, how David exclaims under the weight of his iniquities. He considered himself; he thought upon his life; he saw it everywhere covered with abominations; wherever he looked, he found nothing good in himself. And when he saw so many and so great sins on all sides, affrighted at himself, as it were, he cried out,* IF THOU, LORD, SHOULDST MARK INIQUITIES, O LORD, WHO SHALL STAND? *For he perceived*

*almost the whole of men's lives assailed with the clamour of sin, all consciences accused by their own thoughts, and no pure heart which could presume upon its own righteousness: which, since it is impossible to find, therefore let the hearts of all venture upon the mercy of the Lord their God, and say to God,* IF THOU, O LORD, SHOULDST MARK INIQUITIES, O LORD, WHO SHALL STAND? *But what is our hope?* BECAUSE THERE IS FORGIVENESS WITH THEE.*

Here it is specially to be remarked, that David and Augustine speak not of unbelieving men, or those yet unconverted; but of the regenerate servants of God, such as they themselves were. If these, then, though so advanced in sanctification, did not find that inherent righteousness in themselves, which could justify them before the judgment seat of God; but fled to the asylum of mercy: who can assent to the doctrine of the Jesuits, that no one is justified or admissible into heaven, except he who has such and so great an inherent righteousness, as can by its own nature and efficacy absolutely justify a man and render him worthy of heaven? The plain reason of it is this: the best of the regenerate, in order that they may be justified and saved, need the daily pardon of sins and the unceasing mercy of God. They are consequently not justified by the quality of their inherent righteousness.

14. Lastly, the form of justification ought not to be something easily moveable and separable from the justified man. But, according to the doctrine of the Papists, inherent grace is very easily lost, nay it flies away and vanishes almost every hour. I will not say how truly, yet they lay it down, that this their inherent grace may be extinguished and altogether expelled, by any mortal sin whatsoever. But if it be so, no man can persevere in a state of justification for one day, not to say one hour. For certain it is, that if we reckon our sins of omission and of commission; if we weigh our sins of deed, of word, and of thought, no one is free from sin even for the space of an hour. Nor can they have recourse here to the distinction of *venial* and *mortal sins;* for no one abstains for any long time from those internal evils, which even the Schoolmen have determined should rank

* Aug. in Psal. cxxix.

among deadly sins. Very erroneously, therefore, do they decide that to be the form of justification, by which all the justified are in the habit, so often and so easily, as they teach, of falling away.

Thus far have we contended against that formal cause of justification, which it is the endeavour of our opponents to establish: now we will shew the true ground, and confirm it by arguments.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

### SOME THINGS PREMISED RESPECTING THE TERM *IMPUTATION*, AND *FORMAL CAUSE*.

Before we enter upon arguments, we will premise some things from which it may be understood what we intend by *imputation*, and what by *a formal cause*, in this controversy; and how far the Papists agree with us, and how far they oppose us, in this matter.

*To impute any thing*, then, *to any one* is the same, in this question, as *to reckon and account it in the number of those things which are his own and belong to him*.* But not only our own peculiar passions, actions, or qualities may be imputed to us; but also certain external things, which neither flow from us nor inhere in us. But they are actually imputed to us, when their relations and considerations avail to us for some specific effect, as much as if they proceeded from us, or had their dwelling in us. For instance, when any one on account of his own virtue and brilliant actions is honoured and rewarded, his virtue and his deeds are properly said to be imputed to this man, so as to produce him honour and rewards. The allusion by St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, iv. 4, bears relation to this meaning, where he says, *To him that worketh is the reward reckoned of debt*. So also, when for his improbity and wickedness any one is branded with infamy and punished, his vices and evil deeds are said to be imputed, for ignominy and punish-

* Vasq. in 1. 2. quæst. 114. disp. 222. cap. 1.

ment. On the other hand, if any person unworthy and useless in himself, is, on account of his father's virtues and services to the State, admitted into the Royal favour, and dignified by nobility; we properly say, that such an one is pleasing to the King, and ennobled by him, by and on account of, the imputation of his father's merits. The same reason holds when a man guilty of murder or treason, and deserving of punishment in his own person, is absolved and delivered from the due punishment, either by the intercession of another who is in favour with the King, or by suffering the punishment which, by the Royal appointment and approval, he undergoes in the place and instead of him who has transgressed. And who will hesitate to say, that this criminal has been absolved from his evil deeds, and delivered from their punishment, by the favour of another, and the imputation of that other's satisfaction to him?

Now as to *a formal cause*, it is well known, that that is called *the form* by which a thing is what it is; so we may call the rational soul *the form* of the man, because by it man is reckoned of the human species. But this word is often used also, not only of substantial forms, which determine *the simple essence;* but also of accidental ones, which determine *the kind*. In this sense we say that heat is that *form* in which fire is considered hot; that learning is that *form* in which man becomes learned; righteousness that in which he is made righteous. To come nearer to our purpose —We grant the form of justification to be that, by which man is not only accounted and pronounced justified before God, but is made or constituted so. But because man is said to be justified in the passive term, (to speak grammatically,) it is not absolutely necessary that this term be derived either from an inherent form, or that it should imply an inherent form. For such passive terms sometimes regard the inhering form, as when we say the wall is whitewashed; sometimes not, as when we say that a man is loved, honoured, condemned, absolved: for all these things are said truly of him in whom there is not found the inhering form, which may be the foundation of such terms. William of Paris has noticed this: *Passive denominations*, (says he,*) *or predicates*,

* De Univers. 1. part.

*are made of things in which they exist not; because they are in them, or to them, or of them.* Moreover, Vasquez himself,* for this reason, rejects as weak and useless that very argument which, to Papists in general, seems invincible. For thoughtless persons are wont to urge, that as no one can be called learned from another's learning, or wise from another's wisdom, so neither can he be said to be justified by another's righteousness. Now Vasquez says,† *I am unwilling to impugn this mode of denominating things, by urging that common argument which some use, namely, that this denomination of* just *seems to be one of those which require an inward form.* And soon after—*A thing may be said to be just by an extrinsic righteousness, and that of another.* And in the margin of his book, he brands that mode of arguing which the Papists so often inculcate, with this stigma—*The silly reasoning of some.* Yet I wish you to observe by the way, that we do not affirm the term *just* to be taken usually in Scripture from an extrinsic form, but the term *justified.* For some persons are called *just* as well as *holy* in Scripture, from inchoate righteousness inherent in them; but the *justified* are so called from the perfect righteousness of Christ imputed to them.

And as regards our opponent's concession, namely, that it is not repugnant to reason for any one to be called *just* from an extrinsic form, much less is it repugnant that he should be called *justified* from the same. If any one therefore should ask, in what the truth of the predicate is founded when it is said that Peter, or Paul is justified? I answer, that, from the nature of the case, the free and gracious act of God is sufficient, absolving Peter or Paul from the punishment due to sin, and accepting them to life eternal, according to his own good pleasure; just as the act of a lover is sufficient for any one to be called beloved, and the act of a Judge acquitting is sufficient for one to be termed acquitted, although nothing should in consequence attach to the person himself, which should deserve love or acquittal. But, on the supposition of the Divine appointment, there is required some just and worthy cause, out of consideration and regard of which, God may be moved to absolve the

* Par. 3, cap. 26. † In 1. 2. disp. 202. cap. 3.

sinner, to accept him, and account him as justified; no less than if he had obtained this state by his own personal qualities or actions. I add, moreover, that this, whatever it is, from consideration or regard to which God justifies the sinner, ought, although not by inhesion, yet by some participation and connexion, to become his, to whom it produces the effect of justifying.

If then the word justified, and the benefit itself or the effect of justification be considered, not in the light of some form inhering in us, but in consideration and respect of something extrinsic, it will be manifest, that we are justified in the way of imputation before described, and this extraneous something, although not existing physically in us, yet supplies its place; and in that sense may be rightly called the formal cause of our justification, where the internal or inherent form is wanting.*

These things being explained, let us see how far we and our opponents are agreed; and how far we differ.

First, then, we agree in this, that although some rude and unlearned Papists explode both the thing and the name of imputed righteousness, yet the more learned acknowledge and profess it equally with us. *We grant*, (says Vasquez†) *that there are imputed to us, for some specific effect, not only those things which are in us, as sin, faith, and righteousness; but also certain extraneous things, as the merits and obedience of Christ; because not only those things which are in us, but also the qualifications of others, in consideration of which something is bestowed upon us, are said to be reckoned among our own, for a specific effect, just as if they*

* The frequent use of these terms has been before noticed and a remark made as to their meaning, (see Note † page 54;) but a doubt has been expressed to the Translator, that even with the explanations given, so unusual are these terms, in the present day, in their logical acceptation, that few English readers (that is those not acquainted with the Latin, and with the logical writers) will catch their application. It has accordingly been suggested to the Translator to adopt such expressions where the words *form*, *formal*, species, and the like occur, as *formal quality*, or *distinctive quality*, and specific character; but he has not felt at liberty to depart from the closest literal rendering of his author that he could employ; and has thought it best to pursue that course and leave his reader with such explanations, and the context before him, to form his own opinion and adopt such phrase as his perception of the meaning may suggest to him.

† In 1. 2. quæst. 114. disp. 222. cap. 1.

*were truly our own.* Secondly, although some seem to restrict this imputed righteousness of Christ to that of his passion only; as though the death of Christ alone were imputed to us for the expiation of sin, and remission of punishment; yet Vasquez treats us more frankly: *When we say,* that the merits of Christ are imputed to us, we intend the same to apply to his righteousness and holiness also: for, since the merits of Christ derive their worth from his holiness, his righteousness also is said to be imputed to us, in the same sense in which his merits are said to be imputed to us.* Thirdly, they concede,† that these merits and this righteousness of Christ are imputed for all those effects which are granted us, or become ours, in consideration of the same. Lastly, they admit,‡ that if the righteousness which is inherent in us, did not, of its own nature, purge from sin, reconcile to God, and render us worthy of eternal happiness, there would indeed be need of the acceptance of God, and the imputation of Christ's merits, added thereto.

The Romanists differ from us, First, in that *we* think, that this imputed righteousness of Christ, so far as it consisted in the suffering of punishment, avails so far, that, in consideration and respect of it, we are absolved from the guilt and punishment of our sins:—*they* say, that, in consideration and respect of it, righteousness is infused into us, which, of its own nature, blots out sin, and takes away the obnoxiousness to punishment. Secondly, in that *we* hold that this righteousness of Christ, so far as it consisted in the perfect fulfilment of the law, is so imputed to us, as to avail for our deliverance from the curse of the law, and for the obtaining of that reward of eternal life which is promised to the observers of the law; and this, no less to every believer, than if it had been performed by him in his own person: but the Papists think, that the perfect righteousness or obedience of Christ merited for us that infused grace, by virtue of which we ourselves fulfil the law, and, being perfectly just in ourselves, we stand worthy of eternal life. The benefit therefore, of the imputation of Christ's merits, they restrict to the obtaining the effect of infused grace; and all else—such as remission of sin, Divine accept

* Ibid. cap. 2. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

ance, the obtaining eternal life—they will have to depend on this grace, without further regard to this imputation of the righteousness and merits of Christ. But on the other hand, as we assert that this inherent grace is given to us out of the merits of Christ, so we affirm that after grace is received, man is accounted innocent, stands pleasing and acceptable to God and is accepted to life eternal, in regard of the same merits, not of inherent grace. Lastly, we call this imputed righteousness the formal cause of justification, not because it justifies us by inhering in us, but because, in respect of it, God esteems us and deals with us, just as if we were perfectly righteous, and justified by the form of righteousness inhering in us; but the Papists suppose it a ridiculous and absurd thing, that God should merely from regard to the righteousness and obedience of Christ, reckon his members as justified.

With these prefatory remarks let us proceed to argument.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### THE IMPUTATION OF CHRIST'S OBEDIENCE PROVED TO BE THE FORMAL CAUSE OF OUR JUSTIFICATION.

We have excluded inherent righteousness from efficacy in justifying, on account of its imperfection: it now remains that we shew by arguments founded in Holy Scripture, that such an efficacy pertains to the righteousness of Christ imputed to us.

Argument 1. If the benefit of justification be placed in this,—not that we are endowed with some inherent righteousness, which can bear the scrutiny of Divine justice; but —that apprehending Christ by faith, we are, in consideration of his merits, absolved from the condemning power of the law, and accepted to life; then the justification of a believer arises from imputation, not from infusion: And that this

* Vasq. in 1. 2. disp. 222. cap. 3.

is the case we prove from John iii. 16, *Whosoever believeth in Christ, shall not perish, but have everlasting life.* And ver. 18. *He that believeth on him is not condemned.* And Chap. v. 24. *He hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life.* I ask, what is that condemnation from which believers are exempted for the sake of Christ? Doubtless, that strict judgment, in which a man is examined according to the rule of the law, and, as he is found to answer this law or not, is pronounced just or unjust, and rewarded or punished accordingly. The justification then, and the salvation of believers does not rest upon this, that they have in themselves a quality of new righteousness, which they would venture to subject to a legal examination and the strict judgment of God; but that, by and through the merits of the Redeemer, in whom they believe, they are not to undergo such judgment, but are dealt with as if they had in themselves exact legal righteousness. And this is the very thing which we mean, when we affirm that the merits of Christ, or the perfect obedience of Christ the Mediator are equivalent to the formal cause in our justification.

2. That disobedience of Adam, whereby he violated the command of God, is so imputed to his posterity, that, in consideration of it, they stand guilty before God, condemned, and destined to eternal punishment. Therefore, that obedience of Christ, whereby he fulfilled the law, is so imputed to his mystical members, that, in consideration of it, they stand guiltless before God, justified, and accepted to everlasting life. Which being conceded, his righteousness and obedience, although it hath not the *inherence* of a form, will yet have its *place* and *efficacy* in our justification. This inference rests upon Rom. v. 19, *As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.* Spiritual regeneration and the closest union with Christ, as with a new root, are equally availing that his obedience should be imputed to us for the effect of justification, as that natural generation and union with Adam, the old root, availed, so that his disobedience was imputed to the effect of condemnation. Since then it is certain, that the actual disobedience of Adam is imputed to us, so that through it we

stand condemned; no reason can be brought, why the obedience and righteousness of Christ should not also be so imputed, that by it we should stand justified. Bernard says well,* *Shall the sin of Adam be imputed to me, and shall the righteousness of Christ not belong to me?* But, replies Bellarmine:† *The disobedience of Adam made us sinners, but efficiently, not formally; so also the obedience of Christ will be the efficient, not the formal cause of our justification.* Nay, in both ways, Adam injured us: *efficiently* he filled us with unrighteousness, in so far as he entailed upon us a nature corrupted and defiled by his disobedience; *imputatively* also, inasmuch as his personal act, which though it does not inhere in us, is yet imputed for condemnation, no less than if it was something formally inhering. Bellarmine, when not in the heat of contention, acknowledges this very thing:‡ namely, the free transgression of Adam, or that *the disobedience voluntarily committed by him, exposed his posterity to the penalty of death, and rendered us hateful to God;* and that this his very sin§ *is communicated to us in the only way in which what is past could be communicated, namely by imputation. For it is imputed to all who are born of Adam, since we all, existing in the loins of Adam, sinned in him, and through him, when he sinned.* Thus far Bellarmine. Just the same view ought to be taken of Christ fulfilling the law, and of believers being implanted spiritually in him. Although therefore, we fully admit, that the obedience of Christ merited inherent righteousness for us, as Adam transfused inherent sin into his offspring; yet, at the same time, we affirm, that his obedience also is imputed to us, as though it were our personal obedience; as the very disobedience of Adam, in eating the forbidden fruit, is imputed to his posterity also, as though it had been actually and wilfully committed by them in person. And, in this sense, the obedience or righteousness of Christ is called the formal cause of our justification; because it is accepted by God, on our behalf, just as if it were our own.

3. God, from regard to the obedience performed by Christ, even to the death of the Cross, hath delivered us

* Serm. ad Mil. Temp. cap. 11. † De Justif. lib. 2. cap. 9.
‡ De Amiss. Grat. lib. 5. cap. 17. § Ibid.

from the punishment due to the transgressors of the law, by imputing to us the satisfaction of another, as if it had been our own: therefore, from regard to the obedience performed by Christ, even unto the fulfilling of the law, he will bestow upon us those benefits which are promised to observers of the law, namely, by imputing to us this righteousness of another, even as if it were our own. Concerning the imputation of penal satisfaction, it is evident from Scripture:—

*He poured out his soul unto death;*
*He was numbered with the transgressors;*
*He bare the sin of many:* (Is. liii. 12.)
*With his stripes we are healed.* (v. 5.)

*The Son of Man came to give his life a ransom for many;* Matt. xx. 28. In this sense the imputation is so manifest, that our opponents dare not deny it. Hear Bellarmine:* *Christ is called our righteousness, because he made satisfaction to the Father for us; and he so bestows and communicates that satisfaction to us, when he justifies us, that it may be called our satisfaction and righteousness.* A little after—*It would not be absurd for any one to say, that the righteousness and merits of Christ are imputed to us, since they are bestowed upon and applied to us, as if we ourselves had made satisfaction to God.* If the righteousness of Christ making satisfaction becomes ours by imputation, why not also the righteousness of Christ fulfilling the law? Bellarmine answers,† *Because that one should satisfy for another we can easily understand; but that one should be just, because another is just, is without example, and altogether unreasonable.* Being questioned about garlic, his reply suits but to onions, as says the old Proverb. For, as we do not affirm that the penal satisfaction of Christ is so made ours by virtue of imputation, that the infliction of the punishment itself inheres in our mind or body; so we do not mean that this exact fulfilment of the law should so become ours from imputation, that from thenceforth this righteousness which he performed should inhere in ourselves; but, as, in regard to the imputed satisfaction, God frees us from wrath and punishment, as if we had afforded that satisfaction in our own persons, so in regard of the

* De Justif. lib. 2. cap. 10. † Ibid. cap. 11.

fulfilment of the law for us by Christ, he accepts us to life and the reward of glory, as if we had fulfilled the law by our own personal righteousness. Because the Jesuit sees that he cannot impugn this true opinion, he is unwilling to understand it; but purposely turns away, to fight with shadows and dreams of his own devising. We do not then suppose one to be just because another is just; as we neither say, that one suffers for the expiation of his sins, because another suffers; but we teach, that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us, and that we are dealt with as if we were inherently just: even as also the passion of Christ is imputed to us and in respect of it we are so dealt with, as if we ourselves had paid the penalty due to our sins. And this is the meaning of Protestants when they maintain, that the righteousness of Christ is equivalent to a formal cause in man's justification.

4. God, by his decree, (because man was weak through sin) transferred the fulfilling of the law to Christ the God-man, and willed that that obedience and righteousness, which Christ performed in our flesh, should become ours by imputation. Therefore, his imputed righteousness supplies the place of formal or inherent righteousness, which we were bound by the law of our first Creation to have, but which we have not. The inference is sufficiently valid. The antecedent is proved by many testimonies of Scripture. Rom. viii. 3, 4: *What the law could not do, in that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh; that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh,* &c. The sense of the place is this: That Christ, being sent by the Father, frees all the regenerate from the condemning power of the law and sin; and engrafts them into himself, sustaining the penalty in our stead, which we could not sustain, fulfilling in our behalf the law which we could not fulfill; and thus we are reckoned to have fulfilled in Christ the whole demand of the law; because we have undergone both the punishment for our sins which the law intended, and, at the same time also, performed that exact obedience which it demands. To this passage we may join that other, Rom. x. 3, 4: *Being ignorant of the righteousness of God, and going*

*about to establish their own righteousness, they have not submitted themselves to the righteousness of God. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth.* This end, of which the Apostle speaks, is the primary intention of the law, namely, to justify man, and bring him to life by the observance of the same. But because, through our corruption, it rather effects the contrary in us, Christ comes to our relief, and by his obedience, performed in the name of all believers, comes in and fulfils the primary end of the law; that is, he justifies his people and leads them to everlasting life. Lastly, Paul proves the same opinion in Gal. iv. 4, 5: *When the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons.* The Apostle most clearly teaches, that Christ was made subject to the law, not for himself, but for us; whence it will follow, that the fruit of his obedience redounds to us; which is the same as that the righteousness of Christ, or his perfect fulfilling of the law, is imputed to us. Hence Chrysostom, Homil. 13, upon Romans, on the words THAT THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF THE LAW MIGHT BE FULFILLED IN US, asks, *What is this righteousness? The end, the destination, the very perfection of the work. For what did that law require? What did it command? That you should be without sin. This then is performed for us by Christ; and the overcoming was his, but the receiving the fruit of the victory is ours.* And Theodoret on those words (Rom. x. 4.) CHRIST IS THE END OF THE LAW, observes, *Faith in Christ is not contrary to the law, but quite accordant with it; for the law brings us to Christ the Lord. And whoever believes in Christ the Lord, the same fulfils the design of the law.* How so? but because that by faith he becomes a partaker of that righteousness, namely Christ's, which fully satisfies the law. Let these things suffice to shew, that Christ the Mediator has not only rendered penal satisfaction, but a meritorious fulfilment of the law, on our behalf; and that both are imputed to us by God the Father, for obtaining the effect of perfect justification.

5. Scripture recognises the righteousness of Christ as become ours, but this cannot be understood otherwise than by

imputation, for if this most perfect righteousness become ours through imputation, no other reason can be assigned for it, than that it supplies the place of that perfect righteousness which we are bound to have in ourselves, and have not. The righteousness of Christ imputed in justification supplies the place of a formal cause. The passages of Scripture which clearly indicate that this very righteousness, which, though it inheres in Christ, and has been performed by Christ, yet is applied or imputed to us for justification, are many.

First, *Christ is made unto us righteousness;* &c., 1 Cor. i. 30. He does not say that Christ has infused into us by his Spirit a certain inchoate righteousness, which he might have said with truth; but that he is *made unto us righteousness;* to intimate, that that most perfect righteousness, which he had in himself, becomes ours by application and imputation. Bellarmine replies,*—*Christ's righteousness is said to be ours, not because we are just by that righteousness which is in Christ being imputed to us; but because it is the efficient cause of our righteousness.* If Bellarmine thinks that we are to set it down that believers are just by that righteousness which is in Christ, as if inherently just by it, he falls back to his own follies, and does not understand our sentiment, though we have often explained it. But his setting these two statements, as if contradictory one to the other—namely, that *Christ is the efficient cause of our inherent righteousness,* and that *we are accounted just through our inherent righteousness*—is most iniquitous. For Christ deigns to impart both benefits to us. By imputation, he gives us his righteousness, whereby we stand pleasing and acceptable unto God, and perfectly justified according to the rigour of the law. By infusion, he implants within us inchoate righteousness, or holiness, by which we are rendered capable of works of piety. But because this righteousness does not attain legal perfection in this life, though we must exercise the latter, we must rely upon the former. Athanasius speaks admirably,† *Christ has brought into the world a righteousness free from all sin; because, we are made partakers of which, we shall live, we shall be saved.* Bel-

* De Justif. lib. 2. cap. 10. † De Incarn. Verbi Dei.

larmine perceives that this his first reason does not sufficiently explain the meaning of the Apostle; he therefore adds, that *Christ is made unto us righteousness, inasmuch as he satisfied the Father for us, and bestowed upon us that satisfaction*; and in this sense he admits that Christ's righteousness is imputed to us, *provided it be not denied, that there is besides in us inherent righteousness, to which in the just judgment of God, not punishment but glory is due.* See how the force of truth has almost constrained Bellarmine to bow, though with unwilling neck, to the Protestant doctrine! But I reply: If Christ is made our righteousness, because he has satisfied God the Father for us, and has bestowed this satisfaction upon us, why may we not equally extend this imputed satisfaction of Christ to the righteousness of the law performed in our name, as we do to the curse of the law which he bore on our behalf? For Christ in both ways satisfied the law, and each satisfaction is in its nature imputable. But Bellarmine, notwithstanding this concession of his, is careful of its being denied that this inherent righteousness is in us. This has never been denied by us, and never will. But he wishes such a righteousness to be allowed to exist, for which by the just judgment of God, not punishment, but glory may be due. This too, in a sound sense, we grant. For punishment is not due to that righteousness which the Holy Spirit hath infused, but to unrighteousness or indwelling sin, which is found together with this righteousness, in every regenerate person. Not inherent righteousness then itself, but the defects and sins cleaving to it, cause the regenerate to deserve punishment and be unworthy of glory, if they are judged according to this their righteousness, and not according to the righteousness of Christ, mercifully bestowed upon and imputed to them.

A second passage, whence it is proved that the righteousness of Christ is made ours by imputation is, 2 Cor. v. 21: *For he who knew no sin, was made sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.* In this text we have both included: that which was ours being imputed to Christ, and that which was Christ's being imputed to us in return. Here Bellarmine is in a wretched puzzle, and the more he struggles to extricate, the more he

entangles, himself. He answers, first,* *Christ is not said to be sin, neither are our sins imputed to him, as if he could himself be counted unrighteous; but they are imputed to him only so far as regards the debt of satisfying for them. Thus also his righteousness is imputed to us, as regards the satisfaction which he performed for us; but not that we can on that account be esteemed just and immaculate, if the defilements of sin truly adhere to us.*

I reply, we do not teach, that our sins are so imputed to Christ, that he should for that reason be constituted inherently unrighteous, or a sinner; but because in the view and regard of the righteousness performed by him, God so accounts us and deals with us, as if we were formally righteous; therefore we lay it down that the righteousness of Christ is most truly imputed to us by God the Father. I add also, that, as Christ, although the defilement of our sins was imputed to him, yet remained pure and righteous; so we also, although the most pure righteousness of Christ is imputed to us, yet may remain in ourselves polluted and defiled by many stains of sins.

But to avoid [the doctrine of such an] imputation, Bellarmine brings three different explanations of the last cited passage:—

First—*We are said to be the righteousness of God in Christ, because he is our head; and what is proper to the head is proper also to the members; not as they are distinct from the head, but as they make one, and are one with the head itself. As then he is called sin, not because he is formally a sinner; but because he is our head, and would have our sins to be his to make satisfaction for them; so we are called the righteousness of God in* HIM, *not in ourselves; not because* WE *are formally righteous by his righteousness, but because we are his members.* This exposition would suit the passage well enough, if Bellarmine did not understand all those things which pertain to Christ's human righteousness, of his Divine righteousness. For we do not suppose that Christ's righteousness is imputed to us, as we are considered out of Christ, or disunited from Christ our head, but considered as incor-

* De Justif. lib. 2. cap. 10.

porated into him, and members under him as our head. But, in his after remark—*Neither was Christ made a sinner formally by the imputation of our sin, nor are we formally made righteous, by the communication of his righteousness:* if by *formally* is to be understood *inherently*, he does but founder upon his old error, and wander from the true meaning of the question: but if he would imply that this righteousness is not so imputed to man, that God, in the view of its bestowal upon us, deals with us as if we were formally and inherently righteous, he was bound to prove the point, not merely to assert it; for we have shewn the contrary to be the fact.

Another way of explaining the passage is, that *by the righteousness of God is meant the righteousness inherent in us, which is called God's because it is bestowed upon us by God; and it is said to be effected in Christ, because it is bestowed through the merit of Christ.* He makes Augustine the author of this exposition. I am aware that that most learned Father, when answering Pelagius (who thought that this inherent grace was unnecessary) does sometimes make many passages refer to it, which should more properly be understood of the gratuitous favour of God, and the righteousness of Christ. But Augustine did this with less prejudice to the truth, because he everywhere teaches, that this inherent righteousness is imperfect, and therefore that we must not trust to this infused grace, but to his mercy who infused it, and his obedience who merited its infusion. As to the Apostle's words, they cannot bear this interpretation, unless forcedly. For he who explains the righteousness of God to be righteousness inherent in man; and the righteousness in Christ, to be righteousness apart from Christ, bestowed upon others through his merit; does not bring out the proper meaning of the words, but propounds an opinion of his own under colour of these words. Besides, Augustine himself, upon this very passage,* WE ARE MADE THE RIGHTEOUSNESS OF GOD IN HIM, *says, Observe two things: the righteousness of God, not ours; in him, not in ourselves.* I oppose therefore, this perspicuous and plain interpretation, to that before mentioned, which is more obscure and forced.

* De Verbi. Apost. Serm. 6.

A third way of explaining it is,—*Our inherent righteousness is said to be the righteousness of God, by a figure, because it is the image and effect of Divine righteousness.* But this figurative exposition affords no reason, why our inherent righteousness is said to be in Christ; yet in these words especially the force of this testimony rests.

To dismiss then the complicated and figurative expositions of Bellarmine, take the most elegant and true one of our own Anslem, upon this very passage—GOD HATH MADE *Christ sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him: He therefore was made sin, like as we are made righteousness; not our own but God's; that is, not from ourselves, but from God; not in ourselves, but in Christ; so he is made sin, not his own, but ours; not in himself, but in us,* &c.—This place therefore manifestly proves the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness.

A third passage is Philip. iii. 9, *That I might be found in him, not having my own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith.* The Apostle here teaches what that righteousness is, upon which we must rely before God; namely that which is apprehended by faith. But this is imputed righteousness. He also shews the cause why it is made *ours* by right; namely, because we are Christ's, and are found in Christ. Because then we are engrafted into his body, and are united with him into one person, therefore his righteousness is reckoned *ours.*

Thus much for our *fifth* argument, derived from the very words of Scripture.

6. Those who have put on Christ, and the righteousness of Christ, being thereby pleasing to God, and accepted to life eternal, in them this imputed righteousness, so far as regards the benefit of justification, is equivalent to the formal cause:* but all believers have so put on Christ and the righteousness of Christ. For, being endowed and clothed with this, they are accounted as saints, and without spot in the sight of God. The Apostle, in Galat. iii. 26, 27, says, *Ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus.*

* Vide Newman, Note, p. 410.

*For as many of you as have been baptised into Christ have put on Christ.* So in Ephes. i. 6; *He hath accepted us*, or, *we are accepted, in his beloved Son.* That inchoate righteousness then which we receive, is not sufficient to render us acceptable to God for life eternal; but we must appear before him clad in the garments of our elder brother, as Jacob of old, clad in the raiment of his brother, obtained his father's blessing. To this Bernard alludes, Serm. 61, upon Canticles: *Lord I will make mention of thy righteousness alone, for it is mine too. How can I fear that it should not suffice for us both? It is not that narrow cloak which cannot cover two.** *Thy righteousness is for ever, and will equally cover thee and me, being abundantly large, and an eternal righteousness.* Bellarmine answers:†—*That the similitude of a garment most aptly suits our inherent righteousness; first, because it is not natural, but comes from without, from the bestowal of the Spirit. Secondly, because garments distinguish men, so that they are known one from another; and this inherent righteousness through good works distinguishes the godly from the ungodly. Thirdly, because to clothe, according to the Hebrew phrase, is to cover copiously or abundantly, but the regenerate are copiously replenished with faith, hope, love, and inherent holiness.*

I answer:—We do not affirm that the similitude of a garment cannot be applied to infused righteousness. Bellarmine therefore is here labouring in vain; but we say, with the Apostle, that we put on both, namely, Christ himself, and the righteousness of Christ; because God gives us Christ himself, and with Christ, this his righteousness: for *He who delivered up his Son for us, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?* Rom. viii. 26. We are said also to put on the gifts of sanctification, and all those things which pertain to infused righteousness: See Coloss. iii. 10, 12.—But most senseless is the inference of Bellarmine, that, Because we put on infused righteousness by the gift of the Spirit of Christ, therefore we do not put on Christ himself, and the righteousness of Christ; for the two things are interwoven, and no one is made a partaker of

* Isai. xxviii. 20. † De Justif. lib. 2. cap. 11.

the inherent, who is not at the same time made a partaker of the imputed. Bellarmine, however, himself at length admits, that *this similitude of a garment may very properly, in a sound way, be attributed to imputed righteousness.* But what is that sound way? *Namely, by referring it to the righteousness of Christ, as far as it was satisfactory for sin; but not so far as it was justificatory as a formal cause.* But it has been before shewn, that Christ not only made satisfaction for us, by undergoing the penalty of the cross, but also by taking upon himself the burden of the law. He therefore who admits the imputed righteousness of Christ, as to the former, ought to grant it also as to the latter. For, if that former part be satisfactory in the place of the punishment which we ought to have undergone, and yet do not; the latter will be justificatory in the place of that perfect obedience, which we ought to have performed and yet have not. We do not say then, that we are perfectly righteous formally, because Christ was perfectly righteous; but that this perfect righteousness of his is no less imputed to us, than the satisfaction purchased by his suffering. Being clothed therefore with this righteousness through the gift of God, and the application of faith, it is no less profitable for our justification, than the formally inherent would be; in this sense we call it the formal cause of our justification.

7. He who is made surety for us, and took the payment of our whole debt upon himself, his obedience and righteousness are imputed to us, and being imputed avail equally as if they had been our own and inherent in us. But the Apostle testifies, that Christ was appointed and accepted by God for our Surety, in Heb. vii. 22: *Jesus is made the Surety of a better covenant.* As soon then as this surety, as bondsman, shall have performed anything in our name, that is imputed to us by God. But Christ (as was before observed) not only underwent the sufferings of the Cross in our name, but even the fulfilment of the law. When, therefore, I am called into judgment, and the debt of the law is required from me, I shew that my bondsman has paid this debt, and thus delivered me, and that hand-writing with which I was bound is *blotted out* and *abrogated*, as the Apostle speaks, Col. ii. 14. And thus the righteousness of Christ avails to me for justification, the same as if it was found in myself, or had been

performed by me; and this is what is meant by standing in place of a formal cause. Hence we are said to be *complete in Christ*, not in ourselves, verse 10.

8. Those Scriptures which assert that faith itself is imputed to us for justification, plainly indicate that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to believers. For faith, considered as a quality, can no more be imputed for righteousness, than other qualities infused by the same Spirit; but it must be necessarily understood thus, viz. as far as it apprehends its own object, namely Christ with his saving righteousness, and applies it to the believer. The passages bearing upon this point are these:—*To him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is imputed for righteousness;* Rom. iv. 5. And in Rom. x. 5, 6, the righteousness which is of the law, and the righteousness which is of faith, are opposed. *Abraham believed God, and it was imputed to him for righteousness;* Gal. iii. 6; God *justified the heathen through faith*, verse 8; and very many such like testimonies occur. From which we conclude, that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to believers, when they apprehend it by true faith.

Bellarmine rejects our explanation for two reasons: First, he says,* that *this interpretation is at variance with the Apostle's meaning, who affirms, that this very faith is imputed for righteousness; but faith is not the imputed righteousness of Christ, but a quality inherent in us.* This objection is frivolous enough, for nothing is more common, than to attribute to the appropriating cause, that which properly and immediately pertains to the thing appropriated. Hence because faith apprehends and applies the righteousness of Christ to us, there is attributed to faith itself, what is due in reality to Christ. Secondly, he says, that *the word* TO IMPUTE *denotes not a bare accounting, but an accounting to which there is in reality a corresponding truth; but if it be assumed that we are reckoned righteous on account of Christ's righteousness imputed to us, it will be a bare imagination of righteousness to which there is no corresponding truth.* When God reckons us just through faith, the truth which answers to this Divine reckoning, is

* De Justif. lib. 2. cap. 9.

not the righteousness of Christ formally inherent in us, but the righteousness of Christ really imparted and bestowed upon us by the Divine appointment. If God, because he imputes the righteousness of Christ to us, should regard us as inherently righteous, the judgment of God (which it would be impious to say) would err, and there would be an apprehension of something in the Divine mind, to which there was no corresponding truth. But surely, if, on account of this imputation, he reckons us freed from the condemnation of sin, accepted to the kingdom of glory,—in one word, if he were so to treat us, as if we were possessed of inherent righteousness—here there would be no error, no false imagination; because it is in the power of God, for the sake of Christ, really to confer these benefits upon all believers, who apprehend him, and are united to him, as members to the head. Against this stone then, Bellarmine is always stumbling, namely, in supposing justification to be false and imaginary, if it is not founded in our inherent righteousness: since that too can be true and real which is based on the righteousness of Christ, and made over to us according to the efficacious and gracious appointment of God.

9. Christ's imputed righteousness is either the formal cause of our justification, or is merely introduced at the commencement of justification, in order to procure for us another formal cause, that is to say, inherent love. But it is an established point, that this righteousness, or this merit of Christ, is not brought forward merely on our first justification, as they call it; but is always being presented to the Divine justice, in such a way, that from regard to it, we may not only be received into favour at the commencement, but may also abide in it, and at length arrive safe at the end of grace, namely, the attainment of glory.

The Papists acknowledge the force of this distinction; and hence affirm, that the righteousness of Christ is profitable for this end, that on account of it the mercy of God infuses into us the quality of inherent righteousness; which righteousness afterwards justifies us before God, that is, makes us by its own worth so perfectly righteous, dear to, and beloved of God, that from hence we are accepted as his sons, and heirs of eternal glory; the farther imputation of Christ's righteousness, or the favourable acceptance of God,

for the sake of it, ceasing. So Bonaventura, who maintains* that the causality of justification, or of remission of sins, applies to the death or resurrection of Christ, not *properly*, but only *by way of intervening merit*,† which is resolved into the material cause; but the formal cause he determines to be infused charity itself. Vasquez asserts,‡ that besides the imputation of the merits of Christ for obtaining grace, there is not required another imputation for obtaining in reality eternal life; and therefore that we do not expect another imputation of the merits of Christ, besides that by which at the beginning we received grace and virtue for working and meriting rightly. He brings as a reason, that after grace is infused, our works are so perfectly meritorious of eternal life, that it cannot justly be denied to them. Vainly, therefore, do we require, after inherent grace, the continued imputation of Christ's righteousness. The Scripture, however, refutes these dreams of proud men, and shews that we stand in need of the righteousness of the Mediator and the favour of God, not only for obtaining inherent grace from the beginning, but also that afterwards, through the whole period of our lives, we may be accounted, and may continue acceptable to God. Admirably does the Apostle teach this, Rom. v. First, if it is asked, through what means we have been brought into the Divine favour, and justified from the beginning, the Apostle answers (verse 1) *Being justified by faith we have peace through Christ;* and hence our first *access*, or (verse 2) προσαγωγή into the favour and grace of God. But after we have been received into favour, our sins having been remitted, do we continue in the favour of God by our own righteousness? Nay, as we have *access* into this grace through faith, so we continually *stand* in the same, through the same faith and the same Christ. (Ibid.)

But, although faith, of mere grace, for the sake of Christ, gives us access and continued standing in the Divine favour; yet have we not acceptance to glory, for the sake of our works or inherent righteousness; not merely for the sake of the Mediator and by his righteousness? No: not even this is conceded by the Apostle; for (says he) *By faith we rejoice*

* In sent. lib. 3 dist. 19, quæst. 1. † See Newman, p. 406.
‡ In 1. 2. quæst. 114. disp. 222. cap. 3.

*in hope of the glory of God:* that is, as we have access by faith into grace through Christ, so by the same faith we expect glory through Christ also.

10. The imputed righteousness of Christ, in Romish opinion, is nothing else than the righteousness of Christ applied to and bestowed upon us, to produce some spiritual effect.* For, when God with regard to, or in consideration of this righteousness in us, vouchsafes to do anything in us, or to determine anything respecting us, as if it were our own, then he is said to impute this righteousness to us.† But righteousness so applied and bestowed upon us, although it does not inhere in the way of a physical form, yet it takes the place and has the efficacy of a formal cause, from the appointment of God, and its acceptance with him; because it is considered and accepted as ours. Hence this same and alone righteousness of Christ, considered in itself, and in its own worth, is the meritorious cause of human justification: but, considered as far as it is imputed, bestowed, and applied as his own to every one who believes and is engrafted into Christ, it takes the place of the formal cause. In the mean time, we do not deny, that the form of infused righteousness inheres in us; but because that form is only inchoate, it renders only inchoately righteous. God, therefore, who justifies only on the ground of an absolute righteousness, regards the righteousness of Christ, which alone is such; and deigns to impute it to the members of Christ; which when done he deals with them and resolves concerning them as if it were originally their own. And this is to make the righteousness of Christ the formal cause of our justification.

11. But if there be, as it is objected, only one δικαίωμα, *righteousness*, which can avail to justification of life, and that is the obedience of Christ alone; then it is certain that δικαίωσιν, or justification, pertains to no one who is not a partaker of this δικαίωμα, or righteousness. And yet this the Apostle asserts in express words; Rom. v. 18: *As by the offence of one upon all to condemnation*, (supply, *judgment came;*) *so by the righteousness of one upon all men unto justification of life*, (supply, *the free gift came.*) Justification of life therefore comes not upon us from any quality inherent

* Vide Newman, p. 408.
† Vide Vasq. disp. 222. cap. 4.

in ourselves, but from the complete righteousness of the Mediator, bestowed upon and imparted to us. Our inherent righteousness has not in itself δικαίωμα, that is, a complete and absolute perfection of righteousness ; it therefore cannot produce justification of life in us, which is the most perfect effect of the most perfect cause. Hence the righteousness of Christ is to us in the place of a formal cause, forming thereby a ground of justification.

There is no need of more arguments. We shall now produce the testimonies of the Fathers, who have either denied to our inherent righteousness the virtue of justifying us, or have attributed the same to the righteousness of Christ imputed to us.

## CHAPTER XXIX.

### TESTIMONIES OF THE FATHERS AGAINST INHERENT, AND IN SUPPORT OF IMPUTED RIGHTEOUSNESS.

Since our adversaries charge our opinion with novelty, and boast that all the Fathers are on their side ; we will now see whether the allegation be correct or not. And I will observe, that all those deny to inherent righteousness the power of justifying, first, who teach the imperfection of inherent righteousness, and maintain that it is stained with sin in every militant person ; for a righteousness defiled by sin cannot become a formal cause of justification before God. Secondly, those who deny justification to the good works of the regenerate ; for that he who is deficient in *acts* of righteousness should be justified by the *habit*, is opposed to common sense. Thirdly, those who ascribe justification to faith alone and to mercy ; for this is the same as if they should bid us to seek justification in the favour of God, through, and for the sake of the merits of Christ. Lastly, such as expressly send us to Christ for righteousness ; for this is to refer us to imputed righteousness ; since it is plain that the same is not inherent in ourselves.

The testimonies which pertain to the first class I shall treat either not at all, or sparingly, because they were very numerously brought forward under a former head;* the rest we shall produce indiscriminately, as they offer themselves.

1. We begin with the most ancient Father, Justin. He, in the book inscribed Ἔκθεσις πίστεως, that is, *an Exposition of the Faith*, has these words: *The Son of God, as man, passed a life removed from all crime, and underwent a voluntary death;* διὰ μὲν τῆς ἄκρας πολιτείας αφανίζων το παράπτωμα διὰ δὲ τοῦ μὴ χρεώστουμενου θανάτου καταργῶν τὸ ὀφειλομενον: that is, *obliterating sin by a perfect and sinless conversation, and abolishing our debt by a debt that he owed not.* Justin Martyr here plainly teaches, not only that the death and satisfaction of Christ are imputed to us for the blotting out of our punishment, but that his conversation itself, or active obedience, is imputed to us, for the obliteration of our sin.

2. Irenæus, adversus Hæreses, lib. 5, cap. 14. *To him whom we offended in the first Adam, by not performing his command, we are reconciled in the second Adam, by our being made obedient unto death.* And again, in cap. 18, *The Lord has restored us to friendship by his incarnation, being made the Mediator between God and man; both propitiating the Father for us, against whom we had sinned, and making amends for our disobedience; bestowing moreover upon us that conversation and obedience which is due to our Maker.* Where it is to be observed, that Irenæus says, that we were made obedient to God even unto death, and thus reconciled to him. For what Christ our Mediator and Surety did, that is deemed ours by imputation. Next we must mark also what he adds, that Christ has bestowed upon us that conversation and obedience which he exhibited to God. What else is this than the obedience of Christ both active and passive, made ours by imputation and bestowal?

3. Clemens Alexandrinus, Pædag. lib. 1, cap 6. *The one and universal salvation of mankind is faith.* I ask, why faith, rather than love, or inherent righteousness? Why, but because faith apprehends the righteousness of the Mediator, in which alone is placed the hope of human salvation; seeing that all our virtues and the works of our virtues, are imperfect and defiled.

* See Chap. xix.

4. Origen, in 3 ad Rom.—*We judge that man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law. The justification of faith alone is sufficient; so that he who only believes is justified, although no work shall have been completed by him.* A little after, *Man is justified through faith, to whose justification the works of the law conduce nothing.* Bellarmine* replies to this testimony, that Origen excludes the necessity of external works, when indeed, either the power or the opportunity of working is wanting; but he does not exclude love or repentance,—which inference he draws from his words in chap. 4: *To those who believe in Christ, but have not put off the old man with his deeds, faith cannot be reckoned for righteousness.* I answer: It is true that inherent righteousness, or the good works flowing from it, are not excluded, so that they can be absent from the justified person; yet they are so excluded, that the cause of his justification does not depend upon them. Faith, separated from holiness is not true and living; and therefore cannot be reckoned for justification; but holiness of life, and the works of righteousness, shew the faith itself to be justifying; but they do not contain the very cause of justification. Hence this same Origen (in 3 ad Romanos) says, *Who will boast about his own righteousness, when he hears God saying, that all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags? The only great boasting then is, by the faith of the cross of Christ, which excludes all that boasting which arises from the works of the law.* Origen, then, requires righteousness, but acknowledges that it is defiled with sin; and therefore, that, in the article of justification, we must rest upon the faith of the cross alone, not trust to our inherent righteousness.

5. Cyprian, Epist lib. 2. epist. 3. *If Abraham believed God, and it was imputed to him for righteousness; surely, whosoever believes God and lives by faith, is found just, and is shewn to have been, long since, blessed and justified in faithful Abraham.* He clearly places the power of justifying in faith; which cannot be understood otherwise, than as faith apprehends, and applies to us, Christ our righteousness. He however refuses to attribute the same to inherent righteousness, when he says,† *Nor let any one so flatter*

* De Justif. lib. 1. cap. 5. † In lib. de Eleemosyn.

*himself about his pure and immaculate heart, as that, relying upon his own innocence, he should think there was no need of applying the medicine to his wounds; seeing it is written,* WHO WILL BOAST THAT HE HAS A CLEAN HEART? WHO WILL GLORY THAT HE IS PURE FROM HIS SIN?* *But if no one can be without sin, then whoever shall say that he is blameless, is either proud or foolish: How necessary, how kind, is the Divine clemency, which, knowing that there must needs be some wounds to be healed, gave saving remedies for healing and curing those wounds!* So far Cyprian. I have transcribed the entire passage, because it overturns, from the very foundations, the presumption that we are justified by an inherent righteousness. For if they who continually bear about with them defiled hearts; who are never found free from some wound of conscience; who are always in need of Divine forbearance and the continual healing of their diseases; who, in short, must be either proud or foolish, if they profess themselves to be blameless: if, I say, these same persons should proceed still further, and profess themselves to be justified by this defiled, diseased, and mercy-needing righteousness of theirs, they will thus prove themselves completely senseless or infatuated. —I shall add a third passage from Cyprian:†—*How wholesome is the admonition that we are sinners, who are compelled to ask the forgiveness of our sins, that whilst pardon is sought from God, the mind may remember its guilt! Lest any one should flatter himself as though he were innocent, and perish the sooner by exalting himself, he is instructed and taught that he sins daily, by being daily commanded to pray for the pardon of his sins.* Let the Jesuits explain, if they can, how that man can stand formally justified by his inherent righteousness—that is, purged from sin, worthy of heaven, and that without any intervention of mercy, or a fresh imputation of the merits of Christ—who is not found, even for a moment of time, innocent or free from sin; whose daily supplication to God is, *Forgive me my trespasses;* who never can say, I am clean from sin, reconciled to God, and worthy of eternal life, through that righteousness or holiness which is within himself.

* Proverbs xx. 9. † De Orat. Domin.

6. Athanasius, on *the Incarnation of the Word of God*, against Paul of Samosata,* says, *It is impossible that purity and innocence should be exhibited by human nature, unless God is believed to have been in the flesh, who brought into the world a righteousness free from all sin; by becoming partakers of which we shall live and be saved. For that saying*, THERE IS NOT A JUST MAN UPON EARTH WHO DOETH GOOD AND SINNETH NOT, *pertains to all men in common. Hence He came down from heaven, who was to bestow immaculate righteousness from himself.* See how clearly he distinguishes the righteousness of Christ from the righteousness of all others. His righteousness is pure and free from all sin; but that of all others is contaminated by sin. Then he teaches perspicuously that we are made partakers of eternal life and salvation by our being made partakers of this immaculate righteousness. Lastly, he declares, in the concluding words, that this participation consists in the gratuitous bestowal of the same. But because Athanasius does not use the word *imputation* in this place, we shall add another testimony from him.

The same Author, when reasoning against those who deny that the Saviour so assumed our nature as to be offered up for it in the character of its first fruits,† says, *We must believe the holy Scriptures, must acknowledge Him to be the first fruits from among our race, must celebrate his singular love to human kind, in taking it upon himself; nor fear the curse of the law, but ascribe*, or *impute, to the whole mass that fulfilling of the law which was wrought by the first fruits*: τὴν πληρωσιν τοῦ νόμου, τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀπαρχῆς γενομένην, ὅλῳ λογίζεσθαι τῷ φυράματι. Athanasius is disputing in this place against those who denied that the Saviour took upon himself the first fruits of our nature; and he clearly affirms that the fulfilling of the law wrought by Christ in our nature is imputed to us; and he uses the very same word, namely, λογίζεσθαι, which Paul also uses, Rom. iv. 4, 5. If

* PAUL, Bishop of SAMOSATA in Syria, flourished in the latter part of the 3rd Century. See *Exposition of the Epistle to the Colossians*, vol. 1. p. 413; or Soames's *Mosheim*, vol. 1. p. 268.

† The original of this sentence is simply — adverseus eos qui negant Servatorem ex natura nostra sumpsisse primitias; but such a paraphrastic version, as is given above, seemed necessary to render the passage intelligible to an English reader.

this righteousness of Christ fulfilling the law, which was perfect in all its parts, be imputed to us, who is so insane as to place his justification in his own imperfect and spotted righteousness, rather than in this finished righteousness?

7. Basil, in his Homily on Humility, says, *Perfect and entire boasting in God is this,—not when a man is extolled for his own righteousness, but when he knows that he is in want of true righteousness, and is justified by faith alone in Christ:* Ἱσχυὶ δὲ μόνῃ τῇ εἰς χριστον δεδικαιωμένον. Observe, I pray you, first, that Basil does not deny inherent righteousness to man; secondly, that he acknowledges this righteousness is not entire, that is, not legally exact, and free from all stain; and then, in fine, for this very reason, places human justification in faith alone. He then, did not think even the regenerate themselves formally justified by their inherent righteousness.

8. Gregory of Nyssa, de Beatitudine Orat. 4. upon those words, Mat. v. 6—BLESSED ARE THEY WHO HUNGER AFTER RIGHTEOUSNESS, observes: *By the mention of righteousness, the Lord, who is made of God to us, Wisdom, and Righteousness, and Sanctification, and Redemption, seems to me to set forth himself as the object of eager desire to his hearers.** He acknowledges therefore, that not any infused quality, but Christ, fed upon by faith, is that righteousness after which we ought to hunger, for the justification and salvation of our souls. See Homily 2nd. upon the Song of Songs.

9. Hilary, Canone† 8 in Matt. pag. 164, says, *That has been remitted by Christ, which the Law was not able to relax; for faith alone justifies.* And lib. 10 de Trinitate, § 68: *Faith perfects the just, according to what is written, Abraham believed God, and it was imputed to him for righteousness.* The Jesuits are accustomed to ascribe justification to faith, but not to it alone. Hilary rebukes this error, when he says, *Faith alone justifies.* They attribute the beginning of justification to faith, but not the consummation; but he, far otherwise, declares, *Faith alone perfects.*

* Seipsum audientium appetitui proponere. Orig.

† This was the old title given to the Chapters of Hilary's Comment on St. Matthew; but, in the opinion of the Benedictine Editors, incorrectly;—nullum quidem M.S. codicem vidimus, in quo occurrat hoc Canonis vocabulum. Admonitio §. 14 prefixed.

10. Ambrose, Epist. 71. *Let no one glory in his works, because no one is justified by his works; but he who is just hath it bestowed upon him, because after the laver he is justified. Faith, therefore, is that which frees, through the blood of Christ, because* BLESSED IS HE WHOSE SIN IS FORGIVEN, AND WHO HAS PARDON BESTOWED UPON HIM. Ambrose asserts that our justification depends upon faith, upon pardon, upon cleansing; but he never presumes to rest it upon works, or the worth of any quality inherent in us, as its meritorious or formal cause.

The same Father, speaking of Jacob, and de Vita Beatæ, lib. 1. cap. 6, says, *I will not boast that I am just, but I will boast that I am redeemed; I will boast not that I am free from sin, but that my sins are forgiven me. I will not boast that I have done good, nor that any one hath profited me; but that Christ is my Advocate with the Father, and that the blood of Christ was shed for me.* And lib. 2, cap. 2. upon those words, Gen. xxvii. 27,—*He smelled the smell of his raiment*, observes:—*Perhaps he means that we are not justified by works, but by faith; since the infirmity of the flesh is an impediment to works, but the brightness of faith shadows the error of our deeds, and gains the pardon of our sins.* See how widely Ambrose differs from the Jesuits. The former affirms that, not even the regenerate themselves can boast that they are just; but the latter are constantly urging that they are so just, that nothing remains in them which hath the character or nature of sin. The former always puts his trust in Redemption, remission, and the shedding of the Redeemer's blood; but the latter teach indeed that we need this remission, and this blood to merit for us inherent righteousness; but when that is obtained they bid farewell to the merit and favour of Christ, and boast that through this quality itself, and works flowing from it, they merit the Divine favour and, in fact, heaven itself. In fine, Ambrose says, that we are justified by faith, because the infirmity of the flesh hinders our being justified by works; but the Jesuits attribute the beginning of justification to faith, but the perfection of justification they derive from works. And whence this difference of opinion, but that they endeavour to establish their own righteousness, whilst he reposes on the righteousness of Christ?

11. Chrysostom, Homil. 3, on the 2nd Chapter to Titus, says; *If thou trustest to faith, why dost thou bring in other dependencies, as if faith alone was not sufficient to justify? Why dost thou subject thyself to a voluntary bondage, and thrust thy neck under the yoke of the Law? Do you not trust to grace? That truly is a mark of unbelief*, &c. The same appeal might be made no less to the Jesuits than was to the Jews; for they also distrust faith and Divine grace, and submit their necks to the yoke of the Law, on such a condition that unless they have in themselves an inherent righteousness which can satisfy the Law; unless they perform such good works as can merit celestial glory, they become exposed both to the curse of the Law, and to exclusion from the kingdom of heaven.

The same Father, upon Rom. iv. Hom. 8,* observes, *That a person destitute of works should be justified through faith, may not be considered as any thing remarkable; but that any one adorned with virtue and good works should nevertheless not be justified by them, but by faith alone, is indeed wonderful.* Chrysostom shews that Abraham himself, however conspicuous he was for virtue and works, yet was not justified by them, but by faith alone. It was not therefore, his opinion that either our habitual or actual righteousness is the cause of our justification, but Christ apprehended by faith.

12. Cyril of Alexandria upon the Gospel of John, lib. 11. cap. 25,—*As by the offence of the first man, as in the first fruits of our race, we have been sentenced to death; so by the obedience and righteousness of Christ, inasmuch as he subjected himself to the Law, although he was the author of the Law, the blessing and quickening which is by the Spirit has reached to our whole nature.* The most learned Cyril affirms, that through the obedience and righteousness of Christ, quickening comes to us: Which—what else is it, than that we are justified and saved by the obedience and righteousness of Christ communicated to us; not by our own righteousness or works? And he extends this righteousness of Christ not to the satisfaction only, but to the fulfilling of the law: which, we must observe is opposed to

* Vol. ix. p. 544, Edit. Paris. 1837.

the opinions of the Jesuits and others, who maintain that the *passive* obedience of Christ is imputed to us, not his *active* obedience.

13. Leo, Epist. 72 to Juvenal, says, *But that he might repair the life of all, he undertook the cause of all, and made void the force of the old hand-writing by paying for all; that as by the guilt of one, all were made sinners, so by the innocence of one, all might be made innocent; righteousness flowing upon man from him who had taken our nature upon him.* He expressly says, that the innocence of Christ is no less imputed to us than the guilt of Adam. As therefore that guilt is the cause of condemnation, so this righteousness of Christ, flowing to us, becomes the cause of our justification.

14. Jerome, advers. Pelag. ad Ctesiphontem: *In the sight of the all-seeing God, whom the secrets of the heart deceive not, no one is just. — — — They who seem to men to be holy, are by no means holy in the knowledge and understanding of God.* Since then it is God who justifies, let the Jesuits explain, how they can be justified through inherent righteousness, which appears in the Divine sight imperfect and defiled.

Also in writing against Pelagius, Dialog. lib. 1. Jerome observes,—*This is a man's wisdom to be conscious that he is imperfect; and, as I may say, the perfection of all the just, who are yet in the flesh, is imperfect.* Who would be so foolhardy as to trust in this imperfect righteousness, when he learns that the perfect righteousness of Christ is bestowed upon him?

The same Father, Dial. lib. 2, says; *He is just who is scarcely saved in the day of judgment; but he would be saved easily if he had no spot in him; therefore he is just, because he shines with many virtues; and he is scarcely saved because he needs in some things the mercy of God.* They who are defiled and need mercy are not formally justified, and worthy of heaven through inherent righteousness; but God deems them worthy of glory, through mercy, for Christ's sake.

The same Father again remarks, Dial. lib. 3. *If thou art holy, if innocent, if purged from all defilement, if thou hast sinned neither in word, nor deed; how is it that thou intreat-*

*est for mercy, so as to bewail thyself and pour forth prayers?* &c. This is a clear proof that no one is fully justified by his holiness, his innocence, or righteousness; because the conscience of all the saints compels them earnestly to supplicate God daily for the pardon of their sin and their unrighteousness.

15. Augustine, de Civit. Dei, lib. 10. cap. 22, observes—*The forgiveness of our sins is made through the Mediator Christ, by whom, he having effected the purgation of our sins, we are reconciled to God. For men are not separated from God, except by their sins, of which the purgation is made in this life, not by our own virtue but the Divine compassion; by his favour, not our own power: for that virtue whatever it is, which is called ours, is his; being bestowed upon us by his goodness. For we should attribute much to ourselves in this flesh, unless we lived as pardoned sinners, even to the time of the putting off of the flesh.* From this testimony, we collect two things against Vasquez, Bellarmine, and the rest of the Romanists. One, that remission of sins, and our reconciliation, is not proximately effected by infused grace or righteousness; but through the Divine mercy releasing us from the chains of our sins, on account of Christ's satisfaction imputed to us: for it is not the virtue of infused righteousness or love that washes from sin, but the blood-shedding of the Mediator:—the other, that all the regenerate, upon whom virtue or inherent grace is bestowed by the Divine goodness, yet, notwithstanding this inherent grace, live under pardon, even until the period of the putting off of the flesh. But that which leaves them in need of pardon does not formally justify them.

The same Father observes, in Enchirid. ad Laurent. cap. 41: *He was made sin that we might be made righteousness, and we are so; not our own, but the righteousness of God; not in ourselves, but in him; as he was made sin, not his own but ours; not in himself, but in us.* The very nature of the comparison manifestly proves, that, as the sin which was imputed to Christ unto death, was yet not in him, but in us; so the righteousness which is imputed unto us for justification of life, is not in us, but in him. Which being granted, it manifestly follows, that not our inherent righteousness, but the righteousness of Christ, bestowed, imputed,

and applied, supplies the place of the formal cause in our justification.

16. Gregory, upon Job. iii, lib. 5, cap. 7, writes, *Often our very righteousness, being brought to the examination of the Divine justice, is found to be unrighteousness; and that which shines brightly in the estimation of the doer, becomes base under the scrutiny of the Judge.* That which can be called unrighteousness, and which is not entirely freed from contamination, can by no means become a ground of justification. But, lest the Jesuits should glide away, as through a chink, by means of that little word *sæpe* (often), I annex another testimony of the same Gregory, more express and strong:—

In Job ix. lib. 9, cap. 14, upon those words (verse 15)—THOUGH I WERE RIGHTEOUS, YET WOULD I NOT ANSWER; BUT I WOULD MAKE SUPPLICATION TO MY JUDGE, he says, *As we have often declared, all human righteousness is proved to be unrighteousness, if it be strictly judged. Therefore prayer is needed after righteousness, that that which, if scrutinised might fail, may be made strong by the compassion alone of the Judge.* A little after: *Though I shall have attained to the practice of virtue, I grow strong for life, not from merits, but from pardon.* Let the Jesuits consider, whether these sentiments at all accord with the opinions of those who imagine, that our righteousness is so perfect as to need no intervention of favour, but that it can endure the strictest examination of the Judge, so as to avail to the obtaining eternal life: all such fancies Gregory directly opposes.

I add a third testimony from the same Father:*—*Our righteous Advocate will maintain that we are righteous in the judgment, because we both acknowledge and accuse ourselves as unrighteous. Let us then not confide in our tears, nor in our deeds, but in the pleading of our Advocate.* See in what our righteousness chiefly consists; namely, in the acknowledgment of unrighteousness. Consider also in what we must not trust; not to our righteousness, nor to our tears, nor to our deeds: in these there is no hope of our justification. Mark,

* Lib. 1. in Ezek. Hom.

in fine, in what we must trust, namely, in the pleading of our Advocate. But what does he plead for us? What, but that he underwent death in our name? that he fulfilled the law in our name? To confide, therefore, in this pleading, is nothing else than to confide in the righteousness of Christ imputed to us.

17. Bede, on Psal. lxxvii., p. 701, says: *Let the faithful place their hope in God: that is, let them not desire to establish their own righteousness, and not submit to the righteousness of God; but let their only hope be in the righteousness of God; because by the righteousness of deeds shall no one be justified, but by the alone righteousness of faith.* What is this righteousness of God, and righteousness of faith which he so much celebrates? It may be understood by the antithesis; for it is opposed to our righteousness, and the righteousness of our deeds. It can, therefore, be none other than the imputed righteousness of the Redeemer, apprehended and applied to ourselves by faith. For, if our habitual or inherent righteousness can justify us, then our actual righteousness, or the righteousness of works, can save us. Bede rejects both, and we also reject both, in the cause of justification and salvation; and we fly to the alone righteousness of faith, that is, to the obedience of Christ imputed to us.

18. I come to Bernard, who confirms our doctrine by many passages. In his Sermon ad Milit. Temp. cap. 11, he says: *Death is put to flight by the death of Christ, and the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us.* And in the same place: *Do you suppose that he who put on our flesh will deny his righteousness to us? Will he who suffered voluntarily, and was crucified voluntarily for us, withhold his righteousness only from us?* What can be plainer than that, in the judgment of Bernard, not the mere suffering, but the righteousness of Christ itself besides, is also imputed to us? For what end, I ask, unless that through it we may be justified? More testimonies could be brought from the same work of Bernard.

Upon the feast of All Saints also, Serm. 1, upon those words, BLESSED ARE THEY WHO HUNGER AFTER RIGHTEOUSNESS, FOR THEY SHALL BE FILLED, he says, *What can all human righteousness be before God? Will it not be accounted, according to the Prophet, as a filthy rag? And, if strictly*

*judged, will not all our righteousness be found as unrighteousness, and still less? What then is to become of our sins, when our very righteousness will not be able to answer for itself?* Let the Jesuits here put forth their acumen, and explain to us how that righteousness can justify us before God, which is vile even as a filthy rag; which, being examined, appears as unrighteousness; which cannot satisfy God? But let us hear from the same pen again, what that righteousness is which does justify us.

Upon the First Sunday after the Epiphany, Serm. 1, he remarks: *The water of another hath cleansed us, whom the fault of another had polluted. — It is another's fault, because we all have sinned in Adam at our birth; because, although in another, yet it is ourselves who have sinned, and it was imputed to us by the just, though secret judgment of God. However, that you may have no excuse to plead, O man, there is given thee, against the disobedience of Adam, the obedience of Christ; that if thou hast been sold gratis, thou hast been redeemed also gratis.*

We have, in this passage, imputation considered in both ways; the imputation of Adam's sin, which condemned us; the imputation also of the obedience of Christ, which justified us.

It would be tedious to add all the testimonies of Bernard, by which he sinks inherent righteousness and commends to us the imputed righteousness of Christ. I will merely refer to the passages themselves. Consult then Serm. 61, in Cantic., and Serm. 5 on the Dedication of the Temple; and Epistle 190 to Innocent; to say nothing of others.

19. Hugo de St. Victor, in quæst. circa Epist. ad Rom. quæst. 101, upon those words, ABRAHAM BELIEVED GOD, AND IT WAS COUNTED UNTO HIM FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS, remarks,—*If man had not sinned, he would have possessed every kind of righteousness, which consists in every kind of fulfilling of God's commands:—But after, and on account of sin, man could not acquire that perfect righteousness to which eternal happiness is deservedly due; but God of his grace gives faith to man, which he likewise reckons, through the same grace, in room of that perfection, just as if he were possessed of an entire righteousness.* He mentions three things which wholly overturn the doctrine of the Church of Rome

about justification: The first, that, after sin, no one possesses that righteousness which, in every way, fulfils the law; the second, which is a consequence of the former, that no one has a righteousness to which eternal happiness is due; the third, that, on this account, God reckons faith to every believer for righteousness. What else is this than to deny justification to the righteousness of believers, and to send them for it, to the obedience and righteousness of Christ, apprehended by faith?

20. William of Paris, in his book De Rhetorica Divina, cap. 21, introduces a believer conversing with Christ in this manner:—*This is the strength and confirmation of my cause, namely, thy own adorable and reverend holiness, to which the Father of mercies must necessarily look, on account of which thy Church's prayers are heard, and it is said unto Him by her—Look on the face of thy Christ, which he presents to thy most holy eyes, and interposes between thee and our awful defilements.* From this passage we learn, that when our cause is discussed before the Divine tribunal, the holiness of Christ is the chief strength of our defence; and that God acquits us and counts us as righteous, when he turns his regards upon this righteousness of Christ, and looks off from our unrighteousness. What else is this, but to turn away our justification, from holiness inherent in us, to the favour of God, and the holiness of Christ?

21. Aquinas, upon Rom. iv. explaining those words, *Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness*, thus writes: *The Apostle lays a stress upon the expression,* IT WAS COUNTED TO HIM FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS; *a phraseology adopted when that which is wanting on any one's part is freely imputed to him, as if he had wrought the whole. And thus the Apostle says, that there would have been no opening for such imputation, if righteousness had been attainable by works; but finds room for exercise only when it is of faith.* Hence we gather, first, that something is wanting, in all the justified, to make up a full and perfect righteousness; and that therefore no one can be considered righteous, unless what is wanting be, as it were, supplied by this gratuitous imputation. Secondly, if any one could be justified by his own works, (and the argument will be just the same, if we say by his own virtues or inherent

qualities,) there would be no need of this gratuitous imputation. Lastly, that justification depends upon our faith, and the acceptance of God; because there is nothing found in us of such perfection, as to be able to justify us absolutely before God. From all which it follows, that our justification must be resolved into some external cause. And this cause can be no other than the righteousness of the Mediator, and his grace with God the Father.

22. Albert Pighius, in his Controversies, explains and confirms our doctrine copiously. For, in the first place, he excludes inherent righteousness from the efficacy of justifying in these words:*—*It is plain what would be our doom, if God should deal with us in strict judgment, if he did not enwrap us, having no righteousness of our own, in the righteousness of Christ.* Secondly, he very evidently proves, at the same time, the imputed righteousness of Christ.—*We are justified before God* (says he) *in Christ, not in ourselves; not by our own but by his righteousness, which is imputed to us, when we hold communion with him.* A little after he says: *Christ communicates his righteousness to those who are united to himself; he interposes his righteousness between the justice of the Father and our unrighteousness; and he hides and covers us under it; yea, he imparts the same to us, and makes it ours; covered and adorned with which, let us boldly take our stand before the Divine tribunal, and we shall not only appear, but be, just.* Lastly, he assigns the reason, why the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us for justification: *Because our justification is grounded upon the obedience of Christ, therefore it is that to us, incorporated into him, that obedience is reckoned as if it were our own, so that we too are accounted just by that very obedience.*—Several other testimonies occur in the same author; who, although in his other controversies he carries on a bitter war with Protestants,† yet in this matter of justification, overcome by the clear light of truth, he leaves the Papists and joins with us.

23. But lest they should pretend that Pighius is the only

* Controvers. 2 de Fide et Justif. fol. 38.

† PIGHIUS was a Divine of the Romish persuasion, born at Campen in Holland, and received his Education at Louvain, where he wrote with great bitterness against the Reformers. He died at Utretcht in 1542. See Soames.

Romanist who has written agreeably to Protestant opinion, we will produce the whole assembly of the Canons of Cologne, who, in the book which they entitled *Antididagma* acknowledge this righteousness of Christ imputed to us, as the principal formal cause of justification. Thus say they:* *We are justified by God with a two-fold righteousness, as by formal and essential causes; one of which, and the first, is the finished righteousness of Christ, not as it is external to us in himself, but as, and when the same, being apprehended by faith, is imputed to us for righteousness. This righteousness of Christ so imputed to us, is the chief and supreme cause of our justification.* So far they. From whose words it is to be observed, that, although they unite inherent righteousness with imputed, in establishing our justification, yet they assign the first and principal parts to the righteousness of Christ, apprehended by faith and imputed to us. But they are led to join inherent righteousness, because under the word justification (after the manner of the Papists) they include sanctification, which we do not deny to be founded in this inherent grace. They agree with us therefore in the sum and substance of the matter.

24. The Romish advocates at the Conference at Ratisbon have also given their votes (page 47) in favour of this article. *Although he who is justified receives inherent righteousness, yet the believing soul does not trust to this, but to the righteousness of Christ alone, which is bestowed upon us, without which there can be no righteousness at all.* I see a great difference between this opinion, and that new one for which the Jesuits contend. These advocates at Ratisbon, although they admit inherent righteousness, yet teach that we must by no means trust to it. But the Jesuits trust to it to such a degree, as to teach, that those who are embued with this righteousness, are therefore by that very righteousness, accepted of God, and become worthy of life eternal, without any new favour or acceptance for Christ's sake. In the next place these advocates not only prove imputed righteousness, but confess that there is no virtue in inherent righteousness to justify without this; while those Jesuits deride and explode this imputed righteousness, and attribute the whole

* Titul. de Justificatione, cap. *Perquas causas justificemur.*

efficacy of justification to inherent righteousness, as the form.

25. Isidore Clarius,* Orat. 4 on Luke, affirms that the grace and mercy of God, which is received by faith, brings justification. And a little after, *We say that we are justified, neither by faith at first, nor by love, but by the righteousness of God alone imparted to us in Christ.* At length he subjoins, that *righteousness is freely bestowed upon us through Christ, in whom alone God reckons our works to us freely for righteousness.* From which passages we may infer, that although the author assigns inherent righteousness to the justified, yet he thought justification was to be placed in the mercy of God and the righteousness of Christ, not in the value of our qualities, or the worth of our works.

The same author, in the same place, has likened the value of inherent righteousness to that of a coin, which takes its value from the estimation of the King, not from its intrinsic worth. Thus (in his opinion) the quality of inherent righteousness renders men reconciled to God, and accepted to life eternal; not by its own worth, but by the most merciful and gracious appointment of God, it is approved by the same God and rewarded with so great a price. The words of Isidore Clarius are these:†—*To the things which have no value in themselves, God was pleased to assign a value; just as men are wont to allow that a coin shall pass for so much as they themselves have determined.*

26. Naclantus, Bishop of Chioggia, in Ephes. i, says,‡—*It must be at once admitted, that although we are said to be just before God by the gifts of holiness, yet that it is not absolutely, nor completely so, unless the gifts of Christ are annexed; by the splendour of which, whatever is in us which shines but dimly, shines in a wonderful manner, Christ helping our weaknesses, and even in this way supporting his members, and supplying and completing what is wanting to them.* He clearly grants, that habitual or inherent holiness

* ISIDORUS CLARIUS (de Chiara) was Bishop of Fuligno in Umbria, attended the Council of Trent, and belonged to the Dominican Order. He published Notes on the Holy Scriptures, in which he has suggested some corrections of the Vulgate. Soames's *Mosheim.* vol. iii. p. 287.

† Orat. 4. ‡ Page 72.

is not perfected in us, but is to be supplied by the perfect righteousness of Christ itself being superadded.

The same author, on the same passage,* says:—*The righteousness by which we are justified before God is called in the Scriptures the righteousness of God, of Christ, and of faith:—Of God indeed, not only because it has been often promised by him; but because it is exhibited and bestowed by him; for God is he who justifieth, and indeed freely, by his grace:—but of Christ, because by him it is finished and perfected; it is laid up in him, and from him shed upon and imparted to us; on which account he is frequently called our righteousness. For, as the Father laid our sins upon Christ, and heaped all our punishments upon him, so also it pleased him that our sins should be expiated, and our finished righteousness filled up in the same. In fine, it is called the righteousness of faith, because it is acquired and possessed by faith.* From all these considerations, it is evident, that this truly learned man refers the virtue of justifying, not to habitual grace, or the righteousness which inheres in us; but, as he himself speaks,† to sacramental grace, namely, to that of which we participate by faith, in baptism, when, being incorporated into our Mediator, we are made partakers of his death and obedience.

27. Bellarmine himself does not dare to trust to this formal cause of justification, which the Jesuits so much cry up. For in his treatise de Justific. lib. 5. cap. 7, he maintains this proposition: *On account of the insecurity of our own righteousness, and the danger of vain glory, it is the safest way to repose our trust in the mercy and benignity of God alone.* He who places his whole trust in the mercy of God alone, the same confides altogether in the perfect obedience of Christ; since God does not shew mercy to miserable sinners out of Christ the Mediator. But if inherent righteousness were the formal cause of justification, not only would it be unsafe to place our whole trust in the alone mercy of God, but the most sure way to eternal death. Besides, it is to be observed, that this same Bellarmine dared not entirely exclude the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. For he thus writes, De Justif. lib. 2 cap. 7.

* Page 59. † Page 69.

*If the Protestants meant only that the merits of Christ are imputed to us, because they are bestowed upon us, and we can offer them to God the Father for our sins; since Christ took upon himself the burden of making satisfaction for us, and of reconciling us to God the Father, their opinion would be right*, &c. Thus far Bellarmine. But what else *do* we mean, than that the merits of Christ are so communicated to, and bestowed upon all his members, as to be available to them for expiating the wrath of God, and regaining grace and eternal life, just as if they had been performed by themselves? If this latter opinion be right, so is that other also, which determines that, to the meritorious obedience of Christ is to be assigned the office of the formal cause in our justification.

28. To conclude: Lest I should seem to be dragging the Schoolmen and the later Romanists by the poll (as they say) to vote for our opinion, hear the ingenuous confession of a Jesuit in this matter, or rather his piteous lament:—*I cannot but be surprised* (says Vasquez*) *that the ancient Schoolmen, whom I have mentioned, should have thought so meanly of the righteousness inherent in us, that they dreaded to ascribe to it the true nature of the righteousness, which by its very quality is necessarily pleasing to God.* Lo, then, the ancient Schoolmen, and those many and of great name, give their suffrages in support of our opinion, our adversary himself being judge!†

But perhaps the later Romanists, made wiser by the Tridentine Oracle, have approved of justification by inherent righteousness with the utmost concord. Nay, even they also are deserters to our side; for thus the same Vasquez, in the same place, speaks concerning them: *But I am still more astonished at our more modern theologians, because that, after the remarkable definition of the Council of Trent, they have conceded so slender an inherent right-*

* In 1. 2. disp. 204. cap. 2.

† In connexion with this sentiment, or to shew how other Papal advocates have, though unwillingly, done good service to our cause, the Translator may be allowed to refer to Dr. Sall's *Votum pro Pace*, and to a summary of his reasoning, in that volume, to shew the real point and bearing of Suarez's arguments against us, as given in the 2nd and several following chapters of Sall's *Catholic Religion maintained in the Church of England*, and republished by the Translator with copious Notes in 1840.

*cousness to the just, as not to have any value in itself for cleansing away the stains of sin, unless they be remitted by the favour and forgiveness of God. In fact, both parties, if their opinions be accurately weighed, seem to set aside altogether the true nature of that inherent righteousness, which the Tridentine Fathers laboured to build up and defend.* Thus far Vasquez. What need of further testimonies? when not only Scripture and the Fathers, but even the Schoolmen and the later Romanists, have denied to our inchoate righteousness the power and efficacy of justifying?

Let then the Jesuits, and all others who suspend their faith upon the declaration of the Fathers of Trent, enjoy this slippery and tottering justification; but we will humbly acknowledge the spots and defilements of our own righteousness, and place our hope of justification before the Divine tribunal in the most perfect obedience of our Mediator.

And here we conclude the third question, and the whole discussion concerning habitual righteousness.

# OF ACTUAL RIGHTEOUSNESS,

OR THE

# RIGHTEOUSNESS OF WORKS.

## CHAPTER XXX.

QUESTION THE FIRST, OF THE NECESSITY OF GOOD WORKS.

Those three questions which we proposed to treat at the beginning of this discussion having been explained and presented to you, we proceed now to a consideration of actual righteousness, or the righteousness of works. And in discussing this topic, the enquiry which first offers itself is, what necessity there is for good works; the second, of the truth of good works; the third, of their perfection; the last of the desert of such works before God.

Now it must be observed generally, that by *good works* we understand those only which possess supernatural goodness, that is those which are wrought by the regenerate now, and flow from a heart purified by faith; whether they be *external*, as the invoking God, hearing his word, feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, and such like; or *internal*, as the loving God, the fearing Him, the putting our trust in God, the mourning for sin, the resisting concupiscence, the loving our neighbour, and all such other exercises as are performed by an inward operation of the heart.

The Papists, in their accustomed candour, are continually palming upon us this error—That every believer whatsoever may be saved, although he does no good works, nor applies himself in any way to the observance of the Divine com-

mands. We shall meet this calumny by and by; in the meantime we shall compress and explain our doctrine under two heads, the first of which will be this :—

I. Good works are necessary in all the faithful and justified, who have the use of reason, and are of an age to practise them. This we prove by these arguments :—

1. That is necessary to the justified, without which no one can arrive at a state of justification : But it is easy to mention works of this kind, especially internal, without which justification never has been obtained by any mortal, and never will be; therefore such works are necessary.

For, first, in receiving the grace of justification, the concurrence of the work of true conversion is indispensable. For God justifies him only who mourns for his sins, and turns away from his wickedness. So the Scriptures every where testify: *If my people shall turn from their wicked ways, I will forgive their sins;* 2 Chron. vii. 14. *Return, and I will heal your backslidings;* Jerem. iii. 22. *If the wicked will repent and turn from all his sins, he shall live and not die;* Ezek. xviii. 21. The same is the voice of the Gospel itself, which requires repentance as preliminary to the obtaining remission. So John preached repentance for the remission of sins; Mar. i. 4. But in so plain a case more is not necessary. Moreover, for the obtaining the benefit of justification, there is required on the part of the justified the work of faith, or the believing in God, and in Christ the Redeemer. And this internal work of the heart is so necessary, that without it there is no possibility of justification, no hope of salvation. *This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent;* John vi. 29. *If ye believe not, ye shall die in your sins;* John viii. 24. In fine, the work of loving God and our neighbour is necessary; for it is impossible for any one truly to repent and believe himself absolved from his sins by the Divine mercy, without at the same time being inflamed with the love of God his Deliverer and Saviour, and of his neighbour also. These and other such internal works of the heart, are necessary in all the justified, not because they have in themselves the efficacy or merit of justification, but because by the Divine arrangement, they are required either as previous or concurrent conditions; as to repent and to believe: or

as effects flowing necessarily from justifying faith: as to love God, to love our neighbour, and the like. You see then the necessity of certain internal works, for attaining to a state of justification at the very outset. Let us pass to a second argument.

2. In the second place then, we affirm that good works are also necessary to all the justified, after justification is obtained; and must be performed with all zeal and diligence throughout the whole course of life. It is thus proved. It is necessary (not indifferent or optional) for every subject to obey the will and command of his Lord: But God our Lord has willed and commanded, that all the justified abstain from works of darkness, and exercise themselves in works of piety and holiness. They are bound therefore, under the obligation of a debt, to good works. God has everywhere in the holy Scriptures promulgated his command. *I am the Lord your God, walk in my statutes;* Ezek. xx. 19. *This is the will of God, even your sanctification;* 1 Thess. iv. 3. *This command we have of God, that he who loveth God should love his brother also;* 1 John iv. 21. From this will of God, therefore, made known to us, and his command imposed upon us, arises a debt of obedience plainly necessary. Whence Christ himself said, *When ye have done all things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which it was our duty to do;* Luke xvii. 10. So also says the Apostle: *We are debtors, not to the flesh,* &c.; Rom. viii. 12. Hence in short it is, that, as often as we transgress the commands of God, we flee suppliantly to the throne of grace, crying and praying, *Forgive us our debts.* Good works, therefore are necessary to the regenerate from the necessity of the command, and the *obligation* of duty.

3. A third argument is this: It is necessarily incumbent upon us to do that which, if neglected, will wound the conscience. For things which are left free and optional, whether to be done or omitted, place the conscience under no guilt. But they who neglect the works commanded by God, or do the contrary, feel themselves to be pierced and wounded by the stings of conscience. This plainly indicates, that the human soul itself recognizes the imperative obligation under which it lies, to an obedience to the Divine law.

So the Apostle, Rom. ii. 15., *They shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another.* Nor is it only in the unregenerate that we see this power of conscience subjecting man to the Divine law, but much more vividly does it exert itself in the regenerate and believing. Whence the Apostle in Rom. xiii. 5, bids believers to be subject to magistrates, though heathens, for conscience sake; that is to say, they are bound to do this by the ordinance of God.

4. Fourthly, The necessity of good works appears also from hence, that God himself threatens and inflicts punishment upon men for sins of omission, as well as of commission. But it would be unrighteous and unjust to punish any one for the neglect of that, to the performance of which he was held by no obligatory bond; or for the commission of that, from the doing of which he was not restrained by the necessity of the obligation of duty. Since therefore the voice of Scripture is, *Every tree that bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down*, Matt. iii. 10; and also, *If ye live according to the flesh ye shall die*, Rom. viii. 13; *The wrath of God cometh upon the children of disobedience*, Col. iii. 6; it is plain and obvious that good works must necessarily be performed, and evil ones as necessarily avoided, by all who acknowledge the sovereignty and power of God, and their own subjection to him.

5. A fifth argument for establishing the necessity of good works may be drawn from those passages of Scripture in which those good works that are incumbent upon every one, on the ground of his particular calling, are affirmed to be necessary in express words. For instance, in the Minister of the Gospel, to preach the Gospel is a good work; but is it necessary? Hear the Apostle, 1 Cor. ix. 16, *Though I preach the Gospel, I have nothing to glory of; for necessity is laid upon me: yea, woe is unto me, if I preach not the Gospel.* Thus it is a good work to a subject to obey the magistrate; but is it free, or optional? Nay, on the authority of the same Apostle, *Ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake*, Rom. xiii. 5. If therefore good works, which are looked for from individuals, on the ground of their particular calling, are necessary to

them; then also all the other works of the Divine law, which are required of all in common, on the ground of their Christian calling, are also necessary to all.

6 Sixthly, good works are necessary on the ground of *the end* proposed by them, *ex suppositione finis*, as the phrase is; and that not of the one only and supreme end; but also of the many subordinate ends: which ends no one can attain, without the cultivation of good works, and the avoiding of bad ones. First then, we are bound to refer all our actions to the glory of God, as the supreme end. But God is glorified by our good works; while his glory is obscured (as far as we are concerned) by bad and wicked works. This end therefore being proposed, good works are the means necessary to be employed by us; as our Saviour himself teaches, Matt. v. 16, *Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify*, &c.; and the Apostle, Phil. i. 11, *Being filled with the fruits of righteousness, to the glory of God*. Besides, we ought to regard eternal life as our goal and end; but this goal is never reached except in the way of good works. For that broad way of licentiousness and impiety leads straight to hell, as Christ himself assures us, Matt vii. 13, 14. It being understood then, that we are seeking the kingdom of heaven, we must necessarily enter upon the way which leads to the kingdom of heaven —the way of good works. Moreover, every Christian, in framing his life, ought to have respect not only to the glory of God, and his own salvation, but to the advantage of his neighbour also. Now we help our neighbours by our good works; on the contrary we injure and afflict them by evil and ungodly works. In order therefore to attain this object, we must necessarily perform good works and avoid evil ones, according to that saying of the Apostle, Rom. xiii. 10. *Charity worketh no ill to his neighbour;* and xv. 2, *Let every one of you please his neighbour for his good to edification*. In short it behoves the pious and prudent Christian to aim at having in himself a testimony of the true faith and of his effectual calling, and thus a seal of the eternal salvation prepared for him; according to that admonition of St. Peter, *Give diligence to make your calling and election sure*. 2 Pet. i. 10. But this acquisition, so full of consolation, cannot be obtained without the pursuit of holiness, and the

fruits of good works. For they who boast of their faith, and dream that they are destined to life eternal, while at the same time, they are immersed in their lusts, and strangers to the ways of holiness, deceive themselves, and fall headlong into eternal destruction through their fond credulity. Thus says Christ, *The tree is known by its fruits*, Matt. vii. 17. So St. James, *Faith without works is dead*, Ja. ii. 17. So Peter, *Add to your faith, virtue*, &c., 2 Pet. i. 5. *For he that lacketh these things is blind, and cannot see afar off, and hath forgotten that he was purged from his old sins*, verse 9. And in short, as says St. John, *He who saith that he knoweth God, and keepeth not his commandments, is a liar;* 1 John. ii. 4.

Although therefore, justified persons do not completely fulfil the commands of God, but are stained by continual sins; yet the purpose of a holy life is necessary to them, yea, the practice of good works; since without both these, they can neither glorify God, nor proceed in the way of salvation, nor love and benefit their neighbour, nor in short, possess any sure testimony of their calling and justification.

It would be easy to add more ultimate objects besides these, which constantly occur in the Scriptures; but let it suffice, for the confirmation of our argument, to have shewn, that good works are necessary as means for obtaining all those ends which we have just mentioned.

7. Seventhly, the necessity of good works in every justified person may be shewn from the necessary connexion between the cause and its proper effect. For in all the justified dwells the Spirit of Christ—powerful and efficacious in the true children of God and members of Christ, for effecting newness of life. Thus says the Apostle, Rom. viii. 10; *If Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin, but the spirit is life, because of righteousness.* And in verse 14, *As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God.* It is, therefore, a sure and necessary consequence that all the justified are zealous of good works; because the Spirit of Christ, not by any violent compulsion, but a certain sweet inclining of them, leads them all in the paths of holiness to the goal of immortality. Moreover, the Holy Spirit pours into and imprints upon all the justified *habitual* grace, as it is called; and this habit, although it does not

determine to good works by a *compulsory* necessity, yet produces them by an *unfailing* efficacy. For *Every good tree bringeth forth good fruit;* Matt. vii. 17. Although therefore, evil works shoot forth now and then, from the evil root of concupiscence which is not yet eradicated from the soul of the justified, yet he cannot be altogether void of the love and practice of good works; since there is implanted in his heart a new root of grace, which brings forth its fruit also: *The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-suffering*, &c.; Gal. v. 22. In fine, since among the other gifts of grace, a living faith cannot be absent from the justified man, hence the necessity of works is deduced; for a true and living faith can no more exist, apart from holy operation, than fire can exist without producing warmth.

Lastly, let us illustrate and strengthen these our arguments, by a well-known example. If any one once justified ever could have been altogether void of good works, it would have been the thief on the cross, who was converted in the last moments of his life. But if we consult the Evangelist Luke, we shall find him to have been distinguished by many and great good works. Luke xxiii. 40—42. He *rebuked* his companion, *saying, Dost not thou fear God, seeing thou art in the same condemnation? And we indeed justly; for we receive the due reward of our deeds; but this man hath done nothing amiss. And he said unto Jesus*, LORD, REMEMBER ME WHEN THOU COMEST INTO THY KINGDOM. Thus, so far as regards *external* works, he humbly confessed his sin; he charges his companion to fear God, and repent; he acknowledges Christ hanging upon the Cross, as the bestower of the kingdom of heaven, though deserted by his own followers and derided by his enemies. These were the best *external* works which could then be performed by him. Now, if we consider *internal* works, without doubt he truly and from his soul bewailed and repented of the flagitious acts of his former life; he desired repentance and salvation for his companion also, (which was an evidence of his charity); he firmly believed in Christ as the Redeemer, and in short, manifested a fear and love of God.

Our doctrine being thus confirmed by arguments, we shall add further the testimonies also, as well of the ancient Fathers, as of our own Divines.

Clemens Alexandrinus, Strom. 3. refutes those heretics who thought it lawful for the children of God to live as they listed, and he shews that a true knowledge and faith are always joined with obedience to the Divine precepts.

Tertullian, in his book against the Valentinians, sharply rebukes them for denying that good works were necessary to spiritual men; and he immediately adds, *Woe unto us if we shall grow weary in works of holiness and righteousness.*

Cyprian, lib. 3* ad Quirinum, cap. 96, says, *We must labour in deeds, and not in words;* and he presently after subjoins many testimonies from the Scriptures, to shew the necessity of works.

Ambrose, in Heb. iv. observes, *Faith alone is not sufficient, but it is necessary that faith should work by love, and a walk worthy of God.* And shortly after, *It is needful for every one who would obtain heaven, to adorn his faith by good works.*

Augustine, in lib. 83. Quæstionum, quæst. 76, (tom. 4.) observes, *Paul does not teach that man is justified by faith without works, in such a way, that any one should be left to suppose, that it is not his duty to practise good works.* A little onwards: *A man justified by faith cannot but act justly in future, on account of the grace of God, which cannot now be in him to no good purpose.*

Leo, in Sermon 14, on the passion of our Lord, observes: *As there is no believer to whom the gifts of grace are to be denied, so there is no one who is not under obligation to Christianly behaviour; because, although the strictness of the righteousness of the law has been set aside, yet the dutifulness of a willing observance of it is increased.*

There is however no need to spend further time in collecting the suffrages of the ancients; for they everywhere urge the obligation to the performance of good works: let us proceed at once, therefore, to the writings of our own Divines, whom our adversaries accuse of leaving no place for good works.

We will begin with Luther. In his book De Votis Monasticis, pag. 281, he says: *The good works enjoined in the decalogue are not to be passed by, but to be practised accord-*

* Testimoniorum adversus Judæos.

*ing to the substance, though not as if in defence, or to guard merely against their accusing us. — — They are to be practised for the use and advantage of our neighbour, as the works of Christ were done for us freely and gratuitously. But then they are no longer the works of the law, but of Christ working in us through faith; a neglect of them therefore is unallowable, equally with faith itself, nor are they less necessary than faith.* Observe in what sense Luther denies the necessity of works, in what sense he maintains it. He denies that works are necessary as *defending* and *accusing* us; that is, that according to them a believer should look to be either justified or condemned before the Divine tribunal; for justification is not to be sought, or salvation hoped for, through the legal contract, but from the New Covenant of the Gospel. On the contrary, he would teach that the works of the decalogue are necessary according to the *substance;* that is, so far as they contain the standard of our obedience, the rule of the Divine will, and the advantage of our neighbour, &c.

Luther also, on Galat. v., writes, *Both subjects, even faith and works, ought to be diligently taught and urged; yet so that each may remain within its own limits. For if works alone are taught, as is the case in the Papacy, faith is lost sight of; if faith alone is taught, immediately carnal men imagine that good works are not necessary.* You see how plainly Luther pleads for the necessity of works, and ascribes the contrary error to carnal men. In his disputation against Eccius, he says: *Eccius* knows that it is not a sentiment of mine, that good works are not necessary.* I pass by more.

Philip Melancthon, tom. 2. in his Common Place, de Oper. quæst. 4, says, *A new obedience is necessary from the necessity of the order of cause and effect; likewise from the necessity of the obligation or command; — — also from the necessity of retaining firm hold of the faith, — — — and in order to avoid punishments both temporal and eternal.*

Bucer, in the Conference at Ratisbon, pag. 537, observed, *Although life eternal is to be sought by us in the constant pursuit of good works, yet it is to be obtained altogether*

* ECKIUS (JOHN) an able Romanist disputant of his time, who became most celebrated by a public disputation with Carolostadt and Luther at Leipsic in the year 1519. See *Soames's Mosheim.*

*through faith by all who firmly believe in the Gospel of Christ.* That most learned Divine acknowledges the practice of good works to be necessary, although he places the meritorious cause of eternal life in the obedience of Christ apprehended by faith. And much plainer still is he in Enarrat. Epist. ad Ephes. cap. 2, pag. 69: *We agree with our adversaries in this, that the justified person must necessarily live righteously. We agree likewise that they will perish eternally, who do not perform good works — — — But the question is, whether our good works are of themselves worthy of that glory which God promises.* You see how clearly he approves the necessity of works, and only rejects their meritoriousness for obtaining life eternal.*

Calvin, Instit. lib. 3. cap. 19. sect. 2, says, *The whole life of Christians indeed ought to be a sort of meditation of piety, since they are called to sanctification. The office of the law consists in this, namely, that by reminding us of our duty, it excites to the pursuit of holiness and innocence.* He does not think it free or optional to a Christian man, whether he will apply himself to good works or not; but he affirms this to be his bounden and necessary duty.

Peter Martyr, upon the 2nd chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, page 56, says, *God intended this connexion, namely, that blessedness should follow good works; yet not as the effect from its cause, but as something conjoined with them by the appointment of God.*

The same author, ibid. pag. 58: *We must know that faith cannot be void of good works; therefore those who return at the last hour, if they believe, will not be destitute of good works.* He maintains the necessity of good works in a twofold respect: one arising from the constitution or appointment of God himself, and the other from the very nature of faith.†

Chemnitz, 3 parte loc. Theolog. loco de Bonis Operibus,

* For an interesting and instructive view of Bucer's sentiments on this important topic, the reader may be referred to the account given of Bucer and his opinions in Toplady's works.

† PETER MARTYR and BUCER had both a considerable hand in the framing of our Articles; so that there can be no doubt of the orthodoxy of their sentiments on the subject before the reader. It is quite need ess too for the Translator to attempt any account of these eminent men.

quæst. 1. remarks:—*We teach that God does not allow any licence to the justified, whereby they would venture freely and securely to indulge in their depraved lusts; but that he requires from them good works, or fruits of faith, neither will he suffer them to be idle, and not to produce good works. — — Besides, we teach, that God does not merely recommend this new obedience to the justified, nor propose it as if it were a matter indifferent or optional, but he requires it as fully necessary, on the ground of his own command and will.* Could any one establish the necessity of works in clearer words? And the same, in fact, is the general sentiment of all our Divines;—enough to excite your astonishment at the impudence of the Papists, who are continually charging the contrary error upon Protestants. Let us now then meet their calumnies.

Bellarmine, lib. 4 de Justificatione, (which is concerning the righteousness of works) thrusts this error upon Protestants, namely, that they deny the necessity of works. Let us therefore briefly discuss the calumnies of the Jesuit.

1. *Protestants think that man can be saved although he does no good works, nor observes the Divine commands. This I prove* (says Bellarmine) *from the words of Luther. For in his book on Christian liberty he thus writes: Good works do not make a man good, nor bad ones make him bad. Also, in another passage: Where there is faith no sin can hurt. And in his comment on Gal. ii., where we are instructed after this fashion: It is true, faith in Christ justifies; but at the same time we must keep the commandments of God, because it is written—If thou wilt enter into life, keep the Commandments; then Christ is immediately denied and faith abolished, because that is attributed to the law which is the prerogative of God alone.* These and other things of the same kind, Bellarmine has scraped together from parts of Luther's writings, to make it be supposed that the necessity of good works is entirely set aside by the Reformer.

I answer:—Although what we have already adduced from Luther is abundantly sufficient to shew his meaning, and repel the calumnies of his adversaries; yet, lest any doubt should remain, First, we would observe in general, that *to give oneself to good works,* or *to do good works,* and *to fulfil the law of God,* or *keep the Divine commands,* is not

one and the same thing. We grant that no one is saved, who does not apply himself to the practice of good works; but we affirm that many, nay that all true believers are saved, although they do not fulfil the law of God, nor *run* with an undeviating foot *the way of God's commandments.* For says the Apostle (Jas. iii. 2) *In many things we all offend.* Bellarmine therefore deceitfully confounds these two things—the *not fully keeping the Divine commands,* and *the doing no good works;* since many good works are done by the regenerate, who yet do not entirely keep the law of God. Secondly, as to the words of Luther themselves; when he says that *good works do not make a man good, nor evil works make him bad,* he does not mean to set aside the necessity of good works, but is indicating their origin. As though he had said,—Since we are all corrupt by nature, we do not acquire righteousness and holiness by good works; but we become righteous and good by grace and infused righteousness: and on the other hand, it is not our evil works that make us bad; but because we are evil, we bring forth evil works; as good fruits do not *make,* but *shew* the tree to be good; and bad and corrupt fruits do not *make* the tree bad and corrupt, but *indicate* that it is so.

But as to that other statement of Luther—*Where there is faith, no sin can hurt;* it does not mean that believers neglect good works, and rush headlong into sin; but it implies that by the intervention of true faith, the condemning guiltiness of all sins whatsoever can be blotted out and washed away by the blood of the Mediator; which is just the voice of the Gospel. Bellarmine's inference therefore is unfounded, that all good works may be neglected with safety, and consequently are not necessary. For although, by the intervention of faith, no sins whatever are imputed for eternal condemnation; yet they are the cause why God applies the rod to his children, and hides from them for a time the light of his countenance: In short, good works are necessary, although there should be no danger of condemnation through bad ones, for the many other reasons before mentioned by us.

Now in that last passage where it is asserted that *those are in the way to deny Christ and set aside faith, who, in the business of justification require and mix up the works of the*

*law*, Luther meant nothing else than what the Apostle does in Galat. v. 4: *Christ is become of no effect unto you; whosoever of you are justified by the law, ye are fallen from grace.* For howsoever the good works which are commanded in the law are necessarily required from the justified, as fruits of sanctification and services of gratitude; yet if any one should seek to exact them as causes of justification, he would make both Christ and faith of none effect. In this view then Luther has not written amiss, *We must beware of sins, but much more of good works.* For there is no danger of any one placing his justification in sins, but there is some ground for fear lest a person, who is blinded by Pharisaic pride, would be seeking justification by his good works; for *that becomes often sadly vile in the scrutiny of the judge, which is splendid enough in the estimation of the doer;* as says Gregory in Job iii., lib. 5. cap. 7.

Let this suffice in defence of Luther.

2. Secondly, Bellarmine strives to prove the same from the general doctrine (as he says) of our Divines, who lay it down that *the good works of the justified are all in their own nature mortal sins;* and in proof of this, he cites Luther in defence of the Articles xxxi, xxxii, xxxvi; and Calvin in his Instit., lib. 3. cap. 12. sect. 4; and cap. 14. sect. 9. Hence he argues—If good works are mortal sins, and yet on account of faith are not imputed for condemnation, certainly bad works also cannot be imputed, and for this reason are not hurtful; and therefore there is no reason why they should be avoided, or why good works should be performed by us. They are not, he would argue, therefore necessary, according to the principles of Luther and Calvin.

I answer, as to the doctrine itself, I acknowledge that Luther has said, that every work of the regenerate is a mortal sin, if it be judged by the judgment of God; and that Calvin has written, that all the works of men, if they are estimated by their own worth, are nothing but filth and dirt; which forms of speaking, however harsh they may seem, yet both contain most true doctrine, and are phrases not different from the Scriptures and the Fathers. It is a received rule among the Schoolmen themselves, that *Good does not spring except from perfect causes, but evil arises from any defect whatsoever.* Every action therefore comes

under the character of evil and sin, if it is defective in any part; although it may have in itself some supernatural goodness in another part. Since then some defects adhere to the best actions of the regenerate, they may be called sinful, so far as they do not fully come up to the exact rule of the Divine law. Calvin says admirably,* *Let the holy servant of God select from his whole life, what he thinks to have been the most excellent in its whole course, and without doubt he would discover on examination, something which savours of the corruption of the flesh.* This then is what Luther and Calvin mean, when they call any good work sin, namely, that *there is in every good work some defect which is condemnable, if judged according to the rigour of the Divine law.* The Scriptures both approve of, and adopt, this mode of speaking. Isa. lxiv. 6. *All our righteousnesses are as filthy rags.* And the Psalmist—*In thy sight shall no man living be justified;* Ps. cxliii. 2. And the Apostle—*When I would do good, evil is present with me;* Rom. vii. 21. The force and meaning of which words is, that the brightest and best of our actions have always some evil attaching to them, whence they are found to fall short of the fulfilling of the Divine law, and to be inadequate to justify the doers of them.

The Fathers moreover also acknowledge this, and speak much more harshly than Calvin or Luther. Gregory, Moral. lib. 9. cap. 2,—*A holy man perceives that all the merit of our virtue would be but as sin, if it were submitted to the strict judgment of the inward witness.* And again, cap, 14,—*All human righteousness is proved to be unrighteousness, if it be strictly judged.* That saying of Augustine is well known, *Woe unto the commendable life of men, if you examine it in the absence of mercy.*† That word *woe* sounds of condemnation; and if of condemnation, then also of sin.

We have dwelt longer upon these objections than was perhaps right, because they properly relate to the controversy upon the truth of good works, of which hereafter. Let us proceed now to a consideration of Bellarmine's stupid arguments.

*If good works* (says he) *are sins, and are not imputed for*

* Instit. lib. 3. cap. 14. sect. 9. † Confess. lib. 9.

*condemnation, surely neither will bad works injure believers.* How ridiculous! For the *defect* which adheres to a good action, contrary to the intention of the doer, and which infects that action with sin; and the manifest sin which is the fruit of the ready assent of the doer, and incurred wilfully, are not of the same nature. Nor will the inference hold, namely, because the guilt of evil works is not imputed to believers, therefore they are not to be shunned. For they *are* imputed even to believers, until by an exercise of faith, and a fresh act of penitence, they have obtained a pardon. But even if they should be by no means imputed, nor in any way be hurtful to the doers; yet still it would not follow that evil works were not to be avoided. For since they are displeasing to God, since they are opposed to his command, inasmuch as they obscure his glory, inasmuch as they are a stumbling block to our neighbour, there is abundant reason necessarily in them, why they should be avoided, even though they should occasion no loss or disadvantage to the doers. And the reason is the same why good works should not be neglected, even though this neglect should not prove injurious, in their final condemnation, to the repentant and believing.

It requires then something better than such arguments to prove that Protestants are in the habit of denying the necessity of good works.

3. Thirdly, Bellarmine infers from the teaching of our Divines on the difference between the Law and the Gospel, that they would entirely set aside the necessity of good works. *For, according to the teaching of Protestants* (says he) *the difference between the Law and the Gospel is this, that the Law proposes righteousness and salvation on the condition of man's fulfilling the whole law; the Gospel promises righteousness and salvation, on the sole condition of faith. But if the Gospel requires no condition of obedience, but is content with faith alone, surely he who does no good lives agreeably to the Gospel.* Thus Bellarmine!—

I answer:—It is very true, that justification and salvation are promised in the legal contract, under the condition of exact obedience; but if a person at any time of his whole life shall have broken one point of the law, he cannot afterwards claim for himself eternal life by means of the law.

Hence says the Apostle (Gal. iii. 10, 11, 12,)—*As many as are of the works of the law are under the curse. For it is written, Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things that are written in the book of the law to do them. — — But the man that doeth them shall live in them.* The matter however has been ordered otherwise in the Gospel covenant. For in this covenant, in order to the obtaining reconciliation, justification, and eternal life, no other condition is required than that of a true and living faith. *So God loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish,* &c.; John iii. 16. *To him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness;* Rom. iv. 5. *The Scripture foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith,* &c.; Gal. iii. 8. Justification then, and the right to eternal life, rests upon the condition of faith alone. But good works too are required of men already justified, not for placing them in a state of justification, or to entitle them to eternal life; but for manifesting obedience, and testifying gratitude towards God, who has justified us freely, and for their walking in that way which he has marked out for those destined to the kingdom of glory.

It is therefore worthy of careful observation, that good works are required, as well of those who are under the legal contract, as of those who are living under the Gospel covenant; considering man however under different aspects, and in ways perfectly distinct. The Law, because it regards man as created by God in uprightness of nature, requires good works to be done in the strength of nature; but the Gospel, because it regards man as fallen, requires good works from the justified; but to be done, not by the strength of free-will, but from infused grace. The Law, because it makes the desert of death and life depend upon the condition of works, inflicts death for any one sin, however light; and crowns with the reward of life him only who shall have rendered an obedience that is perfect in all its parts; but the Gospel, because it treats with the justified, who are delivered from death through faith in Christ, and graciously appointed to life, allows sinners an advocate, by whose intercession they obtain the constant remission of sins; and

also promises a reward to the good works of the regenerate, although imperfect, because they are accepted of God the Father, in Christ the Mediator. In fine, the law rests the value and form of its covenant upon the condition of works, but the Gospel places the value and form of its covenant in the blood of the Mediator, apprehended by faith; but annexes the condition of works, as subserving this Evangelical covenant, not as comprising or constituting the covenant itself.

This explanation being admitted, the force of Bellarmine's reasoning is easily dissipated. His argument runs thus:—*The Gospel promises justification and life (according to the opinion of Protestants) but on the sole condition of faith; consequently they exclude the necessity of good works.* I answer, that this is no valid consequence; for though works are not comprised in the Evangelical covenant, as causes and merits, on which justification and salvation are suspended; yet are they annexed to this covenant, as duties to be performed by the justified and saved, according to the appointment of God, and for many other reasons. Of course then, when he concludes in this manner, *The condition of works is not required in justification itself, as the cause of justification, therefore works are not in any manner necessary in the justified. there is a manifest fallacy in arguing à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter;* that is, in forming a general conclusion from a particular premise.

Of the same nature is that other quibble also, that *If the Gospel does not require the condition of works, but is content with faith alone, then he who does no good lives agreeably to the Gospel; and those may receive consolation and salvation from the Gospel, who voluntarily persevere in the practice of wicked works.* Neither of these points is to be conceded. For although in the point or doctrine of justification, the Gospel is content with faith alone; yet in the subject and doctrine of sanctification, it demands the fruits of faith, and a life worthy of the Gospel. But it behoves us, if we are desirous of living agreeably to the Gospel, to listen to the Gospel, not only when it proclaims gratuitous justification through faith; but also when it requires due holiness of life from the justified. Moreover, justification by faith alone does not yield any consolation to such as voluntarily perse-

vere in wicked works; for though such persons may imagine that they are justified, they cannot in reality believe it.

This is our answer to the third misrepresentation of Bellarmine.

4. The Christian liberty which Protestants teach, our adversary argues, leads to a denial and subversion of the necessity of good works. For such Christian liberty, he says, consists in this, that the justified man is free from the obligation of fulfilling the law before God, and according to this scheme all actions are alike, that is, nothing is either enjoined, nor forbidden. To support this statement, he alleges those words of Luther,—*Faith alone is necessary, that we may be righteous; all other things are quite optional, being no longer either enjoined, or prohibited.** Likewise also the following:—*There is no obligation on a Christian man to exercise any work or law, since he is freed from the law through faith;*† and other things to the same purport. He also brings in Calvin teaching‡ that when the faith which justifies is the question, we must pay no regard to the law or works; and again, that our Christian liberty consists in this, that the good works which are done by us, are not to be examined according to the rule of the law, but are accepted by God, whatever they may be. Lastly, that the use of all external things is held to be indifferent. *From this doctrine* (says Bellarmine) *who can doubt that good works are not at all necessary to salvation, if all external things, and therefore of course, baptism and the eucharist, are indifferent, and nothing is to be examined according to the rule of the law?*

I answer:—Bellarmine's exhibition of our doctrine of Christian liberty is very erroneous, and maliciously distorted. For our opinion is not that the regenerate are freed from the obligation of fulfilling the law, so that there is no precept, no prohibition binding on them; but that they are freed from the *Curse* which, according to the legal contract, hangs over those who have not fulfilled the law. This doctrine we derive from St. Paul, *Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us;* Gal. iii. 13. Our liberty therefore consists peculiarly in this, that in the

* In 2. ad Galat. † In lib. de Libert. Christ.
‡ Instit. lib. 3, cap. 19. sect. 2. 4. 7.

case of justification we are freed from the covenant of the law, and are put under the covenant of the Gospel. However much then we are bound to the pursuit and the practice of good works, yet in the Divine judgment, neither is the perfect fulfilment of the law required for our justification, nor will the frequent transgression of it prevail to our condemnation; but we shall be justified and saved by faith, through the blood of the Mediator, *according to the riches of his grace;* Eph. i. 7. Then again, it appertains to this liberty, that in external things we are not bound, after the manner of the Jews, to make use of some and to abstain from other things, and that for conscience sake; but all things of this kind are left free and optional to us, provided we do not sin against the law of love. *Let no man judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of an holy day,* &c.; Col. ii. 16. *Being dead with Christ we are free from the rudiments of the world;* verse 20. Lastly, it is deemed a part also of our Christian liberty that we are freed from the dominion of sin, and from the servile constraint of the law, and are rendered fit to perform works of piety, not from fear, but of a free and ready will. *We are delivered from the hand of our enemies, that we may serve him without fear, in holiness and righteousness all the days of our life;* Luke i. 74, 75. It is in these things that we consider Christian liberty to consist; not in understanding nothing to be enjoined by God upon us, nothing forbidden us, according to the impious and calumnious charges of Bellarmine.

But Luther it is said has written (in Gal. ii.) *Faith alone is necessary that we may be justified; all things else are quite free, being neither enjoined nor prohibited us.* I do not find these words in Luther,* but I find what manifestly establishes his opinion and proves Bellarmine to be a calumniator: *It is to be observed here that the Apostle is not forbidding works, but the reposing upon them; he denies that any one can be justified by them.* Luther, it is true, is wont to say, that *To the justified the law ceases and the works of the law;* but then by *law* he understands the alarming power of the law, and by *works of the law* he understands works

* The words attributed to Luther by Bellarmine are: *Sola fides necessaria est, ut justi simus; cætera omnia liberrima, neque præcepta amplius, neque prohibita.*

extorted by its threats, while the will is murmuring against them within. But these things cease, because the believer, being imbued with a spirit of liberty, does good works willingly from filial love, not reluctantly through servile fear. And such is the meaning of those words in his book on Christian liberty—*There is no need of any work, any law to a Christian:* that is to say, that after the righteousness of faith is revealed, there is no need that justification should be sought from the law by our works; nay, if any one does good works, upon the presumption of being justified by their merit, they then begin to be bad works. It was not therefore Luther's meaning, nor did he write, that believers are absolutely freed from the practice of good works; but that they are freed from the necessity of justifying themselves by their works. With respect to the opinion of Calvin, which Bellarmine nibbles at, there is no necessity for replying to it. Let the passages cited by our adversary be examined, and they will abundantly satisfy any reader. I shall merely observe that that phrase *external things* has been impiously and foolishly distorted by Bellarmine, so as to include baptism, the eucharist, and the works of the decalogue; for Calvin has not abandoned all things or external actions to Christian liberty, but those alone which are in themselves *indifferent*, and enjoined upon men by no command of God. But baptism, the eucharist, and the works of the decalogue fall under the precept.

5. *We prove* (says Bellarmine) *that Luther used to deny the necessity of good works, from the lives and manners of his followers; who in consequence of this teaching abandoned themselves to all wickedness with such incredible licentiousness, that it became quite needful for Luther to praise good works, and to exhort to the practice of them.*

What frivolous arguing! *Many Lutherans live wickedly, therefore Luther denied the necessity of good works.* As if many Papists, many Cardinals, yea, Roman Pontiffs, did not live very wickedly, although the necessity of good works is by no means denied in the Roman Church. Equally silly is the following also: *Luther, in his Saxonic visitation, found it necessary to praise good works, and exhort to them; therefore he had before taught that good works were not necessary to a believer.* How, I should like to know, can it be made

to appear, that he denied good works, who stimulated a negligent and careless people to the practice of them? And lastly, what outstrips all the folly, is, that a Romanist should infer error of doctrine from corrupt manners;—a process of reasoning by which Rome herself, the chief seat of all wickedness (as the whole world can testify) must be concluded to be, herself, the very sink of all errors.

In the last place Bellarmine objects to us some hasty expression made use of by rigid Lutherans in the disputation at Altenburg; who asserted, *that Christians with good works were on their road towards Satan;* also, *that good works are prejudicial to salvation:* in fine, *that we must pray that we may persevere in faith, even unto the end, without good works.*

Bellarmine very well knows, that those whom he designates rigid Lutherans were rejected and refuted by our party in this controversy. Hence although some unadvised language in the heat of contention might have escaped one or another, to attribute that as a received doctrine, to all the rest, who at the top of their voices disapproved and condemned it, is to argue both illogically and maliciously. The Roman Church would not herself be bound by such a law, as to be compelled to abide by whatever this or that Papist may have inconsiderately uttered; nor will our Church recognise as her doctrines, sentiments rashly put forward by some private theologian.

You perceive therefore, that notwithstanding the calumnies of Bellarmine, Protestants teach now, and always have taught, that good works are necessary to all believers and justified persons, who enjoy the use of reason, and are of a suitable age to practise them.

And this may suffice for the explanation of our first proposition; we now pass to that other.

---

Nothing need be added to the defence of Luther by our Author in this Chapter, yet it may be permitted the Translator to quote a passage from the writings of Philpot, published by the Parker Society. The extract he ventures to adduce, as singularly in unison with what has been contended for by Bishop Davenant in reference to the sentiments charged upon Luther, is taken from "The Defence of Christ's Church" in Curio's reply to Florebell pp. 411, 12; and admirably exhibits the doctrine of our Reformers:—

"Furthermore, that is a shameful blasphemy, when thou affirmest that

## CHAPTER XXXI.

### OF THE NECESSITY OF WORKS TO SALVATION, OR JUSTIFICATION.

HITHERTO we have shewn that good works are necessary to believers and the regenerate: which being established and fixed, a new matter of controversy arises. For some enquire whether there is not a degree of unsoundness in such language as, that *good works are necessary for justification:* or, that *good works are necessary for salvation!*

Many who receive this proposition, that *good works are necessary to believers*, nevertheless reject and condemn the statement, if the addition be made, that *they are necessary for justification*, or, *they are necessary for salvation.** Since by this limitation they think that the doctrine of a gratuitous

Luther requireth a barren faith only, or rather a certain trust, with the which whosoever is once endowed, albeit he shall grievously sin until the last day of his life, he ought to be careless; neither any heinous trespass, how feloneous soever it be done by him, may be to him death and destruction. Where ever did Luther teach this? Who ever heard it by mouth of him, or hath read it in print? With these subtleties and lies ye cause the true and sweet doctrine of Christ to be hated, disdained, and envied. We teach the sincere and lively faith, which is right firmly grounded upon the promises of God, out of which do spring all good deeds and honest and virtuous actions, as it were fruit out of a quick and plenteous tree, and not an idle, neither dead opinion or vain confidence. We exhort all men to mutual love and well doings, and to have justice in reverence, that thereby they may testify themselves earnestly to believe and heartily: and in all points we follow the way and rule of Paul, which after that he hath taught faith, proceedeth to exhortation and discipline of living.—Then thou seest, I trow, that neither Luther, nor any of us at any time, have judged good works superfluous. If, that Luther, to the intent that he might take from us the trust we had in our works, and transport us to Christ, did say both our good deeds and bad to be sins; that is, not to be pure acts, but always envenomed with some shrewd affection; neither is it not a singular opinion of Luther's, but the sentiment of the Prophet [Isa. lxiv. 6] who is not afraid to compare all our good deeds, which he calleth righteousnesses, unto the cloth of a menstruous woman. Therefore, Florebell, thou mightest have let this alone."

* See Newman's Lectures, p. 211.

justification and salvation through the righteousness of Christ, apprehended by faith, is corrupted and subverted; and that it is necessary to preserve this, in its entireness, with all care, no pious man doubts. On the other hand, there are found some Protestants* who have no hesitation in declaring that good works are necessary to salvation; though at the same time they make no attempt to weaken gratuitous justification, or our salvation, by this declaration.

The second question then, which is now to be handled by us is—*Whether good works can be said to be necessary to our justification or salvation.*

Some of our own Divines affirm it, some deny it; differing in the forms of words, yet agreeing as to the substance of the matter. But that the truth may be more evident, we shall comprise our view of the subject in the following conclusions:—

1. In contending with the Romanists about justification, it is not wise or safe to use or admit these propositions—that *good works are necessary to justification;* or that *good works are necessary to salvation.*

For even though they may by means of explanations be reduced to a sound sense; yet, when they are nakedly propounded, the Papists always understand by them, that works are necessary as being, from their real and intrinsic worthiness, meritorious causes of man's salvation: which is most false. Since then *use* determines the meaning of *language*, and in formularies of words attention is always paid not so much *to the speaker*, as *to what he means;* we ought not to afford this occasion for error to the Papists, who are accustomed to distort these expressions to an heretical sense.

That this caution is necessary, when treating with the enemies of the truth of the Gospel, is evident from the example of the ancient Fathers, who abstained from certain forms of speaking solely on account of the perverted application of them by the heretics. Jerome has noticed this in his Comment on Hosea ii. 16, *An expression may be correct, and yet on account of some ambiguity, it may sometimes be inexpedient to use it.* Thus, in the controversy with Nestorius, although it is said with perfect truth that the blessed

* Bucer. in Coll. Ratisb. pag. 98.

Virgin is the Mother of Christ; yet the holy Fathers were unwilling to use that expression, lest they should appear to make a concession to Nestorius, who denied her the title of Θεοτόκος or Mother of God. So Damascenus lib. 3, cap. 12, observes—*We do not call the Holy Virgin* Χριστοτόκος, *or Mother of Christ, because the impious Nestorius invented that title for the purpose of rejecting the title* Θεοτόκος, *or the Mother of God.* For a similar reason, as often as we engage in argument with the Romanists, we ought not on any account to affirm, that *works are necessary to salvation;* because the perversity of Papists is accustomed to make use of this form of speech in order to deny gratuitous justification.

The Schoolmen themselves entertained the same sentiment about the use of words, and were unwilling that we should even use the same words as heretics in cases where, from using the same terms, a handle might be taken for spreading false doctrine. Thus Thomas (Aquinas) contra Gent. lib. 3, cap. 93; and Durandus, lib. 1. dist. 11, quæst. 2, —*It is to be observed* (says he) *that there are certain terms which are not received into theology, more because they have sometimes proved the occasion of error, than because of the unsuitableness of their signification.* Since then this mode of speaking administers occasion of error to the Romanists, if we are to attend to the Fathers or the Schoolmen, we ought to abstain from it.

2. In popular discourses, intended for an illiterate audience, the propositions just mentioned should be either altogether avoided, or accompanied at the same time with clear explanations.

For, if all careful foresight ought to be used that we may not give occasion of error to the Papists themselves, how much more lest we should lead our own people into Papistic errors by the use of ambiguous forms of speech? Paul had reference to this when he enjoined his son Timothy to retain *the express form of sound words;* 2 Tim. i. 13 But should any one in the present day affirm among the unlearned, that *our works are necessary for our justification or salvation,* without adding any explanation of his meaning, they would perhaps suppose him to imply, that man is justified and saved by the virtue and merit of his works; for unlearned men would not conceive of any other necessity on the first

glance. Since then such a necessity as this very evidently is inconsistent with the doctrine of a gratuitous justification by faith alone, which the rulers of our Church with unanimous consent have called *a most wholesome doctrine and very full of comfort*,* a prudent and sober Divine will not approach a contrary opinion, so much as in words.

In these two conclusions, regard has been had only to the form and use of words. We will now lay down some other positions concerning the very matter and purport, which may be implied in those propositions.

3. Good works are not necessary to our salvation, if by good works we are to understand works exactly good and perfect according to the rule of the Law.

To explain: By works exactly good and perfect, I understand such as man since the Fall has never been able to perform; such as the Decalogue might demand, from even fallen man, under pain of eternal condemnation. Now this perfection consisted chiefly in two things. The first is that man could perform good works with his whole heart, and full delight, no evil concupiscence impairing the due fervour of his heart, or throwing any stain whatsoever upon those works. The latter is, that the same man in his uncorrupt state could do good works with a perpetual and uninterrupted constancy, without any admixture or intervention of evil. That these two things are required for works to be legally good, is evident as well from those commands of God, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, &c.; *Thou shalt not covet;* as from that form of the legal contract, *He who doeth these things shall live by them;* and, *Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things*, &c.; Gal. iii. 10. —Works then legally good, and necessary to salvation, according to the legal contract, are such as flow from a pure and full love of God, and are manifested in an uninterrupted course (no evil work in the mean time being admitted) to the last breath of life. I say good works of this description are not at all necessary for the justification or salvation of the regenerate. For, if such things *were* required of them, they would be still under the curse; for those who are not yet purged from the dregs of evil concupiscence, cannot of

* In the Articles of the Church, Art. xi. on Justification.

course perform works purified from all taint of sin. Paul proves this at large, Rom. vii. 14, 19,—*We know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal, sold under sin.* — — — *The good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do.* Moreover, if such works were required *necessarily* for the salvation of the regenerate, Christ would have died in vain (Gal. ii. 21). For this, among other things, Christ has merited for us by his death, that we should be delivered from that yoke of the law (which even believers are unable to bear, Rom. viii.); and that we should be admitted to life eternal, not through a legal covenant, but by the covenant of Gospel grace. If then the Church of Rome, when asserting that *good works are necessary for justification* or *salvation*, understands works legally good; and means to say that *no one can be justified before God, or obtain eternal salvation, unless he fulfils the law of God*, it must be utterly spurned by us; since it is certain that not one of the regenerate, in the whole course of his life, performs even one work which can be considered and pronounced good according to this exact and legal perfection.

4. No good works are necessary to the regenerate for salvation or justification; if by *necessary* we understand necessary in the sense of a meritorious cause.

I say *none;* in order to exclude not merely those legal works of which I have treated in the preceding conclusion, but to set aside also the works of inchoate righteousness or sanctification, which, though they may be necessary on many other grounds, yet on the score of merit they do not concur either to the justification or salvation of believers. They do not concur in this way, because the obedience of Christ alone has this merit, to which God having regard, both justifies and glorifies the elect. What can be said more explicitly about justification than what the Apostle asserts, Rom. v. 18? *By the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men to justification of life.* And respecting glorification, or the salvation of believers, we have innumerable testimonies of the same Apostle: *By grace are ye saved through faith—not of works;* Ephes. ii., 8, 9. *The gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord;* Rom. vi., 23. Moreover, if they concurred as meritorious causes, it would be necessary that they should be continuous, no unsound work inter-

vening; so that if anything of a contrary tenour occurred, the regenerate would be wholly excluded from salvation. For by the ladder of his merits no one can ascend to heaven, unless it be preserved entire, from bottom to top, without a single step being broken or interrupted. If therefore good works were required from believers in the way of merit, as necessary to salvation, after one single fall there would be no hope of attaining to salvation; because ground of merit is overturned even by a single demerit. This point, however, I but barely touch upon now, because it is my purpose to consider it under that other question, on the merit of works.

I just add this one remark to the last conclusion, that good works are not necessary in the way of merit, even for *preserving* a state of justification and salvation. For, if the preservation of our salvation depended upon the merit of the worker; since there is no one who does not occasionally grow weary in well doing, and oftentimes relapses into the commission of evil, there would be an end to the salvation of all, even of the regenerate. We admit fully that God preserves and increases the gifts of grace in those who apply themselves to good works, and by the zeal of good works draws them on to the goal of salvation; but we deny that this feeble effort of theirs acquires the efficacy or character of a meritorious cause for the preserving of justifying grace, or the attaining to heavenly glory. For God places the elect in a state of justification of his own grace on account of the merit of the Mediator alone; he preserves those so placed; he glorifies those thus preserved: *Ye are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time;* 1 Pet. i., 5.

5. Some good works are necessary to justification, as concurrent or preliminary conditions; although they are not necessary as efficient or meritorious causes.

Among these good works I reckon those internal ones, which, though they do not meet the eye of man, are highly regarded by God; such as to mourn over, to detest sin, to submit humbly to God, to flee to the mercy of God, to place hope in Christ the Mediator, to resolve on a new life, and other such like things. For the Divine mercy does not justify dead stocks, that is those doing nothing; nor horses and mules, that is, rebellious and untractable sinners, obsti-

nately cleaving to their own lusts; but men, and those too full of compunction and contrition, and following the leadings of the Word and the Divine Spirit. Therefore, as in the case of the healing of the sick, it is necessary that he feel his disease, desire health, apply to the physician, disclose his complaint, and receive the medicine; and yet, as neither by any one of these acts, nor all of them together, as meritorious causes, or properly efficient causes, does he obtain health; but solely by the hand of the physician, and the virtue of the medicine: so for the obtaining of justification there are required certain acts, either preliminary or concurring, and yet we do not obtain justification by their efficacy or merit, but by the grace of God commiserating and helping us, and by the virtue of that Divine medicine, namely, the blood of Christ, whereby leprous and diseased souls are washed and cured. Or, to illustrate the same thing by another comparison: As to be in a condition to receive alms, it is necessary that one should acknowledge himself poor and needy, that he should come to the place appointed for the distribution of the alms, that he should humbly entreat the dispenser, should stretch out his hand; and yet as none of these acts merits the alms, so we say that for receiving justification according to the appointment of God, certain works are required which he himself effects in us;—works, however, which merit not, but accompany justification.

And here it must be observed, that when we say anything is necessary for obtaining this or that end, there is intimated by the very expressions, not the necessity of *causality*, but of *order*. Making then, as I do, this concession, that *good works are necessary for justification;* it must not be forthwith inferred, that they are necessary as causes, much less as meritorious. For example,—if I shall say that for obtaining the dignity of knighthood it is necessary to go to Court, and fall on my knees before the Sovereign, it would be absurd of any one thence to infer, that my going to Court, or falling on my knees, was the meritorious cause of obtaining this rank; in the same way we must decide respecting all those works which are said to be necessary on our part for obtaining justification.

6. Good works are necessary for retaining and preserving a state of justification, not as causes, which by themselves

effect or merit this preservation, but as means or conditions, without which God will not preserve in men the grace of justification.

And here all that we have said on the preceding conclusion may be taken into the account for the present purpose. For as no one receives that general justification, which delivers from the guilt of all preceding sins, unless by the concurrence of penitence, faith, the resolution to lead a new life, and other acts of the same kind; so no one retains a state free from guilt, in respect of sins following, unless by the intervening of the same acts, namely, believing in God, calling upon God, mortifying the flesh, constantly repenting of and mourning over sins continually committed. The reason why all these things are necessarily required on our part is, that if these exercises are interrupted, then their opposites, which are contrary to the nature of a justified man, begin to occupy their place. For if you take away faith in God and prayer, infidelity and contempt of the Divine Being succeed; if you set aside the aiming at mortification, and the exercises of penitence, domineering lusts and wasting sins break in upon the conscience. Since then, God will not have the unbelieving, the obstinate and carnal to enjoy the benefit of justification, he requires the constant works of faith, repentance, mortification; by the presence of which unbelief, obstinacy, carnal security, and other things injurious to the grace of justification, are displaced from our hearts, and kept far away, and special forgiveness is obtained for particular sins. Hence Paul, Rom. viii. 13, says, *If ye live after the flesh ye shall die;* and Heb. iii. 12, *Take heed lest there be in any of you an evil heart of unbelief in departing from the Lord.* Let us then not think that the act itself of believing, repenting, and mortifying the flesh, effects or merits the preservation of justifying grace; because all these things are performed by us languidly, and imperfectly; and sometimes also (through the force of some great temptation) they are smothered and overlaid as it were, for a time; but we say that God himself of his gracious compassion preserves the regenerate while walking in this course, in a state of grace and salvation. As therefore it is necessarily required, for the preservation of natural life, that every one should studiously avoid falling into fire, water, precipices,

poisons, and all other things which endanger the health of the body; so it is necessarily required for the preservation of the spiritual life, that a man should avoid unbelief, impenitence, and all other things dangerous and hurtful to the health of the soul: which cannot be avoided unless the opposite and contrary actions are exercised. But these acts do not properly and of themselves preserve the life of grace by securing the effect itself of preservation; but indirectly and incidentally by excluding and removing the cause of destruction.

7. Good works are necessary to the salvation of the justified by a necessity of *order*, not of *causality*: or more plainly, as *the way appointed to eternal life*, not as *the meritorious cause of eternal life*.*

We have before established the negative part of this conclusion: we will briefly elucidate the affirmative.

When I say good works, I do not mean works perfectly good, which cannot be performed by man not yet perfectly renewed; but those works of inchoate holiness, which through the efficacy of grace are wrought by the regenerate. Moreover, these very works I do not determine to be so necessary to salvation, as that he who for a time should become remiss in the practice of good works, or be hurried away by any temptation to the commission of any evil work, should be wholly excluded from salvation: but that it is impossible to reach the goal of salvation, when the pursuit of good works is altogether evaded and rejected, and a loose rein is uninterruptedly given to the lust after evil works. The necessity for this is shewn from the saying of Christ, Matt. vii. 14. *Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way which leadeth unto life: and few there be which find it.* Hence it is plain, that a certain sure way is laid down to the kingdom of heaven by God himself, and that the same is a narrow way, namely, that of virtue and holiness: not the broad way of iniquity and lust. As therefore, if there is a certain, only, and prescribed way, which leads to any city, it is necessary to all who wish to enter that city, to take this way: so, since by the Divine appointment the way of good works leads to the goal of eternal glory, he must

* See Newman's Lectures, p. 202.

inevitably enter upon and hold this way, who desires to arrive thither. But what if a believer should wander from this path of good works (which often happens) and should fall into the bye-paths of the lusts? I say, that whilst treading this bye-way he is proceeding straight to hell; and that he will never arrive at the heavenly city, unless he recovers himself and returns into the true way. So says the Apostle, 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10: *Be not deceived. Neither fornicators, nor idolaters — — nor covetous, nor drunkards, &c. shall inherit the kingdom of God.* And Gal. v. 19—21: *The works of the flesh are manifest, which are these; adultery, fornication, idolatry, — drunkenness, &c. Of which I tell you before, that they which do such things, shall not inherit the kingdom of God.*

Although thus the justified may halt in the way of good works, and sometimes wander out of this way, falling into the precipices of their lusts, still without letting go their state of sonship, yet for the attainment of their salvation and the heritage of sons, it is necessary that they should return into the same through penitence, and persevere in it to the end.

Thus we have our opinion concerning the necessity of good works for justification and salvation; we shall now reply in succession to those arguments of Bellarmine, with which he opposes our Divines, on this point.

## CHAPTER XXXII.

### BELLARMINE'S OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

Having explained our opinion as to the necessity of works for salvation, it remains that we reply to Bellarmine who, in the treatise on Justification, lib. 5 cap. 7., after much effort accomplishes nothing, and while he dreams that he is effectually opposing our Divines, does but beat the empty air.

He says Protestants agree in this, *that good works are not*

*necessary as an efficient cause of salvation, yet their presence is necessary as evidences of the reality of faith.**—a proposition he thus explains, according to the view which he takes of our writers: *Good works ought to be exercised, since otherwise faith would not be living or true; yet they have not any relation to salvation, as if they were the merits, causes, or conditions of it.* But here Bellarmine mixes what is false with the truth. True it is, that our Divines determine that that faith is not living which does not produce good works. But it is false that we require the presence of works only in this respect, that they may attest the truth of faith; for we have before shewn that there are very many other purposes, which need not repetition here. It is true also, that our works have not any relation to salvation, as though they were merits, that is, under the aspect of a meritorious cause. But it is false, that we teach that works have no relation at all to salvation; for they have that relation which there is, between the way appointed, and the end of the way itself. Again, it is true that we deny that good works are required as conditions of our salvation, if by good works we understand those which are entirely good, and such as fully answer to the demands of the Law; if also by conditions of salvation, we understand those covenant conditions by which we are received into the favour of God, and to the right of eternal life: for these latter depend upon the sole condition of faith apprehending Christ the Mediator. But it is false that we deny that good works are required as conditions of salvation, if by good works we understand those fruits of inchoate righteousness which follow justification, and precede glorification as the way ordained thereto. It is moreover false, that we deny good works to be the conditions of salvation, if by conditions nothing else is designed, than that duty which is enjoined upon those justified and to be saved, by means of which they must aim at salvation, not merit the attainment of salvation itself. Lastly, Bellarmine's affirmation, when laying out his opinion, that *good*

* This periphrasis of the sentence, *Quod opera bona non sint necessaria ad salutem, nisi necessitate præsentiæ* is adopted in order to render the sentence intelligible to the mere English reader; at the same time it is but giving Bellarmine's own interpretation, as will be evident to any one who will consult his discussion of the subject.

*works are necessary to salvation on the ground of efficiency*, is true, if he takes efficiency broadly, for all that which in any way operates and concurs to the effect of salvation; it is false, if he understands such an efficiency as either implies merit, which is to be derived from the righteousness of Christ alone; or such as is apprehensive, which pertains to the power of faith alone; or such as is properly efficient, that is, capable of itself to effect salvation; in which sense God alone is the efficient cause of our salvation.

Having made this explanation, we now proceed to the objections of Bellarmine.

1. If the promise of eternal life is conditional, in that case the conditions must be fulfilled, if any one is desirous of being saved. Now Christ himself has said, *If thou wilt enter into life keep the commandments;* Matt. xix. 17. The condition therefore of fulfilling the law is required to salvation; and consequently our fulfilling the law is necessary, proper, and the true cause of our salvation.

I answer:—The promise of life eternal according to the legal compact, or the covenant of works, is so truly conditional, that it does depend upon the perfect and rigid observance of the Law; and our Saviour Christ wisely referred *him* to that covenant who supposed that he could merit eternal life by his good deeds. But the promise of life eternal according to the Evangelical compact and covenant of grace, depends on the condition of faith; and to this all those are directed who, feeling their infirmity and sickness, acknowledge themselves unequal to the keeping of the Divine law, or meriting their salvation. But of those who are under the Covenant of grace, the practice of good works is required, not as a condition of the covenant, by the exact observance of which they may attain to eternal life, or by the violation of which be driven from it; but as a subsequent condition, which is prescribed to those justified and in covenant, to be performed according to their ability, for a testimony of their gratitude, and of progress in the way of salvation. Although, therefore, through infirmity of the flesh, they daily fail in this practice of good works; yet, leaning upon the Mediator by faith, they do not altogether fall from the promise of salvation. Whence it is plain, that the fulfilling of the law is not that condition upon which

the salvation of believers depends; nor is the meritorious efficacy of works necessarily required for the attainment of eternal life, as Bellarmine has laid it down.

2. A second objection is brought from Heb. x. 36, *For patience is necessary for you; that doing the will of God, ye may receive the promise.** Here we find (says Bellarmine) first, that patience is necessary; secondly, that it is not necessary only in the way of presence, but also in relation to salvation; for that so much is intimated in these words, *that ye may inherit the promise.* Lastly, that it is necessary as a cause of salvation; for whenever we say *that one thing is necessary for the obtaining of another,* we indirectly imply a necessity involving causality.

I answer:—We have never stated otherwise than that the works of patience, and of the other virtues which are infused into the regenerate, are necessarily to be exercised by them. Neither would we say that these works are not necessary in relation to salvation in some view. For they have a relation to the attainment of eternal life, though not as merits by the value and worth of which we attain it, but as intermediate courses, or paths, by which we advance towards the goal of eternal life, according to the appointment of God. But Bellarmine's inference that *they are the causes of salvation* does call for some explanation. If he means *meritorious* causes, or *properly efficient,* that is, causes which attain and produce the effect itself of salvation; we must deny it altogether. If causes only *sine quibus non*, that is, which produce something that ordinarily precedes the effect of salvation, in this wide and improper acceptation, we allow them to be termed causes. For it is not sufficient for the proving of a true causality properly so called, that patience be said to be necessary, that the promised salvation may be inherited. We will illustrate this by some examples. When, I say, that it is necessary for the spiritual regeneration of an infant in baptism, that he be presented to the Church, and be immersed by the minister; yet any one who would infer from thence, that the mere presentation, or external ablution, is the efficient cause of regeneration,

* These being the objections of Bellarmine, the passages of Scripture on which they are grounded are taken from the Romish version.

would be arguing very inconclusively. Thus, in order that a beggar obtain alms, it is necessary that he should take the way which leads to the place where alms are dispensed, and put forth his hand, together with his intreaties, to him who is dispensing them; yet it will not thence follow, that either the undertaking of the journey, or the reaching forth of his hand, is the meritorious or properly efficient cause of the alms so obtained; but only the antecedent condition, or the cause *sine qua non* (that is, without which the alms could not be had). In the same manner, in short, are those passages to be understood, which assert that certain works of ours are necessary for inheriting salvation.

3. A third reason (for the meritoriousness of works) is derived from 1 Tim. ii. 14, 15. *The woman being seduced was in the transgression. Yet she shall be saved through child-bearing; if she continue in faith, and love, and sanctification with sobriety.* In this place, not faith alone, but perseverance in love, sanctification, and sobriety, is laid down as necessary to salvation, as a condition without which *(sine qua non)* the woman cannot be saved.

Our opponent himself furnishes an answer to his own argument. For he says, that perseverance is required in the good works mentioned, as a condition *sine qua non;* but he should have concluded, that they are necessary as merits, or as causes properly efficient. It must be understood, however, that as no one is brought to glorification without sanctification going before; so neither without certain fruits of sanctification, that is, without certain good works. But because these works are not required as establishing a merit, or as causes of salvation, but only as means, or as the way to salvation; let them be as imperfect as they may, provided they are not hypocritical; and although interrupted by frequent falls, yet supposing the subject turns at length into the way by repentance, he will in the end obtain eternal salvation: still, not by the merit or efficacy of such works, but by the grace of a compassionate God. Such a necessity of good works, however, proves only their precedence in the way of appointment, not their efficacy as of themselves the cause of eternal life.

4. *With fear and trembling work out your salvation;* Phil. ii. 12. From these words it is thus argued, *If good*

*actions work salvation, they are necessary not only in the way of presence, but in the way of efficiency.*

I answer:—We do not deny efficiency altogether to good works in relation to salvation, but meritorious efficiency, or efficiency properly so understood: namely, such as reaches or produces the effect itself of salvation: but efficiency taken in a broad sense, that is to say, as working something preceding the effect of salvation, we willingly grant to spring from good works. For good works lead to progression in the way of salvation, which consequence is antecedent to salvation itself, although it is not the meritorious or efficient cause of the same. And in this sense, he who performs good works is said to work out his salvation, not by effecting his salvation, through the inherent virtue or merit of his works, but by advancing forward to salvation by the way of good works.

5. *The sorrow which is according to God worketh penance, stedfast unto salvation;* 2 Cor. vii. 10. Here we see the ground of efficiency. For sorrow worketh repentance, repentance a sure salvation. Wherefore it is not only necessary in the way of *presence,* but also of *cause;* and consequently good works are the cause of salvation.

I answer:—The Apostle does not say, that repentance worketh or effects our salvation, as the meritorious or properly efficient cause of it; but it worketh unto salvation: that is, it effects that, to which God promises remission of sins and salvation. For God will not give salvation but to penitents; yet does he not offer it on account of the merit or worthiness of repentance. When therefore the Apostle says, that *sorrow worketh repentance unto salvation,* he shews salvation to be a sequel of true repentance, not that there is merit or efficacy in that repentance to produce salvation. Bellarmine therefore would fallaciously obtrude upon us for a cause that which is not a cause. For repentance is a condition, without which going before, salvation does not follow; but it is not a cause through the merit and virtue of which salvation itself is obtained.

6. *For that which is at present momentary and light of our tribulation, worketh for us above measure exceedingly an eternal weight of glory;* 2 Cor. iv. 17. What could be said more plain? If the patience of tribulation works out

a weight of eternal glory, who can deny but that there must be some connexion between patience and salvation? unless perchance to work salvation be to effect nothing, or no consequence is to be supposed to follow from the operation. Thus Bellarmine.

I answer :—that in this passage the Apostle's main object is to shew, that the godly and faithful, after the endurance of innumerable afflictions and tribulations, are translated at length (through the mercy of God) into the kingdom of glory. But the patience of tribulation is said to work for us glory; not because it is the meritorious or efficient cause of glory, for we have need of patience as a companion, to enable us to proceed steadily in the way of salvation, and to obtain the crown of glory. As therefore a mendicant endures upon his journey the winds and rain, sits at the door of the rich man and patiently waits there, and at length by his patience obtains alms,—not however for the merit of his patience, but by the gift of another's beneficence;—so tribulations patiently endured, are understood to work out glory for believers. For, if the attainment of glory depended upon our patience, as upon its meritorious cause, we should all fail of glory; because we very often incur the guilt of impatience; neither could we persevere unto the end, unless by God continuing, sustaining, and strengthening our faltering patience. But in that Bellarmine argues, *Hence it is evident that there is some connection between patience and salvation*, he is fighting with a shadow of his own creation. No one denies, but that there is some relation between patience and salvation; but we deny it to be of such avail, as that from it, patience can be considered to be either the efficient cause of salvation, which is to be attributed to Divine grace; or the meritorious, which must be assigned to the obedience of Christ; or the apprehensive, which is the property of faith as an instrument. In one word, this reason labours under the same fault as the former, for he thrusts in the antecedent condition as an efficient cause.

7. *If by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the body, you shall live;* Rom. viii. 13. Here, the mortification of carnal concupiscence is necessary to salvation, as a condition and cause, and that it obtains salvation itself by this connection,

first, the conditional particle *if* shews; then, the antithesis itself: for, a little before, he had said, *If you live after the flesh you shall die.* But it cannot be doubted, but that *to live after the flesh* is the true cause of eternal death; therefore *to mortify the flesh* must be the true cause of eternal life.

I answer:—The object of the Apostle is not to shew by what merits the kingdom of heaven is to be obtained, but what sort of persons they ought to be, upon whom this kingdom will be gratuitously bestowed. We confess that no one will live in the kingdom of glory, who shall not have mortified the deeds of the flesh by the power of the sanctifying Spirit; but we deny that this our endeavour, or act of mortifying the flesh, is a meritorious or efficient cause of our salvation.

But Bellarmine argues against us—*The conditional particle* if *shews, that this mortification is required as a condition and cause.* I answer: we have always granted that the effort after mortification, and the desire of sanctification, is necessary to salvation, as an antecedent condition. But the act of mortification, so far as it is called ours, is not required as the cause properly so called, but as the cause *(sine qua non)* without which it cannot be had; or the removing or hindering cause, to which the nature of causality is incorrectly attributed. For such causes do not operate, or attain the effect itself, but are only something preliminary to, or connected with, the effect. But the antithesis is also urged by our adversary. *To live after the flesh* (says Bellarmine) *is truly and properly said to be the cause of death; therefore to mortify the flesh is the true cause of life eternal.* The cases are not parallel: for every evil work suffices truly to effect or merit death; because *evil arises from any deficiency whatsoever,* as says Dionysius correctly: but any good work whatsoever is not sufficient to merit, or truly to cause life eternal; because *good does not arise unless from perfect causes,* as the same author correctly philosophizes. Since then they who live after the flesh act badly *perfectly* (so to speak), by that very act they deserve death. But they who aim to mortify the flesh, do it *imperfectly;* for they are often hurried away by the violence of evil concupiscence: they cannot therefore merit life by this effort. The cases then

being not at all parallel in their nature, the inference sought to be deduced must be fallacious and contradictory.

8. *With the heart we believe unto justice; but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation;* Rom. x. 10. We here see, that faith, which may be true and sincere in the heart, is not sufficient for salvation, unless an outward profession also shall be added to it.

I answer:—We do not deny that as other good works so also confession, or the public profession of faith, is, in some measure, necessary to salvation. For that declaration of Christ is true, *Whosoever shall confess me before men, him will I confess also before my Father; and whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father;* Matt. x. 32. But the meaning of these passages is, not that the operation itself of confessing merits or effects salvation; but that faith leads at length to salvation, which fails not in temptation, and recedes not from Christ, but remains firm and cleaves unto the end to Christ, and attests this cleaving unto the end by external profession, when any occasion requires it. The words then, *With the mouth confession is made unto salvation*, do not intimate a meritorious cause, on account of which the person confessing receives salvation; but the order by means of which he arrives at salvation. For the kingdom of heaven is reached by believing and persevering in faith, of which perseverance this confession is an external sign.

9. *Come, ye blessed of my Father, possess you the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. For I was an hungred, and you gave me to eat*, &c.; Matt. xxv. 34. The reason given, shews clearly, that good works are, in some measure, the cause of eternal salvation.

I answer:—It is not sufficient for the defence of the Papists, to conclude *that works are, in some measure, the cause of salvation*, unless it can be shewn, moreover, that *they are causes in the way of meritorious, or properly efficient causes.* For that is the grand point in question, and not about the word causality, whether strictly or largely taken. Moreover, the particle *for* does not always denote the cause of a thing, but a consequence of inference, whether it be drawn from the cause, or from the effect, or from the

sign, or from whatever else. As, if any one should say to a person entering a temple—Come, take this place prepared for you, for you are clad in the garb of a magistrate or doctor: In a phrase of this kind, the particle *for* has reference not to the cause of the thing, but to the sign of the cause. Thus, when Christ says to the elect—*Come*, &c. *For I was hungry*, &c., the particle *for* is connected not with the cause of salvation, but with the marks of their being in that state. For the good works which are there enumerated, are the signs of true faith, of adoption, of engrafting into Christ, of predestination, and of the Divine favour; which are the true causes of salvation. In fine, suppose we were to admit, that the works of the regenerate are causes; yet they would be *moving* causes only, on account of the promise of God; not *meritorious* on account of their own efficacy. For every promotive cause need not of course be either meritorious or properly effective. For example: if the king should proclaim to his courtiers—Whosoever shall come in the morning to my chamber, and salute me, shall receive the honour of knighthood; and shall afterwards say to those coming and saluting him—Come hither, receive the promised honour; for ye have come, and have saluted me: who would be so stupid as to conclude from thence, that that coming and salutation were the true, efficient, or meritorious causes of the received honour? By parity of reasoning, because God has promised an eternal reward to the poor works of believers, when the last judgment shall have arrived, he will say—*Come ye, inherit the kingdom, for I was an hungred*, &c.—But to infer from thence, with the Jesuits, that a morsel of bread or a draught of cold water, given to the poor members of Christ, is an efficient, or truly meritorious, cause of such infinite glory, would indeed be a mark of senseless pride. We affirm then, that good works are motives to which God has respect in conferring the reward of heaven, because of his own appointment and promise; but they are not the efficient causes, through their own efficacy or worth, of this reward.

10. *He that hath looked into the perfect law of liberty, and hath continued therein, not becoming a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this man shall be blessed in his deed;* James i. 25. But how, I pray, is he blessed in his deed, if

his deeds have no relation to blessedness, but are merely idly to exhibit their presence?

I answer:—This is to trifle idly; not to argue. Our Divines do not teach, that good works have no reference to blessedness; but that they have not *that* which the Papists falsely ascribe to them. Neither do we assert that good works make a mere shew of existence, but that by a presence which is active, they cause the doers of them to advance in the way of salvation. But as respects the Apostle's words, James intends to intimate nothing else than that that faith is dead, hypocritical, and by no means saving, which does not bring forth good works; but that they will be inheritors of blessedness, who in reality give themselves to works of piety. By sayings of this kind he shews who will be blessed in the end, and whence they may gather the certainty of future blessedness; not by what causes, or merits, the blessedness itself is attained.

Let these replies suffice as to the testimonies of Scripture. What Bellarmine brings against us in this case from the Fathers* we shall altogether pass by; not because I think that the Fathers agree with him in this controversy; but because all testimonies cited from them may easily be explained by what has already been stated.

But since he has subjoined to the testimonies of the Fathers one special argument, *that* we shall briefly refute. Thus then he argues against us, De Justif. lib. 4. cap. 9.—If faith alone saved, and works were not necessary, except in the way of presence, as signs of faith,† it would follow that faith could save even if it were deficient of every good work, and was allied to all kinds of sin. For if works are not, strictly speaking, required in the act of salvation; all good works being set aside, faith would save. For like as fire, because it warms by heat alone, if all other qualities were separated from fire, it would without doubt still warm; so the Christian, because he apprehends salvation by faith alone, could be saved, faith remaining, although he should have acquired no good qualities, and had many bad ones. Now it is evident faith may be separated from works, because works are the effects and fruits of faith; and a cause may

* De Justif. lib. 4. cap. 8.

† Vide Bellarm. de Justif. cap. 14. lib. 1.

be without its effect, and a tree without fruit. Since therefore a faith altogether destitute of works does not save, it is from hence proved, that works are necessary to salvation, not only in the way of presence, but of some efficiency, not less than faith itself.

I answer:—In this argumentation there lurk almost as many errors as words. First, Bellarmine errs in this, that he supposes it to be our opinion that faith alone saves. We say indeed that it is the office of faith alone to apprehend and apply to us the meritorious cause of salvation; but that we may be led to the possession of salvation, we consider that many other things are necessary. Secondly, he charges us falsely also with asserting that good works are not otherwise necessary than under the character of a sign, to announce the presence of faith; as a bush suspended is no otherwise necessary to a tavern, than as a sign, namely to indicate to travellers that wine is to be had there. But we abhor such doatings as these with our whole soul, and openly affirm that good works have, in reference to salvation, a necessity of their own, not *significative* only, but *active*: because (as has been before shewn by us more than once) by means of the practice of good works are we advancing and make progress towards the kingdom of heaven. Thirdly, were I disposed to concede to our adversary, that according to the doctrine of our Divines faith alone saves, and that works are no otherwise necessary than in the way of presence; yet still this inference of Bellarmine would not follow—*Faith therefore could save although it should be void of every good work, and be allied to all sins; for instance, with hatred of God, with a settled purpose of adultery, and the like.* This inference will not hold good, for though a source of action may exist, needing not the aid of anything else to produce certain effects, nevertheless it cannot exist alone apart from the effects which itself has produced; and consequently if there exist no signs of operation, there has been no power in actual exercise, for *to effect* pre-supposes *to exist.* For example: if the eyes alone perceive colours, and the neck, the chest, the arms, the belly, and the feet are not necessary to this operation, except by way of presence; yet it would be wrong to infer from hence—The eyes alone therefore will be able to see, although a person should be

deprived of neck, chest, arms, belly, feet, and all the rest of the human members. For although the eyes can see, without the concurrence of these members in the office and act of seeing, yet these members being removed, as to the verity of their existence, the eyes will not remain eyes (unless by an equivoque). The same we assert respecting the efficacy of faith, and its existing apart from all good works. It can apprehend salvation without their concurring in the very act of apprehending it; yet it cannot, if they are separated as to their existence; for by such separation faith itself will be destroyed.

But let us consider the simile, by which Bellarmine himself has illustrated his own case. He says—*Just as because fire warms by heat alone, it would still also undoubtedly warm, if all other qualities were removed from the fire; so the Christian, because he apprehends salvation by faith alone, could be saved whilst his faith continued, although he should possess no good works, and might have many bad ones, suppose hatred of God and his neighbour, a desire of fornicating, stealing, blasphemy*, &c.

I answer:—Although fire effects warmth by its own heat alone, yet if you take away transparency and lightness from it, and put to it opacity and weight, it will no longer be able to warm; because those qualities being removed, it no longer retains the essence of fire. In the same way, although faith alone apprehends salvation, yet if you take away from the regenerate love, and the other infused graces, and impart to him hatred of God and men, and a desire of adultery and blasphemy, the efficacy of faith is immediately extinguished, because the subject matter itself is changed and destroyed; for qualities can effect nothing unless they have some ground on which to work.

Let us lastly proceed to Bellarmine's argument, by which he endeavours to shew that this hypothesis of his was not an impossibility. And here he asserts that it is sufficient for him, if faith can even be imagined to be without good works, or can be separated from them in thought only. Nay, this will not by any means suffice. For there are many things which the intellect may, without error, consider *separately*, which it cannot. without manifest error, think of as actually *separated*. We grant, therefore, that faith may

be mentally viewed *separately* from good works, that is, alone and without works co-operating in the office of justifying, or of apprehending Christ; but deny that it can or ought to be understood as a *separated* thing, that is alone, and destitute of all other graces and good works, and moreover accompanied with all bad works in the justified subject,

Lastly, Bellarmine argues, that all good works may be separated from true and living faith, because works bear the same relation to faith as fruit to a tree, or the effect to its cause; but a tree can be considered as without fruit, and a cause without effect; therefore faith also without works.

I answer:—the question is not here about the separate act of *understanding* it, but of its *existing*. The intellect may conceive of works, and not of faith, or the contrary; but it never can think truly, nor determine with itself that true justifying faith is in act and reality separated from all good works. Nor is this argument of Bellarmine of any weight. For proper and genuiue fruits cannot be considered apart from a living tree, nor opposite and contrary fruits be even imagined upon it. For although the production of grapes does not make a vine, yet that cannot be a living vine which has ceased to bring forth grapes, and now produces thorns. For as *to produce effects* implies *existence*, so *to produce effects in a certain mode*, implies *a corresponding mode of existence*. Where then the proper operation is seen to be extinct, and the contrary plainly arises, there the very nature also is understood to be changed into one of a contrary description. Add to this that good works are the fruit of the same Spirit, of which also faith itself is the fruit. Therefore, while faith remains, the Spirit of faith remains; but the Spirit remaining and indwelling, the works not of faith only, but of the other graces also (which are the fruits of the same Spirit) will follow. Hence that conditional proposition of Bellarmine is vain and false—*If faith alone should save, it would operate as a thing actually separated from all good works, and actually joined with all evil ones.* The conclusion likwise is unsound: *If such faith does not save, therefore works are necessary by the necessity of efficiency.* For they *are* necessary as *the way to the kingdom*, not as *the causes of reigning.*

And here we shall terminate the question of the *necessity* of good works: that which respects the *truth* or *reality* of them will be the next point for our consideration.

## CHAPTER XXXIII.

### *QUEST. II.*—OF THE REALITY OF GOOD WORKS.

HAVING established the necessity of good works, we must discuss their truth or reality.

Now when we say that any work is truly good, we mean,* that it has in itself a goodness truly supernatural, is truly pleasing and acceptable to Him, who is now become our reconciled God and Father, and is truly destined by Him for the rewards both of this life and of that which is to come.

And the good works of the regenerate are distinguished by this three-fold difference from those works of civil righteousness, which are performed sometimes by the ungodly, unbelievers, and the unregenerate. For however splendid the works of these persons may appear; they are not truly good in the theological sense; inasmuch as they are works which neither flow from the supernatural goodness of the agent, nor are truly pleasing to God, nor properly appointed by the promise of God for the rewards of life.

But now lest any one should confound this truth of good works with their perfection, we also add that these very good works, which are called truly good for the reasons just alleged, are, notwithstanding, imperfectly good, on account of that indwelling sin which clings and adheres to the doer, and besmears with its dust, and infects his works. And in this consists the difference between the good works which are wrought by the regenerate in a state of regeneration and inchoate righteousness, and those which could have

* Vide Lutherum, tom. 5. præfat. in Epist. ad Rom. pag. 97.

been produced by Adam in a state of integrity and perfect righteousness; and much more between those which will be done by the blessed in the state of glorification and of consummate righteousness. And again, lest on account of this defect cleaving to the works of the regenerate any one should rashly imagine that between the good works stained by this adhesion of sin, and the bad deeds directly and openly committed in violation of the law, there is little to choose, it must be shewn, in the last place, that these good works of the regenerate are plainly distinct and incompatible with the works of darkness, as well in the judgment of God as of men. And here will appear the great difference that there is between these imperfect works of the godly, and those condemnable, or (as they are called) *mortal* sins of the same, or of the wicked, whatever the Jesuits may slanderously allege, in their calumnious assertions, to the contrary.

You perceive the boundaries and limits of this second question, concerning the reality of good works; in the development of which, those topics which are not subjects of dispute shall be dispatched by a brief elucidation, but where we shall have occasion to enter into conflict with our opponents, we will make our way by force.

But that we may treat the entire subject more clearly and concisely, we will comprise the matter of our discussion under three propositions:—

I. The good works of the regenerate have in themselves a supernatural goodness, are pleasing and acceptable to God in a supernatural way, and appointed by his covenant or promise for the rewards of grace.

All these points are admitted by our adversaries; they will require therefore only a succinct exhibition.

First, we have asserted in our proposition, that *the good works of the regenerate have in themselves a certain supernatural goodness, whence they are truly called good.* This is evident—

1. Because they are done, not only with the general concurrence of God, but by the special motion and impulse of the Holy Spirit, who dwells in the hearts of the regenerate, and excites and strengthens them to these good works. That this Spirit of God is the principal cause of the good

works which are wrought by the regenerate the Scriptures testify at large. Thus Ezekiel xxxvi. 27:—

> *I will put my Spirit within you,*
> *And cause you to walk in my statutes,*
> *And ye shall keep my judgments and do them.*

The Apostle continually refers good works to this Spirit of God: *The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, goodness, faith, temperance,* &c.; Galat. v. 22. And in Rom. viii. 9, 10: *Ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit; if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you:—If Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is life, because of righteousness.* Here it is shewn that the Spirit of God causes us to begin and to complete every truly good work that we do. *He who hath begun a good work in you will perform it;* Phil. i. 6; and chap. ii. 13, *It is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do.* The Fathers also constantly mention this cause of good works: *It is not in man to will what he is able to do, or to be able to do what he wills; or to know what he wills and is able to do; but the steps of man are directed by God;* August. Soliloq. cap. 24. *Men are actuated by the Spirit of God to act themselves;* De Corrup. et Grat. cap. 2. So also Tertullian: *The grace of Divine inspiration alone works in us to undertake and perform spiritual good;* De Patient. cap. 1. *We should not even aspire after heavenly things without the Holy Spirit;* Cyprian. de Spiritu Sanct. The Schoolmen also, however they ascribe too much to free-will, yet acknowledge that this supernatural operation of the Holy Spirit is necessary for inciting to good works. *A spiritual man* (says Aquinas*) *is not only instructed by the Holy Spirit, what he ought to do; but his heart also is influenced by the Holy Spirit.* A little after: *Spiritual men work of their free will and choice, because the Holy Spirit produces in them that very motion of free will and choice.* Admirably to the same purpose writes Gerson: *Because all the spiritual life of the human soul is founded on the miracle of Divine influence alone.* For what end have I alleged so many testimonies from the Scriptures and from other authors? To shew that every

* In Epist. ad Rom. lect. 3. cap. 8.

work whatsoever of the regenerate man takes its origin from the fountain of goodness, namely, the Holy Spirit, and therefore has in itself a certain goodness truly supernatural.

2. Because the works which are called good, are not only done under the impulse of the Holy Spirit exciting to them, but also by means of the qualities of infused grace which exceed the order of nature. For the Spirit of God not only excites the faithful, by a certain secret motion, to produce good works; but infuses into and impresses upon them certain habitual and permanent gifts, such as faith, hope, love, wisdom, continence, patience; by the help of which they more pleasantly, promptly, and firmly produce the things which are good and acceptable to God. This is that inherent grace or gift of sanctification which makes the difference between the works of heathens, or unbelievers, which seem good, and the works of faithful Christians, which are really good. The works of the former proceed from the light of human reason, or the force of custom, or human discipline; the works of the latter flow from the gift of Divine grace, the virtue of sanctification, and of heavenly illumination. The real goodness of works, according to the Scriptures, is judged of by their proceeding from this root. *Every good tree bringeth forth good fruit, but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit;* Matt. vii. 17. But that tree is understood to be made good, which is endowed with the vital sap of infused grace; while that is deemed bad which is destitute of this supernatural gift. To this grace, then, which causes our works to be esteemed good, these works themselves are to be ascribed, rather than to the workers. So Paul:—*By the grace of God I am what I am: and his grace which was bestowed upon me was not in vain, but I laboured more abundantly than they all: yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me;* 1 Cor. xv. 10. So Augustine, in Psal. lxxxvii.: *It is the hidden grace of God, by which the minds of men are in some measure quickened, that they may be able to attend to the prescriptions of health.* Nor has Aquinas badly observed:* *For performing the deeds pertaining to eternal life, Divine grace is imparted from above, which makes the soul to be*

* Quæst. disp. de Virt. art. 10.

*somewhat spiritual and Divine.* Since then the good works of the regenerate flow from this supernatural grace, they necessarily have in them goodness truly supernatural.

3. Because the works which we call *good*, are not only produced by supernatural efficiency, by means of a supernatural form or quality, but have also plainly in view a supernatural end: this therefore is the third cause which shews their goodness to be supernatural. For in *moral actions*, the specific character is constituted by the end or final motive, as truly as in *physical* and *natural objects* it is constituted by the formal difference. Since then the regenerate have indeed as their ultimate aim in all their works the glory of God, hence the latter acquire a peculiar kind of goodness, of which the works of unbelievers, though they bear the same external resemblance, are destitute. Hence Christ commands us to glorify God by our good works; and Paul admonishes us to *do all things to the glory of God;* 1 Cor. x. 31. And hence it is that the same action as to its external substance, is judged to be truly a good work in a believer, but in an unbeliever is truly accounted a dead work. So Clemens, Strom. 6—*The act of every Gentile is sin, because it regards not the end.* And Augustine, lib. 4 contra Julian. cap. 3, *Whatever good is done, and is not done on that account for which it ought to be done, although it seems good as a duty, yet the end itself not being righteous, it is a sin.* This shall be illustrated by an example.* Alexander performs a work of continence, when he behaves in no way incorrectly towards the captive wives and daughters of Darius, but chastely treated them as his own sisters: Joseph performs the same duty when he repels the allurements of his unchaste mistress.† However, we call the continence of the latter a work truly good and holy, because it had a reference to the glory of God; that of the other a politic and natural work, because he regarded his own glory, or some such thing, which men follow under the guidance of nature.

2. It follows in our proposition, that *the good works of the regenerate are, in a supernatural sense, acceptable and well-pleasing to God.* This is of very great importance in

* Curt. lib. 3.

† Gen. xxxix. 8.

demonstrating the supernatural goodness of works of this description. For although all his creatures and their natural operations may be said, in a certain sense, to please God their Creator; yet in this supernatural sense nothing is pleasing, grateful, and acceptable to God, which does not shine by a supernatural worthiness. That the works of the regenerate are pleasing to God, the whole Scripture declares. Gen. iv. 4. *God had respect to Abel, and to his offering;* by which expression he undoubtedly denotes the respect of paternal and gratuitous complacency, with which he by no means honoured the offerings of Cain. In Chap. viii. 21, where the sacrifice of Noah is recorded, this acceptance and Divine complacency is expressed by a beautiful metaphor; *The Lord smelled a sweet savour*, &c. In the New Testament the same is most plainly declared. The Apostle says of the liberality of believers, *Ye have sent a sacrifice pleasing and acceptable unto God;* Phil. iv. 18; of their aim for sanctification, *Present your bodies a living sacrifice, acceptable unto God;* Rom. xii. 1; of all the good works in general of godly men and believers, *He that in these things serveth Christ is acceptable to God, and approved of men;* Rom. xiv. 18. And hence we have at last, that plaudit pronounced by God himself; *Well done, good and faithful servant, because thou hast been faithful over a few things*, &c., Matt. xxv. 23. On the other hand, the works of unregenerate men, although they seem the same as to external appearance, yet meet not with the same acceptance or complacency from God. Of the sacrifice of the ungodly, he thus speaks; Isa. lxvi. 3; *He that killeth an ox, is as if he slew a man:* Of their liberality to the poor, *Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing;* 1 Cor. xiii. 3: of all their works in general; *A corrupt tree cannot bring forth good fruit;* Matt. vii. 18.

Now, if we enquire whence it comes to pass, that these works of the justified are pleasing to God, with this supernatural, paternal, and saving complacency; but those of others are not so: I answer, the primary cause is, that the person is first acccepted in the Mediator, and reconciled to God; but the works of unbelievers and the ungodly are the works of a person still remaining under the anger and hatred

of God as of an enemy.* The Apostle thus speaks of the justified; *He hath made us accepted in the beloved;* Eph. i. 6: and in Heb. xii. 28; *Let us have grace whereby we may serve God acceptably.* Aquinas says well:† *Good actions are not the cause of the Divine acceptance; but man is first accepted of God, then his acts.* And for this reason Lactantius writes—*All the virtues of unbelievers are found in that deadly way which is in total darkness:* Instit. lib. 6. cap. 9.

Another cause why the works of the regenerate are pleasing to God, and those of the carnal not so, is this: That the works of the regenerate flow from a heart purified by faith, inflamed by love; in one word, renewed by grace, after the image of God: but the works of others flow from a heart unbelieving, impure, and filled with the infection of the old Adam. *By faith Abel offered unto God a more acceptable sacrifice than Cain;* Heb. xi. 4: and verse 6—*Without faith it is impossible to please God.* The works then of the regenerate are the effects of supernatural grace; they themselves obtain the virtue of being acceptable to God in a supernatural order. Calvin says admirably, *Wherever God beholds his own face, he deservedly loves it, and honours it; and therefore it is said not without reason, that the life of believers, conformed to holiness and righteousness, is pleasing to him:* Instit. lib. 3. cap. 17. sect. 5. On the contrary, where faith is wanting and the grace of God, works of external righteousness are not accepted; for *without this those which seem good are accounted as sins,* as Augustine speaks, cont. 2 Epist. Pelag. lib. 3. cap. 5.

A third cause of this gracious acceptance may be, because the regenerate endeavour to serve God with their whole heart, and the measure of the grace received; and, if it happen that they sometimes grow dull through the torpor of the flesh, they diligently rouse themselves, and with all humility seek the pardon of their infirmity. But then, God, who has not willed that sin should be altogether extirpated from their minds, accounts these weak and languid services grateful and acceptable, because they are done with all their strength, and by the degree of righteousness only begun in

* See Tit. ii. 14; 1 Pet. ii. 5. † Quæst. disp. de Grat. art. 5.

us. So the Apostle testifies, 2 Cor. viii. 12: *If there be a willing mind, it is accepted according to that a man hath, and not according to that he hath not.* Paul speaks this as respects Alms-deeds; but it may be applied to all good works whatsoever. For *God accepts whatever is done with all the might*, as Nazianzen well remarks, Orat. 7. Let it however be always kept in mind, that this acceptance of our works depends upon the previous acceptance of our person in Christ. For since the regenerate themselves still carry about a body of sin, their works also savour of the corruption of the flesh; and God would account neither them nor their works acceptable, unless he regarded both them and their works in Christ rather than in themselves.

3. There yet remains the last portion of our proposition to be considered, in which we have asserted, that *the works of the regenerate are appointed to the rewards of this life, and of that which is to come.* And herein they are distinguished from the works of unbelievers; for although God sometimes assigns temporal advantages to wicked and unbelieving men, on account of certain works of civil righteousness, by which the public good is promoted; yet works of this kind, done in unbelief, and out of vain glory, are not destined to receive the Divine rewards concerning which we are now disputing. For Hales has rightly observed,* that men of this kind do not serve God by these actions, and therefore these their works are not destined for Divine remuneration; but that God himself, out of the condescension of his Royal munificence, bestows upon them some temporal good things, which are called, though improperly, the rewards of such works. For if the works of unbelievers were ordained to receive rewards of this kind, any infidel whatever might take to himself, on the performance of such works, that declaration of St. Paul—*There is laid up for me a reward which the righteous Judge shall give me;* 2 Tim. iv. 8. But he cannot expect a reward from God, who has not performed his service to God, neither has received any promise of remuneration. But passing by these works of unbelievers, let us return to the good works of the regenerate. I say then that these are destined to be rewarded:

* Part. 3. qu. 64. memb. 5.

First, because God graciously, according to the good pleasure of his will, promised the rewards of this life and of that which is to come, to the good works of believers and the regenerate. So the Apostle affirms, 1 Tim. iv. 8., that *godliness hath the promise of this life, and of that which is to come.* And in the Epistle to the Galatians (vi. 8.) *He that soweth to the Spirit shall reap life everlasting.* Hence also that in Matthew, xx. 8. *Call the labourers, and give them their reward*—namely, the agreement and promise destined by God himself. But it must be always borne in mind, that the inheritance of eternal life is freely granted at first to all the justified and regenerate, when they are engrafted into Christ and adopted among the sons of God. So says the Apostle, in Rom. vi. 23. *The gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ.* And Rom. viii. 17, *But if ye are sons, then heirs; heirs indeed of God, and fellow heirs of Christ.* But when the right of this inheritance has been acquired in Christ, he assigns it also to the godly and believers, as the reward of their works; yet not in virtue of human merit, (as will be shewn hereafter) but of the Divine promise. Hence Gerson thus addresses God, in Book i. de Consolatione Theologiæ, prosa 4: *Although thou art free from all obligation to thy creature for whatever he does for thee or towards thee, yet in thy glorious condecension thou art pleased to have some communion with men, that they might receive blessings from thee, if they would fulfil thy righteousness, and hope in thee who art faithful and canst not deny thyself.* And a little after: *Thou wilt endeavour to observe the commands of God, but in the help of the Highest; and though a thousand times conquered, thou shalt yet a thousand times come off conqueror; and so much the more surely as thou canst have no confidence in thine own works.* You here perceive that the crown is bestowed upon those endeavouring to work righteousness arising however from *the Divine condescension*, not from *the worthiness of their works.* And Durandus when discussing the merit of works speaks thus:* *The Divine promise in the Scriptures utters not a word of any obligation, but intimates the disposition only of the Divine liberality.* And what is thus

* Lib. 2. dist. 27. qu. 2.

bestowed is not owing to any previous desert of the work, but to the antecedent promise.

Thus we have briefly shewn, that good works are destined to receive a reward according to God's promise; although not from any merit of condignity, of which we shall treat hereafter.

Secondly, there is a certain appointment, or at least suitableness of appointment, in their receiving Divine rewards from the mere condition of the doer. For when the doer himself is supposed to be a believer and justified, it is presumed also that he is admitted into the Divine favour and friendship. Now the law of friendship requires, that whatever may be the services which an inferior performs for a friend in a higher station, they are requited not according to the unimportance of the service performed, but according to the munificent disposition and rank of him to whom they are offered. Since then the regenerate are reckoned among the friends of God, according to the saying of Christ, *Ye are my friends if ye do whatsoever I command you* (John xv. 14); when they aim at this from a godly disposition, they may expect from God, their benefactor and friend, rewards of such a character as those with which he is wont to honour his friends.

Thirdly, they are appointed to rewards from the quality of the works themselves. For these works which are called *good,* ought always to flow from the love of God, and have respect to the honour of God. But such a work, although it has not *a condignity*, yet there is *a propriety in their destination* (so to speak) for a celestial reward. For to do any thing from the love of God, calls forth the love of God towards the doer; which, since it consists in *the effect* not in *the disposition*, brings with it of necessity the bestowment of some good. So to make our works have a reference to the honour of God, excites him as it were to honour us, and confer upon us the Divine rewards. Thus the sacred Scriptures teach: *Them that honour me, I will honour;* 1 Sam. ii. 30. *Whosoever shall give you a cup of water, in my name, because ye are Christ's, shall not lose his reward;* Mark ix. 41. As though he had said—No work is so small, but that if it be done for love of me, and to my honour, it shall obtain the richest reward for its doer. Lastly, the

very difficulty of performing good works, which arises from the opposition of the devil and the world, from the unwillingness of the flesh, and its stimulating to the contrary, gives them a degree of fitness for receiving the rewards. For some reward is always due to him who strives lawfully in obedience to the direction of the umpire ; 2 Thess. i. 5. Since therefore good works are not wrought without opposition and struggles ; for *the flesh lusteth against the spirit,* (to say nothing concerning the devil and the world, who proclaim, as it were, war against all good works) there is on the score of the difficulty of practising them a certain suitableness in meeting with rewards. He therefore who shall have toiled and fought in the exercise of good works, may say with the Apostle, *I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith. Henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord shall give me,* &c. ; 2 Tim, iv. 7, 8.

Thus much may suffice for the explanation of our first proposition, by which we have shewn, that the good works of believers have in them a goodness truly supernatural; inasmuch as they are wrought by the operation of the Holy Spirit, by means of supernatural grace, and in order to a supernatural end. Secondly, we have shewn that such works are pleasing and truly acceptable to God ; because they always flow from a person reconciled through the Mediator ; because they spring from a heart purified by faith, and conformed to the image of Divine holiness ; in fine, because in the practice of good works the regenerate act with all their strength, and according to the measure of the grace received. Lastly, we have shewn that these works are appointed to receive Divine rewards in consequence of the antecedent promise of God ; on account of the condition or state of the performer of them ; and finally on account of the quality itself of the works. These things having been thus established we shall pass on to the second proposition.

## CHAPTER XXXIV.

### THE IMPERFECTION OF GOOD WORKS DEMONSTRATED.

You have heard that according to the doctrine of all our Divines, the good works of the regenerate possess a supernatural goodness, are pleasing to God, and by him are ordained to be rewarded. Thus far we and the Romanists are agreed; but when we come to expose the stains and defects of these works, straightway they cry out, that we are making the good works of godly men to be nothing else than the filth, defilement, and deadly sins of the wicked. But their calumnies ought on no account to have that influence upon us, to induce any departure from what is clearly taught in the Sacred Writings. Those calumniators recognise in the actions of the godly that supernatural goodness flowing from supernatural grace which we have established under our preceding head; they recognise, moreover, the imperfection also that cleaves to them from the defilement of the flesh, as we propose to make evident under this our

Second proposition, which is as follows:—

2. The good works of the regenerate are imperfectly good, being stained by the adhesion of sin, and in order to merit acceptance from God, needing his paternal mercy. I shall run through each particular.

1. *They are imperfectly good,*—Firstly, if they are considered *conjointly*, and as under the aspect of one whole body. For as the human body is rendered imperfect if its continuity be broken by the tearing away of any member, or the introduction of one dissimilar; so the body of good works is rendered imperfect when by any intervening evils it is separated, and as it were torn apart. We account this interruption of good works an imperfection, because the perfection of works consists in their exact proportion, or perfect correspondence to the law, which requires entire, constant, and uninterrupted obedience. *Cursed is he who*

*continueth not in all things;* Gal. iii. 10. *He who offends in one point is guilty of all;* James ii. 10. For like as the whole truth of a copulative proposition is infringed by the introducing even a single false particle; so the complete perfection of legal obedience is spoilt, by the intervention of even one unlawful action. But now produce me, from among all the saints, but one with whose good works no evil is intermixed, who has pursued his course of obedience to the Divine law, without tripping, to the end of life. Such perfection never has been found, nor ever will be found, in any mortal being. Let the Scriptures speak; Psal. cxliii. 2:—

*Enter not into judgment with thy servant;*
*For in thy sight shall no flesh living be justified.*

If any one should perform a courseof perfect and continuous obedience, what impediment would there be to his being justified in the sight of God?

Eccles. vii. 20:—*There is not a just man upon earth, who doeth good, and sinneth not;*

If even a just man sin, in whom, I would learn, shall we find this garment of good works so perfectly woven, as to have no rent in it?—This imperfection of good works which the Scriptures every where assert, however boldly denied by such as are inflated with Pharisaic pride, is yet most humbly acknowledged by all who are truly imbued with Divine grace. So the pious prophet David; Ps. cxxx. 3:—

*If thou, Lord, shouldest mark iniquities,*
*O Lord, who shall stand?*

So holy Daniel; ix. 7:—

*Righteousness belongeth unto thee;*
*But unto us confusion of faces.*

So the Apostle Paul, Rom. vii. 14:—*The law is spiritual, but I am carnal.*

The ancient Fathers also taught the same doctrine. Augustine writes on Psalm cxxix—that *the whole life of man is beset with crying sins;* that *all consciences are accused by their thoughts;* that *a clean heart presuming upon its own righteousness cannot be found.* And soon after he thus addresses God: *If thou wouldest be judge only, and shouldest be unwilling to be merciful; if thou*

*shouldest mark all our iniquities, and shouldest examine into them; who could abide it? Who could stand before thee and say, I am innocent?*—Anselm, in his meditations, says: *My manner of life affrights me; for being diligently examined, my whole life appears to me to consist but of sin or barrenness.*—You see then that although the regenerate may practise some good works, yet the body of their works is very imperfect and deformed, because it is as it were interrupted and defiled by many evil works.

But the Papists, that they may not be led to admit the imperfection of actual righteousness, with wonderful adroitness extenuate those sins with which good works are accompanied. Lindanus* calls them—*the trifling little failings of our daily lapses, which sprinkle the Christian life with a little dust as it were, but do not contaminate it.* Bellarmine says,† *Those sins of the regenerate, free from which no man lives, are not, strictly speaking, sins; but are so termed improperly, and in a particular sense; nor are they contrary to the law of God.* I will not now contend about the distinction of sin into *mortal* and *venial;* nay I acknowledge the wide difference between those sins which are commonly deemed *mortal*, and those which are called *venial.* But this I will say, that there lives not on earth a regenerate man, who does not sometimes fall into those sins (especially internal and spiritual) which are held to be mortal according to the definition of the Schoolmen. And David intimates as much when he says, *In thy sight shall no flesh living be justified.* For he who has committed no offence against the law shall be justified by the law, when God enters into judg-

* LINDANUS (WILLIAM) a native of Dordt, in Flanders, who, about the middle of the 16th Century, officiated under the Spanish Government as a member of the Dutch Inquisition. He displayed so much bigotry and implacability in the execution of that office, that he grew into high favour with Philip II., and in 1562 was advanced by that monarch to the See of Ruremonde. After presiding over this Diocese for 26 years, he quitted it for Ghent. Lindanus was the author of several Theological Tracts, in which his zeal is manifested at the expense of his charity. Of these (all written in the Latin language) the principal are, *The Gospel Panoply*, fol.; *A Catalogue of the various Heresies of the Age; On the best method of interpreting Scripture*, 8vo.; *An Edition of the Mass, said to have been composed by St. Peter*, which appeared in one vol. 8vo. the year after his decease; and another *of the Psalms of David.* His death took place at Ghent in 1588.—*Moreri.*

† De Justif. lib. 4. cap. 14.

ment with him. This the Preacher also meant, when he affirmed, that there was no one so just that he sinned not; for that he is a sinner, who never transgresses against the law of God, the Scriptures nowhere assert.

Lastly, the ancient Fathers who deprecate being strictly examined according to the rule of Divine judgment, and confess the sins of their lives, understood not those *trifling little sins* merely of which Lindanus speaks, or *the sins as taken in a particular sense,* and not at all contrary to the law*, in Bellarmine's notion; but *offences truly and properly so called*, and which would have condemned the doers, unless the mercy of God, on account of the merits and death of Christ, had delivered them.

The works of the regenerate are therefore imperfectly good, when they are considered *conjointly*, because of the mixture of evil.

2. They are also but only imperfectly good, if they are condered *singly*. For as all the evil works of the regenerate are regarded as though they had never been committed; yet neither from the whole assemblage of their good works could so much as one be singled out, which comprehends in it all the particulars required to constitute due perfection. By due perfection I understand, not such a completeness as invests those who are in the state of glory; but that primeval excellence which God impressed upon Adam in a state of innocence, and which the law of God requires under the penalty of an eternal curse, unless the grace of the Gospel interpose, and impart pardon to the believer.

That in this sense every work of the regenerate whatsoever is imperfect, is proved from the circumstance that habitual righteousness itself (as hath been shewn by us) is not carried to perfection in any one of the regenerate. But as is the tree, so is the fruit; as the disposition, so is the act wont to be. If therefore any darkness remain in the intellect, any perversity in the will, any rebellion in the affections; if, in fine, all sanctifying or inherent grace be as yet on the increase, not at its *height* (ἀκμῆ) or completeness; the works of grace also must necessarily be imperfect, for this resson,—that effects do not exceed the

* *Peccata secundum quid.*

power of their cause. Now, that this inward renovation is as yet imperfect, and is *in progress* not *actually perfected*,* the Apostle intimates, 2 Cor. iv. 16, where he says, *Our outer man perisheth, but the inner man is renewed day by day.* And vii. 1, *Let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness in the fear of God.* The renovation which increases day by day, and the sanctification which remains incompleted, cannot produce operations entirely perfect, till they themselves shall have become perfect. Augustine constantly acknowledges this imperfection of habitual righteousness :† *The virtue of which the just man now is possessed is called perfect, so far as it is made to include a sense, and an acknowledgment of its own imperfection, and a humble confession that this is the case.* What he says of the very root, namely infused virtue, that we affirm of the external fruit, namely, every work whatsoever, that the knowledge and confession of its imperfection pertains to the perfection of it. But Bellarmine meets us, and exclaims that we abuse the authority of Augustine, who meant nothing else, than that the righteousness of the regenerate is imperfect, if it be compared with the righteousness of the blessed. But this answer of his is little to the purpose ; for although it is clear that this our righteousness is called imperfect, if it is compared with the righteousness of the blessed ; yet Augustine meant something more, namely, that it is imperfect in comparison with the law of God, to which it behoves us pilgrims to be conformed. For if such an imperfection only be meant, viewed in comparison with the righteousness of the blessed, there is nothing either of praise or humility in acknowledging that we worms are a little less perfect than the angels and glorified saints.

Thus much on the first particular of our proposition.

I come now to the second member, which asserts that *every good work is defiled by the adhesion of sin.* This I add, lest any one should suppose that the imperfection which we have been considering is nothing else than the absence of that perfection which need not be aimed at, of which any one may be destitute without any fault or sin of his own. In order that our meaning may be the better un-

* In *fieri non* in *facto esse.* † Lib. 3 contra duas Epist. Pelag. cap. 7.

derstood, it is to be observed, that an action is said to be sin, or infected with sin, in a threefold sense :—

First, any action is reckoned to be sin, (and that by the common consent of all men) which from its very nature and qualities is evil and unlawful ; such as perjury, theft, adultery, &c.

Secondly, in the opinion of Theologians, those actions are reckoned sins, which are good and lawful as to the external matter or substance of the work ; but which are evil and perverse as to the circumstances and manner of performing them. And this obliquity and perverseness consists first in mere absence [of right motives], as when an heathen or unbeliever gives alms to a poor man, but faith, and love, and a reference in such works to the Divine glory do not accompany the action. For such a work is deemed sinful, because destitute of the proper principle, namely, faith and the love of God ; it is moreover deficient in the proper direction to the end designed : qualities which cannot be absent in the performance of any work commanded by God, without incurring the guilt of sin. But a greater and more manifest obliquity of action consists in the presence of some improper circumstance or quality which instils its own poison, as it were, into an action good in itself, or as to its matter ; as, for instance, if any one should give alms to a needy woman to allure her to heresy or adultery. For unbelief and lust have infected such beneficence with their venom. It is the same if any one should act with the view of attracting popular applause ; for in such an action vainglory corrupted and contaminated it. Hence those maxims of the Scriptures :— *Without faith it is impossible to please God ;* Heb. xi. 6. *Whatsoever is not of faith is sin ;* Rom. xiv. 23. *Let all things be done with charity ;* 1 Cor. xvi. 14. *Do all things to the glory of God ;* 1 Cor. x. 31. From which testimonies it is plainly to be inferred, that all are bound to do good works *well :* and consequently that they sin as often as they are deficient in this. These are the rules also of the most celebrated Theologians. *Whatever life an unbeliever leads,* says Prosper, *it is sin :* Sentent. 106. *Without faith even those which seem to be good works are sins ;* Aug. contr. duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 3, cap. 5. *All doing if not directed to the proper end is sin ;* Parisiensis de Sacr. Matrim. cap. 3.

*That which is done as a holy action is not holy unless it be done holily;* Cyprian de Singularit. Clericorum.* *Good works are judged of, not from their nouns, but from their adverbs;*† says Chemnitz. *As in nature the form is more becoming than the matter, so also in morals, the manner is more commendable than the action;* Albertus Magnus, Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 5, cap. 35.

Thus much may suffice concerning those actions in which men are engaged, the subject being good and laudable; but which become sins, either through the want of some good and necessary quality or circumstance, or from the presence of some evil and unlawful one.

Thirdly, any action which is engaged upon a proper subject; which arises from a proper principle, such as faith and love, and tends to its due end, namely the glory of God, becomes infected with sin, and in this respect may be called sin, according to the rigour of the law, if it is not done with that intention and perfection of faith and love, which is required according to the rule of the Divine law; if it has no reference to the glory of God, and is unaccompanied with that ardour and zeal which we are bound to manifest. And all good works whatsoever of regenerate men labour under this defect; for what good works they do, they never do them from so ardent a love of God as the law requires. Although then the *manner* of performing an action may be good, because men are acting from faith and love; yet the *mode* may be defective *in degree*, because the actors do not manifest such a degree of faith and love as is prescribed by the law itself. And this is very clearly confirmed by Gerson in a certain treatise of his *on Evangelical Counsels* and *the State of Perfection*, where he shews,‡ that the perfection itself of love is a matter enjoined. This he had learnt from Augustine, who acknowledges that God had commanded, that we should love him with all the heart and with all the soul; and confesses also, that God is by no means loved

* Cyprian de Singul. Clericorum [cap. v. § 17.], a work now generally assigned to a rather later unknown author: See Rivet Critici sacri. lib. ii. cap. 15.

† That is, the *manner* of doing them, as illustrated by the word "holily" in the preceding quotation.

‡ De Perfect. Just.

with the whole soul by any one of the regenerate, until carnal concupiscence is entirely extirpated. This mere deficiency in the degree of love vitiates and beclouds every action of the regenerate man. But there is added moreover the motion of evil concupiscence, which, when we do good works, casts a langour and torpor over us; when we would avoid evil ones, it excites in us a propensity and base inclination to them. Hence it is that in good works we reluctantly follow the impulse of the Spirit and Divine grace; in bad ones we are with difficulty dragged from the allurements of sin. This is what Christ has taught us in Matt. xxvi. 41; *The spirit indeed is willing, but the flesh is weak.* And the Apostle in Rom. vii. 22, 23; *I delight in the law of God after the inner man; but I see another law in my members warring*, &c. And verse 19; *The good that I would I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I do.* And to the Galat. v. 17: *The flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other; so that ye cannot do the things that ye would.* This reluctance and hindrance of the flesh in the performance of whatsoever is good, and from which our best actions are not exempt; this vicious propensity of it, and the difficulty experienced in the avoiding of evil, which the most holy discover in themselves, contains in it the nature of sin, although it is not imputed for condemnation to believers, and those engrafted into Christ. Let us illustrate this by apposite examples. A believer, that he may duly honour and worship God, reverently adores and suppliantly intreats him daily. This adoration or invocation arises from the faith and love of God; it tends to the glory and honour of God. Lo, here we have certainly an action which is good! But the same invocation arises from a weak and sometimes wavering faith, from shortcoming and torpid love: Lo, here is the adhesion of sin!—A chaste man, enticed to lust by the fascinations of an unchaste woman; because he knows the thing to be forbidden by God, and contrary to the Divine glory, restrains his passion, repels the evil allurements, and answers with Joseph, *How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?* Here is an action good in itself! Yet he nevertheless feels the wandering flames of concupiscence, he discovers an unlawful propensity

of the flesh to that dissoluteness; in fine, he perceives that it is with difficulty that he enforces this abstinence upon his spirit. Lo, here is the poison of sin! He who does not perceive in his good deeds this adhesion of sin, I should say he had never performed one good action. For you will admit, that concupiscence is an evil, and is then most especially incited to rebel, when the regenerate endeavour to discharge their duty to God. Ambrose has observed this:* *The allurement of earthly lusts frequently creeps in, and the cloud of vanity occupies the mind, so that what you desire to avoid, this you think upon and ponder in the mind: a thing which it is difficult for a man to be on his guard against, and impossible to throw off.* On account of this evil which cleaves to our actions, Anselm breaks out in these words,† —*If any fruit appears in my life, it is either so feigned, or imperfect, or in some measure corrupt, that it must either not please or else displease God.* Luther meant nothing else, whom the Papists so hatefully and so bitterly persecute for setting forth this doctrine. He proposed to maintain this conclusion against the Schoolmen: *That the just man is liable to sin even while engaged in good works*‡. But he thus explains the proposition: *The same holy man both delights in the holy law of God, and likewise opposes it; would at the same time do good according to the Spirit, yet does it not because of the flesh.* A little after: *There is as much of sinfulness there, as there is of unwillingness, of difficulty, of repugnance; and there is as much of merit there,* (or of good works) *as there is of willingness, liberty, cheerfulness. These two opposites are mingled in our whole life, and in our every work. — — — Hence we are always liable to sin, even whilst we are doing good, although sometimes less, sometimes more, according as the flesh is less importunate, with its filthy desires.* Thus far Luther, whom while teaching the same things with Paul,§ the Papists cannot condemn of heresy and acquit the Apostle.

We proceed now to explain the last particular of our proposition, in which it is affirmed, that these works of the re-

* De Fuga Seculi cap. 1.
† In Meditationibus.
‡ Tom. 1. pag. 301.
§ Vide ad Rom. vii.

generate *need fatherly compassion from God that they may find acceptance.* This point is so connected with those which we have already discussed above, that if they be admitted, this is not to be gainsaid. For works imperfectly good, and in any measure defiled with the stain of sin, are allowed to receive a reward rather from the benignity of the person accepting them, than from the merit of the doer. Hence that is a most true declaration of Luther,*—*There is not any act which God simply accepts in itself, but he pardons and spares our every act.* This will be made evident thus: Let us suppose any one endowed with that quality of inherent grace which we receive, and that he performs the good works which we do; and in the meantime that he does not enjoy the free favour of God through Christ the Mediator: I ask whether, by this inherent quality and these his works, he can present himself before the tribunal of God and be accepted to life eternal? Doubtless he cannot: for no one will satisfy the demands of a strict judge, unless he who by his inherent righteousness comes up to the standard of that primeval righteousness which was impressed upon man by law of creation;—he who shall by his good works attain even to the perfection of the Divine law: each of which is wanting in the case of such a man as we have pourtrayed. For *the precepts of God are fulfilled by the mercy of God doing more for man in pardoning, than he himself effects in the way of righteousness;* as Luther has piously and truly remarked.

But let us come to the Scriptures. They shew that these works of the regenerate have need of pardon and paternal compassion.

First, because they teach us to deprecate the strict scrutiny of Divine justice; whence it may be proved that under a legal judge every mortal with his righteousness is condemned to hell. So holy Job, ix. 3:—

*If he will contend with God.*
*He cannot answer him one of a thousand.*

And verse 15—

*Whom, though I were righteous, yet would I not answer;*
*But I would make supplication to my Judge.*

* Tom. 1. pag. 197.

As though he had said—He who has preserved the righteousness of a good conscience to the best of his power, cannot nevertheless rest upon this righteousness, before the tribunal of his judge; but must necessarily betake himself to supplication and the refuge of mercy. Thus holy David most humbly deprecates the scrutiny of strict judgment, Psal. cxliii. 2—

*Enter not into judgment with thy servant*, &c.

And Christ reckoned it one of the greatest benefits to believers, that they shall not be summoned by God to undergo this strict and legal condemnation: *He that heareth my word and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life; and shall not come into judgment,* but is passed from death unto life;* John v. 24. Nor must it be overlooked, that the most learned Fathers dreaded this strict judgment, not only on account of evil works, which often mingle with the good, but on account of the imperfection itself of their good works. Hence Augustine, in Psal. cxliii.:—*Enter not into judgment with me, O my God. Howsoever straight I appear to myself, Thou bringest thy rule from thy treasury; Thou appliest me to it, and I am found crooked.* What then seems exact righteousness to us, is found when applied to God's rule, to have something of crookedness in it. But Gregory very frequently and most plainly has inculcated this opinion: *Every holy man sees all the merit of our virtue to be vice, if it be strictly judged by the inward umpire*; Moral. 9. cap. 1. And cap. 11, *If any one should be judged without mercy, his piety being set aside, even the life of the righteous would fail in that judgment.* And cap. 14: *All human righteousness is proved to be unrighteousness, if strictly judged. He needs prayer therefore after righteousness, that what would fail being judged, may recover itself through the mere mercy of the judge.* And he adduces a manifest reason for this, Moral. ultimo, cap. ultimo:—*If we should be strictly judged of God, what place remains for salvation, when both our evil deeds are purely evil, and the good deeds which we think we possess can in no way be purely good!*

Let this, then, be our *first proof* that good works stand

* In the word "*judgment*" Davenant adheres to the literal rendering of that term.

in need of a paternal acceptance,—because they cannot sustain the strict scrutiny of the Judge.

Secondly, the Sacred Scriptures intimate that the good works of the regenerate need the merciful acceptance of a reconciled God, when they refer their acceptableness (so to speak) not to the internal perfection of the works, but to the effectual prayer of faith. For why does faith render our works acceptable to God, but that it first reconciles God to us as a Father? So says Christ, John i. 12, *He gave them this power to become the sons of God; even to them that believe on his name.* But now, after we are received among his sons, although our services are maimed and defective, yet being done in faith they are pleasing and acceptable to our most loving Father. The Apostle's main object in the whole of the xith chapter to the Hebrews, is to teach that the works of the godly have been pleasing and acceptable to God through faith. And Prosper speaks admirably to this point,* that *Faith which is the foundation of righteousness, which no good works precede, but from which all proceed, itself purges us from our sins, reconciles us to God*, &c. But how does faith render God reconciled to us, and our works acceptable to God? Because it rests itself upon the mercy of God through the Mediator; because it purifies the heart to obey God with a good intention, and with all its might; in fine, because it sues out continual remission of sins, and because it covers as it were the spots and stains of our works by the most perfect obedience of Christ.

The virtue then of faith apprehending Christ, and together with Christ the forgiveness of all our sins, and not the perfection of our works themselves, is the cause why they are accepted of God. *For all his commandments are accounted as done, when he pardons whatever has not been done*, as Augustine has most aptly said.†

Thirdly, Scripture intimates that the good works of the regenerate derive their value not as it were from their own intrinsic merit, but from the merciful acceptance of God, when it affirms that they are accepted, not in themselves, or on their own account, but in our Mediator and High Priest Christ Jesus, who offers them to the Father. Thus, 1 Pet.

* De Vita Contempl. lib. 3. cap. 21.
† Retract. lib. 1. cap. 19.

ii. 5, *We offer unto God spiritual sacrifices, acceptable by Jesus Christ.* This acceptance or favourable reception of our works by Christ is figured by that perfume which the angel offers to God in a golden censer, together with the prayers of the saints, Rev. viii. 3. The prayers themselves then of believers would not be acceptable before the throne of God, unless they are sprinkled with this most pleasing perfume. And this is what Gregory means when he bids the just themselves, *to confide not in their performances, but in the pleadings of their Advocate;* in Ezek. lib. 1. hom. 7.; to whom Luther also, whom I have so often quoted, assents in these words: *God accepts his own mercy* in our works, that is, the appearance of Christ for us. For he is the propitiatory of God, who pleads for our works, and makes them pardonable, so that what is wanting in ourselves, is supplied to us out of his fulness. For he is our righteousness*, &c. Therefore even the best actions of the regenerate stand in need of the paternal and merciful acceptance of God, through and for the sake of Christ our Mediator and Advocate.

Lastly, we are taught that our works have need of the paternal mercy that they may be accepted, when the Scripture expressly declares, that God, in accepting and rewarding our duties and works, acts by us as indulgent fathers are accustomed to act towards their children. That passage in the prophet Malachi, iii. 17, 18, is remarkable:—

*And they shall be mine, saith the Lord of Hosts,*
*In that day when I make up my jewels;*
*And I will spare them as a man spareth*
*His own son that serveth him.*
*Then shall ye return, and discern*
*Between the righteous and the wicked,*
*Between him that serveth God*
*And him that serveth him not.*

In this acceptance of the righteousness of the regenerate, you see that God acts by them as reconciled and adopted among his children. As therefore a father is wont to deal most tenderly with his children, and to approve, praise, and

* Luke i. 72.

reward their first lame attempts to practise obedience, and any little services, just as if they were correct actions; so God, when once he is become a Father to us in Christ, acts towards us most indulgently; most promptly encourages the very beginnings of virtue and good works in us, and crowns them with the highest praises and most excellent rewards.

That this acceptance of our works depends upon the paternal mercy of God, even that very passage* proves which the Papists are wont to misuse, in order to establish the contrary error: *Come ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from before the foundation of the world. For I was an hungred and ye gave me meat,* &c. Why are such little duties crowned with so great a reward? Because they were the blessed of his Father, that is, elect in Christ, called, justified, adopted among the children of God. For the efforts and works of these, however very imperfect, yet God, as a most loving Father in Christ, crowns both with the title and rewards of sinless righteousness. *He crowneth them with loving-kindness and tender mercy,* as saith the Psalmist, ciii. 4. Unless God therefore shewed himself to us as the Father of mercies, he could never assign the rewards of crowns to our imperfect works, defiled too as they are by sin.

And thus much may suffice for explaining our second proposition; in the treating of which we have brought forward some topics which may seem more properly to belong to the controversies concerning the perfection and merit of good works; but the connexion of the subjects has led me somewhat to digress; and also Bellarmine's way of conducting the enquiry: for he is in the habit of mixing and confounding the question as to the reality of good works with that of their perfection, which we shall treat more copiously hereafter in its place.

We proceed now to the third and last proposition, which regards the reality of good works.

## CHAPTER XXXV.

### GOOD WORKS DISTINGUISHED FROM DEADLY SINS.

BELLARMINE and the rest of the Papists purposely confound the reality and perfection of good works; as though he who grants the works of the regenerate to be truly good, should also appear to grant them to be perfectly good; and that he who denies them to be perfectly good, should be thought to deny them to be truly good. And hence it is, that when our Divines assert, that any work of the regenerate labours under any defect, and is contaminated with any stain of sin, they straightway cry out, that we do away with good works altogether, and make no difference between them and what they call mortal sins. To meet this calumny then our third proposition, concerning the reality of good works, will be as follows; namely:—

3. The aforesaid works of the regenerate, although imperfect and stained by the contagion of indwelling sin, are yet not to be regarded as mortal sins, nor are they so regarded by Protestants.

When I speak of the works of the regenerate, I do not mean any works whatsoever of theirs (for they also sometimes fall into grievous sins), but those good and holy works which they do so far as they are regenerate. And these works I consider not only as they flow from supernatural principles, namely from the Holy Spirit and from his infused grace; but also as they are done by a man not wholly spiritual, nor as yet perfectly delivered from indwelling sin. But now if the aforesaid works be considered conjointly under both aspects, and with all the circumstances which depend as well upon the infused grace of God regenerating, as upon the corrupt nature of man performing them, still they are not to be regarded as mortal sins, nor are so regarded by us.

But lest a strife should be raised about words, and the matter not be confined to the things themselves, we must explain briefly, in what sense sin is considered mortal by us. And since our dispute is with Papists, who abuse this word, it must be observed, that sin may be said to be *mortal* or *deadly* in a threefold sense. First, in that it brings with it such a desert of eternal death as is absolute, certain, and irremissible. The sin against the Holy Ghost only is accounted mortal, as Christ has taught us, Mark iii. 29. *He that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation.* This is the sin which in 1 John v. 16 is called figuratively ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον,—*a sin unto death.* Secondly, that is usually called *mortal* sin, which involves the person committing it in guilt of death, but such as is remissible; and which does not suffer him to have part in the kingdom of God, until he repent and return into the right way. Of this kind are all those enumerated by the Apostle, 1 Cor. vi. 9: *Do not err, neither fornicators, nor idolaters, &c., shall inherit the kingdom of God.* The same doctrine is repeated in Galat. v.: *The works of the flesh are manifest, which are adultery, fornication, uncleanness, &c. — — — They who do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God;* verses 19—21. In this class are to be placed not only those which are expressly enumerated by the Apostle, but all others, whether internal or external, which are of the same nature; as the Apostle has plainly shewn in this latter passage, in which he said, that they who do these things, or the like to these, shall be excluded from the kingdom of God. But all those are accounted *the like*, in which obedience to carnal concupiscence prevails against the Spirit unto the voluntary perpetration of an act of ungodliness. For all these are usually called mortal sins, because they place the sinner under a fresh guiltiness of death, and are the very way to hell, until by repentance he shall desist from such sins; according to that saying of the Apostle, Rom. viii. 13: *If ye live after the flesh ye shall die; but if ye, through the Spirit, do mortify the deeds of the flesh, ye shall live.* Thirdly, every sin is called *mortal* by some of our Divines, because it would involve the person lying under, or committing it, in death according to the rigour of the law, if he were judged

without the mercy of God in Christ; although being now implanted into Christ it is not imputed to him for death, but has been even remitted to him, who is yet implicated in it. Among these sins we place the remains of original sin, which inhere in the regenerate; the defects of perfect love which mingle with all their works; and, in fine, corrupt lusts and motions, which they overcome and mortify by the holy motions of grace, and do not suffer to rule in this their mortal body.

All these things, if you regard the nature of the matter and the law of God, are sins, and therefore mortal, that is, worthy of death; for *the soul which sinneth it shall die; the wages of sin is death.* But if you look to the mercy of God, and the state of the person, they are not deadly, but forgiven; because guiltiness is removed by the blood of Christ, from those who are engrafted into Christ, and do not suffer this old Adam to rule in them. *There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus; who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit;* Rom. viii. 1. The Apostle said not, There is nothing condemnable in its nature, or worthy of death, in the regenerate; but, *there is no condemnation to those who are engrafted into Christ;* nor did he say simply, there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus; but with this addition, *who walk not after the flesh.* For as often as the regenerate, giving the reins to the flesh, and obeying its lusts, fall into fornication, murder, or the like sins, they are involved in deadly guilt; nor will they ever be able to enjoy life eternal, unless, by a renewed act of penitence and faith, they be delivered from the same.

These things being thus explained, let us accommodate this distinction to our subject. Take then (for example) a good work of a regenerate man, as prayer to God, feeding the hungry, or any other act done in faith and love for the glory of God. Let it be supposed in this act, that it flows from a supernatural principle, namely Divine grace; that it tends to a supernatural end, that is to say, the glory of the same; finally that is of a due kind, and done in a due manner, namely, from faith and love. Now let it also be considered, on the other hand, that this act is done by a man not perfectly regenerate, but defiled to some extent by

indwelling concupiscence; that this concupiscence is not inactive, but opposes the law of the mind in these works, and instils its own poison, so far as it can, into them; lastly, that on account of this evil allied to them, faith itself does not maintain its due steadfastness, but wavers a little; that love retains not its due fervour, but languishes in some measure: now in this case, I say that works of this description are not to be ranked with the mortal sins mentioned in the second sense, of which class alone we are now treating. The reasons are these:—

1. The term *mortal sin* from the common usage of Divines is appropriated to evil actions, as to their object, or their end, or other requisite circumstances, entirely depraved and corrupt. Hence we say that adultery, theft, lying, and other like things, are mortal sins in their kind and nature; because they denote acts tending to improper objects: we say also that the alms of the unbelieving, the ambitious or lustful, given in unbelief, that the donor may thereby obtain popular favour, or accomplish his lust, is also a mortal sin, because it is attended with improper and altogether unlawful circumstances. Now the good works of the regenerate are occupied upon proper subjects, and are attended also by the required circumstances; they are deficient only in this, that they do not attain the due degree in a proper manner; or that, against our wills and with resistance, some corruption is mingled with them from the defilement of the corrupt flesh. They are therefore of the same nature with the sins which are by Divines appositely called *mortal*.

2. That sin is appositely called mortal, which induces a new deadly guilt, until it is washed away by a new act of penitence. But the sin which cleaves to the good works of the regenerate, however sufficient to condemn a man out of Christ according to the rigour of the law, yet the regenerate engrafted into Christ, is not merely not ultimately condemned, but it does not even involve him in any new guilt. For whereas every one of the regenerate has in himself as it were two men—the new and the old Adam, whatever disturbance the old Adam raises, and however it strives against the law, it is not imputed to the regenerate and new man, who is following the rule of the law according

to his ability, and loathing the rebelliousness of concupiscence, and restraining it, as much as in him lies. *If I do that which I would not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me;* Rom. vii. 20. This is what Augustine has observed, in Epist. 200 to Asellicus: *Although the desires of sin exist within us, whilst we remain in the body of this death; if we never yielded assent to any of them, there would be no occasion to say,* FORGIVE US OUR DEBTS. Augustine does not mean that indwelling concupiscence is not sin in its own nature, neither does he deny that its motions or desires, by which our good actions are hindered and defiled, are sins according to the strict judgment of the law; but he means this, that the regenerate man is so freed by Christ from the guiltiness of Original Sin, that he cannot be arraigned on account of inordinate motions, so long as they are suppressed and subdued by the spiritual man. Although therefore indwelling concupiscence breathes its poison into the good actions of the regenerate, yet such actions are not reckoned mortal sins, because that corruption which arises from the old Adam is not imputable to him who is implanted into the new,—provided that by it he does not suffer his will to be drawn aside from doing well, or be impelled to the commission of evil.

3. The good works of the regenerate may be viewed in two lights; either as proceeding from the operation of the Spirit, or in the condition appertaining to the same works in consequence of the adhesion and repugnance of the flesh; —in the former respect they are the very opposite to mortal sins; in the latter also they are different and distinct; they are therefore in no way to be confounded with sins which are properly called mortal. For the worship of God, the sanctification of the Sabbath, love towards our neighbour, and all the other good works of the regenerate, so far as they are fruits of the Spirit and effects of grace, and are done in faith to the glory of God, are not only not to be ranked among mortal sins, but are certainly not sins at all. For God is not the author of sin, neither does he infuse into men what would incite them to sin. Hence it is certain and manifest, that the regenerate man does not sin, when by the help of grace he worships God, sanctifies the sabbath, and exhibits love towards his neighbour; nay, so far he is

engaged in performing works to be admired, and opposed to sin. With respect however, to these good works, it often happens, owing to the defilement of the flesh, that he who is engaged in worshipping God, does it not with such ardent zeal, such constant faith, as he ought; he who sanctifies the sabbath, who loves his neighbour, does not perform these duties with that cheerfulness and love which is enjoined in the law of God. These deficiencies have the nature of sin, and would bring death upon them who are yet under the law: but they are not deadly to the regenerate; neither are they of the same nature with those which are called mortal sins by Divines. The difference lies in this, that mortal sin, or φονικὸν, murderous (as Nazianzen terms it) implies a complacency and approbation in the doer united with it; but the regenerate does not wish nor approve of his own torpor in the worship of God, or his wavering in faith; in one word, he hates and strives against it, whether it arises from shortcomings, or from the repugnance of the flesh, whereby the works of the Spirit are retarded and obscured. He can say then with the Apostle concerning this evil adhering to, and clogging, as it were, his good acts, —*For that which I do, I allow not; for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate that do I.—Now then it is no more I that do it*, &c.; Rom. vii. 15, &c. It would be more correct that this appended evil should be termed *dead sin*, than that, on account of it, the good action to which it is appended should be termed *mortal sin*.

4. Mortal sins are actions hateful to God, calling forth the Divine vengeance against those who practise such things; but the good works of the regenerate are actions pleasing to God, and destined to receive rewards by his appointment; as was before discussed. The evil then of indwelling sin which cleaves to them, does not cause such actions to be considered in the nature, or ranked among the number of mortal sins. It should however not be forgotten, that the reason for this is not, that these defects do not carry in themselves ἀνομία — lawlessness, or that they do not deserve the curse of the law, but that with the forgiveness of original sin, is accompanied also the forgiveness of whatever sin the old Adam may commit or lead to, the new man crying out against it and resisting it. For as he

who is translated from the stock of the old Adam, and engrafted into the new, is accounted just and holy notwithstanding the depravity and impurity of that old Adam dwelling in him; so the new actions of the same are deemed good and holy notwithstanding the defilement of sin adhering to them.

It would be easy to distinguish and discriminate these works of the regenerate, in many other ways, from the damnable works or mortal sins of the wicked; but when we shall come to discuss the objections and calumnies of the Papists, whatever has not been sufficiently explained, shall then be elucidated.

Now we shall merely add, that Luther and others of our side, who have asserted that the regenerate sin mortally in every good work, meant no more, than that they do not fulfil the law perfectly, even in their best works; but that some defect is mingled therewith, which has the nature of sin, and consequently would, with a strict judge, lay open to the sentence of condemnation, if the guilty person were excluded from the benefit of a Mediator and of mercy. When therefore these works are termed mortal sins, it is not intended by this word *mortal*, to distinguish or discriminate sins, as the Romish Divines are accustomed to do; but to make it evident that the desert of every, even the least sin, is death according to legal judgment; and at the same time to intimate, that the best actions of the regenerate are not free from some obliquity: axioms, both of which are perfectly true and agreeable to the sacred Scriptures.

And now you have our three propositions concerning the truth or reality of good works explained—the first of which our adversaries admit; the second they oppose with arguments, the third with calumnies: We will therefore defend ourselves both against their arguments and their calumnies.

## CHAPTER XXXVI.

### THE ARGUMENTS OF BELLARMINE AGAINST THE AFORESAID PROPOSITIONS ANSWERED.

BELLARMINE, in his discussion on Justification, Book 4, has throughout three whole chapters (15, 16, and 17) entered the lists against our Divines; but for the most part he is merely combating fancies of his own creation. We will however consider what he has been able to advance in this controversy on the reality of actual righteousness or good works, which is opposed to our defence of it.

It is to be borne in mind that we have already stated under our second proposition, that even the good works of the regenerate are imperfect, and defiled by the adhesion of sin; and that we have shewn under our last proposition, that they are not, on account of this imperfection or adhesion of carnal contagion, to be confounded with or reckoned among mortal sins.

Now Bellarmine, in opposition to us, takes up this position, *that the good works of the regenerate, or of the justified, are not sins, but truly just, so that they may even be called actual righteousness.** But he founders shamefully at the very threshold of the discussion. For if he had wished to combat our opinions, the contradictory of our doctrine should have been stated by him thus:—*The good works of the regenerate are stained by no adhesion of sin, but are perfectly just, so that they may be called strictly legal righteousness.* For we do not assert that good works are sins, except in this sense only, that they are not done in absolute conformity to the rule of the Divine law, inasmuch as that contagion and infirmity of the old man, which adheres to the regenerate, forms an obstacle. Neither do we deny that the works of believers are *truly* just, but that

* Bellarm. de Justif. lib. 4. cap. 13.

they are *perfectly* just; like as we do not deny the moving faculty in a man lame or paralytic to be *real*, although we do not admit that it is *perfect*. In fine, we do not refuse the title of actual righteousness to the good works and holy lives of regenerate men; because they flow from that image of righteousness and holiness which the Spirit of regeneration has commenced in them: but we say that they are not so legally perfect as to be able to endure the examination of a strict judge or legislator; nay, that in order to be accepted, they need the grace of the Mediator and the mercy of God the Father.

Bellarmine takes a stand against our opinion from the Scriptures:—

1. His first testimony is derived from Job i., the last verse:—*In all these things Job sinned not with his lips, nor spake he anything foolishly against God.** Here the Scripture itself asserts that where there was so much ground for manifesting impatience, Job did not sin even in word. But neither sinned he in heart; for in the second chapter, verse 3, God himself bears this testimony to him,—*He is a man simple and upright, avoiding evil and still keeping his innocence.* If he still retained his innocence, he sinned neither in tongue nor heart. Moreover, since Satan was set upon nothing so much as to tempt Job to sin, and God permitted him to be tried that his integrity might be demonstrated, if Job had sinned God would have been in some measure overcome by Satan. It is certain then that this work of patience performed by Job was not stained with any sin.

I answer, that in those sudden calamities Job is said not to have sinned, and to have retained his innocence, because (as Gregory observes) he had neither let loose his tongue in insolence, nor had even admitted the sin of murmuring into his heart; in one word, because he had not shewn himself to be an hypocrite, which the devil both desired to find, and to fix upon him before God. His *not sinning*, therefore, or *his retaining his innocence*, means that he

* This and the following passages from the Old Testament, being of course derived from the Vulgate—the only Roman authorized version—the Translator has given them in accordance with it.

so conducted himself in this struggle, as not to rebel against God, nor offend God through impatience: but it does not prove that his patience was perfect according to the standard of the law, or free from every stain of adherent sin. For this imperfection, or dust of sin with which the good works of the saints are besprinkled, is not imputed (as we have often said) to those who are in Christ Jesus. They are therefore not considered to sin, notwithstanding this sin which dwells in those persons working, and adheres to their works, so long as they restrain and mortify its deeds and motions by the Spirit.

St. Augustine treating largely of this innocence of Job, in his second book *on the deserts and remission of sins*, and where he powerfully opposes the Pelagians, who endeavoured to establish the perfection of human righteousness by this example of Job, first of all demonstrates the contrary from the confession of Job himself. *Behold* (says Augustine, cap. 10), *Job both confesses his sins, and says truly that he knows that there is not any one just before God.* Then he proves this same from the perfection of the Divine law: *If I should call myself just against his judgment, where that perfect rule of righteousness convicts me as unjust, truly my own mouth would speak impiously.* Moreover Augustine proves it from the Divine rebuke: *No one is justly blamed except where there is something worthy of blame.* Lastly he argues from indwelling concupiscence:—*These words, in which he is commended of the Lord, may be adopted by the man who sees another law in his members*, &c.

Moreover, Bellarmine's assertion that Satan wished for nothing less than to induce Job to sin, and his inference from it, that *If Job had sinned in any measure, God would have been overcome by Satan*, is inconclusive on several grounds: First, Satan sought to induce Job to curse God, which is plain from verse 11. Although therefore Job, from the infirmity of the flesh, may have had something faulty and infected by sin mingle with his patience; yet so long as that holy man submits himself to God, and restrains the rebellious motions of the flesh, Satan succeeds not in his endeavours. Next, it does not follow—*There was some infection of sin attaching to this good work, therefore Satan came off conqueror in the business.* For Satan is considered to

have obtained a victory, not when the flesh itself has contaminated a good work with defilement and imperfection, but when he has drawn off the regenerate, by means of this contagion of the flesh, from doing well, and has urged him forward to some base action. In fine, if the devil had shaken Job's integrity, and hurried him into any flagitious act; yet it is impious to imagine that God would have been in any way overcome. For when we read that David (whom God pronounced to be a man after his own heart) fell into adultery and murder; we do not from thence argue, that God was conquered by the devil, but David; because he fell not by the fault of God, but by his own. It cannot then be proved from the abovementioned passages, that the work of patience in Job was free from all imperfection of sin; nay, from the last verse of chapter ii. it is clearly to be inferred, that this holy man, who was a pattern of patience, was yet not altogether free from all the goadings of impatience.

2. His second authority is drawn from the Psalms; and many passages are heaped together:—Psal. vii. 8, *Judge me, O Lord, according to my justice.* Psal. xxvi. 1, *Judge me, O Lord, for I have walked in mine innocency.* Psal. xviii. 21, *I have kept the ways of the Lord, and have not done wickedly against my God.* Ps. cxix. 101, *I have refrained my feet from every evil way.* From these, and other similar passages, Bellarmine argues, that the works of David were such as could endure the strict judgment of God; and were therefore such as were not stained by any contagion of sin.

I answer, that when David presents himself for judgment before God, he has not respect to the absolute righteousness of his person or works, but to the special righteousness of *his cause*, which he was maintaining against God's enemies, and wicked calumniators. When therefore he asserts, that he was pure and free from those crimes which were charged against him by his enemies; he is not doing it boastfully, as if his righteousness was so pure and faultless as to be free from sin in the sight of God.—Again, when he speaks of his own righteousness, viewed apart from his conflict with his enemies, he maintains that the desire, aim, and sincere practice of righteousness might be accorded to him; but he

never dares to claim a perfection of righteousness. For as respects that declaration, Psal. xviii. 21:—

*I have kept the ways of the Lord,*
*And have not done wickedly against my God;*

and, *I have refrained my feet from every evil way,*

with similar instances; if any one should be inclined to interpret *that* of his perfect observance of the Divine law, and not of his endeavour, desire, and inchoate obedience,—he must needs blot out the history of his adultery, his murder, and his numbering of the people; he must also erase those confessions of David himself:—

*Who can understand his errors?*
*Cleanse thou me from secret faults.**—
*Mine iniquities are gone over mine head;*
*As an heavy burden, they are too heavy for me.*†

Although then the words of David may sometimes seem to denote a general observance of the law; yet the nature of the case itself requires, that they be interpreted of the constant desire and the sincere effort of the regenerate will, with that exception on the part of David, which the Apostle also uses, *I delight in the law of God after the inner man; but I see another law warring against the law of my mind. — — For with the mind I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin;* Rom. vii. 22, 23, 25. Moreover, that this obedience may be accepted as perfect on the part of God, it is necessary that that mitigation be exhibited to which Augustine refers: *All the commandments are thus accounted as done, when whatsoever is not done receives a pardon.* Retract. lib. 1 cap. 19.

3. Thirdly, that passage of Matthew vi. 22 is alleged; *If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light:* And of Luke xi. 36.—*If thy whole body be full of light having no part dark, the whole shall be full of light, as when the bright shining of a candle doth give thee light.* In this passage (says Bellarmine) is described a work perfectly good, that is good as to its nature, and as to the intention, and other circumstances. For *the single eye* signifies the right intention, *the body full of light* denotes the good work. But such a work the Lord pro-

* Psal. xlx. 12. † Psal. xxxviii. 4.

nounces to be altogether light, having no part dark. But if that work were in its nature a mortal sin, as the Lutherans say, it would be altogether darkness. For, as an evil intention, so any other fault renders a work bad, however good it might be in its own nature. Some works, therefore, of the regenerate are entirely free from all defect.

I answer, that by *a single eye* in both passages, we must understand a mind enlightened and purified by the Holy Spirit; by *body full of light*, a life or conversation shining in righteousness and holiness. For as when the eye is clear and healthy, a man walks in a straight and regular course, but when it is beclouded and diseased, he stumbles, wanders from the right path, and comes into collision with any object in his way; so when the mind is enlightened and restored to health, the believer walks in the direct way of God's commands; but when it is defiled and darkened, he strays amidst works of darkness, and roams over the precipices of his own lusts. But to come to Bellarmine: he is mistaken, first, in restricting the phrase *single eye*, to a right intention; for a right intention alone is not sufficient to produce a work full of light. Paul was not deficient in rectitude of intention, when he was persecuting the Church, that nevertheless was a work of darkness, because it sprang not from an enlightened and purified mind. Secondly, he blunders also in deriving an absolute inference from a proposition limited and conditional. Christ hath said, *If thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light;* that is,—If thy mind has been enlightened and healed by the grace of the Holy Spirit, thy whole life and all thy actions will shine in piety and holiness. Now actions are understood to be so far lightsome, in proportion as the mind is: since then the mind is lightsome only when regenerate, those actions also will shine, which, and so far as they flow from the grace of regeneration. To those actions, however, there may be something adhering which does not proceed from this renewed mind, but from the corruption of the flesh, and which has in it something dark, that is something faulty. Now, that the illumination and purification of the mind are but imperfect and inchoate is plain from those words of the Apostle: *We know in part, and we prophesy in part;* 1 Cor. xiii. 9. And also from those other, *Be renewed in*

*the spirit of your mind;* Ephes. iv. 23. As therefore the regenerate, notwithstanding the remains of darkness, are declared, from their better part, to be *light in the Lord;* so also their works and their life are said to be *wholly light,* notwithstanding the adhesion and admixture of sin, because it is imputed, not to them, but to the old Adam; and also because, although this corruption *works,* it does not *reign* in them. Thirdly, he falsely attributes to the Lutherans, that opinion that *the good works of the regenerate are mortal sins in their own nature.* What they say is, that from the contagion of the flesh something always adheres to these works which in its own nature is bad and faulty, and contrary to the Divine law, and consequently mortal sin, if judged after the rigour of the Divine judgment: but they confess that in their own nature, that is with respect to the Divine grace from which the works flow, they are good and holy and acceptable to God. Fourthly, he is incorrect in concluding that a work must be altogether darkness, because something faulty cleaves to it; just as it would be a mistake to infer, that he who does produce works is altogether darkness, because some degree of ignorance and darkness attaches to him. Lastly, he is wrong in affirming that any measure of faultiness has an equal tendency to spoil an action good in kind, which is of a bad intention. For the badness of an action depends chiefly upon the will, which a bad intention shews to be perverse and depraved. But every other faultiness springing from the flesh does not evidence voluntary badness, and therefore does not equally vitiate a moral action good in kind. Though, were we to speak strictly, the best of our actions, on account of the defects cleaving to them, may be called *bad,* in that sense in which Christ called his Apostles *evil* who were the best of all mortals: IF YE THEN BEING EVIL, &c.; Matt. vii. 11. It cannot, therefore, be proved, from the words of Christ before quoted, that any work of the regenerate is entirely faultless; since the regenerate himself is not yet freed from every degree of faultiness.

4. Bellarmine seeks a fourth testimony from 1 Cor. iii. 12, 12; *If any man build upon this foundation, gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble; — — the fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is. If any man's work*

*abide, which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward; if any man's work burn, he shall suffer loss*, &c. In this passage it is intimated that there are some works built upon the foundation of the true faith so good, that they have no fault at all in them. The comparison to gold, silver, precious stones, shews as much; and moreover, the circumstance that those works are said to abide the fire of the Divine judgment, and to receive a reward. For sins cannot be called gold, neither could they abide the fire of the Divine judgment, neither would they receive a reward, but punishment. Therefore some works of the regenerate are free from all stain of sin.

To this I answer, that I am aware that interpreters differ in their elucidation of this passage; but that explanation of it seems most genuine, which makes the words refer to teachers and the doctrines which they inculcate. The meaning therefore is this:—They who build the true and solid doctrine of the faith grounded upon Christ by the Apostles, and such as pertains to the edification of the Church; these raise upon it a superstructure of gold, silver, and precious stones, that is, things most excellent and durable, and of the utmost price with God.* On the other hand, they who superadd to the Gospel of Christ, their false, vain, and useless inventions, they build over Christ wood, hay, stubble, that is frivolous doctrines, and such as are destined to perish in the fire of the Divine judgment. Nor will any inconvenience follow on our admitting that some doctrines, rightly deduced from the Gospel and adapted to the edification of the people, have no fault at all in them. To the teacher himself something faulty may always attach; but the precious doctrine of his, which he rightly builds upon the foundation, remains immaculate. Let then what Bellarmine begs, but does not prove, be conceded to him, namely, that Paul is speaking of the good works of the regenerate built upon the foundation of a true faith; yet he is mistaken in inferring from hence, that these works have no fault in them: he cannot infer it from their being compared to gold, silver, and precious stones; for in all these is found some dross to be cleared away, and which the artisan custo-

* Vide Aquin. in hunc locum.

marily takes pains to burn and purge out: nor can he do it from the fact of their abiding the fire of Divine judgment; for this is owing to all their stains being covered and remitted for the sake of Christ, the Mediator; not because in doing them no fault or stain cleaves to them: nor, in fine, can he infer it from the fact of their receiving a reward; for God, in our good works, after pardoning what was faulty and of ourselves, will crown what was holy and from himself.*

* It may not be unuseful to observe here, that Macnight, and after him many eminent Expositors and Controversialists, have taken a more extended view of the meaning of this passage than the one here allowed, and especially as it regards the superstructure. In the Hammersmith *Discussion between the Rev. John Cumming and Councillor French* (London, 1841) some very curious information was adduced by Mr. Cumming (p. 361—3) respecting the various different explanations of this passage as given by Bellarmine from numerous Fathers and Doctors of the Roman Church. "There are *five* difficulties," says Bellarmine, "in this place; first, what is understood by the builders. Second, what is meant by 'gold, silver, precious stones.' Third, what is meant by 'day of the Lord.' Fourth, what is understood by the 'fire.' Fifth, what is meant by 'so as by fire.'" Having considered the first, and shewn how widely the Fathers and Doctors differ from one another, he says, with regard to the second, "The difficulty is a little more dreadful, for there are no less than *six* opinions about it. As to the meaning of the foundation and of the superstructure, gold, silver, precious stones, St. Theophylact and St. Chrysostom understand by the foundation true, but weak, faith; by gold, silver, and precious stones, good works; and by hay and wood, mortal sins!" "This opinion of these two Fathers," says Bellarmine, "is utterly indefensible," and he adds, "it would prove the HERESY of Origen."—"*The next opinion* is, that by foundation is understood Christ; by the name of *gold and silver, and precious stones*, Catholic interpretations; and by *hay and stubble*, heresies. St. Ambrose and St. Jerome seem to teach this. This opinion is indefensible;" &c., &c. Mr. Cumming cites much from Bellarmine in the same strain, as affording evidence of the total want of unanimity in the Church of Rome on important doctrinal points, and the impossibility of coming at the truth amidst such a farrago of contradictory matters. The meaning of the text seems to be, that as Christ is the foundation, the Christian Church, consisting of believers of all nations, and of which Ministers are the builders, is the superstructure built upon this foundation. The materials cannot represent the *doctrines*, but the *disciples* of Christ. Let the reader, who is doubtful, compare Isai. xxviii. 16, with 1 Pet. ii. 4—6, and Ephes. ii. 20, 21. If this were duly considered, it alone would uproot the whole system of Popery. Purgatory, for instance, could never be sustained; for *unworthy members, hypocritical professors* of the Church are represented by the "wood, hay, and stubble;" materials which in passing through the fire are utterly destroyed—reduced to a heap of ashes. They are not cleansed, purified, nor in any way improved, but *totally* consumed! So in every other respect the truth may be deduced by regarding this passage as referring to *persons* and not to their *principles* or *actions*. See Godkin's *Guide from the Church of Rome to the Church of Christ*, and Hall's *Doctrine of Purgatory*, p. 42; or Dr. Elliott's *Delineation of Roman Catholicism*, p. 253; London edit.

5. A fifth testimony is drawn from James iii. 2, *In many things we all offend.* Why (says Bellarmine) did he not say, *In all things we all offend?* For if all the works of the righteous are mortal sins, surely not in many things only, but even in all things we offend. But James, in chap. ii. verses 8, 9, had distinguished good works from sins, saying, *If you fulfil the royal law, according to the Scriptures,— Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself; you do well: But if you have respect to persons, you commit sin, being reproved by the law as transgressors.*

I answer: We are said to offend, to fall, or to stumble, not only because evil may accompany good in our works; but when this attendant evil prevails so far as to lead into some actual offence. We confess, therefore, that in this sense we do not all sin in all things, that is, that indwelling sin does not so prevail in all the actions of the saints, as to impel them to some new offence and evil work, although it always tinges and stains (as it were) all their good works with its own inherent taint and defilement. Moreover, as to Bellarmine's inference, that *if all the works of the righteous are mortal sins, then we offend in all things;* if they were mortal sins in the Papistic sense, it would indeed be perfectly true; but Luther sometimes calls such works mortal sins, in a far different sense, because to the work itself, which is holy and laudable, so far as it flows from grace and faith, there cleaves, on the part of the flesh, some defect deviating from the law, and damnable according to the rigour of the law, if the person had not been transplanted from the old Adam into the new, and reconciled to God. This defect does not offend God anew, nor reduce the act into the class and number of *mortal* sins (usually so called by Theologians), as we have before proved. Lastly, in that other passage from the second chapter of James, there is a distinction made between good working and the working of sin: the working of sin is, however, to be understood as something very different in the holy Scriptures from the adhesion of imperfections, or the admixture of certain defects in well doing. For the workers of iniquity are they who study evil works; and ἐργάζεσθαι ἁμαρτίαν, *to work sin*, is studiously to follow base lusts. We grant, therefore, that the regenerate, when they endeavour to fulfil the law of God

by good and pious actions, do not work sin; but we say that indwelling sin exerts itself in those very actions of the regenerate, by lusting against the Spirit, by chilling their love, by weighing down their mind; in one word, by diffusing its internal poison through all.

It is therefore not yet proved from the passages alleged, that nothing faulty adheres to the good actions of the regenerate.

6. A sixth testimony Bellarmine adduces from those passages which exhort man not to sin, *Be ye angry and sin not;* Psal. iv. 5. *Sin no more;* John v. 14. *Awake to righteousness and sin not;* 1 Cor. xv. 34. *If ye do these things, ye shall never fail;* 2 Pet. i. 10. *These things I write unto you that ye sin not;* 1 John ii. 1. To what purpose [says he] are such exhortations made, if in every work, however good, we cannot but sin?

I answer, that exhortations of this kind have their use, though no one lives, or can live, no one acts or can act entirely free from sin. For they shew what we ought to do according to the precept of the law; what it behoves us to strive to attain by the help of grace; what we shall at last attain to in the kingdom of glory. Yet all these passages, whatever shew of argument they present, if accurately weighed, are foreign to the present controversy. For the word ἁμαρτάνειν, *to sin*, is not used in any of these passages to describe any good action to which the evil of indwelling sin attaches and adheres; but, to be urged to the commission of an evil and wicked action, under the influence of reigning concupiscence. For example, when the Psalmist says, *Be ye angry, and sin not:** he does not mean, Let not any defect arising from indwelling sin, let not any fault whatever attach itself to your zeal, or your just and holy anger; (although this were to be desired;) but he means —Restrain this anger of yours, that it may not impel you to improper and unholy actions. Thus when Christ says, *Behold, thou art made whole; go, and sin no more;* he does not dissuade the impotent man from good actions, with which no fault can ally itself from the contagion of the flesh; but from sins of that nature on account of which he fell into that disease. For Christ intimates this

* The quotation here follows the Septuagint and Vulgate of Psal. iv. 4.

in saying, *Sin no more, lest a worse thing come unto thee.* We must say the same with regard to the other three instances; in which, *to sin* is not used to express the committing of an action in some measure defective and faulty; but so to sin, as those who know not God; so to transgress, that there may be need of a new act of penitence, and reconciliation of the conscience with God. Let the passages alleged be consulted, and you will understand this to be the true sense of the Apostle.

7. A seventh testimony Bellarmine brings from those texts which teach, that the works of the righteous are pleasing to God. *The offering of Judah shall please the Lord;* Mal. iii. 4. *He that worketh righteousness is acceptable to God;* Acts x. 35. *Offering up spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God;* 1 Pet. ii. 5. But *nothing can be pleasing unto God, unless what is truly good and clear from all fault,* as Calvin confesses, Instit. lib. 3, cap. 12, sect. 1. Nor does it [says Bellarmine] help Calvin to say that works of this kind are pleasing to God, not by reason of their own worth, but because God indulgently washes away their defilement. For it is absurd to argue that the righteousness of Christ should be imputed not only to sinners, but to the sins themselves. It cannot in fact be made intelligible how sin, by indulgence, should become an offering pleasing unto God.

I reply, that we have already admitted and proved, that the good works of the regenerate are pleasing unto God. There shall be no dispute between us respecting this point. But the position that *nothing can be pleasing to God, but what is truly good, and clear from all faultiness,* is both deceitful and misleading. There is a great deception in confounding a thing that is *really good* with that which is *good and clear from all faultiness*; for it is one thing that an action be *really good,* and another that it be *entirely good,* or *free from all faultiness;* just as true gold is one thing, and gold purified from all dross another. The calling upon God, which arises from the grace of the Holy Spirit, and through faith and love tends to the Divine glory, is an act *truly good;* but if it be performed with cold love and weak faith, while the flesh in some measure spreads its torpor into this good action, it is not *purely* or *perfectly good.* There is

besides a manifest falsity in the position when it is asserted that *nothing is pleasing to God, except that which is clear from all fault.* For a subject in some measure faulty may be pleasing notwithstanding the fault, although the fault of the subject is itself displeasing. Every regenerate person pleases God, who yet has something inherent in himself, which may be called evil, impurity, malice, nay radical defect; Bellarmine himself admitting the same in his treatise *on the Loss of Grace and the State of Sin,* lib. 5, cap. 12. What he admits as respects the person, we infer on the same ground concerning any act of the regenerate; namely, that the very action is pleasing to God, notwithstanding the corruption which adheres to it. But here it is to be observed, that this complacency of God does not rest upon the *corruption* in the person, but upon the person himself; and thus the Divine complacency, which is bestowed upon an action of grace, does not rest upon the defect or fault in the action, but upon its goodness.

Bellarmine has summoned Calvin into his favour in vain; for, in the passage quoted, what he maintains was, that the best human actions, if tried by the rule of the law and weighed by the strict judgment of God, cannot sustain that fiery trial before which nothing can be accepted, but what is entirely perfect and stained with no defilement. But the case is quite otherwise when God acts the Father; when the Son of God interposes himself, and has atoned for all the sins of our life, and all the defects and faults of our good actions by his own blood. For then, though these defects and faults still cling to man, and instil some poison of sin into his actions; yet are they not reckoned to him, but are accounted as if swallowed up and carried off.

It does not however follow hence, as Bellarmine has wrongfully charged upon us, that *the righteousness of Christ is imputed to sins themselves:* But it is imputed to the sinner, yet so, that the sins themselves are by this imputation atoned for and done away. Nor do we hold that sin through this indulgence becomes a pleasing offering; but that the good and supernatural act to which something of sin, from the contagion of the flesh, adheres, becomes pleasing to God; this taint being pardoned, and consequently not impeding its exercise.

8. A last testimony is fetched from those passages which call the works of the righteous good works absolutely. *So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works;* Matt. v. 16. *Charge them that are rich, to be rich in good works;* 1 Tim. vi. 18: and many other similar passages might be adduced. But if [argues Bellarmine] all the works of the righteous were mortal sins, they should be called *bad* rather than *good.* For, on the authority of Dionysius, *unless a work be entirely good, it is said to be absolutely bad.* How is it, then, that Scripture calls works absolutely good, if they are good only in a certain sense, though absolutely and simply bad?

I answer:—It is not strange that the works of the regenerate are called *good* in the Scriptures. For they are good as to the substance of the works, good as to the supernatural goodness of their origin, good in fine as to the main attendant circumstances. But they are stained with some taint, it may be, from defectiveness in degree, or from the corruption of the flesh exerting itself at the same time. Since then by works *absolutely good* Bellarmine understands good works which are so entitled without a diminishing term being added and expressed, his assumption is very erroneous. For those are not unfrequently called *good things,* which are but inchoately and imperfectly good. The regenerate themselves are called *good,* Matt. xii. 35. *A good man out of the good treasure,* &c.; the same are also called *evil,* Matt. vii. 10; *If ye being evil,* &c. And (what is very remarkable) in both cases, the same persons are called absolutely good and absolutely bad, in Bellarmine's sense; for there is no restricting term added in either passage. If then the same regenerate man may be rightly viewed as both good and evil in reference to a difference in circumstances, (for he is called *good,* in respect of the grace infused by the operation of the Spirit, but *bad* in respect of the evil still inherent in him through the condition of his common origin,) why may not the same *act* of a regenerate man be called *good* as regards the *fountain of grace* whence it springs, and *bad* as regards *the contagion of the flesh* which still adheres to it? For schoolboys know that names are taken absolutely, sometimes from the major part, sometimes from the more noble, sometimes from the more familiar.

As to what relates to Dionysius, he determined correctly that that work may be considered bad which is not entirely good; that is, which is deficient in some perfection that ought to be found in it. And this is what our Divines have in view, when they pronounce the best actions of the regenerate to be bad (because stained with evil) if strictly judged apart from the mercy of God, and the mediation of Christ. But when God is unwilling, for Christ's sake, to impute to an individual the evil dwelling in him, through the condition of his common origin, and is unwilling also to judge his actions according to the defilement arising from that origin, then both the person and the action can be accounted and called good.

Lastly, As to that stale sentiment he is so frequently thrusting upon us, that *if the works of the regenerate are mortal sins, then they should be called bad, not good;* it has been again and again replied, that they have never been called *mortal sins* in that sense in which a certain class of sins are called *mortal* by the Scholastic Divines. For if they were of this class, they would be, as Bellarmine infers, *bad*. But they are called *mortal sins* by Luther in his articles, because that stain of sin, which cleaves even to good actions, would hale the person doing them to death, if he were to be judged out of Christ, and according to the rigour of the law, apart from mercy. But that which is of this kind has its supernatural goodness, though not perfect, nor commensurate to the demands of the law.

And thus much concerning the testimonies from the Scriptures brought forward by Bellarmine; the opinions of the Fathers, which he has subjoined, shall be next discussed.

## CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE TESTIMONIES OF THE FATHERS EXPLAINED WHICH ARE CITED BY BELLARMINE IN HIS TREATISE ON JUSTIFICATION, Lib. 4. cap. 16.

I MIGHT pass by all the quotations which our opponent has collected from the Fathers without remark, because they are totally foreign to the present controversy: for they only prove that there is one aspect to be taken of those holy actions which are called good works, and another of those ungodly ones which are called bad; but they do not prove that those holy actions, or good works, are wholly void of all stain of sin adhering to them. Lest however we should seem to shun the authority of the Fathers, let us proceed to examine their testimonies.

1. Ambrose, in his book de Apologiæ David, cap. 6, says, *Because human frailty cannot but be accompanied with sin, we must take care that our sins be not more numerous than our works of virtue.* Here, Ambrose plainly distinguishes works of virtue from sins; which he would not do, if he considered that all works, however good, were truly sins. The Fathers then acknowledged that there were works simply good, and truly and properly distinguished from sins, and infected by no defilement of sin.

I reply: that if, by *works simply good*, we are to understand purely good, without any defilement of sin, I deny that the Fathers acknowledged that such works could be produced by a regenerate man; whilst bearing this corrupt flesh. But if by these terms we understand truly and supernaturally good works, I grant that such works can be produced by all who are endued with supernatural grace, notwithstanding that imperfection and defilement which is natural to them from the flesh; neither do I deny, that good works, which flow from grace, are distinct truly and properly from sins. For if by *sin* Bellarmine intends to denote an action ungodly in its nature, as, for instance, the oppression of the poor;

who does not perceive, that the pious support of the poor is not distinct from it, but contrary to it? If he does this he is but beating the air and fighting without an opponent. But if by *sin* he means that the taint of sin involved in a good action, arising from the contagion of the flesh, such as a degree of vain glory, or a want of due charity and alacrity, joined with this act of succouring the poor, should be pointed out, yet our argument is not weakened thereby. For we do not say, that the evil of an action, arising from the flesh, is not distinct from the goodness of an action springing from grace; but we affirm that this evil or sin, which the flesh communicates even to good actions, is separate, or absent from no good work. For as the conditions and qualities, in all the powers of the soul of the new man, are distinct from the qualities and conditions of the old, and yet are as it were inwoven and intermingled in the same; so also in all the works of the regenerate, the goodness of an action, which flows from the Spirit of grace, is distinct from the depravity of the same, which flows from the corruption of the flesh; and yet they meet in every work and exert their influence. As to the words of Ambrose, he does not without reason distinguish works of virtue from deeds of evil. Bellarmine however infers, and that without any reason, that there is nothing of depravity or sin mixed with these works of virtue. Nevertheless a work of faith is distinguished from a work of unbelief or hesitancy; though there be found in believers themselves some evil of incredulity involved with their virtue and work of faith; according to that saying, *Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief.* Mark, ix. 24.

2. Next, Jerome, lib. 3, adversus Pelagianos [is quoted by Bellarmine] saying, That *man, if he will, may not sin, as to time, place, or bodily weakness, so long as his mind is on the stretch, so long as no chord is slackened on the harp by any faultiness.* And afterwards: *He who is careful and fearful may avoid sin for the time.* In this passage Jerome is labouring, in opposition to the Pelagians, to shew that the human life, even of the just, cannot be so perfect, as to remain long free from all sins, even daily and light ones. Where however he admits, by the way, that for some period at least, a man may live so

diligently, as to commit no sin, not even a venial one; and hence [would Bellarmine argue] that some works are done pure, free from all sin, and entire.

I reply: when Jerome concedes to the Pelagians, *that, if he will, a man may not sin*, he is speaking, not of the defilement of sin which adheres to good actions, but of that commission of sin which is manifest in unlawful and forbidden actions. He does not then mean, that any one can either altogether shake off the corrupt remains of the old Adam, or wholly hinder any stain from defiling his good deeds, but is only intimating that man may for a short time avoid committing a bad and forbidden action; and *that* we by no means wish to deny. Yet it ought to be observed also, that Jerome adds this limitation, namely, that man may restrain himself from committing sin, as long as no faulty chord remains upon the harp. But there is no season, when this harp of the human soul may not have some chord loosened, whilst it is clad in this corruptible flesh; as Jerome himself elsewhere shews.* And hence also something faulty, and, as it were, loosened, is always to be found in the good works of the regenerate; because their mind and will does not attain to a perfect harmony in righteousness and virtue while in this corrupt body.

3. [Again, Bellarmine quotes] Augustine, in lib. de Spir. et Litera, cap. ultimo, as stating, in express words, that the righteousness to which a man may attain in this life is not that he need not sin, nor follow evil lusts, although he may not attain to complete love in this life. He may then [argues Bellarmine] produce actions free from all contagion of sin. For the want of complete love is not considered a fault, as Augustine shews in the same place.

I answer,—Augustine understands by *not sinning*, the not consenting to desire, when it invites us to some unlawful act; as he speaks in the same place. We will allow then to Augustine, that it appertains to this *minor* righteousness (as he calls it) of the regenerate, that in this sense a man may not sin. But we cannot in the least concede to Bellarmine, that the regenerate can perform acts so perfect as to be free from all the defilement of indwelling sin, and cor-

* Ad Ctesiph. adversus Pelag.

responding exactly to the rule of God's law. Moreover, when Augustine says that *the want of perfect love is not to be considered a fault*; if by *perfect love* he understands that consummated love which is peculiar to the state of glory, I confess that no one sins in it, because no one attains it in this life; but if he means that which pertains to the state of nature as now constituted, I say that this defect is of the character and guiltiness of sin in all the children of Adam, until it is remitted, and they be transferred to the new Adam: which Augustine also himself fully admits. But after remission, and implantation into Christ, the deficiency of due love, and the notion of improper desire, remain sins, as to the nature of the thing, although they do not involve in deadly guilt, on account of the state of the person.

4. The same Augustine [Bellarmine continues] de Bono Conjugali, cap. 6, observes, that *cohabitation for the sake of offspring is blameless, but to gratify carnal desires in accordance with marriage fidelity, though a fault, is venial; but adultery or fornication is a deadly sin.* He quotes similar passages from cap. 7., * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * in which [according to Bellarmine] *his* opponents ought either to be able to assign some difference, or to confess that there is no sin at all in the former case. And therefore all the acts of the regenerate are not stained with sin.

I answer: it is easy to assign a difference between works, although there cleaves some stain of sin from the defilement of the flesh to each of them. For first, continence, or virgin chastity, if rightly maintained, that is, both bodily and spiritually, is something more beautiful and excellent than conjugal chastity, as well on account of the greater arduousness, as of the greater advantage in spiritual worship; as the Apostle declares, 1 Cor. vii. 34. Secondly, in the conjugal state, cohabitation for the sake of offspring differs from mere concupiscence, because the former is referred to an end, ordained, and proper; the latter to one perverse and improper. Lastly, between the aforesaid acts and fornication or adultery, a great difference appears; because the latter are acts tending to a forbidden object, and therefore are evil in their own nature; but the aforesaid actions have a due object, although they are sometimes unduly perverted.

Now a difference between these actions being thus established, we yet say that even the least of them is not without sin annexed and adhering. As to fornication and adultery, since they are in themselves grievous sins, it is not necessary that I should say anything. With regard to cohabitation for indulging concupiscence, we have Augustine acknowledging the fault or sin to arise from the inordinate end; although not of such a kind as to wound the conscience. The whole dispute lies then between a conjugal state for the sake of offspring, and virgin continence for the sake of more free devotedness to Divine things. As to the former, we grant that it has neither fault nor crime; but this must be understood of the work itself, considered precisely upon this ground; for Augustine plainly teaches that something evil always mingles with it from the infirmity of the flesh. His words are these:* *Wedlock has this good, that carnal incontinence, although corrupt, is rendered honest for the propagation of offspring; so that conjugal union may produce some good from a bad desire.* Gregory the Great has made the same remark: *Lawful wedlock cannot be accomplished without carnal pleasure, nor can this exist without fault.* A little after: *There are many things allowable and legitimate, and yet we are some way defiled in the very act of doing them. And although what is done may be right, yet it is not to be approved, because the mind is disturbed by it.*—Ad Interrogationes Augustine, resp. decim.

I say then, that this evil of lust is by its own nature, sin; and sprinkles some stain of sin in wedlock; which yet together with indwelling concupiscence, whence it arises, is forgiven to the pious and faithful. Moreover, as to virgin continence, I acknowledge as often as it is kept by a person capable, with the purpose of being freed from all secular cares, and of cleaving to spiritual affairs and meditations without any distraction; it is a work acceptable and pleasant to God: but I add also, that no one cultivates this continence so exactly as to fulfil that law, *Thou shalt not covet;* and therefore some stain of concupiscence mingles as it were with this work of continence. Although then the work of continence itself is much celebrated by Augustine, yet it is

* De Bono Conjug. cap. 3.

not therefore shewn to be free from all infection of adhering sin.

5. Augustine, lib. 4, in Julianum, cap. 3, and elsewhere, contends, that the works of unbelievers are sins. But why does he do this, if the works of believers also are deadly sins, as the Protestants say. By this opinion then of Augustine, [argues Bellarmine] the works of believers are absolutely good, and thoroughly cleansed from all the defilements of sin.

I answer: Augustine did not thereby labour in vain to prove that the most splendid works of unbelievers are sins; for many have been and still are inclined to that error, of thinking that works of this kind are not only not sins, but *ex congruo* meritorious of saving grace. The opinion of Protestants we have often explained; and now we do not say, that the good works of believers are reckoned among mortal sins; but we affirm that some evil connects with and adheres to these good works, which would be deadly if the person should be considered out of Christ and without forgiveness. Lastly, his inference, that *the works of unbelievers are sins, therefore the works of believers are absolutely good*, is about as valid as would be—*Unbelievers are sinners, therefore believers are absolutely good, and free from all sin.* For as believers and unbelievers are sinners, but in a different way; so the works of both are stained by sin, but in a different way, degree, and respect, as we have before explained at large.

6. St. Gregory, lib. 2 Moral. cap. 8, observes: *If we say that Job sinned in his words, which it is unlawful to think, we say that God was vanquished in his purpose.* Job therefore performed some act vitiated by nothing of the contagion of sin. [So Bellarmine.]

We have before answered,* that by *sinning in words* nothing more is to be understood, than that he contumaciously let loose his tongue in accusing God of injustice, and in justifying himself; as Gregory himself interprets it, cap. 19. We grant, therefore, that Job in his words uttered nothing evil or unlawful against God, as we also say many things which cannot be at all censured as false or impious against

* Chap. xxvi.

God. Yea, we readily admit that this godly man refrained even in his inmost thoughts from the sin of blasphemy, of rebellion, and of murmuring. But, because when we say that something faulty attaches to every work of ours, we understand this not of the external work simply considered, but of the internal and external conjointly ;—neither of the substance itself only of the work, but of all the circumstances and degrees of the circumstances accompanying and as it were encircling the same work—although in the external work itself, namely, in the word uttered, there might have been nothing of sin ; yet it is not to be forthwith inferred, that the work itself is free from all sin ; for the mind of the speaker perhaps was not rightly itself. But if both the language were pious and the mind pious, yet if by some emotions of impatience breaking forth from the unrenewed parts, the mind meanwhile is somewhat disturbed and ready to rise ; or, to close all in one word, if it does not maintain a due measure of submission and patience, according to the strictness of the law, the work itself is not excusable from all blame. For all these qualities must be understood to concur for the completion of a good work. We say, therefore, that Job did not sin in his words ; and still we deny that it has been proved from thence, that the work itself of Job's language, considered in every respect, was altogether free from every degree of the contagion of sin.

7. The same Gregory, Moral. lib. ix. cap. 26, says, *Our good works themselves cannot escape the sword of insidious faultiness, unless they are fortified daily by solicitous fear.* He admits then [according to Bellarmine] that it is possible some works of ours may avoid this sword of insidious faultiness.

To this I answer : it is one thing *to escape the sword of an insidious fault,* another *not to be stained by any spot of indwelling sin.* Actions good of their kind avoid the wounds of lurking evil, when their spiritual goodness is not destroyed by the internal slothfulness or guile of the doer ; which is meant by this metaphor of the sword. But they are deemed to be altogether free from sin, when their spiritual goodness or their perfection is not deficient on being judged by the rule of the law ; as may be understood from the definition of sin. Moreover, it is plain that some actions

of the godly, as to their spiritual goodness, are not subverted or destroyed, either by that slothfulness or guile, which, in the passage quoted, Gregory compares to a concealed sword. But it is equally manifest that no actions of the godly, although they are partly carnal and weak through indwelling sin, come up to the demands of the spiritual rule of the Divine law, from which to fall short ever so little is to commit sin. To reason, then, as Bellarmine does—*Gregory admits, that it is possible some works may escape the sword of undiscovered faultiness; and hence therefore he admits some of our works to be free from every stain of indwelling sin,*—is reasoning weak enough indeed.

8. The same, in his Epistle to Augustine, Answer x., says: *It is the property of good minds to acknowledge that in some way fault is there, where fault does not exist.* Therefore in some actions of the godly no stain of sin is found.

Bellarmine has mutilated this testimony, and, contrary to the meaning of Gregory, has miserably distorted it. The words in the author are these,—*Bonarum quippe mentium est, etiam ibi aliquo modo culpas suas agnocere, ubi culpa non est; quia sæpe sine culpa agitur quod venit ex culpa:*—*For it is the property of good minds even to acknowledge their faults in some measure there, where fault does not exist; because often that which originates in something faulty is itself free from fault.* The occasion of the words is this: Augustine had asked, Whether it was lawful for a woman affected by feminine custom to enter the Church and receive the Sacrament? Gregory answers, that it was lawful for her to do so; but if she voluntarily abstained out of great religious feeling, she was to be commended. Then he subjoins the aforesaid words, *Bonarum quippe mentium,* &c. The meaning then is this: To be so affected is no fault of women; but because this evil of natural infirmity argues a sinful defect from which it arises, she acts rightly who takes occasion from hence to consider her own sin, and abstains for some little while from the Sacrament. You perceive then how ridiculous is Bellarmine's inference—*There is no sin then in that feminine affection, yet on account of it females acknowledge their sins: some of our actions therefore are free from all blame or stain of sin!!*

9. Bernard [he proceeds] in his book De Præcepto et

Dispens. says, that *disobedience through neglect is a venial fault, through contempt it is condemnable; but that obedience from fear is good, from love it is better.* He therefore regarded this obedience of love as being free from even venial sin; otherwise he would not have distinguished it from disobedience arising from neglect, which is, he says, a venial sin.

I answer: although our obedience which flows from love is always defective, and stained by some spot of sin; yet it is easily distinguished from disobedience which arises from neglect. And they are discernible easily enough by the very contrariety of the acts; for obedience and disobedience are opposite acts. They may be discriminated also by their origin; for this obedience is supposed to arise from love, but that disobedience is presumed to flow from neglect. Lastly, they are distinguished on the ground of the very fault itself which is attributed to both. For we call the disobedience which springs from neglect, sin, because the act itself is evil; although, if it be compared with disobedience from contempt, it is called a lighter sin, and in that sense venial. We acknowledge, on the contrary, the obedience of love is a good action; although if it be tried according to the standard of the law, it possesses some defect adhering to it, and in that sense is culpable.

Thus then have we replied to the testimonies from the Fathers: Let us now sift the reasons of Bellarmine.

## CHAPTER XXXVIII.

### ANSWER TO THE REASONS OF BELLARMINE.

Bellarmine, after quoting testimonies from the Scriptures and adducing the opinions of the Fathers, endeavours by certain reasons* to establish this opinion: *The good works of the righteous are not sins, but truly good works;* as if our

* De Justif. lib. 4. cap. 17.

opinion was, *Good works themselves are sins, and not truly good.* The Jesuit will not impose upon us in that way. Our defence is this:—*The good works of the regenerate always have some stain of sin cleaving to them owing to the flesh.* We do not therefore confound a good work which flows from grace, with the stain of sin which is derived from the flesh; but we say that every good work whatsoever is marked with this stain, nor can it be purged from the same, before the soul itself shall be altogether freed from the infection of indwelling sin. Neither do we deny that the supernatural works of grace which are wrought by the regenerate are *truly* good; but that they are *purely* or *perfectly* good, so that nothing of the infection of the flesh adheres to them, and nothing of that due perfection, according to the requirement of the law, is wanting in them. If Bellarmine has brought any thing against this defence of ours we are prepared to meet it to the full.

1. He says, If all the good works of the regenerate are vitiated and corrupt, so that they ought from their very nature to be viewed as mortal sins; without doubt that arises either from innate concupiscence, or from defect of love, or from the admixture of venial sins. But nothing of these contaminates the good works of the regenerate: Therefore the good works of the regenerate are not sins.

I answer, we have not affirmed that good works are in their own nature mortal sins; but we say that something of sin always cleaves to them from the corrupt nature of the old Adam. But it is not necessary to spend time in repelling this calumny; let us proceed with Bellarmine to the proof of the minor, which he thus sustains:—*First, concupiscence itself is not sin in the regenerate, but infirmity, unless consent be given to it; therefore it does not vitiate their actions with sin.* I answer, that I had rather believe the Apostle Paul, who lays it down (Rom. vi. and vii.) that concupiscence to which consent is not yielded is sin, than Cardinal Bellarmine, who denies that it is so. Moreover, I assert that this infirmity is not merely *natural*, as to be *miserable* is not to be *blameworthy;* but it is *moral*, and is not free from sin. For it is situated in the faculty which is formed to obey reason; nay, it pervades reason itself and the will, and compels it to rebel against the moral law by

means of a corrupt habit. Such an evil, whether it be called *languor*, or *disease*, or *infirmity*, matters little; for that it has the nature of sin, no one of sound mind will deny. But since we have treated the subject of this very controversy, I shall not again begin what I had finished.* Our opponent objects, secondly, although concupiscence is admitted to be sin, yet it does not vitiate every good action by its contagion; because it does not always act or move in every good work; as Augustine shews, lib. 6, in Julianum, cap. 8. This objection deserves indeed a serious consideration.

First, then, it is to be observed, that by *concupiscence* is to be understood, not only the propensity to lust, or the motion after unlawful practices, but that general inclination of the flesh to rebel against the mind and the law of God, which the Apostle (Rom. vii. 23) terms *the law of sin*. Secondly, this point also should be attended to; namely, that this motion or act of concupiscence may be considered as twofold; one, by which it impels and incites a man to the desire and pursuit of evil pleasure, whilst, on the contrary, he is forbidden and restrained by the Spirit; the other, by which it retards and withdraws a man from the performance of spiritual good, grace in the meantime exciting and aiding him in *that*. The Apostle has pointed to the former act of concupiscence in these words,—*The evil that I would not, that I do;* Rom. vii. 19:—to the latter in those words, *The good that I would I do not.— — I find then a law that when I would do good, evil is present with me;* Rom. vii. 19, 21. He has noted both in Gal. v. 17: *The flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other; so that ye cannot do the things that ye would.* These points being laid down, I say that in the performing of any good and spiritual work, the flesh, or concupiscence, has its share and influence. For as often as the Spirit of grace endeavours to withdraw us from evil, concupiscence strives to drive us into it: on the other hand, as often as grace excites us to the performance of good, indwelling concupiscence retards and withholds us,

* DAVENANT refers to his Determinationes, of which Questio i. is *Concupiscentia in renatis est peccatum.* The reader may also be referred to his *Exposition of the Epistle to the Colossians*, Vol. ii. p. 48, or Chap. iii. vs. 5, of that work in the original Latin.

and thus in some measure it vitiates all our good works; for it does not allow the avoidance of evil to be entire, inasmuch as it excites desires after it within us; while at the same time it impedes the operation of good from being complete, in consequence of the hindrances and impediments which it interposes.

Nor is Augustine opposed to us in the passage alleged; for he states merely, that this evil quality is always in us, but not that we are always influenced by some temptation: but as often as any object of desire crosses its path, he acknowledges that it resists the Spirit. Moreover, in exercising every good work that occurs to the contrary of which corrupt concupiscence inclines. So Augustine, with whom Bede accords, upon those words, THE FLESH LUSTETH, &c. *In the good it lusteth against the Spirit; for in the evil it has nothing against which it can exert itself. It lusts against the Spirit there, where the Spirit is.* Since then the Spirit acts in every good work, according to the opinion of Augustine, the flesh, or concupiscence, will act contrary in the same. The evil inclination of the flesh does then affect, in some measure, every good work with its defilement.

Let us come now to that other cause, which according to the opinion of Protestants vitiates the good actions of the regenerate; and that is a deficiency in the love of God.* Against this Bellarmine argues: *The defect of love, which hinders us from doing good works with so much fervour of love, as we shall do in our proper country, is a mere defect; but sin or a fault it is not. For although our love, compared to the love of the blessed, is imperfect, yet it may be called absolutely perfect.*

I answer: we are not speaking of the defect of beatific love, or of sin, or the cause of sin in our good actions; but of the defect of the required love, that is, of such a love as the decalogue prescribes. Since therefore our good works are never done with that degree of love which the law itself requires; the absence of this due perfection in them, asperses all the best actions of the regenerate with a stain of sin. We might quote the authority of Augustine in support of

* Vide Aquin. opus. 18. capp. 3, 4, and 5.

our position, de Spirit. et. Lit., cap. 36, and Epist. 29 to Jerome.

In the last place, Bellarmine contends, that the admixture of venial sins does not contaminate good works; because it is neither necessary that they should mingle in every good work, nor are they so much contrary to law, as beside it. This reasoning is, however, altogether frivolous; because Protestants do not admit of sin being venial, in that sense in which it is defended by the Romanists, the two cases already mentioned being themselves sufficient to demonstrate the corruptness of our works; and finally, it is absurd to give the name of *sin* to any action, and deny the same action to be committed against the law of God; for sin is nothing else than *a word, a deed, or a desire against the law of God;* according to the definition of Augustine contra Faustum, lib. 22, cap. 27.*

This may be sufficient for answer to the first reason of Bellarmine. [But he proceeds:—]

2. If all the works of the regenerate were sins, even the work of faith whereby we are justified would be sin; and that prayer which we pour forth when we say, *Forgive us our debts*, would be sin. Now it is most absurd that man should be justified by sin, and by sin obtain the remission of sin.

I answer:—In the work of faith two things are to be considered: the supernatural act itself, which arises from the grace of the Spirit, namely, the apprehension of the Divine mysteries and the assent to them; and the evils which are mingled with this work springing from the flesh, namely, a degree of ignorance and wavering or sluggishness on the part of the believer himself. We do not say, that the very act of understanding or assenting is in itself sin; but the ignorance, the wavering, the sluggishness of heart, which instil their poison into these actions, are sinful. And hence we correctly maintain, that the work of believing, considered in conjunction with these evils which are annexed and closely combined with it, is to a certain extent, vitiated and infected with sin. We pay no heed to that puerile inference, that *Therefore we are justified by sin.* For the work of believing becomes the

* The Apostles St. John and St. James have decided this point by inspiration; the former, 1 John iii. 4; the latter, James ii. 9—11.—*Translator.*

instrument of justification, not through the medium of the ignorance, wavering, or any other fault which is mingled with this work: but through the medium of that illumination and assent which is produced by the grace of the Holy Spirit. Exactly the same reply must be made concerning the work of prayer. For devout prayer, so far as it is poured forth under the instigation and direction of the Spirit, is in itself good; but the same prayer, so far as, in consequence of being weighed down by the flesh, it is affected by some degree of dulness and unbelief, is defiled by sin. Nor do I believe that any regenerate man is so blind and so proud as to venture to assert, that he has ever offered to God any prayer free from every spot of sin. Yet it does not follow that we seek, or obtain forgiveness of sin, by means of sin, as Bellarmine absurdly infers; but by means of and for the sake of the merit of Christ: while the duty of prayer, (not the failings attached to our prayer) intervenes as the medium, and in some sense the condition, required from us.

3. But if all the works of the just are sins, why [asks Bellarmine] has the Apostle said, *I am not conscious to myself of any thing?** Why did he expect the crown of righteousness from the righteous judge?

I answer:—Although it be granted that all the works of the regenerate are vitiated by some sin, yet the Apostle could correctly say, *I am not conscious of any thing in myself.* For, first, he did not mean this to be understood of the whole course of his life, but of the faithful fulfilment of his ministry. And, then, the work of the ministry is not boasted of, as having been so completely fulfilled by him, that no fault or sin could be found in this work arising from the grievances of the flesh; but that he had done nothing deceitfully, nothing impiously, which could wound his conscience. For thus Theodoret interprets those words—*I am conscious of no wickedness and iniquity.* Lastly, the Apostle himself, in Rom. vii., is sensible that he could not do that good which he desired, because of the law of sin in his members; but that he rather did the evil which he hated. He acknowledges therefore that his actions were vitiated through the defilement of indwelling sin, and yet he every

* Douay Version.

where professes that he retained the integrity of a good conscience; because all, who are engrafted into Christ, are absolved from the guiltiness of this indwelling sin. Nor is it to be hence proved, that because Paul looked for a reward from God, his holy actions were entirely free from all evil; for God pardons what is amiss in the doings of the regenerate, and mercifully crowns what is good and his own gift.

4. If all the works of the just [Bellarmine proceeds] were mortal sins, it would follow that God himself sins mortally; for it is God who works in us when we do good works.

I answer: this proposition of Luther, *Every work of the just is a mortal sin*, carries this sense: *The just, or the regenerate, does no work complete and immaculate in every part; but there adheres to and mingles something of evil with every good deed, proceeding from the corruption of the agent not yet perfectly renewed, which would prove deadly according to the rigour of the law, viewed apart from the mercy of God.* It must be observed then, that for effecting any good work whatever two agents must concur: God, or the grace of God; and man himself. What is good and supernatural in the act itself springs from the grace of God; what is bad and imperfect, from the disposition of man. Now just look at the brilliant argumentation of Bellarmine. *God works in the regenerate all their good works: But since sin mingles with all those good works through the corruption of man while co-operating; therefore God works sin.* Who but must perceive a manifest fallacy in arguing thus ?* that is, in drawing a general conclusion from a particular case. For God works in us all our good works; such as believing, loving, praying, according to the *goodness* of his own nature; but any *imperfection* or *corruption* which may attach to them, proceeds not from Him; for God does not occasion weakness or slowness of heart in believing; neither coldness nor defect of due fervour in loving; nor backwardness or distraction of mind in praying. For these evils arise from the flesh, and are as it were entwined and interwoven in these good actions; and because of this admixture and cohesion of sin with every good work whatsoever, we say truly, that every good work is vitiated through some sin-

* *A dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter.*

fulness: we maintain also truly, that God is not the author of this evil or sinfulness.

[But Bellarmine argues.]

5. If in every good work there is something sinful, then Christ has not in truth redeemed us from iniquity, nor truly purified his people, nor made us truly to be followers of good works, but of mortal sins. On the contrary, the Apostle, in Titus ii. 14, says, *He gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and might cleanse to himself a people acceptable, a follower of good works.*

The consequence is futile, or rather none at all, in this argument. For admit that the good works of the just are always stained with some sin; yet I should nevertheless be correct in affirming, that *Christ has redeemed them from all iniquity;* because he has redeemed them from the guilt and punishment of all their iniquities, and also from the dominion of Satan and of indwelling sin. He hath also truly *cleansed to himself an acceptable people*, because he has both blotted out the guiltiness of indwelling sin by his blood, and by his Spirit has truly cleansed them all from this original pollution, although not perfectly and completely. For *we are so cleansed that we remain to be cleansed more and more, until this corruption shall put on incorruption, and this mortal, immortality;* as Augustine and Bede have well observed upon that passage of John xv. 3, *Ye are clean*, &c. Lastly, although it be conceded, that all the works of the regenerate are infected by sin, yet Christ has truly made them *followers of good works.* For they do not either love, or cherish willingly, this contagion of sin; but hate it, and check and restrain it with all their might: but good works they sedulously follow, although, being weakened by indwelling sin, they cannot attain to a due perfection in them.

6. If all good works are mortal sins, it follows [according to Bellarmine] that some mortal sins may be good works, and we may syllogise thus:—*All good works ought to be practised; some mortal sins are good works; therefore some mortal sins ought to be practised.* Again—*No mortal sin is to be practised: all good works are mortal sins; therefore no good work is to be practised.*

These childish sophisms deserve no answer; but that they may not deceive children, I again repeat what I have often

inculcated. When Luther asserts, that *all good works are mortal sins,* the words are followed by—*To all those actions which are good and holy, as they proceed from the grace of regeneration, there yet adheres something defiling and evil, as they are wrought by men corrupt, and not yet fully renewed.* Bellarmine himself understood very well that Luther meant nothing else; he is therefore merely acting the sophist—perverting the sense that he might assail the bare words. As to the arguments; the first derived from inversion does not avail: for in the proposition, *Every good work is sin,* the predicate is to be understood according to the *concomitancy* or *coherence,* not according to the *essence;* as though he had said, *Every good work has something of sin cohering,* or, *Every good work is infected with sin:* hence it will follow—*Therefore something to which sin coheres, is a good work;* but it will not follow—*Some sin is a good work.* And the reason why this inversion, which Bellarmine makes use of, is fallacious and incorrect, is this: Because in the proposition of Luther, *Every good work is sin,* that word *sin* occupies the place, not of *the genus,* but of *the accident;* for it has the same force as if he had said, *it is vitiated.* But in the inversion of Bellarmine, the predicate is presumed to be *essential* not *accidental.* But of these trifles we have said too much.—As to the former syllogism, *All good works are to be practised: some sins are good works; therefore some sins are to be practised,* I answer by denying the minor; for, as we have before explained, some sins are always interwoven and connected with our good works; but they are not the good works themselves, but as it were spots and stains adhering to the works. As to the latter, *No sin is to be practised: Every good work is sin; therefore no good work is to be practised.* I answer, No sin in fact is to be done, but to be avoided by all means; but the good which is enjoined is to be practised, although, from accident and against the will of the doer, something of sin may concur during the performance of it. The minor proposition also of the syllogism adduced is incorrect, if taken in Bellarmine's own sense. For no good work is sin in the *essential* meaning of the phrase, but only *accidentally,* as we have before reminded you.

[However, Bellarmine adds:—]

7. If it is to be laid down that good works are mortal sins, a contradiction is implied; for the same works will be good and not good, deserving as well of reward, as of punishment; we shall be also serving God and the devil by the same works; and we shall likewise be children both of God and of the devil.

I answer: the major proposition should be corrected after this manner, in order to militate against our doctrine: *If it is decided that good works vitiated by some sin, would, according to the rigour of the law, lead to death, then a contradiction is involved.* We deny however that any contradiction is involved in this doctrine of Protestants. As to the proof (namely, that, our doctrine being admitted, the same works will be good and not good, to be rewarded and not to be rewarded), I answer, there is no contradiction in this case, unless the same works are called good and not good, in reference to one and the same thing. But we affirm, that these works of the saints are endued with supernatural goodness so far as we perform them, being aided and impelled by Divine grace; but we assert that they are stained by corruption, so far as we perform the same, being hindered and weakened by the defilement of the flesh, or of the old man.

We will illustrate what has been said by an example. Let the paralytic move his hand: the motion, as it proceeds from natural power, is naturally a good act; but as effected by the paralytic trembling as he does it, it is a bad and disordered work: There is however no contradiction implied in saying, this good work is still not good; because, viewed in different aspects, it may be correctly affirmed to appertain both to nature and to disease. In like manner the works of the regenerate are good and not good, to be rewarded and not to be rewarded, when considered in different aspects, as to the grace of God and the contagion of indwelling sin, which both exert their influence in these works.

But our opponent's addition, that *by good works of this kind we serve God and the devil, and are at once children of God and children of the devil,* is to be denied and exploded altogether. For Augustine has well said,* *Although the*

* Contra duas Epist. Pelag. lib. 3. cap. 3.

*devil is the author and the head of all sinners, yet it is not all sins which make children of the devil; for even the children of God sin*, &c. Now, they are said to serve the devil, and are called his children, who live under the dominion of reigning sin, and willingly commit deeds of darkness; not they who have shaken off this dominion and bring forth (somewhat sullied by the fault of the flesh, willing or unwilling) good works. Paul himself determined to serve the Lord Christ, and is rightly accounted among the most holy children of God; yet has he published concerning himself this ingenuous and humble confession: *With the mind I myself serve the law of God, but with the flesh the law of sin*; Rom. vii. v. ult.

Such are the reasons Bellarmine has adduced against us; and these being refuted we terminate this controversy about the reality of good works; [or, that the works of the regenerate are really good works.]

## CHAPTER XXXIX.

### *QUEST. III.*—ON THE PERFECTION OF GOOD WORKS.

In this controversy concerning the perfection of good works, it is not my intention to give any lengthened consideration to all the absurd statements of our opponents, but to subvert their main foundation, for if this is overthrown, the whole pile of Pharisaic and insane structure must necessarily come to the ground.

First, then, it must be observed, that the Papists introduce some Works of *Counsels* (as they call them,*) which

* That is works arising from the observance of Evangelical Counsels, by means of which Romanists are led to imagine that a stock of merit is laid up, of which *the Church* has the disposal, and which she distributes in *Indulgences* to such as need.

"This absurd doctrine was first invented towards the close of the 12th Century, and modified and embellished by St. Thomas (Aquinas) in the 13th;

they lay it down are much more perfect than the works of righteousness enjoined by God in the Decalogue; and they affirm, that those men who bind themselves to the performance of these works live in a state of perfection, and then are accustomed to boast, that they are presenting to God himself works of supererogation (that is, works such as they do not owe—such as transcend the law, and could not be required from them). Thus they elevate human devices above the law of God, and leave God himself in debt to man. Against these errors, we shall maintain this proposition, consisting of three members:—

1. There are no works of Counsels more excellent than the works commanded in the Divine law; nor is there granted, in this life, a state of perfection consisting in the observance of such Counsels as have been alluded to; lastly, the regenerate man does not supererogate by any works of holiness or righteousness.

This then will be our first position against that threefold erroneous foundation of the Papists concerning Works of Counsels, a State of Perfection, and Supererogating Righteousness. Secondly, it must be observed, that as the same Papists attribute to their Monks* works transcending the perfection of the Divine law, so to every Christian, placed in the state of grace, they attribute that perfection of righteousness which comes up to the rule itself of the Divine law; so that he can perfectly fulfil the law of God, by admitting nothing which is contrary to the righteousness of the law. Who but must admire this angelic perfection of the Romanists; among whom the Monks, or (as they call them) the *Religious*, can by works of holiness soar to heights beyond the very law of holiness! and Christians even of the ordinary class can come up to the perfection of the law by their works! But in oppo-

according to which it was pretended that there actually existed an immense treasure of merit, composed of the pious deeds and virtuous actions which the saints had performed beyond what was necessary for their own salvation, and which were therefore applicable to the benefit of others; that the guardian and dispenser of this precious treasure was the Roman Pontiff; and that of consequence he was empowered to assign to such as he thought proper, a portion of this inestimable source of merit, suitable to their respective guilt, and sufficient to deliver them from the punishment due to their crimes."—Henderson's *Buck's Theological Dictionary*.

[* See Calvin's Institutes, lib. iv. 13 §. 11.]

sition to this most arrogant opinion also we shall maintain this proposition,—

2. No one of the regenerate can observe and fulfil the law of God perfectly, but falls short of the perfection of the law through the whole course of his life.

These two propositions we shall use our best efforts to establish in the following discussion; and to dissipate whatever is alleged by our opponents on the contrary side. But before we proceed to make good our first position, that it may not be supposed that this controversy concerning *Works of Counsels*, of *a State of Perfection*, and of Papistic *Supererogation* is but trifling, and of scarcely any importance; I will shew from their own writers what poison they mingle with these opinions, and what a sea of error they bring along with them into the Church of God.

First, then, this Papistic doctrine of Works of Counsels degrades the spiritual law of God, which is the more exact rule of holiness, by setting up a higher and more perfect righteousness in arbitrary works, and such as are enjoined by no law. Thus Bellarmine lays it down* that that perfection is greater which consists in the observance of Counsels, than that which consists in the full observance of the commands of God. Nay, he unhesitatingly avows† that *the subject of the command is the more easy to obey, that of the counsel the more difficult; the subject of the precept is good, that of the counsel better; — — that things not commanded are for the most part more noble in themselves than things commanded!* ‡ What is trampling on the law of God, if this be not? namely, to extol a vow of Celibacy, Mendicancy, and the Rule of Obedience [to men's devices], above all the acts prescribed by the Divine law?

Secondly, the Papistic doctrine of Counsels intimates that any one placed in a state of grace can fulfil the righteousness of the Divine law, and therefore merit justification and salvation; but that the Monks who exercise themselves in the observance of Counsels transcend this righteousness of the law, and not only merit for themselves eternal life, but a pre-eminent and super-excellent degree of glory in this life.

* De Monach. lib. 2. cap. 9. † Ibid. cap. 7 et 29.

‡ [Could any one broaching such opinions have ever studied the case of Saul; 1 Sam. xv.?]

Thus Bellarmine states,* that that perfection of righteousness which consists in the full observance of the commands, is necessary to salvation and common to all Christians; but he ascribes some greater perfection† to the Monkish state, which not only suffices for obtaining salvation, but avails, moreover, for acquiring a more excellent degree of glory in the kingdom of heaven.—If this doctrine obtain, there is an end of the justification by faith, which Paul urges, nay of the whole Evangelical Covenant, in which man's salvation is transferred from the condition of works and of fulfilling the law, to the condition of faith, and to a Mediator apprehended through faith. And thus at one dash they cancel the whole Gospel, and the redemption acquired by the blood of Christ: *For if righteousness come by the law then Christ is dead in vain;* Gal. ii. 21.

Thirdly, they attribute so much to these works of Counsels, that they strip all Christians of perfection who are not bound to them by a solemn vow; while to the Monks they concede a state of perfection because of their having these vows upon them, although they may be entirely devoid of grace and true holiness. So Aquinas philosophises ;‡ *There is a twofold mode of observing the precepts; a perfect and an imperfect one: and there is a twofold practice of precepts; one is that by means of which a person is practised in the perfect observance of the precepts; and this is effected by the Counsels: the other is an exercise in the imperfect observance of the precepts, such as may be found in a secular life without the Counsels.* And elsewhere :§ —*Any person is properly said to be in a state of perfection, not because he is in the enjoyment of perfect love; but because he has bound himself perpetually in some solemn manner to those things which appertain to perfection; that is, to Celibacy, Poverty, and Monastic obedience.* And hence he concludes‖ that *Monks are in a state of perfection, although they may be altogether deficient in charity and grace; and that other Christians are not in a state of perfection, however they may abound in grace and virtues.* Now observe the tendency of this: Patriarchs, Prophets, Apostles, even Christ himself, were engaged in an *imperfect* observance of the precepts, and

* De Justif. lib. 4. cap. 13. † De Monach. lib. 2. cap. 9.
‡ Opusc. 17. cap. 6. § 2. 2. quæst. 184. art. 4. ‖ Ibid

attained not to a state of perfection; Dominic, Francis, Ignatius Loyola, and the whole kennel of Monks, *have* practised the law perfectly, and *have attained a state of perfection!*

Fourthly, they subject the law of God to these works of Counsels to such a degree, as to entertain the notion that it may be neglected in order that these other may be observed. Hence when a man, after rightly contracting matrimony, has not power over his own body, according to the law of God; they nevertheless grant him a licence to desert his wife, that he may enter on the Monastic state, and confer upon him the faculty of entering upon new nuptials. Thus, they dissolve the Divine institution of matrimony; they permit adultery, though prohibited by God, that that notable work of Counsel may be fully observed! The Papistic notion also, that *Monks are released from the duty of taking care of their parents, just as they are released from obligations by death,** is equally senseless. Thus they are exactly imitating the Pharisees, whom Christ censured on the very ground of their having *made void the law of God through their traditions.* Mar. vii. 13.

Fifthly, They extol their state of [supposed] perfection so much, that they exclude from a state of spiritual holiness—I had almost said of salvation—all other Christians who do not entertain an observance of these works of Counsels. Hence they pervert, to the disparagement of seculars (as they call them) and the married, those passages of Scripture, *They who are in the flesh cannot please God;* Rom. viii. 8. *Let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit;* 2 Cor. vii. 1. *There shall in nowise enter into it any thing that defileth;* Revel. xxi. 27.†—On the other hand, the blessings which are equally common to all believers,—*I will betroth thee unto me for ever in righteousness;* Hos. ii. 19. *I have espoused you to one husband;* 2 Cor. xi. 2—these they confine to persons in a celibate state. In one word, almost all the passages which the Scripture refers to the integrity of the mind and faith, those they pervert to the credit of their celibate vow. To say nothing of the

* Halens. part. 3. qu. 33. memb. 4. art. 1.—Aquin. quodlib. 3. art. 16.

† Vide Epist. Siricii ad Himerium, 1. tomo Consil. pag. 493.—Vide etiam Gratian. Dist. 81, 82.

Roman Pontiffs and Monks, Jerome himself, in his first book against Jovinian, has foundered more than once upon this rock. To pass by passages of Scripture unbecomingly treated by him,* what, I pray you, shall we say of this:—*If Eunuchs obtain the kingdom of heaven as their reward, then those who have not made themselves Eunuchs cannot receive the place of Eunuchs!* And a little after: *It is not fornicators, nor harlots, who are condemned here, of whose condemnation there is no doubt; but swelling wombs, and crying infants, and fruits and deeds of marriage.* And cap. 14, *The stains of marriage are not washed away by the blood of martyrdom.* Lastly, I add the following also, cap. 22:—*If the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against God, and they who are in the flesh cannot please God; I think that those who are slaves to the conjugal duty, because they love the wisdom of the flesh, are also in the flesh.*

From these passages you may guess what notions superstitious Monks [are taught to] entertain of the common life of Christians, if compared with the Monastic state; when the most learned Jerome has manifested such perversity of thought, and written so on this subject.

Sixthly, they attribute to works of supererogation, which take their rise from the observance of Counsels, the virtue of satisfying not only for their own sins, but the sins of others; nay, they are so demented, as to suppose that the Monastic vow imparts no less grace to men, than the sacrament of baptism instituted by God himself. In the language of Papists themselves, *We maintain* (says Bellarmine†) *that the works of Counsels, if they are wrought by the righteous, are profitable to the satisfying for sins. — — — We say that the Religious can make others participants in their good works. — — We say that between baptism and the profession of a Religion,‡ there is a certain resemblance. — — — But we do not say that the Monks can save others by their works; — — neither do we make the assuming Monastic vows equal to baptism; neither do we say that by these vows all the fault and penalty of sin is removed; we piously believe merely that the penalty alone is removed by the assumption of the Monastic life.*

* Cap. 7. † De Monachis. lib. 2. cap. 6.

‡ That is, Monkhood.

These statements of Bellarmine are made Jesuitically enough; not so grossly as the ancient Monks, yet with no lack of confidence. *They* speak out plain, what *Bellarmine* is afraid to utter. In the very form of Monastic absolution they use these words:—*May the strictness of your Religion, and the merit of your Order, be available to you for the remission of sins!** Aquinas also writes:—*It may be reasonably affirmed that by the entrance into a Religious Order a person obtains the pardon of all his sins.*† And he brings forward and approves that opinion, which is to be met with in the Lives of the Fathers, namely, that *those entering upon the life of a Religious obtain the same grace which the baptized obtain.* It is plain, therefore, however Bellarmine may shrink from the assertion, that the Monks themselves attribute the same virtue to these works of Counsels, as we attribute to the blood of Christ; and that they assign to them no less efficacy for removing the guilt and penalty of sin, than we ascribe to holy baptism.

They think it little, however, to be able to expiate their own sins by these performances, unless they are privileged to take away the sins of others also, and to invade the office peculiar to Christ the Redeemer. Luther mentions‡ it having been a custom of the Monks to communicate their works and their fraternities' to other sinners, and that he had himself often heard that class of men bestow all their good works upon dying men in this form of words:—*Lo, I bestow upon thee whatever good I have done in my life.*§ What else is this, than as if they should say—Behold, I will be Christ to thee, I will transfer my merits to thee, and thus will take away thy sins?

Some may perhaps be ready to imagine that these things were the mere inventions of Luther; they will find, however, Gerson blames such as were in the habit of distributing their satisfactory merits for the deliverance of others, and in that way were seeking out their own living: *They are deceived* (says he ||) *very much, who while able themselves to live by another,*¶ *yet bind themselves to make satisfaction for the*

* Chemnitz. Exam. part. 3.
† 2. 2. quæst. 189. art. 3.
‡ De Votis Monast. pag. 278. tom. 2.
§ Vide tom. 5. pag. 83. B.
|| In Regul. Moral.
¶ Namely, Christ.

*sins of other people.* In fine, it is a received maxim with the Papists, that the Religious, who are devoted to the practice of these Counsels [of perfection] have been appointed particularly to make satisfaction for the sins of their founders, and generally of all. Hence learn what blasphemous opinions the proud and false notion ends in, concerning the merit of works of Counsels, which has fixed itself so firmly in the minds of Papists!

We have thought it right to dwell on this subject somewhat at large, that all may understand that the dispute between us and the Romanists about Works of Counsels, which they extol so magnificently, and the State of Perfection which they so insolently ascribe to their Religious, is not a mere skirmish of words. For under these terms very many monstrous evils are cherished,—contempt of the Divine law—Pharisaic presumption of perfect righteousness—the institution of a new Christianity,—besides, their uprooting the very foundations of the faith which we embrace; namely, free justification and the remission of sins by the blood of the Redeemer alone—the deficiencies and weakness of our efforts in fulfilling the law—and that every Christian is bound to the fullest love of God. — Had it not been the nature of the Papistic doctrine to embrace these and very many other evils, we should never have entered the lists with them about the mere name of *Counsels.** For it must be admitted that since we can advance to the same end by different means, the selection of this or that is freely left to our own choice, as each may seem to conduce best for the attainment of the end. For instance, we are bound to preserve the chastity of body and mind, we are bound to serve God with an upright heart and pure conscience. On the other hand, it is a matter for consideration whether a man

* It may be permitted the Translator to observe here, that the various arguments in this Chapter appear to be adapted equally well for refuting the errors of Tractarianism, as those of the Church of Rome. Bishop M'Ilvaine, in his last Charge, speaking of the more modern delusion says:—"The whole system is one of Church instead of Christ, Priest instead of Gospel, concealment of truth, instead of the 'manifestation of truth,' ignorant superstition instead of enlightened faith, bondage where we are promised liberty—all tending to load us with whatever is odious in the worst meaning of Priestcraft, in place of the free, affectionate, enlarging, elevating, and cheerful liberty of the children of God."

will observe chastity, and serve God piously, in a celibate or conjugal state; and since a single life, in some particular persons, affords more opportunities, and fewer impediments, the Apostle when offering his advice, gives it a preference to the conjugal state, and on that account it is called *a work of Counsel.* Thus also in works of charity, many things may be said to be works of Counsels, so far as the external act is obligatory upon no one to be accompanied with such and such circumstances by virtue of a command. For example, the precept is, to love our neighbour as ourselves, and to dispense our good things to the glory of God, and the advantage of others; but by what works, and in what particular circumstances this love is to be exercised, is left to our own discretion *(sub consilio.)* If then one person should give his love exercise in erecting Colleges, another in building Churches, a third in clothing the poor, a fourth in redeeming captives; there is no one of these that may not be said to have been performing a work of Counsel, so far as regards the particular matter on which he exercises his charity; because no one is bound by express command to this or that particular course of action. For as particulars are not reducible to art, so they are not to law. The same argument will apply to other circumstances of works commanded. Every one is bound to give to the poor; but how often, in what measure, to what particular persons, is not commanded. If any one then should determine in his mind to give something to the poor three times a-day, or to set apart a certain portion of his wealth for them, or in short to bestow upon these particular persons such a sum of money annually, he, as to these particular and determinate circumstances, is performing a matter *of Counsel,* not *of precept.* Setting aside then, those Papistic errors, we are, in this sense, willing to admit many works of Counsel.

Lastly, as to the perfection which is attributed to those works, by such as in certain practices observe the Counsels, we grant that there are some gifts, as to degree, of a higher and more perfect excellence than others; that there are acts also, originated in the same source, more perfect than those which spring from inferior gifts; in short that they who correctly practise these more excellent gifts, will be honoured with more excellent rewards by God himself.

Thus, the gift of original continence is greater and higher than the gift of conjugal chastity, and if rightly cherished and holily directed, that is, that being *unmarried he may care for the things of the Lord* undistractedly (1 Cor. vii. 35), it places celibates in a higher degree of excellence, and at last will be a means of bringing them a richer reward. But all these things are to be understood with the proviso, that we all along acknowledge, that he who is adorned with the greatest and fairest gifts in this life, has attained to only inchoate holiness; that he who performs actions the greatest and most excellent, is still very far distant from the perfection demanded by the law; and lastly, that he who is honoured with the greatest rewards has obtained them, not by the merit of his works, but through the Divine mercy and munificence.

I conclude with one word—If the gifts of the Divine grace are compared one with another; there are some more perfect than others; if the state and the works of men are compared, you will find degrees, even in these, of greater and less perfection noticed; but if we contrast either the holiness of men, or men themselves, or any of their works, with the perfect and spiritual righteousness which the law of God enjoins, not one of all these comes up to the standard of the Divine law, or attains to that perfection which it requires.

Having premised thus much, we are prepared to confirm our position.

---

The following extract from Melancthon's *Apology for the Augsburg Confession*, bearing as it does on the subject of the foregoing Chapter, may not be unacceptable to the inquiring Student.

"Deinde falsum est et hoc, quod observationes Monasticæ sint opera consiliorum Evangelii. Nam Evangelium non consulit discrimina vestitus, ciborum, abdicationem rerum propriarum. Hæ sunt traditiones humanæ, de quibus omnibus dictum est: *esca nos non commendat Deo* (Rom. xiv. 17; 1 Cor. viii. 8.) Quare neque cultus justificantes sunt, neque perfectio, imo, cum his titulis fucatæ propinantur, sunt meræ doctrinæ dæmoniorum. Virginitas suadetur, sed his, qui donum habent, ut supra dictum est. Error est autem perniciosissimus, sentire, quod perfectio Evangelica sit in traditionibus humanis. Nam ita etiam Mahometistarum Monachi gloriari possunt se habere perfectionem Evangelicam. Neque est in observatione aliorum, quæ dicuntur ἀδιάφορα, sed quia *regnum Dei est justitia et vita in cordibus*, (Rom. xiv. 17) ideo perfectio est, crescere in timorem Dei, fiduciam misericordiæ promissæ in Christo, et curam obediendi vocationi, sicut et Paulus (2 Cor. iii. 18) describit perfectionem: *transformamur a claritate in claritatem, tanquam a Domini*

## CHAPTER XL.

### A DEMONSTRATION OF THE FORMER PROPOSITION.

Among other Papistic errors, which are connected and combined with the doctrine of the Counsels, the setting aside and abasing of the Divine commands claims the first place. For it is customary with the Papists so to magnify the works of Counsels, as to make the works of the Divine law to appear contemptible in comparison with them. Hence they say* that it behoves all those, who fulfil the commands of God only, to say, *We are unprofitable servants, we have done that which was our duty to do;* but they pronounce those who perform the works (which they suppose Monks to do) of Counsels, to be profitable servants to their Lord, and constantly urge that those alone have multiplied the talents committed to them. To meet, then, these and other errors, we shall endeavour to establish the proposition which we just now submitted. It is this:—

There are no works of Counsels more perfect or more excellent than the works commanded in the Divine law;

*spiritu.* Non ait alium subinde cucullum accipimus, aut alios calceos, aut alia cingula. Miserabile est in Ecclesia tales Pharisaicas, imo Mahometicas voces legi atque audiri, videlicet, Perfectionem Evangelii, regni Christi, quod est vita æterna, in his stultis observationibus vestium et similium nugarum collocari.

"Nunc audite Areopagitas nostros, quam indignam sententiam posuerint in confutatione. Sic aiunt:—*Sacris litteris expressum est, Monasticam vitam, debita observatione custoditam, quam per gratiam Dei quilibet Monastici custodire possunt, mereri vitam æternam, et quidem multo auctiorem Christus eis promisit, qui reliquerint domum aut fratres,* &c. Hæc sunt verba adversariorum, in quibus hoc primum impudentissime dicitur, quod sacris literis expressum sit, vitam Monasticam mereri vitam æternam. Ubi enim loquuntur sacræ literæ de Monastica?" *Apologia Augustanæ Confess.* xiii. *de votis Monasticis,* § 6, 7. in Oper. Melanct. vol. 1, pp. 116, 117, Wittemberg, 1562; see also the same *Apologia* in *Libri Symbolici* Chr. M. Pfaffius recensuit, Tubingæ, 1730. See also *Burnet on the Articles* (art. xiv) pag. 180 Edit, by Rev. J. R. Page, 1837; and Dr. Elliott's excellent work, *Delineation of Roman Catholicism,* pp. 226—28, London Edit. 1844.

* Alfons. contra Hæres. lib. 12 in verbo PRÆCEPTUM.

nor are Monks to be allotted or accounted as occupying any peculiar state of perfection on account of their observance of such Counsels. Lastly, no man, because he gives himself to these, to others, or to any works of Counsels whatsoever, does more in regard to works of holiness than he is bound to do by command of the law; that is, he does not, as they commonly say, supererogate.

Let us run through the three members of this conclusion in order: and first we shall shew that there are no works of Counsels more perfect, more holy, or more acceptable to God, than those works of righteousness are, which are prescribed in the Law.

1. The Law of God is itself a most exact and most perfect rule of righteousness and holiness; works therefore, conformed to this rule, are the most exact and perfect: others then more perfect than these do not exist. The first clause is every where confirmed in the Scriptures, which admirably extol the perfection of the Divine Law. Consult the Royal Psalmist in Psal. xix. and cxix., where he is almost entirely engaged in setting forth the great purity and perfection of the Divine law. The Apostle Paul, Rom. vii., acknowledges the Law of God to be *holy, just, and good*, and so spiritual, that its perfection cannot be reached by man clothed in corruptible flesh. St. James in express words calls the law *perfect; Whoso looketh into the perfect law*; Jas. i. 25. Since then perfection of what is regulated, corresponds to the rule to which it is conformed; Papists must either find another rule more holy and more perfect than this rule of the Divine law, or acknowledge, that there are no works of mortal men more perfect than those which are prescribed in this most perfect law of God.

2. As the Law of God is proposed in the Scriptures for a rule of the highest perfection; so those persons who amongst others do most perfectly observe the works of the Divine law, are reckoned the most perfect; there is therefore no description of works more perfect than the works commanded in the Law. For if there could be, believers would not be said to be more or less perfect accordingly as more or less they observe the Law of God; but because they have fulfilled those works of Counsels more excellently than other men. But let the Scriptures speak:—Noah, a

just man and a perfect, is celebrated Gen. vi. 9. Abraham is enjoined to be perfect and to walk before God, Gen. xvii. 1. *Fear God and keep his commandments,* it is said, Eccles. xii. 13, *for this is the whole* duty *of man.* From these and other passages besides, it may be deduced, that God himself has not prescribed, nor placed a value upon, selected works more perfect than the works of the commandments; for in all these passages the observance of the *Commandments,* not of the *Counsels,* forms the ground for the commendation of perfectness.

3. We shall easily prove by instances, that there is no work of Counsel to which it can be imagined so much perfection attaches, as to many works of the commandments. For those—*Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart—Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself—Thou shalt not covet,*—as far surpass in perfection, any work whatsoever of the Counsels, as the human heart itself excels hairs or nails. For I would enquire of the Jesuits, whether to live in a state of celibacy be in any way more perfect than not to covet at all; whether to bid farewell to his property be a work more excellent, than to love his neighbour as himself? In fine, whether the regular obedience rendered to his Abbot be a work better and more acceptable, than to love God with all the heart, *or to submit himself to the Divine will* (as the Apostle says, Col. i. 10. εἰς πᾶσαν ἀφέσκειαν) *unto all pleasing?* Since then these latter are the works of the commandments, and very far excel the former, which are (in the judgment of our adversaries) the most perfect and fairest works of the Counsels, we rightly conclude, that no works can be pointed out more perfect than those of the Divine law.

But Bellarmine, in order to elude the force of this argument, employs an answer partly false and partly frivolous. For he says that the aforesaid Counsels are to be preferred to the commandments, *not by considering the works themselves of the Counsels merely as they appear, but the charity which they pre-suppose, and to which they lead.** This notion however, that the works of Counsels pre-suppose a greater love than the aforesaid works of the command-

* De Monach. lib. 2. cap. 6.

ments is plainly false. For how many thousand Monks are there, who are engaged in performing those works, who are yet deficient in the love of God and of our neighbour commanded in the law? For to pre-suppose or fancy, that all those who take up Celibacy, become Mendicants, and enter Monastic Orders, thereby attain to a degree of love more perfect than is required for loving God with all the heart, his neighbour as himself, for not coveting—shews the necessity of a medicine to clear the head rather than a formal refutation.* As to what he has added, *that these works of the Counsels are to be preferred to the commandments, because they lead to greater perfection than such as come under the precept*, it is frivolous, and of no weight; for perfection itself is not included in every mean by which we are led to perfection. Add to this, that the aforesaid Counsels do not advance men to perfection indiscriminately, but only select individuals, that is certain remarkable men, such as you will scarcely find instances of among the many thousands of Monks. The rest then do not attain to perfection by these means, but proceed to their condemnation. Lastly, they do not pave the way even to a greater perfection than that is which is enjoined in the Decalogue; for inasmuch as these are the instruments for advancing men in the observance of the Divine law, it is ridiculous and contrary to reason to expect, in the mean or instrument, an effect more perfect than the end itself to which it is directed.

4. Such as are works of righteousness and of Divine worship, and in themselves acceptable to God, are better than those works which cannot properly be called works of righteousness, or of Divine worship; and which are not acceptable to God, except so far as they are made to have a reference to the before mentioned precepts. Now the works of the Decalogue are works of righteousness by which we worship God, and are in their own nature acceptable and pleasing to God; but the works of Counsels are not works either of righteousness or worship, neither are they of any value with God, unless as they are made to have a reference to works commanded in the law, as certain external instru-

* Is helleboro opus habet, non refutatione.

ments, or helps. No sane person will have a doubt of the major proposition; nor even of that particular of the minor, which asserts that the works commanded in the law, and performed according to the law, are works of righteousness and worship, and on that account acceptable and pleasing to God in themselves. The hinge therefore of the controversy turns upon this—that we deny that the works of the Counsels are works of righteousness, or are grateful and acceptable to God as works of worship; but are then only accepted, when they are subordinated to the works of the law. This will be evident by induction. For to preserve the chastity of body and mind, which falls under a precept, is a work of righteousness pleasing and acceptable to God; but to lead a life of celibacy which falls under a Counsel, is neither a work of righteousness, nor in itself praiseworthy, nor acceptable, except when it is made subservient to the better keeping of the law of God. In the same way, not to have the heart set on earthly things, but to dispense them to the glory of God and the good of one's neighbour, is enjoined by precept, and is a work pleasing to God in itself; but to renounce the right to, and the possession of, these things (which they teach falls under the class of Counsels), is neither pleasing to God in itself, nor is it commendable for righteousness or piety; unless as it conduces more freely to the performance of the works divinely commanded. Lastly, to obey God and the higher powers is a work of command, and on that account pleasing and acceptable to God; but to vow obedience to this or that Abbot, to whom it is not due, is not pleasing to God, unless so far as in obeying him, the works of the Divine law are fulfilled with greater facility. Such are the decisions of the Scriptures on all those things in which we may be engaged bodily and in external services; 1 Tim. iv. 8, *Bodily exercise profiteth little.* Thus the Fathers judged. Augustine affirms* that that work of celibacy is then rightly undertaken, *when it is made to bear a reference to the love of God, and of our neighbour for the Lord's sake;* which is just as if he had said—there is not sufficient in the work itself to recommend it, but the relation which it has to works in themselves good, which are

* Enchir. cap. 121.

enjoined in the Decalogue. Moses [the Egyptian] Abbot* confesses that, the abandonment of all our property, is not *perfection*, but *an instrument towards perfection*. And all works of the same description *should be practised and offered to God, not in lieu of righteousness, but accompanied with righteousness*, as Prosper expresses it, de Vit. Contemp. lib. 3. cap. 10.—But there is no one who so expressly advocates this opinion as that grave and learned divine John Gerson. *The Divine precepts* [says he†] *are given concerning things in themselves good; as acts of virtue, the love of God and our neighbour, by which man is said to be good simply with reference to the spiritual life; but vows form not a portion of works of the precepts, but instruments for a Christian life, which constitute not in themselves the good works of virtue, but subserve as advancement in virtue.* To sum up our argument in one point: Things in themselves good and laudable, are better than things which are not good in themselves, but are only so from their having a relation to other things: But the works of the commandments are good in themselves, the works of Counsels are not, but are to be viewed as instruments merely inclining to the observance of the commandments: therefore the works enjoined by God are better than the works of the Counsels.

5. If the works of the Counsels are more perfect and more exalted than the works enjoined in the Divine Law, then they who perform these works, have already attained a perfection of holiness transcending the law itself. For as *to work* presupposes *existence*, so *to work in a certain mode* presupposes *a similar mode of existence*. He then who can already perform works which surpass the perfection of the law, ought himself to be more perfect than the law. It is however admitted among men of any sense, that the greater

* One of the parties introduced into Cassian's *Conferences of the Fathers*. See Clarke's *Succession of Sacred Literature*, vol. ii. p. 187; also *Ancient Christianity*, vol. i. p. 316, 363; and infra, chap. xliii. The sentiment above quoted is from Collat. i. cap. 7.

"Quod opus (Collationes) magnam mox obtinuit auctoritatem, ut in plerisque Monasteriis reciperetur, Monachisque ad legendum commendaretur; unde factum, ut Semi-Pelagianismi, quæ tum in eo, tum in priori continentur, semina, longe lateque propagarentur." Buddei Isagoge *Historico. theologica ad theol.*; vol. i. p. 678. Lipsiæ, 1727.

† Part. 3. de Consil. Evangel.

part of those who now undertake these works of the Counsels, that is celibacy, voluntary poverty, and submission to rule, are, or at least may, be most imperfect: *Many, oh, how grievous!* (says Gerson*) *of those ranking among the Religious* [*Orders*] *are the most imperfect of all.* And Aquinas himself confesses that some of the *Religious* who undertake the works of the Counsels are destitute of all charity and grace.† Since then the works of the Counsels are performed by the unregenerate, by tyros, and novices, who have not yet attained legal perfection, it is manifest that these works are more mean and imperfect than the works of the law.

6. That work to which, considered in itself, a reward is due from the Divine appointment, is better than that to which, considered in itself and on its own account, no reward is due; for the proportion of the rewards corresponds to the goodness of the works. Now to the works of the Divine law, even the smallest, a reward is due, whether the works of the Counsels are joined to them or not; because they are works of piety and righteousness: but to the works of the Counsels, if they are severed from the works commanded, the Divine munificence, as it has promised, so it gives, nothing. For he who keeps his body and his heart undefiled by forbidden lusts, shall obtain a reward, although celibacy, the effect of Counsels, may not have been embraced; and he who assumes the celibate state, unless he shall have maintained that chastity which is matter of command, will be unable either to claim or obtain any thing on the ground of mere celibacy. The reason is the same in regard to other Counsels, which formerly were performed by Pagans, latterly by Turks, and it may be added, by a vast number of Monks also; yet with no benefit, when considered by themselves, apart from the works of the law. The Vestals followed the Counsel of Virginity. Some heathen Philosophers adopted the abdication of goods; they rendered moreover, obedience by rule to Pythagoras their master. In fine, there is nothing founded in these external actions and petty observances, which can in itself look for reward from God. Works of this kind then are not to be equalled to the works enjoined in the commandments, which have an assured promise of reward.

* De Consil. Evangel. † 2. 2. quæst. 184. art. 4.

But the Papists will answer, that the external works of the Counsels may indeed be performed by Pagans and bad Christians, without meeting with reward, because they are not done in true faith and charity, neither have any reference to the glory of God; but if they should be done accompanied by these virtues, then they would be better than the works of the commandments, and would obtain more rich rewards. But this answer destroys itself. For faith, charity, and the directing of our actions to the glory of God, are themselves works of the commandments, and come under a precept. If then it is not to be expected that works of Counsels will be rewarded, unless on account of the works of the commandments, who but must immediately perceive that these very works are consequently more likely to receive reward, and therefore are better? For what produces a thing is better than the thing itself, as the philosophers say.

7. If the Counsels included in themselves works more perfect than the works of the commandments, then he who should perform equally a precept, uniting with it besides a Counsel, would be deserving of a greater reward, than he who observed a precept only, passing the Counsel by. There is no escaping the force of this inference. For, if a superior good be added to one less so, the consequence will be, that something more excellent and more perfect will accrue to both, and to be recompensed with a greater reward. But, on the other hand—let us take two believers, endued with equal chastity, so far as it is enjoined under precept, one of whom adopts the celibate state of the Counsels, the other selects the conjugal life; the reward of both will be equal. If we again imagine two endued with equal charity, one of whom chooses to retain his possessions, and lay out the same at intervals for the glory of God; the other at once and for ever bids farewell to all: a greater reward is not assigned to this latter, on the ground of his being a performer of the Counsel. The reason for which is, that *the root of the rewarding* (to use the language of the Schools*) *is charity:* whence it follows that the measure of reward is not to be proportioned to the quantity of some external works, but

* Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 182. art. 1; et quæst. 124 art. 4.

to the degree of charity; as Cajetan has correctly inferred. And this Augustine means when he defined, that *the merit of continence in Abraham, who begat children, and in John who lived single, is not unequal:* De bono Conjugali, cap. 21. For inasmuch as he assumes the internal chastity which is enjoined by the command, to have been equal in both; he rightly infers that on account of the mere work of fulfilling a Counsel, there was no opening for any disparity of either merit or reward. And hence, although the Fathers sometimes assign greater rewards to virgins, and to those who forsook all their property, than to the married, and those who retained their earthly possessions and administered them well; this will not therefore of itself go to prove, that the works of Counsels are better than the works of command, but that they are better than their opposites, that is, are more fitted for the service of God without distraction, and for walking in his commands without impediment; whence it follows that the reward is greater. For example: celibacy is not a state better and higher than the purity and continence which the law demands; but there is in it something more adapted and advantageous to certain circumstances than its opposite, namely, matrimony. Therefore he who is fitted for a life of celibacy, and improves it as an instrument for better waiting upon God, and in keeping the Divine commands, obtains a greater reward, not on account of his celibacy, which is a work of *Counsel;* but on account of the more perfect obedience rendered to God, which is a work of *the precept.* Thus says Gerson: *When the Counsels are said to be a better good, the comparison is not made with precepts, but with their contraries.**

8. In every precept which has the same object in view as a Counsel, the matter of the precept, considered in its whole latitude, is better and far more perfect than the matter of the Counsel; the work of the precept, therefore, is better and more perfect than that of the Counsel. The argument holds well together; though the antecedent is denied by Bellarmine, who says† that the matter of a Counsel is always better than the matter of a precept, when both are employed about the same subject; and on that account he affirms the

* De Consil. Evangel. † De Monach. lib. 2. cap. 7.

reward must be greater for observing the Counsel, than for obeying the precept. Let us therefore prove our opinion. The Counsel is *to lead a life of virginity*. The precepts which have the same matter for their subject are two; one, —*Thou shalt not commit adultery;* the other—*Thou shalt not covet.* If this latter be considered, who would hesitate to affirm, that it is far more perfect to be engaged in repressing all the risings of the inordinate motions of concupiscence, than to be leading a life of virginity? The former cannot be accomplished by even the most holy of mortals; the latter, whole squadrons of Monks either do, or pretend that they do. But to dismiss this last command, which surpasses the powers of fallen man; I say that the other—*Thou shalt not commit adultery*, contains more perfect matter, than the Counsel of not taking a wife, to which the Monks are accustomed to bind themselves. For this precept on the authority of Christ, does not forbid external acts of incontinence merely, as the Pharisees and Papists suppose; but the very inward act of voluntary concupiscence, as Christ interprets, Matt. v. 28. Moreover, it is far more perfect, and difficult, not to lust after a woman at any time, as enjoined in this precept; than to lead a life of perpetual celibacy, or pollute himself in the least by excesses and fornication, which Bellarmine* thinks sufficient to authorise a man to embrace the Council of celibacy, and yet to deem himself free from obligation to marriage. It may be added, Lastly; that it is far more difficult, and much more perfect and pleasing to God, always to be armed with a readiness of mind, willing to forsake wife, goods, our own will, and life even, for the cause of God; than actually to obey those Counsels of celibacy, poverty, and obedience to rules, so greatly celebrated by Papists. Our opponents admit this: Cajetan says† that these acts, considered as to the readiness of the mind, are perfections far higher in degree, than as exhibited in an external fulfillment of Counsels. For to have the mind thus prepared argues essential perfection, which consists in grace and charity; but the undertaking the performance of works of Counsels, manifests merely an attempt at perfection through these media. No one is thus disposed in his mind, but he

* De Monach. lib. 2. cap. 30. † 2. 2. quæst. 184. art. 7.

stands pleasing and acceptable to God: while numbers perform the works of Counsels, who are aliens from God. It is evident, then, that the former acts are better than the works of the Counsels.

I now bring forward the minor, and assert that the aforesaid acts, as to preparation of mind, come under the precept: works *of precepts* therefore are better than of *Counsel*, even when their subject is one and the same. That these acts are necessary may be inferred from the saying of Christ: *If any man come to me, and hate not his father and mother, and wife, and children, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple;* Luke xiv. 26. We are therefore necessarily bound by the precept to be so prepared, when circumstances call for it, and the glory of God requires us, to renounce wife, possessions, and life, and all other things: but this is far more excellent (as we have said) than celibacy, mendicancy, and to yield Monastic obedience, which are the brightest works of the Counsels.

And thus we have discussed the first member of our proposition, and have proved that not any works of Counsels can be produced more holy, better, or more perfect than the works of the commandments. We now pass on to the second portion of our subject.

## CHAPTER XLI.

### THE SECOND MEMBER OF THE PROPOSITION DEMONSTRATED.

We must now discuss the second member of the proposition, in which it is denied that Monks are in a certain special state of perfection on account of the observance of the vow of Counsels. And here let it be observed that Papists* only grant a state of perfection to those who have bound themselves with certain solemnity to fulfil works of Counsels.

* Aquin. 2. 2. qu. 184. art. 5.

For, according to them, *Poverty, Celibacy, and submission to rules, are the three foundations necessary for acquiring a state of perfection. If any one then supposes that he can attain a state of perfection without using these, he may as well think that he can erect a high tower without laying a foundation.** Hence Aquinas teaches that all those love God and their neighbour imperfectly, who only observe the precepts of God, omitting Counsels and Monastic vows. *There is one exercise,* says he,† *in the imperfect observance of precepts, which is done in a secular life unconnected with Counsels; there is another in which a man is occupied in the perfect observance of the precepts, and this is done through Counsels.* Nay, at last he goes so far as to say,‡ that *Counsels are of a nature prior in order to precepts, because they are more perfect; and that the observance of Divine precepts without Counsels is in itself, compared with the observance of Counsels, as is a brute to a rational animal.*

That such persons, however, as are unwilling to bind themselves to these Counsels may not have to rank among brutes, I shall shew that a state of perfection does not consist in the observance of such vows.

1. To be in a state of perfection signifies and denotes, a perfection already had and gained; as to be in a state of servitude, of liberty, of health, denotes the present possession of these things. But our opponents themselves acknowledge, that the religious who are bound to these Counsels, and practise the same, have not forthwith gained the perfection of charity or righteousness: They are not therefore in a state of perfection. For no one can stand in a place at which he has not yet arrived. But when they affirm that Monks are in a state of perfection, they say that they understand a state of perfection *to be gained*, or *to be acquired;* not already *gained* or *acquired*. So Aquinas, 2. 2. qu. 184. art. 5, and quæst. disp. de Char. art. 11. and Quodlib. 3. art. 7. So Gerson and others. But it is ridiculous to be boasting about a state of perfection, and claim it for themselves, and, as soon as they are pressed, to put an end to it, by the necessity of explaining it. For to be in a state of perfection (as we have said) implies present perfection; to be seeking

* Aquin. 2. 2, quæst. 186.

† Opius. 17. cap. 6. ‡ Ibid. cap. 7.

perfection, implies that it is not present, but it is to be had hereafter; between which two things there is evidently a manifest contradiction. And by similar examples we may expose the absurdities involved in this reply. Shew me a man sick, an invalid, and leprous, who will affirm, that he is now in a state of health; and proceed straightway to defend this assertion by the distinction—He is in a state of health *to be acquired*, not already *acquired;* because he has now determined and begun to use the proper medicines, and suited for bringing about a recovery of health. Or if I should affirm of any pious man that he is in a state of glorification; and to the objection—How can that be, since he is clothed with corruptible flesh, and is not yet freed from sin and the miserable consequences?—I should endeavour to answer by this petty distinction—He is indeed in a state of glorification, one however *to be gained*, not yet *in hand;* which is just as if I should say, He *will* be in a state of glorification, therefore he *is* in a state of glorification. Lastly, if it may be allowed thus sillily to trifle with the meaning of words, what objection can there be in our saying, that other Christians, as well as Monks, are in a state of perfection? for all are in a state of perfection to be acquired, according to the Apostle: *We preach Christ; warning every man, and teaching every man in all wisdom; that we may present every man perfect in Christ Jesus;* Coloss. i. 28.—But we dismiss these absurdities of the Monks, which deserve derision rather than refutation.

2. They who are in a state of perfection must necessarily have all things which concur essentially to constitute that state; because a thing cannot exist without the principles which constitute its essence. I ask then, what are those principles in which spiritual perfection essentially consists? Undoubtedly faith, and charity, and the other gifts and acts of the grace of sanctification. He who has these and exercises them, he is in a state of perfection as regards this life of pilgrimage. He who wants them, he is not in a state of perfection; but of deadly sickness and condemnation. Thus the holy Scriptures define perfection: *Charity is the bond of perfectness;* Coloss. iii. 14, not Monastic vows. *Be ye perfect, as your Father which is in heaven is perfect;* Matt. v. 48. Where the perfection to which the disciples are

called is not made to consist in an obligation to the observance of Counsels, but in love. And if we should run through the whole Scripture, we should find the state of perfection determined according to the measure of internal grace and holiness, not of external profession, or of vows of any obligation. Nor can our opponents gainsay this: *In the spiritual life indeed a man is said to be absolutely perfect in regard of that in which principally consists the spiritual life; but the excellency of this life mainly consists in charity, which he who has not is Nothing, as the Apostle says,* 1 Cor. xiii. 2. Thus Aquinas.*—Now I add, that Monks, inasmuch as they are bound to Counsels, do not possess the essential principles of perfection, namely, faith, charity, holiness; and are therefore not in a state of perfection. He admits, that they who are wanting in grace and love are not perfect; while at the same time, he obstinately maintains his conclusion, that they are notwithstanding in a state of perfection.† On the contrary, as it is ridiculous to say that a person is in a state of health, and in the same breath to deny that the same man is well; so it is absurd to assert that all who have bound themselves to Counsels are in a state of perfection, and at the same time to deny that they are perfect. For, if the perfect are not yet in existence, they are in *motion* towards perfection, or *in want of*, not in a *present enjoyment* of, perfection.

He adopts however another subterfuge; namely, that men may be said to be perfect *absolutely* and *essentially*, or *relatively* and *contingently*.‡ He is perfect *absolutely*, who possesses those things which constitute the very ground and essence of perfection; and in this sense they alone are perfect, who possess love and the other internal principles of perfection; but he is said to be perfect, and in a state of perfection, *relatively* and *contingently*, who has some of those things which generally accompany a state of spiritual perfection; and in this sense Monks are placed in a state of perfection, from their obligation to the observance of Counsels. He illustrates this distinction by the following comparison: As an animal is said to be perfect *absolutely*, because it possesses the proper number of limbs, arrange-

* Thom. Opusc. 18. cap. 1.

† 2. 2. quæst. 184. art. 4.

‡ Opusc. 18. cap. 1.

ment, and quantity, together with such qualifications and powers as belong to the perfection of the animal faculty; but is called perfect *contingently*, and in a *particular sense* (secundum quid) or relatively, because it is perfect in whiteness, or, from some other peculiarity; so the Christian is judged to be perfect *absolutely*, because he has faith, love, and all other things in which the spiritual life consists; but he is said to be in a state of perfection in *a limited sense*, or *relatively*, from obligation to Counsels, by which he aims at perfection. But I retort: as any one would assert foolishly, that a horse lame, blind, and diseased, is perfect; and more foolishly would defend himself, by the restriction and explanation, that the horse is in a state of perfection, because he is in a state of perfect whiteness; so equally foolish is the assertion, that Monks who are altogether devoid of grace, of love, and spiritual life, are yet perfect, or in a state of spiritual perfection, because they are in a state bound to Counsels of perfection.

3. We must form our opinion of a state of spiritual perfection according to the rule of the Divine judgment, because God best knows how to discern spiritual things; not according to the outward appearance of ceremonies or works, which we ourselves know are fallacious, uncertain, and for the most part a false mark of true perfection: Now God judges men to be in a state of perfection, not when they bind themselves to celibacy, mendicancy, or Monastic ceremonies; but when they have true faith and love, and walk in the commands of God: It therefore behoves us to judge of a state of perfection in the same manner. Aquinas ingenuously acknowledges,* that *a state of spiritual perfection in the Divine judgment is taken according to the inward disposition of the man.* But he adds, *we must take the spiritual state of man as to those things which are performed outwardly in reference to the Church; because we do not search the heart, but we see* [only] *what is manifest.* Granting that we must judge of the inward state by those things which are done externally; I answer, that, according to the judgment of charity, whomsoever I shall see bringing forth the fruits of righteousness and holiness, him I reckon

v.

* 2. 2. quæst. 184. art. 4.

to be in a state of spiritual perfection; not him whom I see laying himself under obligation to observe Counsels (as they call them) of celibacy, mendicity, and the obedience of a regular. For where are we taught to consider all those to be in a state of perfection, who by a vow bind themselves to perfection? when the whole world is witness that very many of those who have bound themselves to virginity, exercise the foulest lust; they who have bound themselves to poverty, have scraped together wealth the greatest; they who have bound themselves to obedience towards parents, magistrates, and kings, are the most disobedient and rebellious. That demand then of Aquinas, and of all Papists, is unjust and absurd, namely, that we should judge and admit all those to be in a state of spiritual perfection, whom we see to have bound themselves solemnly to the three essential vows; when God himself and almost the whole world, has taught us to judge otherwise.

4. But because Papists themselves dare not maintain, that a state of perfection consists *essentially* in the observance of Counsels,* they have recourse at last to the assertion that this is to be understood *instrumentally:* as though they should say, that Monks are in a state of perfection, when they bind themselves to Counsels, inasmuch as they are then bound to make use of them as means and instruments by which they may easily reach perfection. Hence Cajetan—*Wherever you find works of Counsels to be called perfections, admit that to be true, but with a little reserve, namely instrumentally, not essentially.*†

Come then, let us shew that this *little reserve* is senseless and foolish; nor can Monks be placed in a state of perfection, merely because they have bound themselves by a vow to this instrumental perfection. False and senseless is that proposition which cannot be enunciated except in terms foolish and abhorrent from common sense. Yet such is this Papistic figment—*Monks are in a state of perfection instrumentally, on account of their obligation to Counsels;* for any man endued with a share of common sense must know, that it does not place an agent in a state of perfection, because he is bound to make use of a more perfect instrument than

* Aquin. 2. 2. qu. 184. art. 3. † Ibid. art. 7.

before. For as a man is not pronounced to be in the state of a perfect harper, because he carries about and plays upon an excellent and beautiful harp; or in the state of a perfect and brave warrior, because he wears a strong and sharp sword; so no one is in the state of Christian perfection, merely because by a vow he assumes to his use the most perfect instruments. Whereas then it is one thing *to be in a state of perfection itself, another thing to use some instrument for perfection*, the Romanists senselessly confound these, when they say that Monks are in a state of perfection instrumentally. So much then for this style of speaking of it.

5. I now proceed, and contend that the opinion itself is false, which supposes, that the observance of Counsels undertaken by vow, is the only instrument by which a state of perfection can be acquired. For if a state of perfection consists in a votive obligation to works of Counsels, that is so, either from the practice of such works, or from the vow of obligation which they undertake to them. It cannot be from doing such works absolutely; because to maintain perpetual virginity, to renounce all their possessions, to live by certain rule, does not of itself place any one in a state of perfection, according to Papistic theology. So says Thomas,* *Virginity, unconnected with a vow, is out of the state of perfection.* And the same may be said as to mendicancy, and obedience; the value of such works, if a man observes them only voluntarily, being insufficient to place him in a state of perfection.

I now pass to the other branch of the distinction we made, and affirm—If from the practice itself of such works, a state of perfection is not attained to; then much less from the votive obligation to perform such things. For, if the nature of the works neither implies nor effects a state of perfection, much less will the obligation to the going through such things effect it: for they who are most infirm and imperfect, may bind themselves by a vow to practise those things to which they are neither accustomed, nor are able to accomplish. Let us illustrate the matter by an example: If a soldier does not forthwith stand out a perfect warrior, just

* Opus. 18. cap. 23.

merely because he carries a long, stout, and well-pointed lance; such as Homer describes, ἔγχος Αἰακίδαο, Βριθὺ, μέγα, στιβαρόν· so neither is he brought into that state, by being bound by vow to hurl such a lance: for the vow, though it contributes to the necessity of using such a lance, yet it does not contribute at all to the strength, the skill, or the perfection of the person who uses it. In like manner, if a Christian is not in the state of a perfect spiritual warrior, merely because he maintains virginity, because he renounces wealth, because he conforms himself to a certain rule; so neither is he in that state in consequence of being bound by vows to do such things. For to be in a state of instrumental perfection, (if I may concede that such a state of perfection exists,) must either arise simply from the perfect use of such instruments; or, if it be not thus produced, there is no possible way in which it can result from the vow which binds to the use of them. For this vow occasions only a state of necessity and obligation to make use of these instruments; but does not impart the state of perfection in the using them.

6. If works of Counsels are not instruments suited for acquiring perfection as regards those who avail themselves of them; then to vow and undertake works of this kind, does not place Monks even instrumentally in a state of perfection. But as to the greater part of those who are bound to use them, these instruments are unfit and by no means suited for enabling a person to acquire spiritual perfection; which I thus shew. Works of Counsels (as the Papists teach) are greater and more difficult than the works of the commands; but they who are bound to use these instruments are boys and girls, not yet fitted for bearing even the burdens of the commandments. Since then the value of instrumental perfection is not to be estimated from the magnitude of the instrument, but from its adaptation to the agent; those who induce so many feeble, young, and imperfect persons to lay themselves under obligation to make use of these great and ponderous instruments, instead of advancing them by these instruments, rather hinder them. The armour of Saul was of itself an instrument more perfect to fight with the Philistine, than a sling and stones from the brook; but because it was not proportioned to the strength of David, as yet a youth and feeble, it did not place him in the state

of a perfect warrior, but of an imperfect one. The same opinion must we entertain concerning those tyros who, as soon as they have taken these great instruments of perfection upon them, fancy that they are straightway placed in a state of perfection. But let them listen to their own Aquinas:* *Inasmuch as an instrument is not sought on its own account, but on account of some end; a matter does not become so much the better, in proportion as it is a greater instrument, but in proportion as it is better adapted for attaining the end.* In the present case it is not proportioned to the attainment of the end, as it respects this or that individual, because it is not proportioned to his strength. Hear also the most learned and prudent Gerson:† *Experience teaches us that religious services of human invention, or forms of will-worship, never confer perfection, but on the contrary frequently lead to decays of it; not of themselves, but from the fault of those who abuse them; or from the rules being disproportionate and beyond the strength of those who profess to abide by them.* Even though then we were to admit that these Counsels are great and perfect instruments of their kind, yet will they scarcely place one or two out of many thousands in a state of perfection; because very few have strength proportioned to the use of such instruments. *Rari quippe boni,* &c.‡

7. If virginity, poverty, and obedience, are those instruments by means of which Monks ought to acquire a state of perfection, then they are the most imperfect of all mortals; for whatever vows they make, and pretend as they may that they perform these works, yet in reality scarcely one out of many thousands performs them; which will be evident thus: The Schoolmen§ maintain that mental virginity is lost, by the mere consent itself of the mind to lust, although the deed does not follow; but if Monks are tried by this rule, since they do not fulfil the Counsel of virginity, it is impossible they can thence claim to themselves a state of perfection. As to poverty (to say nothing of the rest) the Mendicants themselves, who vow the deepest poverty, enter a religious order, not that they may be in want,

* 2. 2. qu. 188. art. 7. respons. ad primum.
† Part. 3. de perfect. cordis. ‡ Juvenal. xiii. 26.
§ Sylvest. in verbo Virginitas.

but that they may abound. For who ever would call it poverty to possess nothing of his own, and in the mean time to be luxuriating upon the common riches? Such poverty Jerome has described:* *There are Monks more wealthy than they were when living in the world; under a poor Christ they possess riches such as they did not under a wealthy devil.*† And Cajetan himself confesses, (2. 2. quæst. 188. art. 7,) that those Mendicants had great treasures, and used to build sumptuous fabrics. Lastly, their obedience is mighty slender and paltry; for they vow obedience to their Abbot in things of no consequence; but manage nevertheless to withdraw themselves from obedience to Princes, Magistrates, and Bishops. In a word, under the veil of virginity they are lustful; under the mean cloak of mendicity they are luxurious; under the yoke of submission to rules they shake off obedience, natural, civil, ecclesiastical. If therefore a state of perfection consists in maintaining virginity, poverty, and obedience, the Monks, for the most part, neither essentially nor instrumentally have any thing to do with perfection.

8. Many, unengaged by a Monastic obligation to works of Counsels, have been formerly, many are now, in a state of equal, nay of greater perfection, than the Monks themselves: a state of perfection therefore does not depend instrumentally upon an obligation to the practice of those Counsels. And, in the first place, we can instance among the Patriarchs and Prophets many who were married and rich, but bound by no solemn vow to virginity, poverty, or

* Epist. ad Nepotianum.

† "Quid diceret (exclaims Rivet) si hodie vivens, magnifica ædificia, [illegible] tersa, et abundanter parata habeant, et ut verbo dicam, nihil ipsis desit. Nonnullum enim est bonum Legem bene [illegible] (see obed. virtute §. 2.) *ut eo usu rebus vestis ordinibus facile se putentur superare jejunia regulæ et cæterâ cultus victusque asperitate.*" Catholicus Orthodoxus; tract. ii. quæst. 23. §. 2.

Since Rivet wrote long sentences, the Jesuits have been banished from most countries of Europe; and the property of the Monastic Orders secularised to a great extent.—See Cramp's *Text Book of Popery*, p. 328 edit. 1841.

obedience under rules. Secondly, we say that Christ himself and his Apostles, who were a specimen of perfection to other Christians, neither bound themselves by a vow to these works of Counsels, nor even by one word advised, that they who would aim at perfection should entangle themselves in the chains of such vows. We affirm, moreover, that the ancient Monks were much more holy and perfect than the moderns, although they were not bound by those three vows which are called *essential*. Not by the vow of virginity, as Athanasius shews:* *Many of the Bishops have not contracted marriage, Monks, on the contrary, have become parents; as on the other hand you may notice that Bishops have become fathers of sons, and that Monks have not sought the privilege of becoming parents: — — for it is allowable to adopt one course, and the other course is not prohibited.* And Augustine:† *The Catholic Church has many Monks and Clergy, married and possessing their own property.* And we may add a Romanist writer to these Fathers, Alvarus Pelagius:‡ *The relinquishment of property, and the maintaining of a celibate state, are not essential to Monachism, because in Egypt and Palestine the real Anchorites possessed property, and bought and sold; and yet were reckoned among the more perfect kind of Monks. Nay Paul, the first and chief Anchorite, retained his own property, and bequeathed it.* Lastly, to come to our own times, by the common consent of Papists, Bishops are in a state of greater perfection than Monks; and yet are they not bound to those three vows. Thus says Cajetan:§ *The state of a Bishop's perfection is a state of perfection both more perfect than the state of Monks, and requires no one of the three vows; as is clear in the case of the ancient Bishops, as regards the vow of celibacy, and universally as to the vow of poverty; and in the Roman Pontiff as to the vow of obedience.* From all these things I infer, that these are not the ordinary, much less the only instruments, upon which a state of perfection depends; un-

* Epist. ad Dracontium. † Lib. de Hæres. cap. 40.

‡ De Planctu Ecclesiæ lib. 1. cap. 46. ALVARUS PELAGIUS, or PELAGIUS ALVARUS, a Spanish Franciscan, who studied at Bologna, Pisa, and Paris, A. D. 1304; was Papal Penitentiary in 1332, and afterwards a Bishop in Portugal. Besides the work above mentioned (in two Books, Venice 1560), he wrote *Summa Theologiæ* (ed. Ulm, 1474); and other works never printed. —Scames; or See *Baxter's Key*, p. 274.

§ In 2. 2. quæst. 186. art. 5.

connected with which so many thousands have enjoyed a state of greater perfection than modern Monks; and without which the whole order of Bishops obtain a more excellent perfection, by the acknowledgment of the Monks themselves.

9. If from the votive obligation to continence, poverty, and obedience, Monks were placed in a state of spiritual perfection; then it would be an act of impiety and apostasy, on account of temporal advantage or danger, to pass from this state into a state of imperfection, that is, a secular state; it would even be daring sacrilege in the Roman Pontiff to grant a license for forsaking this perfect state, and returning to an imperfect one, and that against the solemn vow of dedication to God, which is an act of supreme worship, to be set aside by no human power. Thus Aquinas :* *Whoever passes from a more perfect state to a state which is not one of perfection, he is deemed an apostate.* And elsewhere :† *Having professed Religion, they are dead to the world, and live to God; hence they are not to be recalled to a secular life upon any account whatsoever.* Bernard also affirms :‡ *It is not lawful for any one to abandon the good which he has once vowed;* and for this he adduces that declaration in the Gospel, *No man having put his hand to the plough and looking back is fit for the kingdom of God.* It is not allowable therefore that any of these obligations be violated, if there is in the Monastic profession a certain eminent state of spiritual perfection. But now, the modern Romanists contradict and overthrow all this, for they teach that the Pope can give a dispensation that a Monk may become a secular; which would be intolerable impiety if there be in Monachism a state of spiritual perfection. For who is at liberty to give dispensation to a Christian, to fall back from a perfect to an imperfect state? to leave off *reaching forward to the things that are before,* and to look back *on the things that are behind,* contrary to the mind of the Apostle, Phil. iii. 14? When therefore they maintain, that the Pope can grant indulgences and dispensations to those who bind themselves to works of Counsels, they manifestly confess that it is not in them that spiritual perfection is to be found. This power is attributed to the Roman Pontiff by Hostiensis in his treatise *concerning a*

* Opusc. 18. cap. 25. † 2. 2. quæst. 88. art. 11.

‡ De Præcept. et Disp. cap. 20. Vide Decret. Greg. 9. *de Statu Monach.* cap. 6.

*vow, and the redemption of a vow;* by Alvarus Pelagius, (lib. 1, cap. 46;) and by Cajetan (in 2. 2. quæst. 88, art. 11.) where he shews, that the Pope in fact has dispensed with many of the Religious, allowing them to contract matrimony and return to a secular life. Munster* writes that a dispensation of this kind was granted to Casimir, the Monk.† And it is now the common opinion of the Papists that the Roman Pontiff, in the plenitude of his power, can do this.‡ The

* Sebastian Munster: he was born in 1489, at Ingleheim, in Germany. In the early part of his life he was a Franciscan Friar, and applied himself assiduously to Divinity, the Mathematics, and Cosmography. Embracing Luther's sentiments, he quitted his Order in 1529, and retired to Heidelberg, and afterwards to Basil, where he became professor of Hebrew and taught with reputation. His Latin translation of the Bible is esteemed. He was the first who wrote a Chaldee Grammar and Lexicon; he also was the first who published the Gospel of St. Matthew in Hebrew. He was the author of several other learned works; and died of the plague at Basil in 1552, aged 63. See Platt's *Biography*, and Townley's *Illustrations*.

† Or, Casimir I., King of Poland: He was the son of Mieczlaus II, and losing his father at an early age he was placed under the tutelage of his mother Rixsa, who was appointed Regent of the kingdom. She ruled in so despotic a manner that the Poles revolted, and expelled both her and her son. Casimer took refuge in France, and having a propensity to Literature, studied in the University of Paris, and, assuming Deacon's Orders, he became a Monk, first in Italy, and afterwards in the Abbey of Cluny, in France. Poland, having suffered much during the Interregnum, the nobles of the country discovered the place of Casimir's retreat and recalled him from his exile: but it was necessary that he should be released from his Clerical vows, for which purpose a dispensation was obtained from the Pope, on condition of the payment of Peter-pence by the Poles, and some other stipulations favourable to the Holy See, and he was then crowned with unusual solemnity in 1040. Platt's *Biographical Dictionary*.

‡ Bayle gives a summary of a remarkable case relative to Papal Dispensations, which took place at Rome under Pope Paul IV., who assembled a Conclave of Ecclesiastics to consider of the legality of annulling a marriage contract between Francis de Montmorenci, son of the Constable of France, and a Maid of Honour to Catharine de Medicis. The young man had not acquainted his parents with his engagement, fearing they would oppose it, Henry II. having expressed a desire to the Constable that his son should marry that Monarch's natural daughter, the widow of the Duke de Castro. The Constable's ambition was too much favoured by the thoughts of such an alliance to suffer the loss through his son's engagement, and he omitted nothing to get it set aside. The affair, says Bayle, became the greatest in Christendom, because the Pope wished to effect a marriage between this daughter of Henry and one of his Nephews. This he could not succeed in, if he declared the promise to be made to the lady de Pienne, to whom the Constable's son was engaged, to be null. Henry, being engaged on the side of the Constable, sued for a dispensation, believing that the Pope would not deny him any thing at a time when they were treating of a league against Spain. Nevertheless, Paul appeared so averse to it, that the king

force of the argument then rests here: No one can grant dispensation to a Christian to renounce his state of spiritual perfection, and return to a state more mean, imperfect, and less acceptable and pleasing to God: but the Popes can dispense with the Religious, allowing them to desert their state, to leave off performing those works of Counsels to which they were bound by a solemn vow; in one word, to return

was obliged to have recourse to some other expedients. Having engaged the lady de Pienne to renounce her pretensions, she was shut up in a Nunnery; her formal renunciation was presented to the Pope, with the edict against clandestine marriages, and the Court of France pursued the appeal for a dispensation with the greatest solicitude. They obtained *a Copy of a Dispensation which the Pope had granted in a like case*, which was also laid before the Pope. Dr. de la Haye thus relates the result to the Constable:—"Paul IV. sent immediately for the Datary, to know how that dispensation had been granted, wondering at it; and much more, how it came into our hands! The Datary answered, that it had been granted in a full signature, and by his Holiness himself; which he might remember, being desirous to know and understand more than any of his predecessors did, what passes in his signature. His Holiness was amazed at it, and asked the Datary by what means the said dispensation might be retracted, a thing which the Datary said could not be done, because it was already in the hands of the parties, and that they were married by virtue of the same." To shift the withholding of a dispensation, in the Constable's case, from his own shoulders, a Congregation was convened; many Divines and Canonists were called to it, and the Pope presided in person, nullifying the freedom of discussion by the severity of his remarks when any member of the Conclave spoke in a way that was favourable to the pending cause. The Conclave was broken up, many of the members leaving it in terror and dismay, without coming to any conclusion on the matter. The case throws much light, extremely curious and interesting, on the subject of dispensations and Papal infallibility. The Pope's sentiments, expressed in the Congregation, are too remarkable to be omitted:—"I am not ignorant" (said his Holiness) "that the Popes, my predecessors, have granted several dispensations in this case; they are in the presence of God, to give him an account of it. If they have been mistaken I have no mind to follow them; perhaps they may have done it through ignorance, and *that* age might not then know, certainly, what other ages clearly perceive, according to the words of Jesus Christ: Scietis autem postea, &c., non potestis omnia portare modo, &c., veniet paracletus, &c. — — — *But ye shall know afterwards*, &c., *ye cannot bear all things now*, &c., *the Comforter will come*, &c. And as to what is said, that I have granted a dispensation in a like case, I would not have this to cause any prejudice to this matter; *for God knows that I never understood it!* In the signet office there is a multitude of people, prelates, referendaries, and others, who make a great noise; so that an old decrepit Pope cannot mind every particular thing. As to myself, I protest that I never understood it; and moreover, that *though I should have erred in one thing or another, yet I would not continue in my error.*"

So much for Papal infallibility, and salvation by the perfection of works in the Romish Church, by the aid of *their* Evangelical Counsels. See *Bayle's Dictionary*, *vol.* iv. art. *Pienne*.

to the life of ordinary Christians: hence Monachism is not a better state of perfection, and more grateful and acceptable to God, than the common and legitimate state of other Christians.

10. If there is nothing in the threefold vow of the Monks which surpasses the perfection required by the Divine law from every Believer, then are they both mistaken and unwise in restricting a state of perfection to a state of Monachism, and to those three vows of continence, poverty, and obedience of a regular. This consequence is manifest, and needs no confirmation. As to the antecedent, I affirm that, generally, a state of perfection and imperfection neither can nor ought to be distinguished according to the quantity of external works; since with God there is no difference, as to perfection and merit, how many and how great are the external works you do, but how much internal faith and love you have exercised. For instance, he is not in a more perfect state, or of greater merit, who has fasted often, who has offered many and longer prayers to God, who has been more liberal to the poor, and who has excelled in other external works; for in all these things the Pharisees surpassed the disciples of Christ: but he is reckoned in a more perfect state, who excels in internal faith, and charity, and piety, and exercises external works, as the law of charity and prudence has dictated. For (as it is said in the Schools) *internal acts of any persons are of the same kind and intention: their merits are equal.* Which being granted, since all works of Counsels are external acts, we ought not, from the observance of them, to dream of a state of higher perfection or merit.

Secondly, to descend to particulars,—In the vow of celibacy there is nothing which exceeds the perfection required from any pious person whatsoever. For chastity of heart and body is required from every Christian; but the Monks cannot vow anything more perfect than this chastity. I acknowledge the gift of virginal chastity of which Christ speaks in Matt. xix. 11, to be something higher and more perfect than the gift of conjugal chastity, of which the Apostle speaks in Tit. ii. 5. But if a Monk vows that he will have this peculiar gift of virginity, he proves that he is not perfect but foolish. What then does he vow? an

outward state of celibacy, and restraining himself from flagitious pollution, as Bellarmine infers* from the Apostle's words, 1 Cor. vii. 2, *To avoid fornication let every man have his own wife, and every woman have her own husband.* But many do this, who have not attained that perfect chastity of heart and body, which the law demands from all Christians, even married. The vow of celibacy then has nothing of perfection in it to make it rank above the chastity required from married persons.

I proceed to assert, that in the vow of poverty, there is nothing greater, more perfect or pleasing to God, than in the common life of Christians, who with thankfulness use the good things bestowed by God, and dispense the same to the glory of God, and the advantage of their neighbours —duties to which all Christians are bound. For it is neither a sign, nor the cause, nor the part of perfection to be divested of all external advantages, and to live a life of poverty; but not to have the heart set on these outward goods, and to be able, when they are taken away, to endure extreme want with equanimity. This state of perfection Paul professed that he had attained, Phil. iv. 11, 12; *I have learned in whatsoever state I am, therewith to be content*, &c. This he commends to all Christians; 1 Tim. vi. 8; *Having food and raiment let us be therewith content.* To this every believer is obliged by command, Heb. xiii. 5; *Let your conversation be without covetousness; and be content with such things as ye have;* and this state excels by far the vow of poverty of mendicants, who would be poor, and at the same time, lose nothing thereby, as says Cajetan, 2. 2. quæst. 188, art. 7. For that, notwithstanding their vows, they are still cleaving in heart to these earthly things, appears most convincingly from the circumstance, that wherever they have settled themselves they contrive by their crafty entrapping of the simple, their impious traffickings in masses, and innumerable other devices, to collect all the good things they possibly can into their dens. It is not then a mark of a perfect Christian, but rather of a perfect hypocrite, for a man to surrender his personal property, that he may live more splendidly and idly

* De Monach. lib. 2. cap. 30.

upon that of other people. For as Bonaventura has said rightly enough,* *It is possible and very easy to surrender one's own property, when one may enjoy possession in common.*

But one point remains to be considered, namely, the obedience of a regular, by which in fact they imagine that they excel all other mortals, and even themselves. Thus Thomas,† *Man can do nothing greater for God, than for His sake to subject his own will to a higher will.* In subjection to this vow they place the very summit of perfection itself; and on this account the Jesuits, that they may be supposed to surpass other Monks, promise a general and blind obedience to their Superior and to the Roman Pontiff. But I see nothing in this obedience to rules more perfect than in the obedience to which other Christians are bound. For to obey, as we are bound, civil rulers, spiritual pastors, parents, and in fine all whom God has placed over us, is much more perfect and difficult, than to obey one Abbot, according to a prescribed rule; and that too in matters for the greatest part of no importance, and in trifling externals, to the performance of which the *will-worship* innate in human minds excites us. But as regards that blind Jesuitic obedience, we not only deny it to be perfect, but affirm that it is impious and unlawful. For God would not have us make the will of any man the rule of our will and life; this privilege he reserves for himself and his word, as David shews at large in Ps. cxix.

Since then it is clear from what has been said, that there is nothing in the three-fold vow of Monks, which can go beyond the perfection of the Divine law enjoined upon all Christians, it savours both of folly and pride to attribute a state of perfection to Monachism alone, as though it were the very key-nail of the beam.

11. Our last argument is this:—If there is nothing in the ordinary life of believers, which is inconsistent with a state of Christian perfection, or forbids them to aim at the perfection possible and competent to pilgrims; it is consequently both a mistake, and unjust to exclude them from that state of perfection which is conceded readily to those

* In 2. sent. dist. 44. quæst. ult. † 2. 2. quæst. 186. art. 5.

who lead a Monastic life. For if there were any thing in the common life of Christians which clashes with a state of perfection, without doubt it would be what is *opposed* to the three Monastic vows, in which they say this state of perfection consists. Now these three are, the liberty of marrying, of retaining property in external things, and lastly, the liberty of not observing the rule (for instance) of Benedict, Augustine, Dominic, Francis, or any others. But a state of perfection suitable to pilgrims does not clash—nay it is comparable—with the maintenance of freedom in these three points. For with this freedom (as we have before proved) Patriarchs, Apostles, Bishops, yea, the best and most holy Monks, have retained a state of Christian perfection, not any way inferior to that which Dominicans, Franciscans, or Loyolists attained. Nay even the Monks themselves, whether they like or not, are compelled to admit, that there is nothing in these rules opposed to Evangelical perfection. For if you enquire of them, as regards matrimony, whether Bishops, to whom the Oriental Church, and the Apostle himself has allowed matrimony, are, in consequence of this liberty, debarred from a state of perfection, they dare not maintain it, nay, they ingenuously confess, that these are in a state of greater perfection, than the Monks are with their celibacy. So Cajetan says, in Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 186, art. 5. *The vow of chastity does not come under the description of a state of absolute perfection; but under the description of a state of perfection in relation to religious Orders. For the Episcopal state is a state of perfection, and a more perfect state than that of persons who have bound themselves under such religious vows, and yet it does not require the vow of celibacy.* Secondly, as to worldly riches and secular concerns, if you enquire whether those who retain the one, or engage in the other, are debarred on that account from a state of perfection, they dare not affirm even that. *The highest perfection may co-exist with great wealth,* says Thomas, 2. 2. quæst. 185, art. 6. *To be rich is not an impediment excluding from the state of Bishops,* says Cajetan, in Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 186, art. 3. *To carry on secular business for the sake of wealth, is not lawful either to Monks or Clergy; but for the sake of charity, they may, by permission from their superior, engage*

*with due moderation in secular concerns, by ministering and directing.** From which it is plain, if some Christians possess wealth, and carry on secular affairs piously, and with a view to the Divine glory, (to which all are bound by a necessary command) they are just as little excluded from a state of perfection, by possessing or being engaged about such things, as Bishops themselves.

Lastly, if the question be about the obedience of regulars, they cannot deny that Christians were in an equal and greater state of perfection before these rules were forced upon them by a vow, than Monks now are after various rules have been invented and intruded. For the rule of the Divine word gives far better direction for a state of perfection, than the rule of a Francis, or a Dominic: and the occupations which devolve upon Christians, from their common and special vocation, conduce much more to the acquiring a state of perfection, than the worthless traditions prescribed in a rule by these petty masters.

In conclusion; it is acknowledged that Monks attain to a higher state of perfection when, being released from this obedience to rules, they are promoted to be Bishops. But if the three *vows* were the choicest instruments for obtaining perfection, it would be absurd to set Bishops free from using them, who are especially bound to aim at a higher perfection, even to the last breath of life. Freedom then from these Monastic vows does not shut out a man from attaining a state of perfection.

And thus we have abundantly confirmed the second particular of our proposition; we proceed then to the last.

## CHAPTER XLII.

### THE LAST MEMBER OF THE PROPOSITION DEMONSTRATED.

We are arrived now in the last place at the third member of our proposition, in which we shall oppose the proud fiction of supererogation.

* Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 187. art. 2.

Now the Papists, in order to obtain an opening for their doctrine of supererogation, teach that in his Law God has enjoined some works more easy, and of an interior importance, to be performed by all who would gain eternal life; and has left other works more difficult, and of greater importance, to which a larger reward is promised and deserving of special glory, as subjects for Counsels: these are called by them *Evangelical Counsels*.* Hence they who fulfil the law, and superadd works of this kind, do, according to their doctrine, go beyond the righteousness of the Divine law, and perform duties that are not owing to God; and therefore whilst they render to God *more* than they are bound to render, they supererogate. We on the contrary deny that any works can be better or more acceptable to God, than those to the observance of which men are bound by the Divine law; which we have already proved by arguments not a few. We deny also (what is a consequence of this) that any mortals can exceed the righteousness of the Divine law, by any works whatsoever that are not owed, and which the law of God does not require; in one word, we deny that any one, by any good work, can render to God more than he is bound to do, or (as they commonly express it) can supererogate.

But before we actually engage [in a refutation of this notion] I premise these few remarks; that the law of God positively and strictly obliges to the internal works of loving God and our neighbour, of honouring our parents, of restraining our lusts, and all other things. The same law of God moreover obliges to the performance of all those external works in general, by which this love of God and of our neighbour may be put in exercise and manifested. In fine, although it does not definitely prescribe particular external acts to particular individuals, with all the attendant circumstances; yet it engages to the performing of such acts, individually considered, with such accompaniments, as a spirit of prudence and Christian charity shall suggest to be done. For instance: that law of God which commands us to love our neighbour, and help him by acts of kindness, does not expressly bind me down to perform some particular

* See Note, p. 554; and Rivet, *Catholicus Orthodoxus*, tract. iv. quæst. xi. § 3.

work of beneficence, neither that I should give to some one man in preference to another; but when the rule of prudence and charity shews my mind, that one course of action should be followed rather than another—that I should relieve some one individual rather than another—what had without consideration of circumstances been left to free choice, now becomes a matter of command. For—in these external works, in which the circumstances are not particularised—to do any thing from the mere impulse of a man's will, or to prefer and select one line of action in preference to another, is not a work of supererogation transcending the righteousness of the law; but a work of human discretion done in subservience to the righteousness of the law, and in its own nature indifferent, but pleasing and acceptable to God, only when taken in connection with some duty enjoined, whom he serves by thus practising it or evidencing it.

These remarks premised, it will readily appear what opinion is to be passed concerning Papistic works of supererogation; which do not in the least excel or surpass the perfection of the internal act, to which they are bound by the law; but merely offer to God, some external work, or circumstances of an external work, which is not definitely prescribed in the law itself. In these things, therefore, men are not rendering more to God than they are bound to do by the law; but since various external means conduce to the due discharge of the law, that is selected which seems to them eligible in preference to others. But let us proceed to argument.

1. The first argument is derived from the very nature of supererogation. Now the mere word includes these two things: one, that he who is supposed to supererogate, fulfils the whole law, not even omitting the least point; the other, that he goes beyond and transcends the law, by performing deeds not only not due and not in any way enjoined, (which any one can do) but by performing deeds better, more perfect, more acceptable to God, than those are which are commanded in the law.* But now as to the first: it is certain that no mortal man can fulfil the law itself,—a

* Vide Bellarm. *de Monach.* lib. 2. cap. 7.

point which we have already taken for granted, and shall proceed to prove in the following discussion. It is ridiculous then to boast that the law is exceeded by a man, who has not fulfilled all the commands of it. As to the latter, we do not deny that many things are done, to which the individuals are not bound, if merely the external work, with each of the circumstances, be considered. For instance, if a man has built a College or a Church, although it is correct to say that he ought to love God, and to honour him with his outward goods; to love his neighbour, and to help him as he can with those same outward means; yet was there no obligation to evidence his love of God and of his neighbour by limiting it to these particular works; such as the erection of Colleges or Churches. For he might have discharged the same duty of love in other good and pious works, and be at the same time equally approved by God. I add moreover, what cuts up the sinews of the doctrine of a supererogation, that these external works, of which in the execution, the particular way of doing them is left open, are not more excellent, more perfect, or more acceptable to God than works commanded. For the work commanded is, to love God with all the heart, to promote the glory of God with all our might; the work commanded is to love our neighbour as ourselves, kindly and compassionately to assist our neighbour when needing our help. These internal acts, and this internal working of a pious mind, which has been made the subject of command, are much better and more acceptable to God, than any duty externally viewed, the circumstances of which are regulated much as we will. Nay, the whole external work is of no account with God, unless as it flows from and depends upon the inward act due and commanded, as the Apostle teaches, 1 Cor. xiii. 3.

Since then, as to the internal act commanded by God, no one can supererogate—for no one loves God or his neighbonr more than he ought to do*—it is foolish and puerile, from the quantity or circumstances of an external work left free, to attribute supererogation to it. For he who with any measure of love lays out, it may be, but a farthing upon the poor, performs a work more excellent and more acceptable

* Vide Aquin. 2. 2. quæst. 184. art 3.

to God, than he who expends even a thousand pounds without any love, or coldly. For the excellence of a work is not to be judged of from the external magnitude of the work itself, but from the proportion of internal love with which it is accompanied; and this external quantity can form no fund of supererogation, inasmuch as it always falls short of the demand of the law.

2. We maintain secondly, that there is no ground for supererogation, arguing from the very origin of good works. For our good works, whether great or small, whether they are said to be commanded or merely recommended, yet will always remain gifts from God. The greater and more fruitful in good works a man appears, manifestly the greater and more abundant grace is he ever shewn to have received; according to that declaration of St. Paul, *I laboured more abundantly than they all, yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me;* 1 Cor. xv. 10. They then who do works, such as those which are termed *Works of Counsels*, do not supererogate; for although there was not any obligation, in virtue of a general command, to the practice of such works; yet from having been endued with special gifts, they became bound to exercise themselves therein. This is manifest from the parable of the talents; Matt. xxv. 14. And also from that saying of Christ, Luke xii. 48: *Unto whomsoever much is given, of him much is required; and to whom men have committed much of him will they require the more.* Inasmuch then as (according to Bellarmine's own acknowledgment*) such as are qualified for exhibiting what he terms the *heroic virtues*† have themselves received

* De Monach. lib. 2. cap. 12.

† "*The heroic virtues*, as he terms them:"—This term is still in use at Rome—Posthumous candidates for saintship must have been in the possession of these *heroical* qualities, as pre-requisites for the credit of being workers of miracles. "The examination is proposed in the form of a doubt, whether the servant of God possessed the theological and cardinal virtues in a *heroical degree;* and until this doubt has been favourably resolved the question respecting the miracles said to have been wrought through his intercession cannot be entertained." Introduction, p. xi. to *Lives of St. Alphonsus Liguori, St. Francis de Girolamo*, &c., whose canonization took place, May 26, 1839; London, 1839. In the words of another authority—"Les témoignages de bonne vie et les *vertus héroïques* de ceux qu'on souhaite de fair canonizer." Dictionnaire des Reliques, &c. par Collin de Plancy; Paris, 1822, vol. iii. p. 56.

their powers from God, if, instead of cultivating those infused graces, they satisfy themselves with attending to inferior or more common duties, though made capable by God of undertaking the more eminent and extraordinary services, they would certainly fall into a sin of omission and incur the guilt of hiding their talent. Gerson has said well,* *He who can serve God in a superior station, will be condemned if he should choose to occupy himself in matters of inferior moment; neither will he find an excuse on the score of humility, but it will be imputed to him rather as the effect of lukewarmness.* Such therefore as are endued with that measure of grace, that will enable them to serve God in some remarkable efforts, beyond the common order of Christians, do not supererogate when they do that; but are merely occupying their province duly according to the measure of the talents which they have received.

3. A third argument we derive from the ultimate end of all good actions, namely the Divine glory. For we are bound to seek this end with a degree of boundless desire; because *the longing desire of an end has no defined limits;* as the Philosopher has rightly said, Politic. i. 6. Since therefore the means are always afforded in order to the attaining some object, if after proper deliberation this should seem to me to conduce altogether to the glory of God, and I should yet neglect to perform it, I am not in that case seeking the end itself with the earnestness that I ought; and on this ground such omission will not be free from the guilt of sin. Although then we are not bound to enter upon an accurate deliberation, which may be the best and most conducing to the glory of God, among the vast variety of legitimate and good actions that can be performed by us; yet in actions of great moment, which should never be entered on without mature deliberation, it is wrong to neglect that which, after such deliberation, seems to be peculiarly fitted and adapted both to promote a man's own salvation, and to enhance the glory of God. When therefore those works which are called *Counsels,* in which it is supposed that this supererogation consists, are of such a quality, as that after due deliberation they shall appear to be conducing greatly to man's salvation

* *De Monte Contempl.* cap. 28.

and the glory of God; then in consequence of such previous deliberation, and the connection which it is perceived they have with this supreme and necessary end, they henceforth acquire the force of a positive duty; nor does any one supererogate by performing them, though he would fail in a debt of love to God by omitting them.

4. Fourthly, We argue from the necessary obligation, under which every Christian whatsoever lies, to aim at all possible perfection according to the measure of grace given him; Matt. v. 48—*Be ye perfect as your Father which is in heaven is perfect.* Every one therefore is bound to aim at perfect love, and a perfect observance of the Divine law. Hence Cajetan himself is forced to admit* that, *If any one give his mind to observe the Divine precepts, only in a common manner, and makes no efforts to advance in charity, even to a perfection therein, such a temper of mind is not free from sin.* And yet, according to the common opinion of Papists, the works of Counsels, or of supererogation, are required as necessary means for a perfect observance of the precepts. So says Aquinas,† *The first foundation for acquiring a perfection of charity is voluntary poverty.* And more plainly still,‡ *There is a two-fold method in observing the commandments, the one perfect, and the other imperfect. And the way of putting that in exercise is two-fold; one in which a man aims at perfection in the observance of the precepts, and this is effected through the Counsels; another, in which he is engaged in an imperfect observance of the precepts, and this is done in the secular life.* If these statements are correct, since every man who is bound to strive at the end, is bound also to adopt those means which are the most fit for attaining the end, it follows, that all such as are competent to observe the Counsels, seeing it is their duty to aim at a perfection in charity and a perfect observance of the Divine law, are bound to attend to those works also, without which this perfection is neither attained nor exercised. They do not supererogate therefore when they perform such works; but by means the most suitable and advantageous they are aiming at due perfection, as they are in duty bound.

* 2. 2. quæst. 186. art. 2. † 2. 2. quæst. 186. art. 3.
‡ Opusc. 17. cap. 6.

But Bellarmine meets this argument by laying down a two-fold perfection;* one which he calls *necessary*, the other which he terms *useful*: to this first he thinks all are bound, not to the second; and that the works of Counsels, or of supererogation, should be classed under this second. This distinction is however very unmeaning, nor does it explain the difficulty. For that perfection which we are bidden to seek after, whether it be called necessary or useful, is an aim to fulfil the law of God in the most perfect manner that we are able, and to do the will of God on earth, as it is done by the blessed angels in heaven. If the works of the Counsels conduce to this, so little can they be neglected by fit and proper persons, that the omission condemns them of neglecting the very perfection to which they lead.

But Bellarmine endeavours to illustrate his opinion by a simile:—*As he who is commanded to proceed to the Venetian States, if he stops by the way and is unwilling to advance, offends; but if he chooses to go by the common road, not by shorter paths, and if he chooses to walk on the road, not run, does not offend; so if any one through pride or listlessness thinks that he is sufficiently perfect, and is totally unwilling to advance farther, he would sin; but if he is willing to be more diligent, and make progress, yet according to his condition and degree, although he is unwilling to ascend to a higher point when he might, he would not be sinning.* But I retort the simile:—If he who is directed to proceed to the Venetian States, should be instructed likewise to do it as speedily as he can, he would undoubtedly sin by leaving the road which he knew to be the shorter, and in following one less expeditious. Thus when we are bidden to aim at perfection with all our strength, laying aside all delay, he sins against the grace of God who, if he can make his way by a short and speedy road, of his own accord chooses to travel on a road intricate, and obstructed as it were by thorns, which would bring him at last to the end of his journey, but with more difficulty and less expeditiously. Bellarmine is contradicting himself, in supposing that he, who can attain to a higher degree of

* *De Monach.* lib. 2. cap. 13.

spiritual perfection, is living according to his degree and condition, although he is unwilling to do it. For that man is not attending properly to his condition and spiritual state, who does not exert himself answerably to the measure of strength bestowed upon him by God. For the degree of actual perfection ought to correspond to the degree of habitual perfection.

Such therefore, as have been endued with a sufficiency for undertaking those extraordinary works by grace received, are not doing more than duty calls for, but are performing such acts as their individual situation requires them to exhibit.

5. We proceed to impugn the doctrine of *works of supererogation* by an argument derived from the infirmity of regenerate men. For the law of God is adapted to the highest powers of nature when in its integrity, and as at first created. Hence nature corrupt, and not yet wholly renewed, cannot transcend this law. The Apostle has shewn this, Rom. vii. 14, when he acknowledges that the law of God is *spiritual*, and that he himself is *carnal;* and viii. 3, when he teaches, that we cannot attain to the righteousness of the law, because of the infirmity of the flesh. And therefore it is the extreme, both of pride and folly, to suppose that a man can do works of supererogation; that is, (upon the authority of the Papists themselves) that he can perform some works not required, better, and holier than the works not enjoined in the law of God. But if we should wish to enquire into those works which the Monks extol and thrust upon God under the title of works of supererogation, we shall find that, for the most part, they are mere rubbish if compared to the spiritual works commanded in the law. For to become inmates of a Monastery,* to abstain from eating flesh, to mutter over, as it were, a bead-roll of prayers, at certain hours, daily; not to marry; to submit to rules of

* Membership in a Monastic Order was formerly estimated very highly and differently. In the account of *St. Antony*, in the *Legenda aurea*, it is related: —"Aliquando dum ab angelis in aëre elevaretur, adsunt dæmones et ejus transitum prohibent, peccata ejus ab exordio nativitatis ejus objicientes. Quibus angeli: non debetis illa narrare quæ Christi pietate jam sunt delata. Si qua autem scitis ex quo factus est Monachus illa properte. Et cum in probatione deficerent, liber Antonius in sublime tollitur et liber deponitur." *Jacobi a Voragine Legenda aurea;* cap. xxi. § 2.

human invention; to relinquish a man's own possessions—are things which can be done by men the most imperfect, and are therefore works of supererogation in the prophetical sense only, being such as God by no means requires (see Isa. i. 12,) though not in the Papistic sense, inasmuch as they surpass and transcend in perfection the works required by God in the law.

6. We shall shew that those works of Counsels, which are supposed to be unrequired, and therefore supererogatory, are yet due, and cannot be neglected by those whom God has qualified for undertaking such services without incurring sin; and that from their object which is two-fold. For, in the first place, the object of works such as those among suitable individuals is, the withdrawing and removing of impediments to love; secondly, for an augmentation of love itself. The Papists themselves say*:—*The Religious state* (that is Monachism) *was principally instituted for attaining perfection through the means of certain exercises, by which the impediments to perfect charity are removed.* And Alfonsus,† *All that is necessary for maintaining love towards God or our neighbour, must be supposed to be enjoined upon us; but what is equitable for increasing love towards God and our neighbour, yet not necessary for the preservation of it, that is to be considered merely as a Counsel.* If therefore we are bound, in so far as God has qualified us, to remove the impediments to love and Divine grace, and to seek, by the most suitable means, perpetual increase of grace and love, it is clear that they who understand that not merely the impediments to Divine love and spiritual perfection may by these works of Counsels be removed, but that hence they are acquiring also the noblest augmentations of love and grace, are under an obligation to observe the Counsels. For the Scriptures bid all (as far as they are strengthened for such works by Divine grace) to perform such things as tend to the removing of impediments to spiritual perfection, and the promoting and increasing the perfection itself of grace. Thus, in Heb. xii. 1, *Laying aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, let us run with patience the race set before us.* We are

* Aquin. 2. 2. qu. 186. art. 1.
† *Adversus hæres.* lib. 12, in verbo *Præceptum.*

bound therefore decidedly to lay aside all the impediments whereby we are retarded in the course of godliness. 2 Pet. iii. 18; *Grow in grace.* We are bound therefore not only to increase the grace received, but also to increase and enrich the same by the best methods and means. Hence Scotus maintains* that *it is a venial sin to neglect to do whatever is most adapted to advance us in our Christian course,* or *to do anything which has a tendency to retard us in that course.* And Cajetan says,† *To neglect advancement in Christian love through contempt of the Counsels of perfection is a mortal sin.*‡

The whole strength of the argument comes to this:—It is incumbent on every Christian, according to the nature of his particular calling, as well to remove the impediments to grace, as to promote in himself as much as possible the increase of grace: he therefore is not doing more than he need, when he does those works by which one or both of these ends is secured.

7. If men could transcend the perfection of the Divine law by supererogatory works of this kind, and could render to God more than they were bound to render him, then it would follow that works of this kind were true and certain effects of inward and spiritual perfection. For no one can render due obedience to God, without inward and spiritual perfection, much less what superabounds and transcends it. On the contrary it is very well known, that works of this description are not sure effects of grace or of spiritual perfection, but signs only; nor are they *demonstrable* signs,

* Lib. 2. dist. 21. quæst. 1. † In 2. 2. quæst. 186. art. 2.

‡ There may seem to some readers an apparent inconsistency in these two statements. This might have been avoided had Davenant omitted the words of *venial* and *mortal*; but he doubtless would not so far depart from the fairness argu[illegible]quotation; and the apparent inconsistency does not interfere with the Duns [illegible]ment, although it does with the perspicuity. The argument is—Both [illegible]Scotus and Cajetan say it is sinful [though they differ in the degree of piety:—Th[illegible] to do that which may check piety or to neglect what may advance it is a *positive* [illegible]refore to practise what advances piety and avoid what may check of supererogat[illegible]*e duty.*—Therefore [illegible] is not a *mere counsel* of perfection or work quotations may [illegible]on.—The apparent inconsistency or contradiction in the two Aquinas; and Ca[illegible]be thus accounted for:—Scotus loved to oppose Thomas his doctrines. He[illegible]etan was the devoted admirer of Thomas and maintainer of to be *venial* sin. S[illegible]ce what the one contends to be *mortal* sin, the other affirms [illegible]h is the *unity* in the Church of Rome.

but *probable;* nay not even probable, because very apt to mislead. For, as to wear silken or costly robes is a mark of a rich or generous man; but very fallacious, because even bankrupts and base fellows may be, and are not unfrequently, very handsomely accoutred; so for one individual to take upon himself the angelic state of virginity, as they call it, or the burden of voluntary poverty, or the yoke of submission to Monastic regulations,—these, even admitting that they are signs of some spiritual grace or perfection, are very uncertain and fallacious; seeing that these feats are very often accomplished by persons who are filled with lust, avarice, and pride. Such works consequently which are not sure signs even of saving grace or piety, are not of any transcendent righteousness or holiness. For, as Augustine has truly observed,* *It often occurs that the same persons are negligent in their obedience to positive precepts, who are yet very eager to abstain from what is allowed.*

What therefore the Apostle said (Rom. xiv. 17), *The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost,* that we may properly apply to any works not commanded: The kingdom of God does not consist in a life of virginity, or in the conjugal state; not in a Monastic or secular condition; but in the inward endowments of the Holy Spirit, and their fruits.

But our opponents will object that—Although these works of Counsels are not, in themselves considered, works of righteousness or piety; nor yet of transcendent righteousness or supererogatory holiness; yet when they flow from sanctifying grace, and have a reference to the glory of God, then they are works of supererogatory righteousness, and surpass and transcend the righteousness of the law. For instance, when a pious man, in order to serve and cleave more firmly to God, chooses to lead a life of celibacy, to which he is not bound, his celibacy at least will be a work of supererogation, and surpass the perfection of the law.

But even this is not to be conceded, because although it may be presumed, that such an one is not bound to the celibate state in which he is living, yet he is bound by virtue of the law to a greater and more excellent purity, of body

* *De bono Conjug.* cap. 24.

and mind, than he can perform in this state of celibacy. The mere adherence then to celibacy, or of a life of virginity, is not a work of supererogation transcending the perfect chastity commanded by the law; but an instrument according to a person's situation, which is profitable and tends towards acquiring that perfection which consists in the perfect observance of the precepts; as Gerson has fully proved, part 3. tract. *de Consil. Evangel.*

8. We prove that no one can supererogate, when he performs works of Counsels, both on the part of him who advises, and on the part of the Holy Spirit inclining and inwardly exciting and strengthening man for obeying such Counsel. For (if we must believe our opponents) Christ is the author of the Evangelical Counsels, Christ is the adviser, and he who persuades his people, that they who can should embrace Counsels of this kind. Hence Alfonsus says:* *If we understand by the precept doctrine, we maintain that the Counsels are the precepts of Christ, because Christ taught us the Counsels no less than the precepts.* I would learn then whether a person who refuses to obey Christ, thus advising him, even when he can, and that in things which especially conduce to the glory of God and his own salvation, is sinning or not? If he sins in refusing obedience, then he does not supererogate in obeying.

Papists however are unwilling to admit that such as do not follow the Counsels of Christ are offenders, although they act very nobly who do embrace them. Thus Bellarmine says,† *We call the Counsel of perfection a good work not commanded, but pointed out to us, by Christ; not commanded, but recommended to us; — — not obligatory by its own force, but which a man is at liberty to attend to or not as he pleases.* Hence that definition of Alfonsus‡ *A Counsel is an exhortation to some good thing, the observance of which is praiseworthy, the transgression without blame.* On the other hand, not to listen to the advice of a prudent man, in matters which appertain to some great profit in this life is unwise; and he who when he can does not hearken to the Counsel of Wisdom itself, in things which tend ad-

* *Advers. hæres.* lib. 12. in verbo *Præceptum.*
† *De Monach.* lib. 2. cap. 7.
‡ *Advers. hæres.* lib. 12. in verbo *Præceptum.*

mirably to promote the good of the spiritual and eternal life does worse. He is thus acting contrary to the dictates of prudence; the first parts of which are, that a man is enabled of himself to judge, and select what things are best; the second, that he is willing to accept the best when pointed out and recommended to him: *But he that sinneth against me wrongeth his own soul;* Prov. viii. 36. And Cajetan is correct in his opinion* that *In contemning the Counsels, Christ the Counsellor is contemned, as in contemning the precepts, Christ who gives them is contemned; and hence it is a mortal sin to omit what may conduce to advancement in charity from a neglect of the Counsels.*

But, if the Papists should maintain that although they are not fulfilled, *that* need not be supposed to arise from contempt: I answer, that there exists at least constructive contempt, when individuals who are qualified by the impartation of special grace, are unwilling to bind themselves to an observance of those Counsels, which they are well aware conduce admirably to the glory of God, and the promotion of their spiritual perfection. For Bernard is right when he says, *That man has little goodness about him who desires not to be better; and where you begin to be unwilling to be made better, there you are leaving off to be good.*

And thus far have we shewn from the authority of Christ himself, that qualified persons *ought* to obey the admonitions and Counsels, and that they cannot without sin, resist Christ, when advising to their observance.

Let us now proceed to the other part of our argument. I maintain then that there is no room left for supererogating in works even the most remarkable and extraordinary; because such are never rightly performed, unless by the Holy Spirit inspiring, inclining, strengthening, and as it were inwardly calling and drawing to such works. But admit that there is this secret operation of the Holy Spirit, then an offence is committed when he is resisted; and there is consequently no supererogating in obeying. As regards the former, namely, what are called works of Counsels, and are reckoned supererogatory, that none but those persons, who are influenced to engage in them by the special in-

* In 2. 2. quæst. 186. art. 2.

stigation and private law, as it were, of the Holy Spirit, can properly undertake or execute them, even Papists themselves must admit. Pope Urban II., in consideration of this inspiration and private law of the Holy Spirit, allowed a Clerk to engage in the life of a Regular, which is advantageous for fulfilling the Counsels, even though his Bishop should oppose it. *He* [says the Pontiff] *who is led on by a private law, is not bound by a public one.** Aquinas writes†—*That this purpose* (namely of embracing the Counsels) *is inspired by the Holy Spirit, who is a Spirit of fortitude;* and that *the final decision is also inwardly ministered by the same Spirit, who is a Spirit of knowledge.* In fine, Bellarmine grants, that they act unadvisedly who take up a vow of Celibacy, when they perceive that they have not the gift; and he explains those words of Christ,‡ *He that can receive it, let him receive it* (Matt. xix. 12), as they are by Jerome and Augustine§—*Let such as perceive that, by the gift of God within them, they are persuaded to continence, approve this saying.* Now it is the opinion of the Schoolmen that those, who by this inward bidding of the Spirit are called to undertake these peculiar services, have, in order to their more easily hearkening and obeying, a certain gift bestowed upon them, which they call *the Spirit of Counsel*,‖ by which they are inclined obediently to follow the Divine leadings. In such a case then, I say that the man whoever he be, who is stirred up and strengthened by the inspiration of the Spirit to take upon himself any peculiar engagement (such as a life of virginity, or the distribution of all his property) offends, if he withstands the impulse of the Holy Spirit and extinguishes that προθυμίαν special zeal, which has been implanted in him for accomplishing these particular works. Hear Aquinas himself;¶ *If we must obey the external call of the Creator as soon as uttered; much more should no one resist the inward speaking by which the Holy Spirit changes the mind, but obey without hesitation.* A little after: *When a man is moved by the impulse of the Holy Spirit, he ought*

* Gratianus Caus. 19. quæst. 2. §. 2. "Dignor est enim (quoth Urban) lex privata, quam publica."

† Aquin. *Opusc.* 17. cap. 10. ‡ *De Monach.* lib. 2. cap. 4.

§ Ibid. cap. 31.

‖ Aquin. 1. 2. qu. 68. art. 4; and 2. 2. quæst. 52. art. 1.

¶ Opus. 17. cap. 9.

*immediately to follow the motion of the Holy Spirit.* He who merely performs his duty does not supererogate; nay he would sin, if by resisting the Holy Spirit, and by repelling and extinguishing his motion, he should neglect to act accordingly.*

To bring this argument to a point:—They who rightly undertake works of Counsels, are influenced thereto by the special impulse of the Holy Spirit; but they who are influenced in a special manner, and strengthened by the Holy Spirit, are bound not to resist him: It can therefore be no work of supererogation when they obey, and perform those certain particular works to which they were not obliged by a general law; namely, because forsooth the obligation originates in some special motion, and by *a private law*, as Urban has called it, of the Holy Spirit.

9. No one can supererogate with God by performing voluntary acts, or abstaining from lawful deeds, unless he does likewise all things that are commanded, and abstains from all unlawful things. For instance: a man does not supererogate with his parents by honouring them, who, as often as he beholds them, bows his head even to the ground in token of reverence—a degree of reverence exacted by no precept—should he in the meantime fail in shewing them such love as he is bound to do; if he does not aid and sustain them with such labour and care as is incumbent upon him: by parity of reason, that man is not supererogating before God, as it respects this command *Thou shalt not commit adultery*, who, while abstaining from wedlock which is lawful, does not in the meantime refrain from every lustful act and impure desire which is unlawful.† The reason is manifest; for τὸ πάρεργον τιθέναι ἐν ἔργῳ λόγῳ *to make a bye work equivalent to the work of the law*, is not to satisfy the righteousness of the Divine law, and cannot therefore transcend it. Now if any one will carefully examine all those works about which the Papists vaunt so much as supererogatory, whether their merit consists in doing or abstaining; he will always find that whilst they are performing what they are not bidden to do, they fail in the same matter by omitting, or not perfectly fulfilling other duties of far greater importance which they *are*

* Acts vii; 1 Thess. v. † Vide Hieron. tom. 9. de Virgin.

bidden to do; and whilst they abstain from things which are not prohibited, they are not conspicuous for refraining from all those which are prohibited. They foolishly dream then that they have supererogated, and transcended the height of the law, when, being closely examined, it is discovered that they have done anything rather than satisfied the law itself, nay, have not accurately observed even the first principles of it.

10. The selecting of the most fit means for discharging a necessary duty, is not a work of supererogation, but of discretion or prudent deliberation in the doer himself. Now all those works, which the Papists call supererogatory, are nothing else than means, desirable and selected in preference to others, according to the situation of the doer, and that for the discharging a necessary duty: They are not therefore works of supererogation as respects God, but of prudent consultation as regards ourselves. The former part of the proposition is thus made good: As regards God, it matters not whether a man lives in the married state as Abraham lived, or in the celibate as John; whilst he cleaves to God with equal love and purity of mind. It is not therefore the choice of this mean, which does not fall under precept, but the more perfect fulfillment of the duty itself, which, falling as it does under precept, will obtain a greater reward from God; whether it be an unmarried virgin or a married person who has best performed the duty commanded.

What has been said, concerning the unmarried state, may be properly affirmed of all other things also not commanded, that from the choice of them we do not supererogate before God.

As to the latter, namely, that *the supererogatory works of the Papists are nothing else than means or external instruments afforded for the better fulfillment of the duty commanded*, it needs no proof. Our opponents themselves clearly admit it, when they teach* that *the Counsels pertain to the perfection of life, not because perfection principally consists in them; but because they are instruments for attaining the perfection of love.* So Gerson:† *The Counsels properly and mainly apply to the means and instruments*

* Aquin. Opusc. 17. cap. 6. † *De Concil. Evangel.*

*adapted for acquiring more easily and briefly the essential perfection to a Christian life.* And a little after: *Vows do not respect so much the duties enjoined us in precepts, but rather the instruments for progress in the Christian life; as the mendicant state, celibacy, vigils, and virtues of that quality, which are not good in themselves, but predispose to virtues: and the ultimate object of which is, a perfect observance of the commands.* Such works therefore which are only good, so far as being instruments they subserve and are subordinate to the observance of the commands, cannot be considered as supererogating and superior to duties enjoined. And in this way they furnish an individual with some advantages; but nevertheless the person does not hereby offer supererogatory holiness to God.

11. The last argument, which is urged by all our Divines, shall be that derived from that great and necessary command, Deut. vi. 5. *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy might.* Now that the fulfilling of this command is far more noble and greater than external acts of Religion, is gathered from Mar. xii. 33: *And to love God with all the heart, and with all the understanding, and with all the soul, and with all the strength; and to love his neighbour as himself, is more than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices.* We deduce from hence, that there is no ground for works of supererogation; first, because no one can fulfil this command; secondly, because no one can perform a work better or more noble, than that which is contained in this precept. But he who supererogates ought both to do something more, and to perform works more difficult and noble, than God commands. Bellarmine endeavours very adroitly to evade the gripe of this reasoning, yet he cannot manage an escape from it. For, perceiving as he does, that if all the duties which we can discharge with all our heart, with all our soul, and with all our might, are due to God in virtue of his command, there will be nothing remaining whereby we can supererogate; he endeavours *first*, to confuse and pervert the meaning of the words. He goes on to say that it is not unfrequent in Scripture to have several names used for explaining one thing, in order to impress it more strongly; and that by all the aforesaid words, this one thing is com-

manded, namely, to love God sincerely, not feignedly. But the context forbids that interpretation: for it not only charges us to love God truly and sincerely; but to love him with the entire application of all our whole powers. So it is explained even by a Papal interpreter:—*This precept of the love of God,* remarks Aquinas, Opusc. 17. cap. 6., *is confined by no limits, so that it may be said that so great a love of God comes under the precept, but a greater love exceeding the limits of the precept falls under a Counsel; but every one is commanded to love God as much as he can, which appears from the very form of the precept.* Consult him also, 2. 2. quæst. 44. art 5. et 6; and quæst. 184, art. 3, Gerson is of the same opinion:* *As there are precepts of God given concerning charity, and all virtues, and their acts; so also are there concerning the perfection of charity, and of all the virtues.—The precept of charity includes all the whole extent of love, both as well in height as in breadth; however perfect and extended that latitude may be.* Bellarmine's interpretation therefore, who will have nothing else to be enjoined in that command, than the sincerity of our love, was founded in error. For it enjoins both this, and moreover an entire, perfect, or supreme intenseness of that love, so far as is possible to us.

Again, Bellarmine replies that—*Although by this command we are bidden to exert all the powers of the soul to the glory of God, yet because this precept is affirmative, it enjoins us to exert those powers for God merely when the necessity of securing his glory requires it; but if that should be done at any other time, it becomes a work of Counsel and of supererogation.*

I am aware of that common saying—*Affirmative precepts always bind, though not in all circumstances;* but even allowing this, still I affirm that Bellarmine is shamefully mistaking in restricting the external exercises of Divine love to the mere point of necessity; and that if anything is done by us, beyond this necessity of procuring the glory of God, all *that* is to be attributed to supererogating. Such doctrine, however, is far more befitting a Jesuit than an Apostle: For, according to the word of God, we are bound

* *De Concil. Evangel.*

to glorify God with all our good works, not only when necessity requires it, but when we have ability to do so; and opportunity offers. *As therefore we have opportunity let us do good unto all men:* Gal. vi. 10. And in Titus ii. 14, it is said that Christ requires his people to be *zealous of good works:* and in chap. iii. 8, the Apostle says, that Christians should be *careful to maintain good works* and to *excel in them*. In fine, we are enjoined, *whatsoever we do, to do all to the glory of God:* 1 Cor. x. 31. All these passages most directly clash with that perverse interpretation of the Jesuit, who lays it down, that we are bound to glorify God by good works then only, when the necessity of promoting his glory constrains us thereto.

Thirdly, he answers, that those very authors who by the command, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, &c., understand the highest degree of love to be commanded, affirm likewise, that men are not rendered prevaricators, although they do not perfectly fulfil it in this life. Hence he infers that this highest perfection of love is not so much *inculcated* as *indicated* to us; for he sins whosoever performs not what God has properly commanded him.

But neither can he hope to escape in this way. For we can truly say, that the law of God obliges us to have and to exercise this perfect love; and yet the faithful are not prevaricators, that is, do not incur any new guilt, from the circumstance that they are deficient in charity, both in disposition and in act. The reason is, that either defect, so far as it is involuntary, appertains to original sin; and its guilt is done away in baptism. As therefore, inordinate desire, whether in act or disposition, is prohibited by the law of God, and yet the regenerate do not become prevaricators, that is contract no fresh guilt by having or experiencing this forbidden concupiscence; inasmuch as its guiltiness was done away in spiritual regeneration—so the disposition and the act of perfect charity is commanded by the Divine law, and yet believers do not contract any guilt, because they come short of this perfection; for such deficiencies are no more imputed to the regenerate. Moreover, the best of the regenerate not only come short of that fulness of charity which the law requires, but even of that measure of Divine love which the Schoolmen themselves have laid down as

necessary for avoiding culpable transgression. For (upon the authority of Aquinas*) *the lowest degree of Divine love is, to love nothing above God, or besides God, or equally with God; and if a man be deficient in this degree of perfection, he cannot by any means be fulfilling the command.* But with the exception of Christ alone, all the children of men are deficient in this degree and come short of this love. For the cause of sin (from which no man living is free) is in general an inordinate love of the creature, which interferes with the love proper to the Creator.† In fine, I add also, that the regenerate themselves, in loving God and promoting his glory, not only always do less than they ought, according to what the law requires; but for the most part less than they could, if they strenuously laboured after piety. But he who does less in the service of God, than he could have done, is very far from doing more than he was bound to do.

Lastly, Bellarmine argues, that although we can superadd nothing to this Divine precept, as far as it denotes the *end*, yet we can as far as it denotes the *mean;* and in that way perform works of supererogation.

If by the *end* he understands that highest degree, and final perfection of Charity which we are bidden to manifest in loving God; by the *means*, any external works of piety, by which we exercise and evidence our love of God; I deny that he who fails in the end can supererogate in the means. Bellarmine says, Although I am not able, as regards the love of God itself, to do more than love him with my whole heart, my whole soul, and with all my might, as is enjoined by the command itself; yet, as to the means through which this love is exercised and shewn, I can do more than I am bound to do by the commandment. For I can, in order to testify my love, invoke God ten times daily; but no one is bound by the precept to pray so often every day. I can bestow half of my goods upon the poor; but no one is bound by the command to distribute so large a portion among them. I can abstain not only from things unlawful, as from drunkenness, fornication, and such like; but over and above this, from things lawful, as for instance from eating flesh, from wedlock, and other things of the same

* 2. 2. quæst. 184. art. 3.

† Vide Bellarm. *ascens. in Deum grad.* 15 pag. 391.

kind. In these, and innumerable other matters which might be mentioned, I seem to supererogate, because I am doing more than I am required to do.

In refuting these statements, it must be understood, that the external circumstances of good works, as of time, place, quantity, number, and the like, on account of the infinite variety, neither could have been, nor was there any necessity they should be, expressly defined and limited by any law; for the law of God which enjoins us to invoke God, does not prescribe how often, or how long we should pray to him every day; the law of God, which enjoins us to love our neighbour, and to assist the poor, does not point out particularly the individuals, or with what benefits we should manifest and exercise this inward love and our kindness. Moreover it must also be observed, that these external circumstances, which do not come under any special injunction, are yet guided by the rule of charity and prudence. These points being admitted, I deny that there is any ground for works of supererogation in those external matters or circumstances, which are enjoined by no particular law: First, because every good work is to be estimated, as well by its internal as by its external part, nay much more by the internal than the external. When therefore a work is maimed and defective in its more important parts, it cannot be reckoned remarkably perfect and supererogatory in its less important part. For instance: in praying, it is foolish to say that a man who fails in reference to his faith, and love, and zeal, which are as it were the more internal properties of prayer, is supererogating because he repeats it often in a day, or protracts his praying for such a length of time, which are the exterior circumstances in prayer. Secondly, because the circumstances which are left free become proper, where prudence and Christian charity suggest an attention to them. For to perform an act in a particular manner generally, in the way in which Christian prudence and Christian charity dictate that it should be done, is not a matter of *supererogation* but of *duty*. Although therefore, I am at perfect liberty, either to abstain from wine, or flesh, or matrimony, or not; yet since prudence and Christian charity say, that this abstinence is a means expedient and conducive towards promoting my spiritual good or the glory

of God; unless I wish to act imprudently, I cannot act otherwise. Lastly, (which is the main point of the matter) whatsoever I do in these external acts or circumstances, which I am not bound from command to do, it is so far much inferior and mean, as compared with what I am bound by command to do; and because I do not by any means fulfil it according to the standard of the law. For abstinence from wine, or flesh, or wedlock, or any other external things, is an act both far inferior and ignoble, compared with abstaining from all unlawful desires; so to distribute all our goods to our neighbours, is an act far less perfect than to love our neighbour as ourselves, or as Christ has loved us. Now they who perform those former acts, fail in these latter. As therefore a soldier, who fights less manfully than he ought, does not supererogate in his commander's estimation although whilst fighting he may use a longer sword than his general had prescribed him; so we do not supererogate in the judgment of God, although we make use of means or instruments greater than he has commanded us; whilst in the internal acts of loving God, of loving our neighbour, of mortifying the old Adam, we do not attain that perfection which is enjoined us.

And thus have we vindicated our arguments from the chief objections of Bellarmine; he offers besides some other objections which can be easily refuted by these explanations, and therefore we have passed them by for brevity's sake. Having confirmed our doctrine by arguments, we will now proceed to corroborate it by the accordant opinions of the Fathers.

## CHAPTER XLIII.

### PASSAGES FROM ANTIQUITY PRODUCED.

Although the ancient Fathers may have conceded to some individuals the title of *perfection*, and have attributed to some of their works the term *Counsels*, yet have they never accorded with Papists in thinking, either that such

persons as bound themselves under Monastic vows, were all in a state of perfection; or that those who practise such works as are termed works of Counsels, do more than is demanded by the law of God, and thus offer to God sacrifices both superior and more pleasing, than those are which the law prescribes. Let us then attend to what their opinions were.

1. Origen, in his 8th Homily upon Matthew, treating upon the words, IF THOU WILT ENTER INTO LIFE, KEEP THE COMMANDMENTS, observes, *We shall enter into life according to the measure of our observance of the commandments, by being admitted either into its more interior and blessed, or into its moderate enjoyments, or into whatever portion of that life the observance of the commandments may have introduced us.* Here he teaches evidently, in opposition to the Monks, that not merely the attainment of life eternal, but of each man's share of glory in it, depends upon the measure of duty which has been given to the commandments, and not upon that paid to Counsels. The perfection of holiness, in this life, is, then, not to be judged of from the assumption of Monastic vows, but from the more careful observance of God's commandments. And the better the observance of these has been, the more glorious reward shall any one attain of a more perfect obedience, whether he has practised or omitted what are called works of Counsel.

2. Jerome, upon the xiiith chap. ii. Corinthians, upon the words, BE YE PERFECT, remarks: *It is to be observed, that, writing to a whole Church, he tells them all that they ought to be perfect.* The Apostle did not wish them all to turn Monks, and therefore did not consider that the summit of Christian perfection rested in the observance of Monastic vows.

Jerome again, when writing to the Virgin Demetrias, says, that *that servant pleases his Lord who though he may voluntarily do more than was exactly required, does not thereby pass over what was enjoined him—does not substitute one thing for another, but performs both—does not alter, but adds to his obedience. And be not thou misled by the examples of such as, taking credit to themselves on the score of chastity alone, quite cast aside what the Lord has en-*

*joined them, and wish to offer the virtue of their continency not in union with righteousness, but as righteousness itself.* Hence we may infer first, that those who take upon themselves a profession of virginity, and other Monastic obligations, are not therefore in a state of perfection, seeing they often pay no regard to plain commands, and are heedless of the will of God. Secondly, that such voluntary performances are not of a more sublime nature, nor more pleasing to God than keeping the commandments, inasmuch as they proceed from persons who are devoid of spiritual righteousness, and they obtain not a title to true righteousness before God. And thirdly, it is evident also from hence that men do not, by their performance of such voluntary acts, exceed what the law requires, seeing those acts have no justifying power in themselves.

3. Gregory of Nazianzum, in his Oration on observing a moderate tone in disputation, remarks that *Righteousness is invalidated not less by defect than by excess, just as any addition or subtraction injures a rule. Let no man then assume to be wiser than he ought to be, or to be more exact than the law, brighter than the light, straighter than a rule, or higher than the Divine commands:* Thus restraining the inordinate pride of those who fancy that they can go beyond the very rule itself of what is right, and exceed the perfection required by the law. Not that he would repress any attempts directed towards the most strict observance of the law, nor our adopting any external means to assist us in the effort;—but he sets aside entirely the Monkish and Romish notion, that men, through their observance of certain external performances, have thereby become more strict than the law, or have exceeded the commands.

4. Augustine, in the 121st Chapter of his Enchiridion, notes, that *unenjoined services, such as are suggested under peculiar circumstances, are then properly undertaken, if directed towards the love of God, and of our neighbour for the Lord's sake.* If Counsels have a reference to commands, then are they inferior and of less importance than commands; for it is not usual to refer what is superior and more dignified in its nature, to what is inferior and of a lower rank; but just the opposite. Hence, such as accomplish works of Counsels, do not thereby surpass the

command, but they use these, as aids towards getting as near as possible—not that they ever attain it—to the summit of the law. St. Augustine remarks also, *de bono Conjug.* cap. 23., that *obedience is a greater virtue than continence:—such obedience I mean as fulfils the commands.* From these and many other passages which are alleged in the same place by Augustine, it is plain enough that he accorded not with Papists, in regarding works of Counsels as either more dignified, or as superior to, the works of the law.

5. Ephræm, *de charitate*, says:* *Though a man may justly lay claim to continence, may fast, may receive the poor hospitably, may build Churches, or anything else without love; yet all these are reckoned as nothing with God, since He takes no pleasure in those things unaccompanied with love.* In this passage most of the works are mentioned which Monks are in the habit of often inculcating, and in which they make the state of perfection to consist, and in short, in which they would appear to exceed the holiness required in the law, and to do more than is enjoined. Now we must observe, in the first place, that all these things may not unfrequently be met with unaccompanied by love; and that, in consequence, a state of perfection cannot be supposed to consist in works of this description, from which love, the bond of perfection, is absent. Secondly, it is to be marked, that works of Counsels derive all their value and importance from love alone, and are not, accordingly, to have a value put upon them, as if superior to injunctions contained in the commandments. And finally, it is to be well considered, that such works, of themselves, render no man pleasing to God; still less can any one, by such performances, do more than he is called upon to do in the sight of God.

6. Anselm, on the conception of the Virgin, cap. 22, writes:—*No man can pay so much as he owes; Christ alone has laid down for all who are saved more than was owing.* If men are unable to pay even what they owe, much less can they render over and above what is required of them. The Monks must be invading the province of Christ, when they assume to be in possession not merely of legal right-

* See Soames's Mosheim, Vol. i. p. 328, for an account of Ephræm.

eousness, but to be enriched and graced also with the fruits of a righteousness more than needful and overflowing.

7. Moses, the Egyptian Abbot, in the first of Cassian's Conferences* cap. 6 and 7, says, that the virtue of perfection

* Conferences of the Fathers, or rather of Abbots, concerning Monastic Rules, feelings, virtues, &c. Clarke's *Succession of Sacred Literature*, vol. 2. p. 187. See Sozomen's *Hist. Eccles.* lib. vi. cap. 29; and Dupin's *Ecclesiastical History*, vol. 4. p. 11. London 1699, where there is a long abstract of the Conferences of Cassian.

ABBOT MOSES:—The history of this man is so novel and extraordinary, and, in corroboration of the opinions quoted, affords such an insight into the turn which the superstition of man had given at that early period to the religion of Christ, even in the mind of one who was evidently a miracle of grace, that an abstract of his life may be gratifying to the reader.

He was an ascetic, and martyr (according to the Greek Church) born in Ethiopia, and who spent his youth without any sentiments of religion or of honour. Having been driven away as a villain by an officer of the country whose slave he was, he withdrew into the woods, where he became the head of a gang of robbers, and abandoned himself to every imaginable crime. The fear lest justice should overtake him induced him to seek safety by flight into Egypt, where he entered into the Monastery of Petra, at the extremity of the Desert of Sceté. Here, giving himself up to penance in proportion as he had before abandoned himself to vice, he passed six whole years, standing entire nights in continual prayer. These extraordinary nocturnal watchings, added to the incredible penances he imposed on himself by day, did not prevent him from being, for a long time, tempted by the impure spirit. At length these temptations ceased; and after many years' trouble, he obtained that peace which he had so ardently desired; and approached the sacred mysteries with entire confidence in the mercy of God. By the advice of Isidore, an holy Abbot of Sceté, he subsequently moderated his excessive penances, and followed the mode of living and discipline adopted by the other penitents of that Desert. Peter, Patriarch of Alexandria, being informed of his sanctity, ordained him Priest, notwithstanding his resistance, towards the year 375 or 380, and he was obliged immediately to undertake the superintendence of one of the Monasteries of Sceté. He governed it with wisdom and prudence, equal to the charity which led him to be very kind and indulgent towards his brethren. He evinced also great tenderness towards the poor, and was singularly compassionate in his dealing with offenders, from the consideration of the mercy of God towards himself. He foretold the desolation of the Monasteries of Sceté by the Maziques, a barbarous nation, occupying a part of Mauritania; and he prepared his disciples, some for flight and others for death, according to his knowledge of their dispositions. He was put to death, with six of his disciples, near the end of the fourth, or in the beginning of the fifth, century. The Greeks honour his memory on the 28th of August.

The above account is from Richard and Giraud, *Bibliothèque Sacrée*, vol. 17, p. 266, who cite Palladius's *History of the Fathers of the Desert*, ch. 22; Sozomen's *Ecclesiastical History*, book 6. c. 29; Cassian's *Collationes*, book 3. cap. 5; Baillet, Vies des Saints, tom. 2. Aug. 28.—For an account of the Maziques, or Mazices, the reader may consult Lucan's *Pharsalia*, 4. 680; *Philostorgius*, book 11. § 8; and *Evagrius*. Tillemont has much respecting Moses in his *Memoires Ecclesiast.* Vol. x., Paris, 1705.

does not consist in works of Counsels, such for instance as the abandoning our property, constant occupation in fastings, and vigils, and so forth; but in that love and purity of heart, which are the subjects of command: all the practices before mentioned he entitles *means towards perfection*, not *the thing itself*. Little does he accord then with Bellarmine, in thinking that those works of Counsels are something far more dignified, excellent, and pleasing to God, than such duties as are enjoined upon us.

8. *William of Paris*,* treating of the reasons why God became man, remarks (cap. 7) that, if we consider the matter well, it will be evident that *no creature can sustain more than the burdens laid upon him by God the Lawgiver. For there is no being which has not been subjected to the laws and regulations of its Creator, and with these is so fully engaged as to leave no room for busying itself about other matters, since idleness itself meets with punishment from the Lord.* Where then can Monks be found who are equal—not to sustain merely the weight of all the commands of God—but to carry also a new burden, of more importance and of more difficult attainments than is that of the commandments?

9. Hales, pt. III. quæst. 56, memb. 6, art. 2, § 6, observes, that *the law may be viewed in two lights, one as to the form in which it was proclaimed, and the meaning of it in the letter; and the other when considered by the rational understanding, and according to its internal spiritual meaning. In the former the law is particular, the Gospel universal; in the latter it is of universal application, and a rule of perfect righteousness.* From which I infer that, as we are under an obligation to regard not merely the bare letter and outside of the law, but also the spiritual interpretation of it, (as is evident from Matthew v. 21, &c.) containing as it does a guide to perfect righteousness; consequently no man can exceed the righteousness prescribed and enjoined in the law. The Jesuits then must be dreaming when they are for introducing unenjoined performances, such as are to go beyond and excel the very rule of perfect righteousness.

10. Aquinas, 2. 2. quæst. 184, art. 3, says: *Perfect love, regulated by which the Christian life is said to be perfect, has*

* See the Translator's Edition of *Davenant on the Colossians*, vol. 1. p. 21, and Clarke's *Succession of Sacred Literature;* vol. 2. p. 734.

*this for its object, that we love God with all our heart, and our neighbour as ourselves.* On the admission then of Aquinas himself, true Christian perfection is to be judged of according to the perfection of its love, and not by the assumption of Monastic vows. It is not, moreover, a work of the highest attainment, to abandon our worldly prospects, to decline marriage, or anything of a similar description; but to love God and our neighbour with all our heart. In short, these Counsels are not any way more ennobling, or more acceptable, or better entitled to reward, than works of commandment.

The same writer observes also, 2. 2. quæst. 184, art. 7:— *A state of perfection may exist without the necessity of giving up our property; and the same remark will apply to other outward observances also.* Of course, then, both Aquinas himself was mistaken, and the Doctors of the Church of Rome in general, in making a state of perfection (as they commonly do) to arise from the submission to certain performances of Counsels. — Once more, Aquinas writes, 2. 2. quæst. 186. art. 2, *All persons, whether belonging to a religious order, or not, are in a measure bound to do whatever good they can; for the common injunction is laid upon all*: WHATEVER THY HAND CAN DO, DO IT DILIGENTLY;* Eccles. ix. 10. Admitting these statements to be correct, there is no room left for supererogatory working: and Bellarmine's dictum, de Monachatu, lib. 2. cap. 13, is shewn to be false, when he affirmed, *The law does not demand the exertion of our whole strength; but requires merely that we discharge its commands, whether we are able to do so or not:* for in internal acts, in which the essence of righteousness properly consists, the law demands the utmost exertion of all our powers, although it allows us at times to select the way in which they shall be manifested externally. For instance, the law requires us to shew love to our neighbour in the best way we can, but does not call upon us to assign over to him all the property we can, but to be guided therein by the dictates of charity and prudence.

11. The last testimony which we shall adduce, in opposition to the doctrines of Monkish perfectibility and Romish

† *Whatsoever thy hand is able to doe, worke it instantly.* Douay Version, 1610.

supererogating, shall be that of the eminent Theologian *Gerson* of Paris, who is constantly engaged in refuting this foolish notion. In the first part, among the propositions presented to the Cardinal of Verona, and referring to the assertions of brother Matthew Grabbon,* he has the following:—*Fictitious forms of religion are deemed—incorrectly and improperly enough, I might say arrogantly—to be states of perfection; seeing that it is individuals the most imperfect who constitute the members of such Orders.* Again, in the 3rd part, on perfection in religion, consid. 1., he says:—*The Christian Religion under the one supreme Abbot Christ, is alone that which bringeth salvation, and is perfect. — — Hence we must judge no one, who lives under the Christian religion, to be out of a state of perfection.* And again, in his treatise upon Evangelical Counsels, he writes—*The vital, essential, intrinsic, and formally perfective principle of a Christian life is love, and what it enjoins.* All which assertions are expressly directed against the mistaken notion of the Monks, who coin for themselves a fancied state of perfection, in the adoption and observance, of performances of Counsels; but deny that privilege to others, who give their allegiance to what the law enjoins, and to that alone.

We will, however, just quote what the same writer has decided with respect to supererogation:†—*As there are precepts given by God concerning love, and all the virtues, and the practice of them, so there are concerning what constitutes the highest degree of love, and the other virtues:* and a few lines onward—*Their notion is very defective, who imagine that the precepts of God are to be understood with a degree of limitation, when urging us to the practice of love and other virtues; and that what exceeds this mea-*

* A member of the Dominican Order, flourished in the early part of the 15th Century, and wrote a Treatise against what he considered the unwarranted proceedings of some Devotees: (See *Scriptores Ordinis Prædicatorum*, tom. i. p. 760.) "Having asserted some propositions, which advanced the state of the Regulars so far above that of the Seculars, that he affirmed there could be no perfection out of the Religious Orders; and that the Evangelical Counsels, and the virtue of poverty, could not be practised in the world; this doctrine was condemned by the Cardinal of Cambray, about which Gerson relates his own opinion," &c. See Dupin's *Eccles. History*, vol. xiii. p. 65.

† *De Consil. Evangel.*

*sure or degree falls under the class of Counsels. — — — Nowhere, however, is it to be found in the whole range of Scripture, that some degree or some portion of love towards God and our neighbour was a matter for Counsel.* Now the very notion, which Gerson is here attacking, is just that on which the Jesuits are accustomed to raise their figment of supererogation: for what else can Bellarmine's language mean?*—*If I sin not in loving God with only one degree of love, I am not necessarily bound to do more; if then I add another degree of love, I love God more than I am bound to do, and thus perform a work of supererogation and of Counsel.* He is, however, grievously mistaken, if he supposes a man, who could manifest a higher degree of love, does not sin, while he is willing to render only what is inferior and low; for the very form of the command enjoins us strictly to the exertion of all our powers in the love of God.†

* De Monach. lib. 2. cap. 13.

† The following additional testimony to those adduced by our Author, against the arrogance of the sentiments opposed may, not be unacceptable to the reader.

"Vestium diversitas ac colorum varietas non absolute inter Christianos reprehenditur, in quibus pro personarum, honestatis, ac decori ratione, discrimen observari potest. Verum in Monachis certæ formæ ac coloris affectatio, merito carpitur, et sanctitas, quam histrionicis ejusmodi vestibus non solum in homines, ejusdem professionis, sed in alios quoque, qui eas, ægri sanive, *ad benedictionem quandam inde consequendam*, induunt, ascribunt.

* * * * *

"Quis ignorat, eos æmulatione duci, odii indulgere, et quemlibet suum Institutorem non sine reliquorum contemptu, commendare: *Propter quod* (dicit Alphons. de Castro *advers. hæreses* lib. 1. c. 9.) non possum non stomachari in eos, *qui ut suum institutum laudent non verentur coram populo jactare et dicere*, eum qui semel habitum istius Ordinis susceperit, non posse in fide errare: *nonne aperta est hæc blasphemia, cum per hoc magis videatur tribuere habitui, quam fidei aut gratiæ Dei: estne forte potentior pannus ille, quam Dei gratia aut fides? Absit tanta* dementia! * * * *

"*Testor Deum, non mentior. Nam me præsente, quidam in concione publicæ adpopulum prædicans, in die quo agitur solemnitas sancti qui ordinem instituerat, dixit; fraternitatem suam ac societatem laudibus extollere volens; eum qui habitum illius ordinis semel induerit, non posse esse hæreticum.* ——

"*Ego quidem cum audirem, abominatus sum hominis audaciam et impudentiam,*" &c. Rivet *Catholicus Orthodoxus*, tract ii. quæst 23 §. 18, 19.

Alphonsus a Castro, from whom this is quoted, was of the *Franciscan* Order, and is supposed to be alluding to some *Dominican's* exaltation of *his* Order and its supereminent virtues: the testimony has its value, however, independently of that—the argument is good, and would probably suit *all* the Orders.

Thus far have we established our position by arguments and testimonies brought from the Fathers of the Church. We shall proceed next to meet their representation of Evangelical Counsels, in which they endeavour to prove, that a righteousness superior to the righteousness of the Law, and more dignified, and consequently a supererogation, may be attained through them.

## CHAPTER XLIV.

### A FEW REMARKS PREMISED, AND THE ARGUMENTS OF OUR OPPONENTS DERIVED FROM THE SCRIPTURES ANSWERED.

BEFORE we proceed to discuss the arguments themselves, it will be useful to anticipate a few points which are introduced by our opponents on the subject now under dispute.

Bellarmine then explains to us as well what is meant by a Counsel of perfection or work of supererogation, as on what grounds these Counsels are to be preferred to the precepts of God. Since then we are not contending against the mere name of Counsels, which we think may be allowed in some sense; but are opposing the doctrine of Counsels as understood in the Papistic sense, which we judge to be most erroneous; it is but just that we should learn from Papists what opinions they have themselves laid down on this subject. And here Bellarmine alone still stands for all. A work of Counsel then or of supererogation is defined by him* thus:—*A Counsel of perfection is a good work not enjoined on us, but to which we are directed by Christ; not commanded, but recommended.* And of this class he affirms† that *there are many truly and properly called Evangelical Counsels; but especially three: continence, obedience to rule, and poverty.*

Now, as regards this definition we deny that any work uncommanded, is properly and in itself a good work; but

* *De Monach.* lib. 2. cap. 7. † Ibid. cap. 8.

of its own nature indifferent, and to be considered good solely from its subordination to works enjoined, just as any other positive command may be. For example; chastity of mind and body, as being matter of command, is a good work; but the chastity of a life of celibacy, inasmuch as it is left to a man's free choice, is a work indifferent; neither good nor pleasing to God, unless the object in undertaking it be, to render the fulfilling of duties themselves, which are commanded, more easy. And in this sense wedlock also is a good work, when that state is chosen with the view of living more holily, and yielding a better obedience to the Divine commands.

The excellence then of such things as do not come under precept must be altogether sought in their suitableness to the situation of the person* employing them as instruments; and from the relation they bear to the main object in view, the observance of the Divine commands. Moreover, seeing that Bellarmine in his definition has laid it down, that *these works of perfection were not commanded to men by Christ, but recommended,* we admit that they are not commanded, but we deny that they are recommended to Christians. To begin with celibacy, or a life of virginity: Christ has not recommended it to Christians indiscriminately, nor has he at all commended it as a work better and more holy, than the works of the commandments;† but he has recommended it to a very few, who are endowed with an extraordinary gift; and to them not as a work in its own nature good, meritorious and pleasing to God, but as an auxiliary advantageous to such as are fitted and qualified for promoting the kingdom of God, as well in themselves as among others. Now then as regards poverty, and the forsaking of all our possessions, Christ has enjoined it as often as the necessity of our particular vocation, or justice, or faith, demands it; but as respects Monastic poverty, which, under the pretext of a supererogating charity renounces the possession of all temporal things, yet so that it contrives to

* It is not to be enquired, how excellent anything is, but how proper? Those things which are helps to some may be encumbrances to others. An unmeet good may be as inconvenient as an accustomed evil. Bishop Hall's *Meditation—David and Goliath.*

† Matt. xix. 11, 12.

retain to itself an affluent use of the same, and that too at the greatest ease, Christ has neither commanded it, nor counselled, nor approved it. Finally, to come to the work of obedience, it is certain that the religious obedience which is to be rendered to God, to our parents, and indeed to all lawful superiors, falls necessarily under a precept of the law; but Monastic obedience, by which the Monks submit their wills entirely to the will of another, and subject themselves to the rule of a Francis, or a Dominic, or an Ignatius [Loyola] under the notion that by this will-worship ἐθελοθρησκείᾳ they are satisfying God, and performing a work of supererogation—such obedience (I say) Christ has not only not counselled, as a work of perfection; but has condemned it as a work of superstition: *In vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men;* Matt. xv. 9.

If therefore Monks (superstition out of the case) should place themselves under a prudent Abbot, to be guided according to some useful regulations prescribed to them; such obedience would be of the same nature with that of young academics among us, who submit themselves to be governed by the authorities according to the statutes and customs of the Colleges in which they live. And as our obedience cannot, but with the greatest absurdity, be deemed a work of perfection or of supererogation; so neither can that of the Monks. The obedience both of the one and the other, is in itself nothing more, than a work of external discipline or of *bodily exercise*, which *profiteth little* (1 Tim. iv. 8); and it is a work of piety, so far as it is practised in duties, or bears a reference to works enjoined in the law of God: but as to being a work of perfection, or of supererogation, it cannot either be truly called or thought so.

And thus far we have examined the definition of Bellarmine, who in the same passage makes a great variety of distinctions between Counsels and precepts,—the value of which we shall now proceed to consider.

He states then that Counsels differ from precepts, first as regards the matter; *because the subject-matter of the precept is more easy, that of the Counsel more difficult.**

* *De Monach.* lib. 2. cap. 7.

But we do not admit that there is any such difference; for all the works of Counsels appertain to external acts, which are performed much more easily than internal acts, to which the laws of God more particularly apply. To live single is more easy than to observe the chastity which is enjoined in the law. To surrender the possession of all temporal goods, as the Monks do, is a much easier task, than to disentangle the mind from an inordinate love of earthly things, as the law of God directs. In fine, to render obedience to Monastic rules, which prescribe merely external exercises, is of far easier attainment than submission to the rule of the Divine law, which prescribes spiritual obedience and inward holiness. Bellarmine's shew of argument is, moreover, of no great importance, when he says, that *the subject-matter of the precepts is more easy, inasmuch as it is derived from the principles of nature; but that of the Counsel more difficult, inasmuch as it exceeds nature itself.* And this he endeavours to illustrate by the example of virginity and of marriage: *for nature inclines to preserve the fidelity of wedlock, though not so to abstain from wedlock.* In all these statements however, there is something either ambiguous or mistaken. For first, the principles of nature, howsoever plainly they shew the propriety of the command, are nevertheless quite insufficient for fulfilling what is enjoined. If it is Bellarmine's opinion that they do, he is siding most clearly with the Pelagians. In the next place, nature (according to our supposition) being corrupted by inordinate concupiscence, is so far from predisposing a man to maintain the chastity of wedlock, that it inclines rather to the practice of unlawful lusts. Lastly, it is quite a mistake to confine the subject of the precept to abstinence merely from adultery, by which the fidelity of wedlock is violated; for on the interpretation of Christ, it extends itself also to the inward motions of lust, by which the purity of the heart is sullied.

Then again, as regards celibacy or virginity, to choose to live in that state no more exceeds the powers of nature than to prefer the marriage state. For formerly there have not been wanting among the Pagans, and in the present day among the Turks, individuals unregenerate in will, who have both preferred and maintained a celibate state, and

with no less strictness, than the Monks among the Papists. Nature, then, that is, the will of the natural man, does not unfrequently incline many to abstain from marriage, and much more easily than to observe fidelity in wedlock. In the next place we affirm, that a pious Christian, in the selection as well of the marriage as of the single state, is governed not by the impulse of *nature*, but of *grace;* for he acts as God has imparted the gift to him, and that by the guidance of the Divine Spirit. In fine, although we allow that it is more difficult to maintain chastity in a state of celibacy than of marriage, and that there is therefore need of a higher and more noble gift for rightly maintaining virginity than the marriage state; yet at the same time we affirm, that they who do possess this gift cannot fulfil the command itself, nor maintain such purity of body and mind, as is prescribed in the law.

The subject-matter of the Counsel then, is not more difficult than that of the precept, as Bellarmine supposes; on the contrary, when the infirmity of human nature is considered, the observance of the precept of remaining in a state of virginity is more difficult, than in that of wedlock; either of which is but a means for fulfilling the precept, not a work transcending the commandment itself by its perfection.

Secondly, Bellarmine will have it that Counsels differ from precepts, *because the subject of the precept is good, that of the Counsel better, when we are speaking of the precepts which relate to the same subject, as Counsels themselves do; for that the Counsel includes the precept, and adds something besides.* This however is perfectly inadmissible. For in the subject of a precept there is a reference to the *essential* works of righteousness; in the subject of a Counsel, to the *instrumental:* in the one, works to be done *for themselves* and *on their own account* are considered; the other has in view those to be performed *on some other account:* the former therefore are superior to the latter. But Bellarmine is mistaken in restricting the subject of the precept to its negative portion only; as though this precept, *Thou shalt not commit adultery*, bid us do nothing else, than abstain from the act of adultery. But an affirmation is included in this negation; and in

this prohibition of adultery, every inordinate desire tending to adultery is prohibited, as well as every forbidden lust. Now to restrain every voluntary inclination to inordinate desires is a work more elevated and perfect than to have in view, or actually to live a life of virginity. Besides, Bellarmine's reasoning, by which he would establish his opinion, is partly *false*, partly *fallacious* and *sophistical*. His assertion, that *the Counsel includes the precept*, is false; for a vast number of Monks have embraced the Counsel of celibacy, not even one of whom has fulfilled this precept, considered in all its latitude. It is sophistical to institute a comparison between a precept and a Counsel, and to demand, after having joined the precept with the Counsel, which is the superior, and to argue that the excellence arising from both united is better than the precept by itself: and that a Counsel is consequently better than the precept. Bellarmine might after this fashion of arguing easily prove that lead is better than gold; because if you give gold to a person who already has lead, you make him richer than if he has possession of gold merely. In fine, to assert that *the person who embraces the Counsel of celibacy performs the precept, and something more than the precept itself*, is equally false. True, he performs something *else*, but not something *more;* he performs something *besides the precept*, but not something *above* or *beyond the precept;* for his extra performance does not essentially belong to the precept; and he who puts such virginity as this into practice, must be deficient in the very essence of the precept, namely, in that internal purity of mind which is included in the precept.

Thirdly, he states that Counsels and precepts differ as to their object, *because a precept is common to all, a Counsel not so*. This difference to a certain extent we admit; for the precepts of the law bind all equally; but those which are called *Counsels* do not bind all. We add, moreover, that Counsels, owing to a man's gift and particular calling, may assume the nature of precepts; and thus *in case* (as they say) *of place and time*,* particular persons are bound, as it were, by a particular command. For Aquinas is right in

* Or, in circumstances where the situation of the parties and the season accord.

saying* that *No act of perfection falls under a Counsel, which does not in the issue fall under a precept.*

Fourthly, Bellarmine lays down a difference between Counsels and precepts as it respects their form; because the precept binds by its own power, the Counsel is left to the individual's free choice. This latter clause however needs in our opinion explanation and restriction. For a human Counsel, about merely human affairs, is left to the will and judgment of man whether to take it up or not, as he pleases, while a Divine Counsel pertaining to things concerning our salvation is proposed indeed to man's judgment, yet in such a manner that it neither ought to be rejected, nor can be without sin, by such at least as are united to undertake the duties by the peculiar call of the Holy Spirit. A work of Counsel then (such for instance as the work of celibacy or of virginity) may be considered in a two-fold view; in itself, without any account being taken of the qualification of the persons; and in this form proposed in a general way to human acceptance; and again as respects particular individuals, adorned with these peculiar gifts by God, excited by this peculiar calling to such a state; and in this case a man is not at liberty to follow his own course; so far from it he would be doing wrong who neglected the gift of God, and his private calling to this particular work. For the Apostle himself who has not by any general precept enjoined celibacy, yet commands, *As God hath distributed to every man, as the Lord hath called every one, so let him walk;* **1 Cor. vii. 17.**

The last difference which Bellarmine introduces, is on the ground of the consequences; *for a precept*, says he, *being observed is rewarded, not being observed it is punished; but a Counsel, if it is not observed, is followed by no punishment; and if observed it receives a greater reward.*

We do not admit any such difference. For by the non-observance of Counsels in suitable persons, such as are called to the fulfilling of them by a private law of the Holy Spirit, guilt is contracted, and consequently punishment, unless remitted by Divine mercy; for, as regards such persons, they are equivalent to a particular command, as has been already intimated. Bellarmine's addition that *a Coun-*

* 2. 2. quæst. 124. art. 3.

*sel, if observed, receives a greater reward,* is not to be so understood, as though he who performed the Counsel obtained a greater reward, than some one else who without binding himself to the observance of the Counsel, nevertheless perfectly fulfilled the commands; but merely on the supposition (although that is uncertain) that such as perform the Counsel approach nearer to a perfect fulfilling of the commands than others do. It is not, therefore, on account of any perfection belonging to the mere act of maintaining a state of celibacy, that a greater reward is due to the unmarried than to the married; but it is assumed that such higher reward is due, on account of a more perfect obedience to the commands of God; that act of celibacy being considered a symptom or indication of such more perfect obedience, and therefore authorising this assumption as a probable inference.

Having thus canvassed Bellarmine's reasons brought to establish a distinction between precepts and Counsels, we shall proceed to add a few remarks also upon those three points in which he has decided that Counsels are to be preferred to precepts.

Thus says he :* *Counsels may be considered as preferable to precepts in three ways. First, by comparing particular Counsels not with any precept, but with those precepts which have reference to the same subject. For example, the precept* THOU SHALT NOT STEAL *has for its subject-matter external goods; the Counsel*—SELL ALL, AND GIVE TO THE POOR *refers to the same matter also; but it is certain that the Counsel is more perfect than the precept.* Thus far Bellarmine. But we meet here with the same mistake as that already refuted. For although the mere letter of the precept points to the external act only; yet the precept, truly and spiritually understood, extends itself to the internal acts also. The subject-matter therefore of this precept,—*Thou shalt not steal,* relates just as much to the *mind* as to the *hand.* Moreover, it is not this precept, *Thou shalt not steal,* which alone has the same matter for its subject, namely temporal goods, but that also, *Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house,* &c. Nor is it limited to this alone, but that of Christ also is included, Luke xiv. 33: *Whosoever he be of you that forsaketh not all that he hath, he cannot be*

* *De Monach.* lib. 2, cap. 6 [col. 360, tom. ii. edit. Paris, 1613.]

*my disciple.* Now to restrain hand and will from seizing and coveting another's goods, and to have a mind prepared moreover to forsake all one's own for the sake of Christ —all which are works of a necessary command—is assuredly something far superior and of higher perfection, than to renounce all one's goods in the way in which the Monks do. For it is not unfrequent for men who are most eagerly desirous of another's wealth to renounce their own; there are also those who renounce the sole dominion and proprietary over their temporal possessions, whose minds are yet not prepared to surrender the things themselves, and their life also, if the profession of Christ should require it. Lastly, there was not, in that saying, *Go, and sell all that thou hast*, such a Counsel of perfection recommended by Christ to all Christians, as Bellarmine supposes; but a peculiar precept addressed to a particular person, and intended to point out his failings; but on this matter more anon.

Secondly, *Counsels are*, says he, *to be preferred to precepts, not by comparing Counsels with precepts, but the state of the individuals observing both precepts and Counsels, with the state of those who observe precepts alone. For it cannot be doubted but that the state of the former is far better and more perfect than that of the latter, inasmuch as the one includes the other.* The comparison, thus made by Bellarmine, assumes however, that that is conceded which no sane person would have conceded to him; namely, that men observing precepts and Counsels are to be allowed to be filling an exalted station. We admit that those external works which are called *Counsels* by Papists, are observed by a certain class of men, namely, the Monks;* but we deny that the precepts of God are perfectly observed by those Monks, or by any class of mortal men. For if we compare a Monk, who after his manner observes Counsels and precepts, with any ordinary Christian who does not engage himself to Counsels, but nevertheless keeps the precepts better than the Monks, it cannot be doubted but that the state of this Christian is more perfect than that of a Monk. Thus Augustine has clearly defined the matter:† *Not only is obedience to be preferred to disobedience, but the more obedient*

* See Cramp's *Text-book of Popery*, chap. xiii., p. 318; edit. 1841.—*Translator.*

† *De bono Conjug.* cap. 23.

*wife to the less obedient virgin.* Our opponents, however, may be inclined to say, that the obedience which a man renders to the precepts secures Monks, who engage to practise the Counsels, from being surpassed by any ordinary Christian; let them then hear Augustine again in the same treatise: *Surely we have ground for wonder, that some of both sexes, who refrain from all carnal intercourse, should be so careless in their observance of the precepts, when at the same time they are so violent in abstaining from what is allowable.*

But I follow up this comparison, and affirm, if the states of the two are compared with each other, the one of whom observes both Counsels and precepts, the other the precepts alone, but with the same degree of perfection as the other, that the state of this latter will be as perfect as that of the former. Here also we have Augustine agreeing with us, who lays it down,* that the merit in Abraham who observed the precept alone, and in John, who superadded the Counsel, was not unequal. Nothing of perfection then accrues to any man from the observance of Counsels considered in themselves; only so far, and when, as instruments, they subserve a more perfect observance of the commandments; just as no one is said to be more healthy than another, merely from using a prescribed diet for preserving health, unless by that means he actually acquires a more perfect degree of health than they possess who do not use such a method. As then it would be absurd to contend that the state of a man making use of some prescribed diet and in consequence enjoying health, is far more perfect than the state of those who enjoy health without making use of such a method; seeing that the former state includes the latter and something more: so Bellarmine's argument is equally absurd concerning a twofold condition of Christians; inasmuch as Counsels are *not the essential works* of perfection, but *means instrumental* thereto, as diet is to health.

Thirdly, he maintains that Counsels may be preferred to precepts, *by comparing Counsels with any precept, even with that* THOU SHALT LOVE THE LORD THY GOD WITH ALL THY HEART, &c., *but having in view in the Counsels, not so*

* *De bono Conjug.* cap. 21, § 26.

*much the external works of the Counsels, as the love which they presuppose and to which they lead. For in that precept it is not an infinite love which is enjoined, but such a degree of it, namely so much love as shall lead you to equal or prefer nothing to God. But a greater measure of love is required for renouncing riches and all unlawful pleasures for the sake of God.*

Here the Jesuit plainly discovers what a low estimate he had formed of the Divine law, in thus shamelessly setting up the worthless maxims of Monkery, in preference to that greatest and most exalted command. Christ has decided otherwise, when he avows that there is no other command greater than this; and that no outward work can be put in comparison with this (Mark xii. 31, 33.) But let us try the ground upon which this assertion of Bellarmine rests. First, when he prefers the counsels to this command, *Thou shalt love the Lord*, &c., he would not have us consider so much the external works of Counsels as that internal love which they presuppose and to which they lead. But it is impossible, when a comparison is instituted between the commands of the Divine law and Counsels, to pay any regard to any thing else in the Counsels besides external works; inasmuch as Counsels are nothing else than certain external works, or means having a reference to the love of God and our neighbour. Indeed the very love itself by which the works of Counsels are effected is a work grounded on command. It is then quite fanciful to imagine that the works of Counsels presuppose a greater love than is required by that command, *Thou shalt love the Lord*, &c. For we have already proved that these works of Counsels can be executed by men the most imperfect, and altogether destitute of internal grace; but are used as instruments for leading by the hand, beginners and the imperfect, to a perfection of love; and do not consequently imply such an overflowing measure of love as exceeds the law of God itself. Neither do they, in short, lead to such love, at least they do not lead to such a degree as goes beyond the perfection of the law; for there is nothing required in an instrument higher or superior to the main end to which it is destined; but the main objects of Counsels are the commandments; as Aquinas himself admits, Opusc. 17, cap. 6.

Still Bellarmine has other subtle notions to propound.—*In this precept,* THOU SHALT LOVE THE LORD, &c., *an infinite measure of love* (says he) *is not commanded, but a certain degree of it, such as shall keep you from equalling or preferring nothing to God; but they who perform the Counsels by renouncing all their riches and unlawful pleasures for the Lord's sake, possess a greater degree of love than the law requires.*

We admit that an infinite degree of love is not absolutely required by this command; because a finite creature is not capable of an infinite quality; but we deny that any certain measure of love, which stops short of the limits of human possibility, satisfies this command. For the command requires our whole strength in this act of loving God, and leaves no part of it to Counsel; as Gerson has most correctly shewn* from Augustine and Aquinas himself, whose words we have before quoted. Moreover *to equal or prefer nothing to God* requires a greater degree of love than any Monk has ever exhibited, whatever state of perfection they may boast of having attained. For (on the confession of our adversaries) in all mortal sin there is something preferred to God; neither (I believe) can they produce any Monk so confirmed in love from his practice of Counsels, who does not often commit mortal sins (especially internal,) even as understood by the Schoolmen themselves. Lastly, to Bellarmine's assertion, that *to renounce all wealth and unlawful pleasures implies in it a greater measure of love, than the command itself of loving God requires;* I answer, that Monastic renunciation neither contains nor implies any such thing. For they do not renounce all wealth absolutely, but merely the title, that is, as they say the possession and dominion of all temporal goods; while they continue nevertheless to enjoy magnificent buildings, delightful gardens, the most generous wines, the choicest meats; in short, not only lawful, but sometimes even unlawful gratifications. But suppose, that they did renounce those things unfeignedly; it would not follow, that they abound in a greater measure of love than is required by the Divine command; seeing, it is much more difficult to deny internal

* *De Consil. Evangel.*

affections than to renounce worldly possessions; but love does not reign uncontrolled where inordinate inward lusts have not been entirely subdued; and if any man is inclined to boast, while in this sinful flesh, that he has effected this, there can be no spark, either of love, or of sensibility, or conscience remaining in him.

I have dwelt somewhat largely on these topics, that all may clearly understand what an evil the Papists are endeavouring to thrust upon us under the name of *Counsels:* namely, certain works not commanded, better [as they say] and more worthy of being rewarded than the works of the Divine commands,—certain works, and uncommanded, which presuppose a greater perfection of love than is required by this great command, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, &c. In fine, works they are which place the doers in a state of perfection, yet are not enjoined, being on the contrary such as leave God, according to the measure of the supererogation, in the condition of debtor to them. These dogmas of Bellarmine it is necessary to impress on the memory; for if he shall have proved that there exists such Counsels or works of supererogation as he has described, we must readily confess that he has got the better of us; and that we have failed to establish our cause. But if he sets before us from the Fathers the mere name of Counsels, and cannot prove that such works are meant to be understood under this term, it will be evident to all that he is, as it were, but beating the air. With these prefatory remarks, we are now prepared to sift the arguments, with which he endeavours to establish his works of supererogation.

The arguments of Bellarmine derived from Scripture examined.

1. His first argument is from Isaiah, lvi. 3, 4:—

*Neither let the Eunuch say, Behold I am a dry tree,*
*For thus saith the Lord unto the Eunuchs,*
*They that keep my Sabbaths,*
*And choose the things that please me,*
*And take hold of my Covenant;*
*Even unto them will I give in mine house*
*And within my walls, a place and a name*

*Better than of sons and of daughters;*
*I will give them an everlasting name,*
*That shall not be cut off.*

Out of this passage Bellarmine has with wonderful acumen managed to fabricate a work of supererogation or Counsel of perfection. First (says he*) it treats of those who were continent voluntarily; not of those made so, or so born; for the Fathers explain this passage of those who had made themselves Eunuchs.

I reply, that the Fathers are accustomed to apply this passage allegorically to those who mutilated themselves for the kingdom of God's sake, as Christ speaks; though at the same time they admit that Isaiah was speaking of Eunuchs properly so called, as if they were aliens. And the meaning is this; although in the Church of the Old Testament, aliens and Eunuchs seemed to be debarred the blessing promised to the children of Abraham; yet in the kingdom of Christ there will be no prejudice through external defects of this kind, as regards those who embrace the Gospel Covenant by faith, and cleave holily to God. Those sentences of Paul—*Circumcision is nothing, and uncircumcision is nothing, but the keeping the commandments of God;* 1 Cor. vii. 19—*There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; but ye are all one in Christ Jesus;* Gal. iii. 18—*For neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision; but a new creature;* Gal. vi. 15—form the best commentaries on the passage. Cyril explains it in the same way, and says, that it may be accommodated in fact even to those Eunuchs of whom Christ speaks; though it cannot be understood of them properly and literally. Bellarmine then will have built nothing solid upon this unstable foundation.†

Secondly, he endeavours to prove that this passage must be understood of persons voluntarily continent, not of Eunuchs properly so called, from the reward promised to them: *for there is no reason why a greater glory should be promised to Eunuchs born or made so, than sons and*

* *De Monach.* lib. 2. cap. 9.

† See this and the preceding points of this Chapter argued, as bearing upon the notions of other advocates for the superstition, in a very lucid and forcible manner, in Taylor's *Ancient Christianity*, vol. I.

*daughters of God enjoy.* This reasoning is foolish; for it is not on the ground of their being Eunuchs, that God, in this passage, promises something; but because they keep his commands, and obey his will. Neither does he promise anything more exalted, than that glory which is given to the adopted children of God; but a measure superior to the glory consequent upon a large family of children; and which among the Jews was great, as great also was the opprobrium attached either to bereavement or sterility; as is very well known.

Thirdly, to come nearer to the question itself, concerning the perfection of Counsels, he says, that the continence of Eunuchs is not *commanded* in this passage, but *advised*—an inference which he makes from these words—*Who choose the things that please me.*—that is, (as Bellarmine interprets it) *who do more than those things which I have enjoined when accommodating myself to human infirmity, and who choose of their own accord those more perfect things which I desire and wish.*

I answer, that the prophet is not speaking in this passage of the continence of Eunuchs, but of the misery of men by nature, which is neither enjoined nor advised, but supposed. Moreover, should we allow that the words may be accommodated to spiritual Eunuchs, yet there is not even a word in the prophet concerning this surpassing continence of theirs, but of obedience to the Divine commands. Neither does Bellarmine with any solidity infer this from the words, *They who choose the things that please me;* as if those works alone are said to be chosen, which are imposed by no command. For since a pious man acts with reason and consultation, he deliberately prefers those things also the performance of which is incumbent upon him by command; as ungodly men do by preference those things which are forbidden. Thus spake Joshua, *Choose ye this day whom ye will serve,* &c. Josh. xxiv. 15; and yet the people were bound by command to worship Jehovah. So, 1 Mach. i. 65, *They chose rather to die, than to pollute themselves with unclean meats,* and yet the Jews were bound by command to abstain from such meats. In vain therefore does he weary himself in hammering out a work of supererogation from the word *choose.*

Lastly, he urges also, that virginal continence is not only useful for this life, but truly deserving of special glory; for it is said, *I will give them an everlasting name, which shall not be cut off;* and this he endeavours to confirm by the testimony of Augustine,* who assigns a certain peculiar and excellent glory to virgins in the kingdom of God. But it does not follow—*He gives some more excellent glory to virgins, therefore virginity merits such glory.* For God confers his rewards upon the godly of his own munificence, not from their merit. Again, this *everlasting name* is not promised in this passage to Eunuchs on account of their continence, but on account of their keeping the Sabbath and doing the will of God. Lastly, admitting that a singular reward is given to holy virgins, and we by no means wish to deny it, yet it will not thence follow, that it is a better work than the works of the Divine commandments, and that, on the score of perfection, it is to be preferred to this precept itself, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God*, &c., as Bellarmine philosophises concerning works of supererogation. Nothing more therefore can be concluded from hence, than that some gifts of God are more excellent than others, as for instance, virginal chastity, than conjugal chastity; so also greater rewards are vouchsafed to them, who have made their gifts yield greater service to the glory of God. But notwithstanding this, we may truly say, that neither they who have lesser gifts, nor they who possess greater, enjoy a perfection of righteousness coming up to the requirements of the Divine law; much less do they transcend the law, and supererogate, as the Papists dream.

2. Wisdom iii. 13, *Happy is the barren, and the undefiled, who hath not known bed in sin; she shall have fruit in the visitation of holy souls. And the Eunuch that hath not wrought iniquity with his hands, nor thought wicked things against God: for the precious gift of faith shall be given to him, and a most acceptable lot in the temple of God.*† *Jerome interprets this passage*, says Bellarmine, *of virgins;* and those words, *the precious gift of faith shall be given to him*, signify some special gift answering to his fidelity.

I answer, that Jerome may enjoy his privilege in amusing

* *De Sancta Virginitate*, cap. 25.

† Douay Version.

himself with allegories: the words denote nothing more, than that the barren and Eunuchs who live holily are much more blessed, than adulterers and the ungodly are, howsoever numerous their offspring may be. But if we explain this passage of voluntary virginity—it is a correct inference from the passage, that God gives certain rewards or remarkable gifts to holy virgins; but that virginity is a work of perfection and supererogation better and more acceptable to God than the works of the commandments are, or, that they who maintain this virginity transcend the spiritual perfection of the Divine law (which is the point and hinge of the controversy) is not intimated in the slightest manner by even a single word.

3. Matt. xiii. 23, The Lord compares the kingdom of heaven, that is [says Bellarmine] the Church, to good ground, of which one part rendered fruit a hundred-fold, another sixty, another thirty. In which words the Fathers teach, there is a distinction made between the merits of conjugal chastity, of widowhood, and of virginity. Hence it is concluded that virginal continence is a greater good and more meritorious with God, than conjugal chastity is, and on that account is a Divine Counsel; for that which God has not commanded, and yet has recommended and gives a preference to before other things, He must without doubt counsel.

I answer: Doctrines of faith are not to be supported by the allegorical interpretations of the Fathers. Even Augustine does not trust to this allegorical method of interpretation, but says modestly*—*What may be meant by that diversity of fruitfulness, I must leave to the consideration of those who understood these things better than we do.* And in the end he says, that it is more probable, it is intended in these parables to intimate that *the rewards of grace are many, and some gifts of God are greater and better than others.* We agree with Augustine, and besides that, we admit that the gift of virginal chastity, which proves as great a measure of continence to the individual, so that he can cleave holily to God without having recourse to marriage, is a gift larger and more elevated than that of conjugal chas-

* *De Sancta Virginitate*, cap. 45.

tity, which contributes such assistance as renders man meet for cleaving holily to God; though not without taking up the lever, as it were, of matrimony in the way of support.* Moreover, if any one using this higher gift, cleaves more inseparably to God, and promotes the kingdom of God more than one married, I grant that a greater reward is assigned to him from the appointment of God; not simply because he has a better gift, but because he employs his gift better and more to the glory of God.

Thus far we agree with our opponent. But we differ from him in this, that by *virginal continence* he seems to understand the external celibate state, and by *conjugal* chastity the external conjugal state; and in this sense he maintains that virginity is better than matrimony, and that virgins are more acceptable to God than married persons; which is utterly false. For either state is a matter indifferent in its own nature; but good in a theological sense, and acceptable to God, so far as used as an instrument it assists men in things and actions acceptable in themselves to God. And virginity is superior to the married state so far only as it promotes the same objects. Besides, we reject also that inference of our opponent—*Virginal continence is a greater good than conjugal chastity, therefore it is a Counsel, not a precept.* For the greater the goods are, the greater are the gifts of God; *for what hast thou which thou hast not received?* And although God does not enjoin men to possess themselves of these greater and higher gifts, but dispenses them according to the good pleasure of his will; yet he enjoins us not to neglect having them, but to employ them for the advancement of his glory. In fine, in this reasoning of Bellarmine we miss what the cause altogether demands, namely, proof that they who receive the gift of original chastity from God, not only surpass other men, but in reality transcend that purity of mind and body which the law of God demands. Since he has not even attempted to prove this, he has not touched the main point of the controversy.

4. In Matt. xix. 11, 12, when the Apostles had given

* Davenant could speak more practically on these points than most men, since he lived a celibate life from the kindest motives:—See the Memoir of him prefixed to the Translation of the *Epistle to the Colossians.*

their opinion that *It is not good to marry;* the Lord says, *All men cannot receive this saying, save they to whom it is given. For there are some Eunuchs which were so born from their mother's womb; and there are some Eunuchs which were made Eunuchs of men; and there are Eunuchs which have made themselves Eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake. He that is able to receive it, let him receive it.* From these words Bellarmine makes three inferences: One, that there is no precept in this passage enjoining original continence; because in this very chapter marriage is approved of. The second, that a Counsel concerning virginal continence is here given; because when the Apostles had said, *It is not good to marry*, the Lord does not say, *Nay it is good;* but, *He that is able to receive it, let him receive it.* The third is, that this continence does not confer bodily advantage merely, but has its reward in heaven; for it is said, *they have made themselves Eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake.* These inferences Bellarmine confirms by testimonies also from many of the Fathers. The sum of the argument is this: Virginity is a good work, not *commanded* but *recommended*, to which a celestial reward is promised; and that it is therefore a work of supererogation.

To meet these objections of Bellarmine in order, First, we admit there is not given, either in this or any other passage, any general precept binding all equally to a life of virginity; for this would be clearly to prohibit marriage. Yet we say that certain individuals are here pointed out, who are bound to a life of virginity by a peculiar calling; namely, those who, having received a peculiar gift, are in a peculiar manner excited to the use of it, by the private injunction of the Holy Spirit, for the purpose of promoting the kingdom of God. Secondly, we deny that Christ gives any Counsel in the Papistical sense of that word, concerning virginal continence. For they understand by a *Counsel* a work of perfection recommended to all indiscriminately. But Christ here teaches, who those are who are capable ἀγαμίας of refraining from marriage, and he invites those specially to this life of celibacy, not all Christians alike. Again, neither does he invite such persons to remain unmarried, as if they would acquire, from the mere condition

and act itself a perfection surpassing the righteousness of the Divine law; but because by means of this state they can more easily and fully proceed and advance in spiritual perfection. That saying, therefore, *He that is able to receive it, let him receive it,* is not a Counsel recommending celibacy to all Christians as a work of perfection; but a rule intimating to whom celibacy is adapted, as an instrument of perfection. Lastly, to Bellarmine's assertion, that *virginity is to be preserved, not for the sake of bodily advantage, but of celestial reward,* we reply, that so far as it is used as an instrument for greater progress in the kingdom of grace, it contributes in the way of consequence towards rewards in the kingdom of glory; but does not avail of itself for meriting the rewards of the heavenly kingdom, but only for advancing godly men in that way which leads to the celestial kingdom, and for obtaining richer rewards in that kingdom, from the free bounty of God.—The sum of our answer is this: Virginity is not recommended by Christ, nor are *all* Christians advised to adopt it; it is not recommended as a work transcending the spiritual perfection of the law; and hence it is not a Counsel in that sense in which Counsels are pleaded for by the Papists.

5. Matt. xix. 21,—*If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor; and thou shalt have treasure in heaven.* That a precept is not given here, but a Counsel, is [in Bellarmine's opinion] evident from the very connexion of the words: for to the enquiry, *What shall I do, that I may have eternal life?* our Lord answers, *If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments;* where he shews that the keeping of the commandments is sufficient for salvation; and then he subjoins, *If thou wilt be perfect,* that is, if thou art not content with eternal life, but aspirest to an excellent degree in eternal life, *Go, sell all that thou hast.* Bellarmine heaps together many other observations in explaining this argument, and undertakes to refute five of the expositions which have been given of it; but it is not necessary to go over each, it will be better to cut the very sinews of this argument by a clear answer.

I answer, then, that this young man was deluded by the same error as our Romanists are; he supposed that the observance of the Divine law was a matter so easy and so plain,

that it could be fulfilled by any man, by applying moderate diligence: he thought also (as our Papists do) that there are some other works, matters of choice, and of greater perfection than the works enjoined in the law of God. Since, therefore, the Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes* had their peculiar works, in which they placed this perfection, he desires Christ to shew him which of these he himself approves of, and to which he gives a preference as more excellent than the others. For this is the drift of those words—*All these things have I kept from my youth up; what lack I yet?* As though he had said,—The commands of the Divine law I have fulfilled, with scarcely any difficulty, from my youth; I ask you to point out to me some other more perfect works, that I may exercise myself in doing them also.—Moreover, Christ in order to bring back into the right way this erring youth, who confided so much in his own powers, proposed to him a special precept of discipline or probation, as God had done before to Abraham, from which it would be made evident that, as yet, he loved not God with his whole heart, nor his neighbour as himself, and, consequently, had not hitherto (as he imagined) completely fulfilled the Divine commands. Thus Origen interprets this passage: *It will be evident* (says he†) *that you have spoken the truth, if you will do* THIS; and he adds that this young man had not fulfilled that command, *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself*. The opinion of Hilary, of Jerome, and of Augus-

* These sects "disagreed first, respecting the *law* itself, or the rule which God had given them. The Pharisees superadded to the *written* law, an oral or *unwritten* law, handed down by tradition: which both the *Sadducees* and the *Essenes* rejected, adhering only to the written law. They differed also respecting the *import of the law*. For the Pharisees held to a *double sense* of the Scriptures, one the obvious and *literal*, the other recondite and *figurative*: the Sadducees held only to the literal sense of the Bible: the greater part of the *Essenes* dissented from them both, maintaining that the *words* of the law were of no authority, but that the *things* expressed by them were imagery, indicative of sacred and Divine things. To these contests concerning the law, others were added on subjects of the highest moment, and particularly respecting the punishments and rewards declared in the law. These, the Pharisees held, referred to both the body and the soul, and extended beyond the present life; while the Sadducees held to no future retributions. The Essenes took a middle course, admitting future rewards and punishments, but confining them to the soul, holding that the body consists of a malignant substance, and is the temporary prison of the soul."—Soames's *Mosheim*, vol. i. pp. 32, 33.

† Homil. 8 *in Matthew*.

tine is the same; who think that this young man replied with much more arrogance than truth, in saying that he had kept all the commandments.

I come now to Bellarmine. He mistakes, first, in laying it down that a general Counsel of perfection, or of supererogation is given in these words of Christ—*If thou wilt be perfect, go, and sell*, &c.: for it is a peculiar precept of probation, or examination, and you may add also, of correction or healing, which is conveyed in them. But in opposition to this Bellarmine argues, that when the Lord said, *If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments*, he meant to shew that to *keep the commandments* was the way to eternal life, common to all men; so when he said, *If thou wilt be perfect, sell all*, he shewed, that *to sell all* is a mean by which all, and not this young man only, may attain perfection. The Counsel therefore given to him, is a Counsel of supererogation given to all Christians also, who are desirous of becoming perfect. To this I answer, that it does not follow; because Christ in the former words referred to the thing itself, and gave a direct answer, that if anyone wishes to be saved by works, he must fulfil all the commands of God. This is a general remark addressed to all. But in the latter words he has a special regard to the individual and his malady, and sets before him what was most adapted to his benefit in particular. As though he had said, If you are aiming at perfection, do not fancy to yourself an *imaginary* one attainable by works not commanded, but one that is *true*, consisting in the love of God, and of your neighbour; go, and sell all your possessions. For your riches, which you love too much, in which you confide too much, suffer you not to fulfil the command of love. Since therefore all Christians are not labouring under the same disease, the same remedy is not suited for all.

A second mistake of Bellarmine is, that he thinks this young man uttered the truth, when he said that he had kept all the commandments of God from his youth; and that Christ was giving him Counsel not absolutely necessary for his salvation, but for obtaining a more excellent degree in the kingdom of heaven. Not to mention the Fathers who teach expressly that this young man said what was not true; the very context proves this to be the case. For they who

love God with the whole heart, obey him with cheerfulness; but this young man went away sorrowful, without applying himself to the work to which the Son of God particularly invited him. Again, had he possessed the perfection necessary to life eternal, there was no reason why he should have given way to such grief; for to have a place in the kingdom of heaven is sufficient to produce gladness, although you understand that you are not to occupy any distinguished place in it. Lastly, Christ himself shewed, that this young man had not acquired such perfection as would suffice for introducing him into the kingdom of heaven, when he said to his disciples, *How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of heaven!* He did not say, *How hardly shall any one obtain particular glory in the kingdom of heaven;* but *how hardly shall he enter it!* Mark. x. 23, 24; intimating by this, that the young man was debarred such entrance, by an excessive love of riches, and a too great confidence in them.

Again, Bellarmine is mistaken in supposing that to *sell all things and give to the poor,* is a work of perfection and supererogation exceeding in excellence all the commands of God. Whereas the Apostle says, (1 Cor. xiii. 3.) *Though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.* Hence it clearly appears that this work, which Bellarmine extols beyond all the commands of God, is of no value, except so far as it is subordinate to the command of loving our neighbour. It appears also, that this is a work which may be performed by those who are devoid of love, and who, on that account cannot in any way transcend the law of God. Hence it is not a work of perfection, or of supererogation exceeding the law. Lastly, should we admit, that *to renounce all things for the Lord's sake,* is sometimes an evidence of pre-eminent love; yet this would not help the Monks. For the lowest degree of the most lukewarm love is sufficient to induce a man to relinquish all his own, when an expectation is held out, of living more securely, more at ease, perhaps even more splendidly, on the wealth of others.

6. A sixth testimony of our opponent is derived from the passage already adduced, with the subsequent words, *And follow me;* from which Bellarmine endeavours to draw the

conclusion, that the Counsel of obedience to rules, or of Monasticism, is a work of supererogation in this way. The course to be adopted, and which is here recommended, is (says he) a work in compliance with a Counsel; as is evident because it is spoken to him alone, who wished to be perfect, and to whom it is said, *Sell all that thou hast.* But these things are not enjoined upon men by command, but left under Counsel. And that by those words, *Follow me,* is signified obedience to rules, is proved [Bellarmine thinks] in two ways: First, because *to follow Christ* is to imitate Christ; but Christ *became obedient even unto death.* Secondly, because Christ himself, explaining what it is to *follow him,* says, *He who will come after me, let him deny himself,* &c., Matt. xvi. 24. But *to deny himself* is just the renouncing a man's own judgment and inclinations, and the accommodating himself to the judgment and will of another. The obedience of Monks, therefore, who do renounce their own judgment and inclinations, and submit themselves to be governed by a superior or Abbot, according to the rule of a Francis, or a Dominic, or of an Ignatius Loyola, is a Council of perfection, and a work of supererogation; inasmuch as they follow Christ in the manner before-mentioned.

To all this I reply, that the words *Follow me,* in the passage quoted, do not contain a general command such as is proposed to all Christians indiscriminately; nor a Papistic Counsel, recommended for the adoption of all who wish to be perfect; but a command, embracing a personal calling to the discipleship, which was made to this young man in particular. For, *follow me,* signifies in this passage—Join thyself to the number of my disciples, who continually attend upon and serve me. The same words are thus used in this same way in Luke ix. 59, *Christ said to another, Follow me.* And Mark ix. 38: *We saw one casting out devils in thy name, who followed not us,* &c. Now consider how foolish and impious it is to say, that an individual was performing a work of supererogation who, upon Christ's invitation, had joined himself to the company of those who attended on him. It was truly a work of supererogatory *grace* in Christ (so to speak) that he deigned to invite and receive this young man into the company of his disciples; but that it was a work of supererogatory *righteousness* in the young man himself,

to give himself up to be governed by Christ, none but a madman would assert. But, to proceed with Bellarmine,

He proves that obedience is signified by these words, *Follow me*. But that is not the question: he ought to have proved that Monastic and supererogating obedience is to be understood here. This therefore he endeavours to do, from Matt. xvi. 24, where the meaning of *to follow Christ* is explained, namely, *to deny himself;* that is, to surrender his own judgment and inclinations, and to yield himself to the judgment and will of another; as all Monks do, and especially the Jesuits, who vow a blind and universal obedience to their general.* But now,

In the first place, these words do not explain the foregoing passage; for the injunction, *Follow me*, in Matt. xix. (21) denotes a special following of Christ in the office

* "This is the first thing which they are taught, *to be so conformable to the Catholic Church* (which in their view is the Pope) that *if it defines that to be black which appears to them to be white, they are notwithstanding, without more ado, to account it black. (Exercit. Spiritualia Ignatii;* p. 141. reg. 13., Antv. 1635.) And this is an obedience which they are not only bound to yield to the Apostolic chair, but to the rest of their Superiors, and in which their founder Ignatius writ an Epistle on purpose to confirm them. An Epistle, that *nothing can be added to, or taken from*, saith their General F. Borgia *(Epist. ad Fratres Aquitaniæ;* p. 63. No. 9.)—an Epistle that is *truly divine*, saith their General Muzio Vitelleschi. *(Epist. ad Patres prov. Societ.* p. 441.) In this Epistle it is that Ignatius doth lay down these things:—

"First, *That they must look upon their Superior, not as a person obnoxious to error, but, as Christ himself—who could not be deceived, nor would deceive.*

"Secondly, *That whatsoever their Superior commands or thinks, that they must always be ready to defend, and by no means to reject.*

"Thirdly, *Whatever he commands, that they must resolve to look upon as the command of Christ*, and with a blind resolution, *without any doubt or delay, resolve to do without giving way to any human reasonings and discourses*, as their General *Aquiviva* expounds it *(Cl. Aquiviva Industriæ*, cap. 5. num. 6.) *that they renounce not only their own wills, but understandings also, and submit them wholly to his, without calling anything into question; for otherwise the excellent virtue of* blind obedience *would fail*, as Ignatius saith:—*(Ibid*, n. 3. 9. and n. 12.) *That every one must persuade himself that he is acted and governed by Divine Providence, through his Superior's orders; and that he ought to be in that case as a carcase, which suffers itself to be carried or disposed of any way; or as a staff in an old man's hand, which he directs as he pleaseth;* as it is fully expressed in their Constitutions; (Paris 6. c. 1.)"—*Impartial Considerations of Speeches, which pass under the name of five* Jesuits *lately executed*, [by G. Burnet, D.D.] London, 1679, p. 4. 5.

The learned reader who wishes for still further information on the subject brought out in the above, may consult Rivet. *Cath. Orthodox.* lib. 11. quæst. 23. § 13. (misprinted 15).

of discipleship. But the words in Matt. xvi. 24, *Let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow me*, denote the general following of Christ in the duties of a good Christian. Secondly, even if Monastic obedience be deduced from this latter passage, it will not be a work of supererogation; because Christ is speaking of necesssary obedience, which whosoever shall not have performed will lose his own soul (Matt. xvi. 25). In fine, *the absolute surrender of a man's own judgment and his own inclinations does not constitute the denial of self,* but *the renunciation of one's own corrupt judgment and evil affections.* And to *follow Christ,* does not signify *to yield oneself absolutely to the judgment and will of another;* but *to yield oneself to the judgment of Christ himself, and to the will of God himself.* Monks and Jesuits then act ridiculously in claiming to themselves the praise of supererogatory obedience, on the ground of their renouncing their own judgment and will, and submitting themselves to the judgment and will of some other man, perhaps in no respect wiser than themselves. For this is not *to follow Christ,* but *to form to themselves a new Christ.*

Lastly, Bellarmine devises two species of obedience; one common and necessary to all, which consists in obeying in matters which are necessary to salvation; the other greater and more universal, which consists in obeying in all things even not necessary, provided they be not sins; and he affirms that the latter is counselled by Christ to those only who wish to be perfect.

But these notions are mere dreams. For not a single word anywhere exists in which Christ counsels us to submit ourselves in this manner in all things to the will of another. Nay, on the contrary, the Apostle says, *Be not ye the servants of men.* (1 Cor. vii. 23). But if a man of weaker judgment submits in every thing to the direction of another who is more judicious, this will not be a work of *supererogation* transcending the perfection of the Divine law, as the Monks foolishly imagine; but a matter of *discretion,* by which a person provides against the imperfection of human wisdom; as the thing itself testifies.

7. A seventh testimony [in Bellarmine's opinion] is derivable from 1 Cor. vii. where, in many places, virginal con-

tinence is recommended: *It is good* (says St. Paul, verse 1.) *not to touch a woman.* Again (verse 26) *It is good for a man so to be.* Again (verse 27) *Art thou loosed from a wife? seek not a wife.* Again (verse 9) *I say to the unmarried and widows, It is good for them, if they abide even as I.* Also (verse 25) *Now concerning virgins, I have no commandment of the Lord; yet I give my judgment* (consilium), *as one that hath obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful.* Where the Apostle intimates,* that this Counsel is not human, but Divine; for he says that he gives his advice not as *a member of civil society*, but as *a faithful minister of God.* Again he says (verse 38) *He that giveth his virgin in marriage doeth well; but he that giveth her not in marriage doeth better.* Lastly, concerning widows, he thus speaks (39, 40) *Let her marry to whom she will, only in the Lord. But she is happier, if she abide after my judgment; and I think also that I have the Spirit of God:*† where we see that he attributes this Counsel to the Holy Spirit. Thus far Bellarmine: who ought to have added as the inference from these premises, virginity is therefore a Counsel of perfection recommended by Christ to all who are seeking a state of perfection; it is a work, as to its matter, better and more pleasing, than the works of the Divine commandments; and such as perform it are transcending the law of God, even that great command, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart*, &c. Unless this conclusion is to be drawn from the premises, Bellarmine does not make out his case.

But to proceed to our answer:—In the first place, then, I assert, as a general principle, that Counsels, such as are contended for and maintained by the Romanists, are not set forth in any part of Scripture. For a Counsel in the Papistic sense, is a work although not *commanded*, yet *recommended* to all indiscriminately. But the Counsel of Virginity is not recommended by the Apostle to all, but to such only as have a special and extraordinary gift from God. For to this those words of Christ (Matt. xix. 11) have reference: *All men cannot receive this saying, save they to*

* See Chemnitz. *Examen. Decret. Concilii Tridentini*, pars iii. loc. 1. cap. 5.—*Translator.*

† In the Vulgate, *Consilium;* in the Douay translation, *Counsel.*—*Translator.*

*whom it is given:* and of the Apostle (1 Cor. vii. 7), *Every one hath his proper gift of God, one after this manner, and another after that,* &c. — — (verse 17) *As God hath distributed to every man, as the Lord hath called every one; so let him walk.* A life of virginity then is not recommended to all, but to those alone to whom God has imparted this special gift; and they are but few. Moreover, it may be added also (as Junius has accurately remarked) that although the Latin Fathers, following the Latin interpretation, often make use of the word *consilium:* yet the word employed in the text of St. Paul is, γνώμη, which signifies *judgment;* not βουλὴ, which denotes *Counsel.* Paul therefore says, that he gave this judgment concerning celibacy, that in persons rightly disposed—such, that is, as had a special gift from God—it was a more advantageous state, and one which left them more free for performing those things which appertain to the worship of God and eternal salvation; inasmuch as they could engage with less distraction in the exercises of prayer, meditation and mortification. But he does not say (as the Papists represent him) that he gives a Counsel that all persons should embrace the celibate state, as if it were in itself a work of perfection and of supererogation transcending the commands of God. In vain then do they seek countenance for their error from the bare word *consilium,* seeing that the word is not to be found in the Apostle, and if it were, yet it would not coincide with the Papistic definition of Counsels.

But Bellarmine shapes his objection in this way: The Counsel of Paul concerning Celibacy is adapted to all, not to those only who already have received the gift of continence. For although all have not this gift, yet all *may* have it, if they seek it from God. He is however mistaken. For there is a great difference between the spiritual gifts which are necessary to salvation, such as faith, hope, and charity; and the extraordinary gifts which are not necessary, such as the gift of tongues, of miracles, and of virginal continence. Of those former it is rightly said, *If any of you lack these let him ask of God; and they shall be given him;* (Jas. i. 5). But of the latter we cannot be sure that God will give them to those who do seek. Our desire then in things of this description must be regulated by the Divine

will; not the Divine will by our desire. He who acts otherwise knows not what he is asking; he receives not because he asks amiss, (Jas. iv. 3,) namely, without faith, and a revelation of the will of God.

In the next place, to those particular passages in which it is said, *It is good not to touch a woman; It is good if they abide even as I*, and the like, I answer that the Apostle does not mean that celibacy is in its own nature a good and holy work, much less that it is a supererogatory work, more pleasing and excellent than works done in obedience to the commandments; but that it is so far good as it is useful and conducive to the advancement of the glory of God, and to the cultivation of exercises of piety free from those distractions wherewith the conjugal life is attended. It is then good, as an instrument in relation to works of Divine worship, not as a work of worship or pleasing to God in itself. Moreover, it must also be observed, that in virginity or the celibate state, two things may be considered; the *essential* act of continence, as far as it is a *virtue;* and the *contingent* act of continence, so far as it is virginity. The essential act is to restrain all inordinate motion, and to avoid every act of unlawful desire. We say that this virtue and the essential act of it, is good in itself, and pleasing to God, and a work of Divine command. But the contingent act is to abstain from female intercourse, although lawful; which act we say is good only when viewed in reference to those works which are works of the commandments, and properly good. In fine, we affirm, that all men, even virgins fail, in the former esssential act of continence, and do not reach the perfection of the law: it is therefore foolish to attribute perfection or supererogation to them on the ground of the latter accidental act.

Thirdly, to meet those testimonies in which it is said comparatively, *He that is not married doeth better;—She is happier if she so abide:* we would first observe, that the comparison must be understood as viewed in connection with the subject of which the Apostle is treating; namely, that such a state is preferable, so far as relates to those useful objects, which are pointed out by the Apostle in that chapter. Secondly, it is said to be better, not than works enjoined in the Divine commands, as though it was some-

thing superior to the righteousness of the law, but better, that is more conducive to good, than its opposite, namely, than the married life. Lastly, the single state is said to be more blessed than the married, not because a celibate or virgin state is in itself a work meritorious of a higher degree of happiness deservedly owing; but because by means of the gift of virginity, the unmarried enjoy a greater opportunity or capability for engaging themselves in works of Divine worship, whence by the recompense of God a greater measure of glory accrues.

8. An eighth testimony is derived from 1 Cor. ix., throughout which chapter (according to Bellarmine) Paul is endeavouring to prove, that he did more than was commanded him; and was therefore deserving of a special degree of glory from God. For whereas the Lord had ordained, that they who preach the Gospel should live of the Gospel, Paul preferred to preach the Gospel freely, and so perform a work of supererogation.

To which it is answered, first, that even admitting Paul did more than was commanded him; yet it would not follow, that he had performed a perfect work, or one of supererogation; unless that *more* were also something more noble, more holy, more pleasing to God, than the works enjoined in the commandments. But who would be so absurd as to suppose, that it is a work better and more pleasing to God, for a man to decline receiving some small sums of money due to him, or other things necessary to his subsistence, when he can support himself without such assistance, than it is to love God with all his heart, and his neighbour as himself? than to honour his parents, to restrain his evil lusts, and other things which are commanded in the law? Secondly, in order to make out a case of supererogation, it is not sufficient to perform some work which is not obligatory, unless all that is required by the law be first fulfilled. But if Paul with much sorrow bewails his inability to fulfil the spiritual law of God, Rom. vii.; how much less could he perform any act of supererogation? Thirdly, to grapple more closely with Bellarmine's argument, I deny that this work of Paul was in any way an unnecessary work. For a man to decline any return for his labour, if we view the thing abstractedly, is an act not re-

quired of him: but if the incidental circumstances are considered, in that case it sometimes becomes a duty. For instance: If by receiving money from the people, Paul would have cast a stumbling-block in the way of the weak, have hindered the edification of souls, have retarded the glory of God, it behoved him on account of these circumstances to decline. For where occasion of offence may be given, what is lawful may become unlawful, as Paul himself shews, 1 Cor. viii. 12, 13, where he says that they were sinning against Christ, who, by eating flesh, made their weak brethren to offend. And yet to abstain from eating meats, if the mere action be considered, is a duty as uncalled for, as to abstain from receiving wages. So also in Rom. xiv. 13, 14, 15, &c., he teaches that such were not walking charitably who were unwilling to abstain from that meat which presents a stumbling-block to a weak brother. And this is that very thing which Augustine meant, when he wrote, that *Those things are lawful, but not expedient, so far as relates to righteousness, as it is at least in the sight of God,* (that is, so far as relates to the eternal law of God) *yet are to be avoided on account of the offence which they may occasion to others, that no impediment be thereby put in the way of their salvation.** *De adulter. Conjug.* lib. i., cap. 17. And cap. 19, *That which is not expedient, the Apostle prohibits; the Lord allowing him the liberty of doing so.* Since then Augustine says, that lawful things of this kind, when from circumstances they become an hindrance to our neighbour's salvation, *are not prohibited by the*

* Well would it have been for the Church of England, if men who have of late brought in a flood of confusion by the revival of obsolete forms and modes of worship, and toys and trinkets in conducting it, had been actuated by such sentiments as are here inculcated. In reference to the modern innovations alluded to, and the pertinacity with which their abettors have striven for them, the Translator may not inaptly cite a paragraph from Archbishop Sandys, given among the miscellaneous pieces appended to his Sermons, published by the Parker Society, p. 448:—"Concerning rites and ceremonies, by political constitutions authorised amongst us; as I am, and have been, persuaded, that such as are now set down by public authority in this Church of England, are no way either ungodly or unlawful, but may with good conscience, for order and obedience sake, be used of a good Christian; — — so have I ever been, and presently am persuaded, that some of them be not so expedient in this Church now; but that in the Church reformed, and in all this time of the Gospel, (wherein the seed of the Scripture hath so long been sown,) they may better be disused by little and little, than more and more urged," &c., &c.

*law, but are by the Counsel of charity;** he intimates that they are not unlawful as to the nature of the action itself, but accidentally become unlawful, as involving a violation of brotherly love. But Bellarmine asserts that Paul, even if he had received payment, would not have given any ground of *offence*, but only some *interruption*, and that not to the *weak*, but the *covetous;* and not by his *own* fault, but the fault of *such hearers*. Paul however himself plainly acknowledges that he abstained, *lest he should hinder the Gospel*, 1 Cor. ix. 12.; neither had he any reference to the covetous in this matter, but that *he might not abuse his power*, (verse 18). In short, to whatever extent they would have been in fault, who, from the conduct of Paul, lawful as it was when viewed abstractedly, would have derived an occasion of stumbling; yet he himself would at the same time have been in fault, if he had not paid regard to his weak brethren. Aquinas understood this passage in the same way. Paul (says he,†) laboured with his own hands, that he might not occasion offence to the weak. He does not say with Bellarmine, *lest he should occasion an interruption to the covetous.*

Lastly, Bellarmine's assertion that Paul in those words, —IT WERE BETTER FOR ME TO DIE THAN THAT ANY MAN SHOULD MAKE MY GLORYING VOID, *is speaking of some reward of the pre-eminent glory which he expected, as owing for that work of supererogation*, is perfectly vain. The Apostle, humble and holy as he was, never even dreamt of this Monastic supererogation; but is on the contrary speaking of the glory of a good conscience, which would have been defiled, if, for the sake of obtaining the gain of perishing things, he should have put an occasion of falling before the weak, and neglected the profit of souls. This is evident. For, if he had supererogation in view, when so acting, he would never have taken from others what he declined receiving from the Corinthians. Yet he himself acknowledges that he *robbed other Churches, taking wages of them to do the Corinthians service:* 2 Cor. xi. 8. What kind of supererogation, I pray you, was this, to spare the Corinthians and take more largely from others? The Apostle

* Ibid. cap. 18. † 2. 2. quæst. 187. art. 4.

consequently acted in accordance with what the cause of charity and of the Churches required; not from any impulse of vainglory arising from a notion of supererogating.* We do not mean to say that from a work of such a description as was this conduct of the Apostle there was no accession of glory accruing to the agent; for every work of charity tends to increase the amount of future glory; what we would deny is, that Paul by this act did more than was required of him, or that he performed anything better and more excellent than what is enjoined in the Divine commands.

9. A ninth testimony Bellarmine deduces from Revel. xiv. 3, 4, where we read—*No man could learn that song, but the hundred and forty and four thousand: — — These are they which were not defiled with women; for they are virgins, and they follow the Lamb, whithersoever he goeth.* From which testimony it appears [says he] that virgins have a special reward, since they sing a song which none of the rest of the blessed can sing. Hence it is evident, that virginity is a work of perfection and of supererogation, transcending the perfection of the law.

I reply: it is the custom of Scripture to compare believers to virgins; the wicked and unbelievers to harlots, because they are polluted by spiritual fornication. The souls of the faithful, therefore, are in this passage called virgins, as in Matt. xxv., under the parable of the wise virgins, all believers are denoted. Bellarmine is therefore wrong in making this passage refer to bodily instead of spiritual virginity. But let us assume that the passage is to be interpreted of virgins properly so called, there is nothing else to be inferred from it, than that they who have the greater gifts will receive the greater rewards, if they lay out their talents well. Let us concede therefore to Augustine that virginal chastity, because it contains in it a greater degree of continence than conjugal chastity, will receive a greater recompense; yet never will we accede to Bellarmine's notion that in this virginity is included a continence more perfect than that which is enjoined by the Divine law. As compared then with the law of God, it does not contain in itself any supererogation, although it may possess some advantage when compared

* Vide August. *Epist.* 239.

with the lower degree of continence which the conjugal state admits.

And these are all the passages of Scripture which Bellarmine has brought for establishing his doctrine of works of perfection, or of supererogation; but because there is one other passage of Scripture whence the name itself of *supererogation* is derived, which is being constantly referred to by Papal writers, we shall add this also to the other testimonies.

10. In Luke x., in the parable of the man going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, among many other these words are found:—*He took out two-pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him, and whatsoever thou spendest more (supererogaveris,) when I come again I will repay thee.* From this passage the Papists gather, There are some works *necessary to salvation*: namely, such as are commanded in the two tables of the law; and some also of *counsel* and *perfection*, to the performance of which there is no obligation. He *spends* therefore (*erogat*) who discharges the commands laid upon him; he *spends more* (*supererogat*) who joins Counsels to the commands.

I am aware that the whole of this parable has received from the Fathers an allegorical explanation; but I answer that theological inferences derived from parables are not suited for confirming doctrines, especially when the doctrines are not naturally deduced from the general scope of the parable, but from a detached portion of it. Again, inasmuch as we can effect nothing in the works of grace, except so far as Christ shall have enabled us, it contradicts a fundamental principle of theology, to infer from this parable that man can supererogate in some measure by gratuitous works: that is, that he can lay out more than he has received from Christ. Moreover, it is the scope of the parable to prove, that every man is neighbour to every man, and consequently should be willing to do good to all men. He who forms any argument foreign to this scope, is but weaving a rope of sand. Although if we were to admit that man could do something, and lay out in good works, beyond what is enjoined by the express command of God; yet that does not prove the case maintained by the Papists, unless what is thus laid out is something more, better, and more holy than

duties commanded; and that will never be shewn to be the case. For all over and above payments, as they are imagined to be by the Papists, are referable to certain external circumstances which the law of God has not particularised, or at least to certain external acts, which conduce but instrumentally to the worship of God. Now such are far inferior to those works of piety which are commanded in the law: they are not therefore works of perfection, or of supererogation, as the term is understood by the Papists.

In conclusion, I will subjoin the opinion of a Jesuit on this argument and others of the like description, not unfrequently derived from detached portions of parables:—*The separate parts of parables are not to be examined too nicely; but judgment must be used and we must gather from the main design of the parable, what constitutes its necessary and proper parts, what are added, as supplementary to the narrative, or in the way of embellishment. For many expressions are made use of in parables not to convey any specific signification, but because in the circumstances on which the parable is grounded it was customary to be done. I think what is said in this parable is of this kind, That the Samaritan when departing gave two-pence to the host, desiring him to take care of the wounded man; and that, if in taking care of him, he should spend more (supererogásset) he would repay him,* &c.*

* Maldonat. *in hunc locum.*—"JOANNES MALDONATUS, a Spaniard of noble family, was born at Fuente del Maestro, a village in the province of Estramadura, in 1534. He received his education at the University of Salamanca, under Dominic Soto, and Francis Tolet; and afterwards taught philosophy, divinity, and the Greek language in that seminary. Having entered into the Society of the Jesuits, he was called to Rome, where he taught theology in their College, and assumed the habit of the Order. When the College of the Jesuits was established in Paris, in 1563, he was sent thither by his superiors to teach philosophy, and there became the strenuous antagonist of Calvin. His lectures were so popular, that he was frequently obliged, from the crowds which attended, to deliver them in the court or the street. In 1570, he was sent with nine other Jesuits to Poitiers, where he read lectures in Latin, and preached in French. Afterwards he returned to Paris; but having been accused of heresy, and of procuring a fraudulent will in favour of his Order, though honourably acquitted, he retired to Bourges, where the Jesuits had a College, and remained there about a year and a half. He was then called to Rome, to assist in the publication of the 'Septuagint,' and after finishing his *Commentary upon the Gospels*, in 1582, he was, early in 1583, found dead in his bed. His most celebrated work is the before-

The Papists then act absurdly, when they found distinct doctrines on such disjointed portions of parables, which convey no peculiar instruction, but serve either for embellishment, or to shew more clearly the general scope of the parable.

So much for testimonies derived from the Scriptures; other kinds of arguments follow.

## CHAPTER XLV.

### THE ARGUMENTS OF BELLARMINE FROM PASSAGES OF THE FATHERS, AND FROM REASON.

To those citations from the Scriptures, of the aid of which we just now deprived him, Bellarmine subjoins other arguments borrowed from examples, from passages in the Fathers, and from natural reason; let us therefore examine how far they avail in establishing the case of the Romanists.

1. First, from examples of the primitive Church he endeavours to show that voluntary poverty is a Counsel of perfection, or a work of supererogation. *For it appears* (says Bellarmine*) *that soon after the formation of the early Church, many, parting with all their possessions, began to live in common. Now there could be no other reason for this new proceeding except the preaching of Christ and his Apostles. In Acts iv. we read that as many as possessed houses and lands, having sold them, laid the price at the feet of the Apostles. To what could this be owing, but that they had heard that the Lord had given this counsel?* To forsake all things then is a work of perfection, of Counsel, and of supererogation.

I answer, that this sharing in all things in common did

mentioned '*Commentary*,' which has received high encomiums from both Papists and Protestants, as a judicious and excellent exposition."—Townley's *Illustrations of Biblical Literature*, vol. iii.; who refers to Alegambe, *Biblioth. Scriptor. Soc. Jesu.* pp. 255—257.

* *De Monach.* lib. 2. cap. 10.

not prevail in the whole primitive Church, but only in the Church at Jerusalem; which Augustine plainly acknowledges: *We do not read that any Church of the Gentiles practised this. De doctr. Christ.* lib. 3, cap. 6. I add, neither did the Apostles themselves recommend the Gentiles to adopt this plan, but the contrary; namely, that they should not make a common purse, but communicate generously from their own substance to such as had need, 2 Cor. viii. 13; which cannot be done where property has been entirely consigned over for general purposes to other hands. In short, in the Church of Jerusalem itself, some of the best and most perfect Christians retained the possession of their goods in their own hands, *distributing* (κοινωνοῦντες) *to the necessity of the saints* (Rom. xii. 13), not turning over all their property to a common stock. Such an one was Simon, with whom Simon Peter used to lodge, who retained his house in his own possession; Acts x. 6. Such an one was Tabitha, who was *rich in good works and almsdeeds;* Acts ix. 36. Such an one was Mary the mother of John, who had not sold her house, Acts xii. 12; to pass by other cases. Secondly, which is the main point, they who did sell all their possessions, did it not as a work of supererogation, under the notion that voluntary poverty was itself a work of penance, which would make satisfaction for sin, and merit especial glory, but with a very different intention. For their main object in doing this was not to attain the merit of voluntary want, but to provide a remedy for Christians in need. See then how great is the difference between the opinion of the Monks and the practice of these Christians. The Monks say that we must renounce these temporal possessions in order to become poor and needy; but the primitive Christians sold their goods, and had all things in common, that none among the Christians might be in need; Acts iv. 34, 35. Lastly, Christians in the primitive Church did not so act with the view of enabling certain individuals, from the abandonment of their possessions, to secure a state of perfection, as is the practice among Papists; but to provide more advantageously for the existing condition of the Church, which was then destitute of property and of settled habitation, and was moreover beginning to be harrassed by persecution. Bellarmine therefore, in this argument, fallaciously puts

off upon us, as the cause of this custom, what was not the cause.

2. In the next place, Bellarmine contends for [the merit of] celibacy, relying upon the example of the daughters of Philip the Evangelist, of whom we read that he had four daughters who were virgins, Acts xxi. 9. And it is probable that all these remained so to the end of life, and that voluntarily. Philo Judæus also writes,* that many in his time, lived in common, and abstained from marriage. And Justin Martyr testifies, that among no people was celibacy so much fostered as among Christians: Apolog. 2.;† and Tertullian writes to the same effect in Apologet. cap. 9. Whence could this arise, had not Christ recommended a celibate state, as a work of supererogation?

I answer, that all these instances, as they injure not our case, so they add nothing to our adversaries'. For if Bellarmine could produce in the primitive Church not four, but four thousand who maintained virginity, we should say it was from a gift and particular calling that they maintained the celibate state, not as a work in itself supererogatory, but as a means useful and advantageous towards the spiritual worship of God. Still less did they imagine that they were performing more than the law of God required in so doing; but endeavoured by this help to approach as near as they could to the perfect observance of the law. As regards Philo, he is writing about the Esseneś among the Jews, not about the Monks of the Christians. It is true that Justin Martyr and Tertullian state, that virginity is nowhere strictly observed but among Christians; and is cultivated both better and more frequently by the same Christians than among any Gentiles. But the cause of this is, that receiving the gift of continence

* *De vita contempl.*

† This ranks now more accurately as *Apolog.* i., in editions subsequent to Bishop Davenant's writing; § 15—but Justin is not arguing in behalf of a *celibate* state in this chapter, but of chastity: vol. 1. p. 167. edit. Jenæ, 1842.

‡ A sect dispersed over Syria, Egypt, and the neighbouring countries, who held religion to consist in silence and meditation; and endeavoured, by a strict mode of life, and by various observances, borrowed from the Egyptians, to raise themselves to higher degrees of virtue. Some lived in celibacy, and others married; some acted from a literal view of the Mosaic law, others by an allegorical interpretation of it. The first Monks seem to have borrowed their peculiarities from this sect. Is there anything new under the sun? See Soames's *Mosheim*, and *Mosheim's Comment. de rebus Christianorum*, &c.

from God, they exercise it to the glory of God; not that presuming on their state of celibacy they select the same in order to acquire the vain glory of supererogating.

Let us now proceed to consider the testimonies of the Fathers, which we shall dismiss with as much brevity as possible.

### Passages from the Fathers answered.

1. Origen, in Rom. xv., *Whatever we perform beyond that which is obligatory, we do not perform on the authority of the precepts. For example: Virginity is not maintained as the fulfilment of an obligatory duty; for it is not required by the precept: but it is an offering beyond that which is obligatory as a duty.* From these words Bellarmine thinks it may be inferred that celibacy is a work of perfection, or of supererogation similar to what has been described above.

Now call to mind what has been before observed by us: that a two-fold view of obligation may be taken on the part of man towards God; one arising from *a general precept*, the other from *a peculiar endowment received*. Virginity is not obligatory upon all in the former sense, yet it sometimes becomes the duty of particular individuals, in the latter sense. For as Origen himself observes (in Matt. Homil. 33.)—*This alone is required, that whatsoever a man shall have received from God, he apply the whole use thereof to the glory of God.* Inasmuch then as the special gift of virginal chastity comes from the grace of God, we are bound as by a special call to employ the same to God's glory. But even if we allow that virginity is not obligatory, either *on the ground of precept*, or of *special gift;* yet it will not follow that it is a Counsel of perfection, or a work of supererogation, according to the rule of Papistic definition. For a work of supererogation is not only not included in the command, but also exceeds in its perfection all that is enjoined in the command itself. But the virginity which the most holy maintain in this corruptible flesh, so far from not exceeding that purity of flesh and spirit which the law of God requires, does not perfectly attain to the perfection of the command itself, although it may accomplish something which is not specially enjoined in that command.

2. Eusebius, lib. 1., *Demonstrat. Evangel.* cap. 8, says, *Two modes of living have been instituted in the Church of God; one superior to our nature, and the common course of man's life; not seeking marriage, nor offspring, nor substance, but devoted to the service of God alone; and this form of perfect life exists in Christianity. But the other is more lax and adapted to humanity, which is connected with chaste wedlock, and the procreation of offspring*, &c., *and to these the second degree of piety is assigned.* And he intimates in the beginning of the chapter, that both modes of life were instituted by Christ. From these words (unless I am deceived) Bellarmine thinks it follows, that the former mode of living goes beyond a perfect fulfilling of the Divine law; and consequently that those who embrace this mode of life are doing more than is required.

We do not deny that some in the Christian Church prefer the single life, and others the conjugal state; we also allow that both states of life were instituted by Christ. For God enjoined the conjugal state, by a general rule, upon all those who had not the gift of continence; by a special vocation and gift he calls to the celibate state those whom he has enriched with such a gift, in order to their promoting the kingdom of heaven. And as this gift is more exalted and perfect than the gift of conjugal chastity, so also the life of celibates, when rightly conducted, may be said to be more perfect than the life of the married. But it must always be maintained, that this perfection is to be understood comparatively with reference to common gifts, or the ordinary life of those men whom celibates excel in perfection; not to the spiritual law of God, as if they were going beyond the perfection of it, by the mere work of celibacy. Although then they attain some degree of perfection above the mass of men; yet they fall much below a perfect fulfilling of God's commands. Therefore from this kind of perfection, which is such only as viewed in comparison with other men, no proof is afforded of supererogation in comparison with the law of God.

3. Athanasius, in his treatise concerning the incarnation of the Word, says, *What man, either after his death, or during his life-time, ever gave instructions concerning virginity; and did not suppose the practice of this virtue to be*

*impossible? Yet Christ our Saviour, and the King of all, had so great power in his instruction in this subject, that even children not yet come to that age at which they become subject to the law, profess that virginity which is beyond the law.* Virginity is placed above the law in this passage; it is therefore a work of supererogation.

I reply, Christ had such power, because he imparted that special gift of continence to whom he pleased. But Athanasius affirms that virginity is above the laws, because it is not enforced in the precept of the law; not because virgins surpass or transcend the purity and perfection of the law itself. The Papists, therefore, are but dreaming when, from the sayings of the Fathers, who sometimes assert that virginity is above the law, they straightway infer, that those men who profess celibacy are more perfect than the law, and are supererogators before God. Hear the ingenuous confession of a most holy Father, who cultivated celibacy with much more sanctity than our Monks:—*Woe is me, that in me what is concealed is not as that which appears! Whilst I am discoursing of chastity, I am thinking of lasciviousness; whilst I speak of purity of heart, the thought of base affections besets me day and night.** Since the chaste are vexed by such infirmity—even those who restrain and subdue their inordinate desire; who is so proud or so infatuated, as to fancy that he can surpass the perfection of the Divine law by the mere act of celibacy?

4. Basil, in his treatise on virginity,† remarks:—*It was the will of our Lord, that this good work of virginity should not be a precept; but a superior attainment of a soul devoted to virtue, by its own free will accomplishing of itself that which is beyond the law and beyond nature.* Here virginity is placed above the commands.

There are three points needing explanation in this testimony. In the first place, as to what Basil affirms, that *God would not have virginity to be a subject of precept*, I answer that he is speaking of the common precept of the Divine law, which all men are equally bound to observe. We acknowledge that in this sense virginity comes not under a precept; for if the case had been so, all would have sinned who should

* Ephræm. *Confess.*, pag. 69. [p. 16. edit. Oxon. 1709.]

† § 55. This treatise, though attached to Basil's work, is evidently not his.

enter the matrimonial state. Secondly, Basil's assertion that *this virginity is in the free power of a man's own soul, choosing the state of itself,* needs some explanation. When he says then that it is in its *own power,* he does not mean to set aside the supernatural gift of God, who imparts to the soul of man the very *power* to do this; he means that there is no outward necessity impelling a man to this work of celibacy. Neither when he calls it *free* does he exclude an obligation arising from a special call of the Holy Spirit, against which whosoever resists, in that case, sins; but he sets aside the fact of any obligation arising from the common direction of the Divine law; for whosoever infringes that becomes absolutely, and in all cases, a sinner. For when the Spirit of God excites to any particular duties, we discharge the same freely; yet we should be sinning against this as it were private law of the Spirit, if we did not follow them. Lastly, when Basil said, that *virginity is above the command,* he meant nothing else (as we have before explained) than that it is not included within the limits of common precepts; nor would he have dreamt of inferring from this, that such a work is more holy and better than the works enjoined in the Divine commands; or that they who retain their virginity have outgone the perfection of the law of God itself, as the Papistic advocates of supererogation idly pretend. [Bellarmine proceeds:]

5. Epiphanius (hæres. 48) says, *The Church rejoices in those who are able to perform the approved worship of God, and who delight to maintain the virgin state; but she also honours single marriages.**

This is directed against the Montanists, and does not in any way affect the present case. For we allow that the extraordinary gift of virginal continence is greater and more perfect than the ordinary gift of conjugal chastity; but we deny that even the purity of the holiest virgins either transcends or equals the purity of body and mind commanded in the law. It is not therefore a work of supererogation, or a Counsel of perfection surpassing the righteousness of the law. [Again says he:]

6. Chrysostom, Hom. 8, *De Pœnitentia,* writes:† *Do not*

* That is, marriages in contradistinction to second marriages, &c. *Translator.*

† [Hom. vi. § 3., tom ii. p. 378, edit. Paris. 1834.]

*by any means accuse the Lord; he has not enjoined what is impossible to be done;—many do more even than is commanded.*

When Chrysostom says, that men *do more than is commanded*, he means only so far as the outward act of a command is concerned, not that it is observed in all perfection internally. This may be proved from Chrysostom himself, who elsewhere teaches that the Gentile Philosophers exceeded the commands of God. For thus he speaks, Hom. 3 on 1 Cor.:* *Are not the precepts of God so easy* (he asks) *that many have exceeded them by philosophical reason only?* According to this mode of speaking then, a philosopher, a Vestal virgin, and in short any unmarried person surpasses this command, *Thou shalt not commit adultery*, who refrains not only from the outward act of unlawful desire, but even from that of lawful union. But if we consider the precept in its full extent, the admission into the heart of even one impure desire renders the obedience to it imperfect. If the unmarried were to be tried by this rule, not one would boast that he had supererogated, or surpassed the Divine commands by his voluntary continence.

7. Gregory Nazianzen, in his first oration against Julian, says, *How is it thou perceivest not, thou wisest and most acute of mortals, who endeavourest to force Christians into the very citadel and summit of virtues, that in our Religion some laws must of necessity be obeyed, and cannot be neglected without danger: others impose not so much necessity; but are left to our choice and freewill; and therefore are of such a description, that they who observe them are loaded with honour and rewards; and they who have not fulfilled them, need fear no danger?* There are then [argues Bellarmine] some works of supererogation.

I answer, Julian, from Matt. v., took occasion to deride the Christians, and to treat them in a most shameful manner. For he asserted† that it was contained in our law, that we should not avenge ourselves; that we should not consider anything as our own; that to those smiting us on one cheek we should turn the other; to any one taking away our cloak, we should surrender our coat also. These things he objected to Christians with the design, that they might

* [Hom. ii. p. 13. tom. x., edit. Paris. 1837.] † Orat. 1. *in Julian.*

become ridiculous to the Pagans, if at any time they should complain of the injuries done to them, or of their property being taken from them. He wished also to make it appear by the way, that a State could not exist in safety, if the doctrine of the Christians should obtain a prevalence. For, if it be prohibited to seek legal satisfaction for injuries; if we are forbidden to resist evil; the insolence of the wicked will increase, and the power of government be completely relaxed. To obviate these calumnies, Nazianzen gives that answer which you have had quoted above; namely, that there are some things in the doctrine of Christ to which all are of necessity bound; but some more sublime, which are proposed to those who are aiming at the highest degrees of virtue; but they are not so strictly enjoined, as to expose those to punishment who do not attend to them.

But to come nearer to the point: Although Nazianzen employed such an answer as he judged best suited to stop the mouth of Julian; yet other divines give one more suitable, namely, that the words of Christ do not forbid the public, but the private, vindication of our rights; and that he is not giving Counsels to such as were aiming to be perfect; but precepts common to all Christians; which we should be prepared in mind to observe at all times; but as regards the external fulfilment, are then to be put in practice, when the welfare of our neighbour and the glory of God shall require it. Again, even if we admit the distinction of Nazianzen, and allow that some duties are incumbent upon all: as *to keep the body chaste and pure from forbidden alliances;* while others are performed optionally by certain persons, which are praised when done properly, and rewarded: as *to abstain from conjugal union,*—we shall assert that this difference arises from a diversity of gifts, or a different measure of grace, bestowed from above. For he who marries does not sin in so doing, nor risk punishment; because he does what is allowable, and acts according as God has imparted to him the gift. He also who abstains from wedlock freely and of choice, does it from a special gift, being incited by the Spirit and the calling of God to this state; though in this he is not doing more than he is required; and yet will receive the reward of larger grace in greater glory.

8. Cyprian [remarks Bellarmine] in his book *de habitu Virginum*, towards the end, says: *The Lord does not indeed make this a subject of command, but exhorts to it; neither does he impose a yoke of necessity, when freedom of choice remains; but seeing that he says there are many mansions in his Father's house, he points out the highest rooms in the dwelling. You are seeking those latter dwellings, laying aside carnal desires, you obtain the reward of greater grace in celestial abodes.** Virginity therefore is [he concludes] a work of supererogation.

I answer:—that this and such like testimonies will never support Bellarmine's conclusion, that virginity is a Counsel of perfection, or a work of supererogation transcending the works of the law of God. For first, where Cyprian says, that *the Lord does not command virginity, nor impose it as a necessary duty, but leaves it to our free choice*, he means that *he does not enjoin it by a command delivered* totidem verbis *in the law, but that he leaves it to the free choice of all whom he induces either by gift, vocation, or external operation of the Holy Spirit, to adopt it.* Such most readily and eagerly prefer the unmarried state; because the Spirit liberally imparts these powers and this disposition: yet in making the choice, they are not supererogating; because that obedience to the Holy Spirit, when he directs and strengthens, is an act of *due and obligatory submission*, not an act of *supererogation beyond the claims of duty.* Secondly, we are, with Cyprian, ready to admit, that *better habitations are prepared for the virgins*, if it is understood of those who, for the kingdom of heaven's sake, have made themselves Eunuchs, and by means of this cleave to God more freely and constantly. For the greater grace there is employed, the greater glory, according to the Divine appointment, follows as a reward. Lastly, it must be observed, that although Cyprian has said, that the Lord does not command virginity; yet he has not said that virginity is something superior to all those works which are commanded in the law of God; nor has he said that the unmarried go beyond the Divine law, in a perfection of spiritual holiness; but that there are some men to whom a less

* [Cap. iv. p. 158. edit. Paris. 1836.]

measure of grace is assigned. Cyprian has said nothing then which tends to establish the error of supererogation. [Bellarmine proceeds:]

9. Ambrose, in his book concerning widows, says:—*They who have fulfilled the command can say, We are undeserving servants, we have merely done what we ought to do. A virgin does not say this; he who has sold all his goods does not say this.* And afterwards; *Hence a command is not given; a Counsel is given: for chastity falls under a command, entire abstinence from marriage under Counsel.* The remaining therefore in an unmarried state is a work of supererogation.

But with the good leave of St. Ambrose, he is, I must say, rather perverting the words of Christ to suit them to his present purpose. For Christ is only pointing out in this passage, that it becomes us, even if we had perfectly fulfilled the commands of God (which no one does) nevertheless humbly to acknowledge that we are unprofitable servants; seeing that all our good works are due to God; seeing that we have received from God every qualification for acting well; and, in short, because our good works are profitable to ourselves, not to God. Again, it is evident Christ entertained not a notion of that fancy of Ambrose, which leads him to think that the unmarried, and such as relinquish their own property, are exempted from sharing in this humble confession, because they were engaged in a work of *counsel;* not of *command.* For it is his Apostles who are here invited to adopt this humble language, who, according to St. Ambrose, need never to have made use of any such humble confession, inasmuch as they had renounced all things. The interpretation of Bede then is more accordant with the meaning of Christ, who writes on the same words:* *In this alone consists the perfection of faith in men; namely, in the consciousness, even if they have fulfilled every thing which has been commanded, that they are imperfect; and that so long as they are absent from the Lord, there are always indwelling evils to be mourned over; and in the continual remembrance that they are deficient in good qualities, to which, by the assistance of His grace, they are to*

* Bedæ *in* xviii. *Lucæ.*

*make advancement.* To the same effect Theophylact, whose words on the same passage are these: *We must not be elated by any good work, nay not in the fulfilling of even all the commands.—And if, when we shall have done all things commanded us, we deem it anything remarkable; how greatly do we sin, when not having performed the greatest part of the commands of God, after all, we are elated?* Where are they then, who are puffed up with the notion, that the Counsels of perfection are fulfilled by them, and that works of supererogation are performed; and on this score are boasting that this confession—*We are unprofitable servants,* &c.—in no way belongs to them, when the very holiest and most perfect fall short in an obedience to the greatest part of the commands?

Again, as to those latter words of Ambrose, in which he distinguishes between works of *Counsel* and of *command;* I answer, by *a work of command* he intends such a work as is commanded to all and every one equally, under *a preceptive form* (as he terms it). By *a work of Counsel,* that which is not obligatory upon all equally, but proposed to certain fit persons. Let us then allow Ambrose the use of his own forms of expression; he may, if he pleases, call celibacy *a work of Counsel,* seeing that God does not compel any one to remain in an unmarried state, in the way of *a command,* but draws and incites certain persons to this work in the way of *counselling* them; nevertheless we affirm that a work of supererogation cannot hence be deduced; seeing that God counsels no one by the secret direction of his Spirit to prefer a state of celibacy, without at the same time, rendering him fit for embracing that state by an extraordinary gift of grace, well knowing that he will be more at liberty in that state for the promotion of the kingdom of God, both in himself and in others. Consequently he who is incited by Divine influence, and strengthened by a special gift for some particular service, is not performing an act of supererogation, but is only laying out what he has previously received as a special gift from God. He is therefore under an obligation to perform this work, if not from *a general command,* yet in consequence of *a special talent* entrusted to him; the Spirit of God, as an internal suggestion to it, co-operating. Ambrose, in the before cited

treatise, has himself intimated as much pretty plainly, where he thus writes concerning works of this kind: *There are tasks which Wisdom assigns; and so assigns as to take into consideration the ability and strength of each. And accordingly he says, He that can receive it, let him receive it.* It is our bounden duty to perform that task which the wisdom of God, having a reference to our ability, has apportioned to us. It is our bounden duty to take a portion of the burden upon us, equivalent to our measure of strength. We therefore do not perform any thing supererogatory, when we do works of this kind, although we are not compelled to it by any authority of precept, yet are incited by the impulse of the Divine Spirit, and strengthened by his special gift.

Lastly, whatever we may understand by the different terms *Counsel*, and *Precept*, it is certain that they who do perform these works which are called *works of Counsels*, are not able to fulfil even *the works enjoined by command*, and therefore do not surpass the law of God itself by any perfection of righteousness.

10. Jerome lib. 1. *contra Jovinianum* [is noticed by Bellarmine, saying] *Christ has a greater love to Virgins, because they voluntarily render that which had not been commanded them; and it is an act of superior grace to present that which you do not owe, than to repay that which is demanded of you.*

Jerome's remark that *virginity is not strictly enjoined upon any one, and therefore is not obligatory*, is to be thus explained: namely, that it is not commanded, or a matter of duty, with reference to any command of the law. And in this assertion of its being *a voluntary contribution, and tendered without being absolutely required*, nothing more is intended, than that all they who properly adopt this state of life, by the gift of God and the secret influence and calling of the Holy Spirit, willingly choose that which it was not obligatory upon them to do by any outward command of God. Seeing then that it is this internal act of God which inspires strength and will to undertake such a work, that is quite enough to set aside any little glory arising from any fancy of supererogation. For the bestowment of greater grace, involves an obligation to greater works. *For to whom*

*much is given, of him is much required;* Luke xii. 48. It is, in short, a subversion of the Papal cause, that while we admit that we are able to present to God some external works, which are not obligatory, yet these are always inferior to many other actions which *are* obligatory, and which are either not at all accomplished, or but in a very small measure. [Bellarmine goes on.]

11. Gregory, lib. 15. *Moral.* cap. 9, says:—*The Elect sometimes aim to do more than the Lord has been pleased to enjoin them. For the virginity of the body is in no way commanded, but recommended; for if it were commanded, then wedlock must be considered a fault; and yet many are so strong in maintaining a celibate life, that they yield more by voluntary submission, than they have received directions to do by precept.*

We admit that the Elect sometimes do more in these external works than they are *enjoined;* not that they do more than they are *bound* to do: they yield a greater return in the way of *voluntary obedience* than was demanded by *precept;* and yet they do not yield more in the way of *voluntary obedience* than was due from them, on the ground *of the grace which they had received.* Bellarmine then is wrong in supposing that we are bound to peculiar duties only from general precepts of God; for we are bound sometimes in consequence of special gifts and excitements of God. Moreover, Gregory's remark, that *the Elect sometimes do more than they are enjoined,* is not to be explained Papistically, as if *they do more* meant that they do some works uncommanded, better, more perfect, more pleasing to God, than the very duties that are commanded; but that *they do more than they are enjoined,* that is, they select some helps for promoting their better observance of the commands, which do not fall under a plain and general command. In fine, Gregory never supposed that they who do more in any particular works than God has commanded, have attained thence to a state of perfection, and gone beyond the righteousness of the law. For the man who in various places inculcates *the imperfection of human righteousness,* never supposed that there is in some men *a supererogation of righteousness* exceeding the demands of the law of God. That is a well known saying of Gregory: *All human*

*righteousness is found to be unrighteousness, if it is rigidly scrutinised by God. Moral.* lib. 21. cap. 15.

12. Again, Augustine, in his book *De sancta Virginitate*, cap. 30. [is quoted by Bellarmine, saying]—*For it cannot be said, Thou shalt not marry, in the same manner in which it is said, Thou shalt not commit adultery; Thou shalt not kill. The latter are required; the former is a voluntary offering. If any do the former, they are commended; if they do not obey the latter, they incur condemnation. In the latter the Lord commands you what is obligatory; but in the former whatever you spend more, when he comes again he will repay you.*

We acknowledge with Augustine that there is a wide difference between these two, *Thou shalt not commit adultery*, and *Thou shalt not marry*. For the first is a general command which is required of all men under pain of condemnation; this latter is a special privilege which is bestowed on a few, and is employed to the glory of God, and, accompanied with commendation. The one is called *a debt*, and is said *to be commanded*, because it is expressly and absolutely enjoined by the very word of the decalogue; the other is said *to be offered*, because it is rightly performed by those alone, who by the gift of God and an internal calling are induced voluntarily to adopt that mode of life, without a command directly compelling them. Lastly, they who observe this virginal continence, are said to have spent something more, not in the Papistic sense, as though they had fulfilled the law of God, and had moreover performed some work, superior to, and more holy than all the works of the Divine law; but because they had done something more than seemed to be required of other men, who had not received this special gift. God then, who gave to these persons a greater measure of grace, when he returns will give them a more abundant measure of glory; not because they have abounded in works not strictly required from them by the will of God; but because, from the gifts received, they have repaid in more duties comparatively than other men. [But Bellarmine again quotes]

The same Augustine, in his Sermon on 1 Cor. v. 9—19:* *The virgins earnestly seek after that greater beauty of heart;*

* [Serm. xviii. *de verbis Apostoli*, or clxi. edit. Benedict. §. 11.]

*as though they should say—What dost thou command? That we should not commit adultery? Commandest thou but this? In loving Thee we do more than thou commandest.*

It is manifest that Augustine asserts nothing else in this passage, than that the voluntarily unmarried perform something more than mere abstinence from the forbidden act of adultery; for they abstain besides that from entering the conjugal state. But he never either said or thought, that virgins, beyond the fulfilment of the whole Divine law, supererogate before God, by doing works more perfect and better than are the works of the law itself, as the Romanists maintain. Neither has he said, that those who remain unmarried, by this work of virginal continence absolutely surpass that perfection of chastity which the law of God requires; but only go beyond that negative part of the law which forbids adultery. Many can do this, who nevertheless are very far removed from that chastity of body and mind which the law of God requires. Let it be sufficient then for those individuals, who truly and rightly maintain their state in this respect, that they are doing more than other men, to whom this special gift of continence has not been granted; but let them not boast, that they have done more than the spiritual law of God commands, which requires a purity of heart altogether immaculate. Listen to Augustine himself when addressing virgins:* *What shall I say respecting that care and watchfulness against sin? Who will boast that his heart is pure? or who will glory that he is clean from sin? Holy virginity is indeed inviolate from the mother's womb, but in Thy sight, no one is clean*, &c. He who fails in internal chastity of heart, does not supererogate by transcending the perfection of the law.

14. Bellarmine's last citation is made from Augustine also, who in Enchirid. cap. 121, thus writes: *Whatever things God commands, of which this is an instance*—THOU SHALT NOT COMMIT ADULTERY; *and whatever things are not enjoined but recommended by a special Counsel, of which this is one instance*—IT IS GOOD FOR A MAN NOT TO TOUCH A WOMAN; *are then performed aright, when they are made to have a reference to the love of God and of our neighbour.*

In this quotation that circumstance alone appears favour-

* *De Sancta Virginitate*, cap. 48.

able to the cause of the Romanists, that Augustine draws a distinction between precepts and counsels; but the ground of this distinction, and how little it tends to establish the doctrine of supererogation, has been at different times made evident in preceding discussions. And the sentiment contained in the last words of Augustine, namely, that *works which are recommended by a special Counsel are performed aright, when they are made to have a reference to the love of God and of our neighbour*, is surely a mortal blow to the Romish argument. For, according to the opinion of Papists, such works are superior and more perfect than works commanded in the Divine law; but Augustine clearly shews that they are inferior and more ignoble, inasmuch as they are not even to be accounted among good works, except so far as they are subject to this law, and are performed in reference to the love of God and of our neighbour enjoined in the law. Hence it appears how very erroneous is Bellarmine's doctrine,* that *Counsels are to be preferred to the precepts of God, even to that great command,* THOU SHALT LOVE THE LORD THY GOD WITH ALL THY HEART, &c.

And as respects his testimonies from the Fathers so much may suffice: The argument of Bellarmine *derived* (as he says) *from natural reason* remains to be considered.

---

For a general review of the subject of this chapter, the Translator would refer the reader, desirous of further information, to Gerhard's *Loci Theologici* tom. vi. edit. Tubingæ, 1762.

The learned reader may not inaptly be presented with a passage from another portion of the work referred to:—

"Breviter, opinioni illi de satisfaciendo pro peccatis propriis et aliorum per celibatum, et præstando quodam supererogationis opere aliis etiam applicando, opponendum est totum systema locorum practicorum de ἀδυναμία perfecte implendi legem; de justificatione non ex lege, sed ex evangelio, non ex operibus, sed ex fide, non ex meritis, sed ex gratia speranda et obtinenda; de bonorum operum imperfectione et contaminatione, de unico et solo Christi merito, de causis, propter quas præstanda bona opera, &c. Inde est, quod quidam moderatiores ex ipsis Pontificiis opinionem illam, quod celibatus (ac monachatus) sit satisfactio peccatorum et meritum regni cœlorum, aperte rejiciant. Conrad. Clingius in loc. comm. cap. 118: *Hoc cavendum est ne ponatur justitia, id est, solus in hujusmodi observationibus* (monasticis) *id est ne quis putet se promereri justitiam et remissionem peccatorum et gratiam hujusmodi servandis ritibus: nam justificationem et gratiam impetrare sit per fidem in Christum. Igitur Monachus, si servata sua regula sensiat se propterea justitiam coram Deo consequi*, is errat juxta illud Christi, Matt. xv. *Frustra me colunt mandatis hominum.*" Gerhardi *Loci Theologici;* loc. xxvi. cap. x. sect. i.; tom. xvi. pp. 30, 31.

* *De Monach.* lib. 2. cap. 6.

## CHAPTER XLVI.

### A REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS DERIVED FROM NATURAL REASON.

THE final effort of Bellarmine is to support his cause by a course of reasoning borrowed both from the case of natural bodies, and also from political affairs.

1. He first argues thus:*—In every thing natural we perceive a two-fold perfection; one necessary to mere *existence*, the other to *a good condition of existence;* one without which the thing itself is *imperfect;* the other, unaccompanied by which it is devoid of *ornament*. Now a Christian should in the same way be possessed of a two-fold perfection; one a state necessary for *existence*, that is by means of which he becomes truly a child of God and an heir of the kingdom, which consists in *the keeping of the commandments;* the other required for his *being in a good condition*, and that is required by *an observance of the Counsels*.

To this I reply: that there can be no doubt but that natural things may be considered with reference to two kinds of perfection, one *required* as it were, and *necessary* to the existence of the whole class—and in this view there is needed for the entireness of a man, both body and soul, with the faculties and parts of each;—and another perfection *accessory* as it were, and *attached* to certain individuals only; and in this view, learning, beauty, and things of that description, contribute to a man's perfection, being an ornament to either body or soul. Admitting however all this, we must nevertheless affirm, that Bellarmine has fallen into a great mistake in his application of this view to his argument. For should it be allowed that a Christian may be regarded as possessing a perfection of two kinds, we

* *De Monach.* lib. 2. cap. 12.

cannot admit, that the perfection necessary to a Christian's *existence*, by which he becomes a child of God and an heir of the kingdom, is founded on the keeping of the commandments. For that necessary and essential perfection, which confers *existence* on a Christian, and imparts a *right* to an inheritance in glory, is founded on union with Christ, and that grace of the regenerating Spirit, which accompanies this union. He therefore who is implanted into Christ, and is endued with faith, hope, and love, does already possess the perfection necessary for *existence* as a Christian, even though in many respects he fall short in his observance of the commandments. And Aquinas himself has admitted this when he says,* that *grace imparts to the soul of the Christian its spiritual and divine existence.*

This then is Bellarmine's first mistake in conducting his argument, that he ascribes to the operation of man that perfection of the Christian which is necessary to his *existence* as such; whereas he ought to have derived it from Divine operation or impartation.

In the next place, it is not an observance of Counsels which is required to place a man in *a good state* as a Christian; but the being made a partaker in more excellent gifts and more abundant grace; and, as a consequence of this larger measure of grace, a greater and more entire observance of the commands of God. For Abraham, Isaac, Job, David, and other eminently holy men, were possessed of that degree of perfection necessary as well to a *good* state, as to mere *existence;* and yet they never laid themselves under any obligation to observe Counsels. In short, such as do possess the former degree of perfection, necessary to constitute existence as a Christian; or the latter, which we consider as conducive to his *well-being*, yet attain not to a completeness in legal righteousness; and consequently neither in the one case, nor the other, can any claim be made of having entirely fulfilled the law; much less of having done more than its demands required. I cannot but subjoin that most correct sentiment of Augustine, that *The virtue which in this life exists in a righteous man, may be denominated perfect, with this understanding, that*

* Quæst. disp. *de virtut. in comm.* art. 2. resp. ad 21.

*both an unfeigned sense and an humble acknowledgment of imperfection itself be considered as forming a part of his perfection: Contra duas Epistolas Pelag.* lib. 3. cap. 7. [§. 19].

2. I proceed to consider Bellarmine's other argument deduced from political arrangements; it is to this effect: *In all well ordered States, besides rewards and penalties established both for the sake of observers and transgressors of the laws, there are also peculiar rewards adjudged to heroic exploits: and in a similar way, besides the promise of eternal life made to such as keep the law, there are also peculiar honours destined for such as do not merely observe God's law, but moreover exhibit heroic virtues.*

In this argument Bellarmine commits several errors: In the first place, he takes for granted, that men are universally justified, and obtain eternal life, by the observance of the law; whereas since Adam fell, no one could ever be justified in the sight of God through the law; as Ambrose has correctly remarked: *We are not justified by works, but by faith, seeing that the weakness of the flesh is an obstacle to the performance of works;* lib. 2. *de Jacob. et vita beata,* cap. 2.

In the next place, Bellarmine is also mistaken in supposing that individuals, endowed with heroic virtues, have power not merely to observe the law of God, but to go beyond the perfection which it requires. For although the degree of Divine favour, and the measure of infused graces may differ, no one of the best endowed will be found acting commensurately with the demands of the law of God.

Again, he is inaccurate in inferring the doctrine of supererogation from the existence of heroic virtues. For as no man possesses them but as gifts from God, and no one can exercise them, but by aid from the same source—even supposing any man to perform any act beyond the ordinary measure of other men, there is nevertheless no supererogation with God, seeing that in such cases more had been *received*, than among the generality, both in endowments and assistance.

Lastly; the doctrine of supererogation does not follow from the fact that some receive the reward of higher honour than others. For God confers greater rewards of glory in

the life to come, on those to whom he has given in this life a larger measure of grace. In both I perceive the overflowing or superabundant goodness of God; in neither any supererogatory righteousness on the part of man.

And here we will close the present discussion. We will next proceed to the second of the two propositions which we laid down (chapter 39) in reference to the perfection of good works.

## Addition to Note pp. 207, 208.

Michaelis seems rather to approve of the turn given to Prov. xviii. 17; and it is so quoted by *Ignatius*, Epist. ad *Magnes*, § 12. But Rosenmüller argues that the original will not bear that interpretation.

## Page 446.

Whilst occupied on the preceding pages, the Translator, having obtained from a friend, distinguished in the literary world, the account of the character brought forwards on the page above specified, was desirous of procuring some information relative to the *Maziques* mentioned near the close of the sketch. After enquiring in several quarters, another friend supplied him with the information, which, while it enabled him, sufficiently for his purpose, to describe the parties enquired after, has since appeared to him so valuable in other respects that though its insertion was no farther essential to his object or the scope of the work, he has thought it ought not to be withheld.

The Mazices (called also Mazyges, Maxyes, and Magaces, and by the French writers Maziques,) occupied a part of Mauritania; about the heart of the modern Algiers, southward of the sources of the river Chinalaph or Shellif, and between that stream and the small river Midroc, which falls into it.—(See Smith's or Eton Ancient Maps, lat. 35¼. N., long. 1½, or 2. E.)

Lucan, in his *Pharsalia*, 4.680, when enumerating some African nations, says,—

> ..... Æquaturusque sagittas
> Medorum, tremulum cum torsit missite. *Mazax.*

Where the commentators have inaccurately confused it with a perfectly different place, Mazaca in Cappadocia. It is probable that these Mazices are meant by Suetonius when he mentions a great number "*Mazucum*" attending on Nero on his journeys (Nero, § 30).—Strabo does not make any mention of these Mazices. Nor do we find in the Greek Ecclesiastical Historians, nor in Fleury, nor in the Magdeburg Centuriators, any reference to the destruction of the Monasteries of Petra or of Scitis in the fourth century.—Philostorgius, in his account of the latter part of the century, describes them as ravaging the neighbouring countries. After relating the progress of the Huns into Cilicia and Cœlo Syria, he adds:—Οὐ μόνον δὲ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Μάζικες καὶ Ἀυξωριανοὶ· κ. τ. λ. — "Not only so; but the Mazices also and the Auxoriani, who live between Lybia and the Afri, devastated Lybia, eastward of their own country, and brought to ruin no small portion of Egypt; and having proceeded westward and invaded the Afri, they there committed similar devastation."—(Philostor. Bk. 11. § 8.) It is probable that when thus invading Egypt they destroyed the Monastery of Scitis:—and it is possible that they may, on that occasion, have gone so far eastward as into Arabia, so as to destroy Petra likewise.

At a later date Evagrius mentions the Mazices incidentally, in a manner which shews them to have been a fierce people, and opposed to Christianity.—He is describing the banishment of Nestorius to Oasis, or Ibis, in Egypt; or rather quoting from an Epistle of Nestorius on the subject of the capture and destruction of that place by the Blemmines, (an African race bordering on the Numidians):—these, he says, most astonishingly took compassion on them,

and instead of fulfilling the threats of destruction which they had uttered, urged them to escape to Thebais, ὡς Μαζίκων αὐλὴν μετ' αὐλοῦς ἀμελλητὶ παραληχομενην "on the ground that the Mazices would immediately take possession of Oasis after them,"—implying, it would seem, that these Mazices were more bitter enemies to the Christians than themselves.

Another friend sent me the following passage from Stephen of Byzantium—Μαζυες· οἱ Λιβύης νομάδες — Ἑκαταῖος περιηγησει. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι Μαξυες, καὶ ἕτεροι Μάχμες.

Page 488.

If the reader should wish further information respecting the Essenes mentioned on p. 488, he will find some able, and pertinent well-timed remarks in Mr. Taylor's Natural History of Enthusiasm, pp. 202—5, &c.; or still more so in *Ancient Christianity*, vol. i. pp. 519—22, and *Supplement*, vol. ii. p. 62. He may be referred also to Prideaux's *Connexion*.

T. RAGG AND CO., PRINTERS, SPICEAL-STREET, BIRMINGHAM.


5856
Davenant, John
AUTHOR
On justification
TITLE
234.7E
D271E
V.1
C.2
DATE LOANED
BORROWER'S NAME
DATE RETURNED

234.7 E
D 271E
v. 1
c. 2

5856